From the Gulf of Tonkin to the Baltic Sea. Seymour Hersh

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Idlib Earthquake Aid Hijacked by Terrorists

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What Will Happen When Banks Go Bust? Bank Runs, Bail-Ins and Systemic Risk

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Terror-supporting MK compares settler arson to Kristallnacht

MK who was a close advisor and confidant to Yasser Arafat compares Jewish settlers to Nazis; doesn’t mention widespread Palestinian celebrations after deadly terror attack on Sunday.

By Adina Katz, World Israel News

An MK who has repeatedly supported and justified Palestinian terror attacks against Jews compared the riots in Huwara, following a deadly terror attack, to Kristallnacht.

In a tweet on late Sunday evening, Ahmad Tibi of the Arab Joint List party posted a picture of cars burning in a junkyard with the caption “Kristallnacht in Huwara” written in English, Hebrew, and Arabic.

ליל בדולח בחיווארה
Kristallnacht in Huwara
ليل البلور في حوارة pic.twitter.com/Bb9Np1jsv9

— Ahmad Tibi (@Ahmad_tibi) February 26, 2023

Kristallnacht, which occurred in Nazi Germany in 1938, is widely perceived as the catalyst for the Holocaust. On that night, mobs rampaged through Jewish neighborhoods in multiple cities across Germany and modern-day Austria, looting and destroying Jewish businesses and attacking Jews. At least 91 Jews were killed on Kristallnacht.

Unlike Kristallnacht, which saw innocent Jewish civilians attacked for no discernible reason, the rioting within Huwara occurred after two Jewish brothers were murdered in the town, and following a month in which an additional 11 people were killed by Palestinian terrorists.

Shortly after the deadly attack on Sunday, Palestinians handed out sweets and candies to celebrate the murders.

Tibi’s condemnation of settler violence in response to the murder of two brothers, who were shot in an unprovoked attack at point-blank range, is notable when considering his long history of remarks praising terrorists who murder Jewish civilians.

He was a close advisor and confidant to PLO Chair Yasser Arafat, who was directly involved in the planning and executing of terror attacks.

Lawmakers from right-wing parties and Zionist NGOs have tried multiple times to have Tibi disqualified from serving in the Knesset due to his support for terror, but to no avail.

“May God have mercy on the martyrs,” Tibi wrote on Twitter in February 2022, after three terrorists who fired at IDF soldiers were killed by security forces.

In May 2022, Tibi leveraged his parliamentary immunity to help an Arab suspect escape arrest in eastern Jerusalem, in an incident which saw him physically tussle with police officers.

“Any other citizen, if he had not been a Knesset member, would have been arrested this afternoon and handcuffed for questioning after doing what MK Tibi did,” a source at the scene told Channel 12 News.

In January 2022, Tibi visited a convicted hunger-striking Islamic Jihad terrorist in the hospital. Tibi, who is a physician, wrote on his Facebook page that he had come “out of great concern” for the terrorist’s health, adding that he was “in talks” to see him released.

“We want him to be alive and free, at home with his family and children,” he wrote.

During a January 2012 speech, Tibi said that “there is nothing more praiseworthy than those who die for the homeland,” while referring to suicide bombers, whom he called “martyrs.”

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US Sends Troops to Taiwan After General Threatens War with China by 2025

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Israeli Rampage on West Bank Village Leaves One Dead, 390 Injured, 75 Burnt Homes

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Russia’s Ukraine Offensive in Suspended Animation

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Alexei Navalny’s Support in the North Caucasus: More About Corruption Than Navalny

On February 20, Ruslan Ablyakimov was walking in Makhachkala, the capital of Dagestan, with two friends when he was stopped by six young men who proceeded to beat him. “Where did you come here from?” they asked, “You are from Moscow, right? What are you doing here?” Before the men left Ablyakimov, they told him, “You have until tomorrow to get out of here” (Meduza, February 20).

Why did these men choose Ablyakimov to beat up? The answer is straightforward: he was the coordinator of the new Navalny Regional Headquarters in Makhachkala. Following this violent event, Ablyakimov complained that he could not find any space to rent for the headquarters, and he ultimately left Dagestan. He promised that this did not mean the headquarters would not open eventually; but its future is uncertain (Kavkazsky Uzel, February 22).

Authorities in Dagestan have not been friendly to supporters of Russian opposition leader and anti-corruption crusader Alexei Navalny in recent months. In late January, protests erupted across Russia, including, on a small scale, in Makhachkala. On January 21, a lone protester was detained by the police with his sign that read “Freedom for Navalny/Freedom for political prisoners” (Kavkaz Realii, January 21). Two days later, over 40 protesters were arrested, including students, in the center of Makhachkala, a city of about half a million (Kavkaz Realii, January 23).

According to journalist Magomed Magomedov, there are two groups of Navalny supporters in Dagestan. The majority of them support his anti-corruption efforts but do not necessarily share his political views; the rest are those who would like to see Navalny as president (Kavkazsky Uzel, January 21). Neither of these groups are particularly large, and videos of protests in Makhachkala show only a small crowd—tens, not hundreds (Kavkaz Realii, January 23).

These protests, which occurred all across Russia, took on a different meaning in the North Caucasus. Indeed, in Makhachkala, protesters frequently distanced themselves from Navalny and said that their actions were in response to dissatisfaction with the authorities in general (Kavkazsky Uzel, February 1). While protests against corruption in the North Caucasus are not an everyday occurrence, there is precedent. In 2017, a few hundred demonstrators came out to support Navalny’s anti-corruption message (Kavkazsky Uzel, June 12, 2017).  Earlier, in October 2011, hundreds protested corruption in Makhachkala itself (see EDM, October 12, 2011).

Still, support and turnout for the Navalny protests in particular was low in the region (Kavkazsky Uzel, January 21). So why were authorities so quick to arrest protesters and reticent to allow these actions in the first place? What threat did they perceive? The answer lies not in Makhachkala, but in Moscow. The authorities in the North Caucasus understood that to allow these rallies to move forward would not align with Moscow’s directives to quash any Navalny-related activity, however small the demonstrations may be (Kavkazsky Uzel, January 21). And in the North Caucasus, alignment with Moscow is often vital for regional elites to maintain their power and privilege. Both economically and administratively, Moscow pulls many strings in the region, by appointing outsider governors like Dagestan’s Sergei Melikov and by ordering financial policy in republics like Ingushetia (see EDM, November 16, 2020). In 2014, subsidies to the North Caucasus Republics were all higher per capita than the average in Russia with the exception of Stavropol Krai (Edward C. Holland, “Economic Development and Subsidies in the North Caucasus,” Problems of Post-Communism, December 2015).

The hard line on even limited protests in Makhachkala suggests that any open displays of discontent in opposition to Moscow’s official stance will not be tolerated in Dagestan. At the same time, this implies that Alexei Navalny is likely not the man to mobilize the masses in the North Caucasus, even though some citizens there are sympathetic to his anti-corruption campaign.

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Georgia, Lithuania Call for Permanent US Troop Presences

The foreign and security policy expert communities in Georgia (Neweurope.eu, November 17) as well as both the outgoing and candidate Lithuanian defense ministers (LRT, November 16, 19) have called for a permanent presence of United States military forces in their respective countries. These calls indicate a hope that the incoming administration of President-elect Joseph Biden will bring greater attention to security on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastern flank.

In addition to the results of the US presidential election, this summer’s announcement that thousands of US troops would be moved out of Germany, with some being re-stationed elsewhere, led to a small bidding war for some of those military units. Poland, as the result of signing the Joint Declaration on Defense Cooperation ratified in August, will receive an additional 1,000 US troops to the current 4,500 rotational forces, plus a further 200 soldiers as part of the newly established V Corps Forward Command Center (see EDM, June 29). Moreover, rotational presences will be deployed to other countries along NATO’s eastern and southeastern flanks (Crsreports.congress.gov, August 4). Latvian Defense Minister Artis Pabriks expressed Latvia’s wish—and willingness to pay—for a US troop presence in his country, either on a rotational or permanent basis (Leta.lv, July 11; Lsm.lv, September 9). Pabriks had previously expressed excitement at the prospect of US troops more frequently operating in Latvia if they are stationed in Poland (Lsm.lv, June 26). Estonia, on the other hand, has only emphasized the role US troops play as “a cornerstone of European security” since the troop withdrawal and re-stationing from Germany was announced (ERR, June 18, July 30, November 29). Georgia and Lithuania are just the most recent states trying to capitalize on a potential shift in the US’s defense posture in Europe.

Prospects for a more robust US military presence are much stronger in the case of Lithuania than Georgia. Lithuania, a NATO member, is currently home to a NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) multinational battalion in Rukla, between Kaunas and Vilnius, plus a six-month deployment of 500 US troops, starting this past October (Nato.int, accessed November 27; Reuters, September 25). On the other hand, Georgia, a NATO Partner for Peace since 1994—which was promised eventual membership at the 2008 Bucharest Summit but has yet to even receive a Membership Action Plan (MAP)—only benefits from a training center and troops during exercises, despite 77 percent of Georgians supporting European Union accession and 74 percent supporting NATO accession. Moreover, Georgia has long contributed to NATO’s Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan and Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean (Mod.gov.ge, September 18; Nato.int, March 18, 2019 and October 21, 2020; Ndi.org, May 28, 2019).

Russian aggression is also a contributing factor, and both Georgia and the Baltics have been particularly concerned about their level of security since the 2014 invasion of Ukraine. With the Karabakh peace deal further increasing Russia’s military presence in the South Caucasus, Georgia is wary of more “peacekeepers” arriving to the region. Georgia knows better than most that Russian peacekeepers can eventually transform into invading forces.

In the Baltics, Lithuania holds a special status in terms of strategic importance. Lithuania’s border with Poland forms the so-called Suwałki Corridor, which runs between the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and Belarus. Security expert Jacek Bartosiak, in his interview on The Jamestown Foundation’s first episode of the Eastern Approaches webinar series, highlighted three main security issues for Lithuania and the Suwałki Corridor. First, this 65-kilometer strip of land contains the only two main roads on which NATO forces (other than the Baltic eFPs) could reach the Baltic States from Poland (only one of these roadways is sufficiently developed for troop mobility). Both routes, which go to Vilnius and Kaunas respectively, are vulnerable to rapid projections of military power from Grodno in Belarus and from Kaliningrad. The situation in Belarus has brought about greater Russian military activity, with a more permanent Russian presence potentially on the horizon (see EDM, September 17, October 20, 22). Kaliningrad, which is surrounded by NATO members, has undergone rapid military modernization over the past few years, including the development of a layered Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) system and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities (see EDM, February 23, 2018, December 11, 2018, January 17, 2019, April 1, 2020). Second, the Baltic States have vulnerable eastern and western flanks: the east is sparsely populated with Russian speakers, leaving it more vulnerable to information warfare and slow mobilization, while the west is open to naval and amphibious attacks through the many ports and beaches. Third, the geography of Lithuania is ideal for tank warfare but not for the use of Javelin anti-tank missiles; this issue is compounded by the inadequacy of armored NATO forces as part of the eFP battalions and the positioning of the NATO base at Rukla, which leaves the entire countryside vulnerable in the event of a Russian invasion (see Eastern Approaches, July 17).

The geographic compactness of the Baltics heightens the risk each vulnerability poses. Other than Lithuania and the Suwałki Corridor, Riga, which some consider the center of gravity for Baltic security (see Eastern Approaches, July 17), and the Estonian island of Saaremaa, whose location allows for control of this sector of the Baltic Sea, are the most exposed in the event of invasion (see Eastern Approaches, September 25).

Georgia’s location on the eastern coast of the Black Sea proves the country’s strategic importance twofold. First, Georgia helps limit Russia’s presence on the Black Sea, working in tandem with NATO members Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey and NATO partner Ukraine (see EDM, February 4). The Black Sea is becoming increasingly important due to energy and goods transit, in addition to bordering Russian-occupied Abkhazia and Crimea. Second, Georgia plays a key role in the Caspian–Black Sea transit corridor as the central stop of the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway and the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan and South Caucasus pipelines (see EDM, July 30). As a defense partner, Georgia has consistently stood by the West in Afghanistan, providing 20,000 troops to Resolute Support Mission since 2010, the most of any non-NATO country and more than many Alliance members (Nato.int, February 2020; State.gov, June 16). Georgian troops also participate in the annual Joint Noble and Agile Spirit exercises with the US.

Georgia, Lithuania and the other countries that have asked for a permanent US presence have clearly been motivated to speak up by the controversial decision to move troops out of Germany. And yet even opponents of the new basing decisions admit that Germany is a logistics and command hub, not the frontline (see Jamestown.org, August 18).

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US Messaging to Russian Citizens: Time to Step It Up?

In the first week of August, cellphones across Russia lit up with surprising text messages. They came from different numbers, but each said the same thing in Russian: “The US State Department is offering up to $10 million for information about interference in the US elections. If you have information, contact rfj.tips/bngc.” The State Department confirmed the messages were authentic (TV Rain, August 6). They came from the department’s “Rewards for Justice Program,” which had just expanded from hunting terrorists to tracking election interference.

Russian authorities ridiculed the messages. But their reaction suggested they saw something more sinister. “By offering money to talk about interference in American elections, American intelligence is blatantly interfering in our life,” declared Maria Zakharova, spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “What is this, if not the most real kind of hybrid attack?” (Vedomosti, August 6).

Zakharova’s reference to hybrid warfare suggested that Russian officials were paying as much attention to the medium as to the message. They undoubtedly realized the potential of the United States deciding to reach out to individual Russians so directly. In the future, US messages might not be about American elections, but about Russian foreign policy or internal conditions.

As it readies its policy toward Russia, the incoming Joseph Biden administration will need to decide whether to let Vladimir Putin’s government be its sole interlocutor in Russia, or if it will regularly go beyond the Kremlin to communicate directly to the Russian population.

In recent years, US government agencies have hesitated about messaging campaigns to Russian citizens. Several proposals have been considered but set aside. The reasons for pulling back ranged from a fear that such messaging would be too provocative to a belief it would have little effect given the power of Putin’s internal propaganda. At the same time, online platforms like YouTube and social networks offer access to Russian citizens as never before. “In an age of openness, we’ve stopped trying to communicate with the Russian people,” says Peter Pomerantsev, the British specialist on Russia and the information war. “The opportunities are just there to be seized” (see Jamestown.org, October 23).

Of course, two US government-financed broadcasting networks—Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America—have been speaking to Russian citizens for decades. They have never shied away from talking about internal conditions in Russia or the costs of its foreign adventures. Under the law, however, the broadcasters enjoy editorial independence. They cannot be harnessed to convey specific messages or told to turn up or reduce the heat on an adversary. If the new administration wants to communicate to Russians in a way that is precisely calibrated with its policy goals, it will need to develop its own messaging tools and doctrine.

Many US officials and analysts are wary of anything that looks like a US government “propaganda offensive” to Russia. They ask what such messages would even look like. If they bore the brands of US government agencies, they say, Russians would view them with contempt. If they were unattributed—not revealing where they came from—their source would likely be exposed anyhow. Then the US would be accused of descending to the same level as Russian covert information operators. (The nature of the August text messages suggested they came from US authorities, but they were not signed.)

Others, however, believe stepped-up communication to Russians is not only reasonable but essential. Dmitri Teperik of Estonia’s International Center for Defense and Security calls for a “ruthless projection of truth” to Putin’s people (Icds.ee, June 8, 2020). Such an effort might even add stability to the US-Russian relationship by establishing a balance of information power. Especially with a new administration that is highly aware of Russian operations, the United States cannot indefinitely tolerate Russia assaulting the US information space with impunity. Unless Washington develops a concept and capability for response, US frustration over Russian provocations could boil over into an overreaction that could escalate beyond the information realm.

During the 2018 midterm elections, US Cyber Command launched an electronic strike on Russia’s Internet Research Agency, a major troll farm, and briefly cut it off from the internet. (see EDM, February 27, 2019). Writing after that action, Benjamin Jensen and Brandon Valeriano of Marine Corps University said, “It’s valuable for the US to introduce friction against enemies who seek to harm the American way of life. But it’s equally important to consider the potential for escalation to more widely harmful forms of conflict. […] Quick wins, like shutting down a troll factory for a few days, could produce much bigger longer-term consequences in a connected world” (Navy Times, March 13, 2019).

US messaging to Russia, as a response to Russian messaging to the US, would be more symmetrical than a cyber strike and present less chance of a spillover to other domains. Any new campaign should be based on a coherent US policy toward the Kremlin, which the new administration is drafting now. Then, depending on how US-Russian relations evolve in the first part of the Biden administration, US messaging could be targeted to whatever goals policymakers found appropriate.

These could include:

Inflaming popular discontent in Russia, already on the rise, with the goal of sparking a “color revolution” that would bring down Putin’s regime.
Encouraging incremental change in Russia through pressure for basic freedoms and against adventurism abroad.
Improving Russians’ view of the United States by “telling America’s story” more effectively.
Demonstrating that the US, too, has “information teeth,” and can penetrate Russia’s own information environment if Kremlin operations cross red lines.
Simply creating new, well-promoted communication channels for the day they may suddenly be needed for urgent messaging.

Any hope that Western messaging to the general Russian population can chase Putin from office is probably fanciful. Should he fall from power, the impetus could well come not from ordinary people, but from a decision by Kremlin powerbrokers that his policies have outlived their usefulness.

If the goal is more incremental change in Russia, increased communication from the United States and its allies could play a role. A growing number of Russians already see the West as a potential friend or partner, and are unenthusiastic about seizing other countries’ territory (Levada, May 6, 2019 and February 28, 2020; Thechicagocouncil.org, April 3, 2019). “I wonder how many Russians, as opposed to what the Kremlin wants, want to actually be a normal European country in the international community,” asks Pomerantsev. “Can we start […] a broader dialogue with the Russian population about how they see Russia’s role in the world? Is it the same as the role the Kremlin has given them, which is these rogue pariahs?” (see Jamestown.org, October 23, 2020). US messaging might also be designed to aid and amplify Russia’s own liberal-minded independent journalists, social influencers and civil society. They have been courageous advocates for basic freedoms at home and constructive policies abroad.

Since much of Putin’s legitimacy rests on his being a bulwark against the West, US messaging should seek to improve Russians’ view of the United States. The goal would not be to whitewash the US’s failings, but to recognize its successes and demonstrate that few Americans have any interest in invading or humiliating Russia. The most effective communications will probably not consist of quoting US officials. More convincing voices might be those of US celebrities known in Russia, and recent Russian emigrants who have forged rewarding lives in the United States. However, Biden himself should consider an early address to the Russian people. It can be on YouTube if Putin will not grant him the appearances on Russian television that the Soviet Union allowed Ronald Reagan in 1986 and Margaret Thatcher in 1987 (Margaretthatcher.org, March 31, 1987; Reaganlibrary.gov, January 1, 1986). Such a speech would demonstrate to Russians that Biden sees them not just as disciples of their president, but as a people with their own dignity and agency.

Demonstrating “information teeth” would not aim to change anything inside Russia in the short term. Rather, the United States and its allies could launch small demonstration campaigns with political or non-political content, just to make clear they have the tools and social insight to affect Russian attitudes if they so choose. Such demonstrations would be the cognitive equivalent of the US government’s reported placement of potentially crippling software inside the Russian electrical grid, designed to be visible to the Russians as a signal of what the US is capable of (The New York Times, June 15, 2019).

As for establishing new channels to reach Russia’s population, failing to do so seems almost irresponsible—especially when Russia runs a 24-hour television channel visible across the United States, and AM and FM radio stations in Washington and Kansas City. If the United States government must suddenly reach the Russian people in an urgent situation, it cannot start building social accounts and websites at that moment. It makes sense to establish a panoply of sites and accounts now with a wide variety of content, and work to build audiences for the day they are needed. US branding is not necessarily a dealbreaker; at the very least, the United States is a constant subject of Russian curiosity.

Many of the tactics above can be implemented by a wide variety of actors. A growing number of non-governmental pro-democracy groups have appeared in recent years that have broad experience with social network campaigns and websites. Several are located in former Soviet-bloc countries, meaning they can work easily in Russian. Small amounts of US support could encourage them to engage Russian citizens, each group using themes it develops on its own.

Policy papers often imagine the United States “working closely with allies” on information strategies against Russia. Such cooperation may well founder on those governments’ reluctance to stand up to the Kremlin—for reasons of domestic politics, fear of Russian retaliation or an aversion to “doing propaganda.” Non-governmental activists have fewer such concerns. They also tend to be more creative and nimble than government departments.

A potential obstacle to messaging to Russia is the possibility that the Kremlin could close off its internet to content originating abroad. In May 2019, Putin signed a law that would allow authorities to disconnect the so-called Runet from the rest of the world in extreme situations. This project is technically problematic and may never succeed. However, even if the ultimate “cutoff switch” never appears, the Kremlin will likely develop some new barriers to foreign web and social network penetration (see EDM, June 23, 2016, March 27, 2018, February 27, 2019).

For this reason, any strategy to communicate with Russian citizens must include alternative technical options. Text messages are a simple possibility. Email, if allowed by the “cutoff switch,” can carry text and video attachments. Russians likely would become more adept at using VPNs and proxies to reach foreign destinations. A cutoff of foreign content would also raise the importance of Russia’s own independent journalists, social influencers and civil society—whom the West would do well to encourage now.

As the US looks for new responses to Russian information violence, there will likely be more pressure to shoot not only the arrow but the archer—not only to protect our own populations from Russian disinformation, but to respond with information tools directed at Russia’s own population. Strategies for the Biden administration must be built on a clear consensus of what such actions would aim to accomplish and the best tools to do the job.

 

Thomas Kent, a former president of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, teaches about disinformation and Russian affairs at Columbia University’s Harriman Institute. This article is based in part on his new book published by Jamestown, Striking Back: Overt and Covert Options to Combat Russian Disinformation, and on an October 23 Jamestown webinar with Kent and Pomerantsev on communicating to Russians.

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