Georgia, Lithuania Call for Permanent US Troop Presences

The foreign and security policy expert communities in Georgia (Neweurope.eu, November 17) as well as both the outgoing and candidate Lithuanian defense ministers (LRT, November 16, 19) have called for a permanent presence of United States military forces in their respective countries. These calls indicate a hope that the incoming administration of President-elect Joseph Biden will bring greater attention to security on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastern flank.

In addition to the results of the US presidential election, this summer’s announcement that thousands of US troops would be moved out of Germany, with some being re-stationed elsewhere, led to a small bidding war for some of those military units. Poland, as the result of signing the Joint Declaration on Defense Cooperation ratified in August, will receive an additional 1,000 US troops to the current 4,500 rotational forces, plus a further 200 soldiers as part of the newly established V Corps Forward Command Center (see EDM, June 29). Moreover, rotational presences will be deployed to other countries along NATO’s eastern and southeastern flanks (Crsreports.congress.gov, August 4). Latvian Defense Minister Artis Pabriks expressed Latvia’s wish—and willingness to pay—for a US troop presence in his country, either on a rotational or permanent basis (Leta.lv, July 11; Lsm.lv, September 9). Pabriks had previously expressed excitement at the prospect of US troops more frequently operating in Latvia if they are stationed in Poland (Lsm.lv, June 26). Estonia, on the other hand, has only emphasized the role US troops play as “a cornerstone of European security” since the troop withdrawal and re-stationing from Germany was announced (ERR, June 18, July 30, November 29). Georgia and Lithuania are just the most recent states trying to capitalize on a potential shift in the US’s defense posture in Europe.

Prospects for a more robust US military presence are much stronger in the case of Lithuania than Georgia. Lithuania, a NATO member, is currently home to a NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) multinational battalion in Rukla, between Kaunas and Vilnius, plus a six-month deployment of 500 US troops, starting this past October (Nato.int, accessed November 27; Reuters, September 25). On the other hand, Georgia, a NATO Partner for Peace since 1994—which was promised eventual membership at the 2008 Bucharest Summit but has yet to even receive a Membership Action Plan (MAP)—only benefits from a training center and troops during exercises, despite 77 percent of Georgians supporting European Union accession and 74 percent supporting NATO accession. Moreover, Georgia has long contributed to NATO’s Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan and Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean (Mod.gov.ge, September 18; Nato.int, March 18, 2019 and October 21, 2020; Ndi.org, May 28, 2019).

Russian aggression is also a contributing factor, and both Georgia and the Baltics have been particularly concerned about their level of security since the 2014 invasion of Ukraine. With the Karabakh peace deal further increasing Russia’s military presence in the South Caucasus, Georgia is wary of more “peacekeepers” arriving to the region. Georgia knows better than most that Russian peacekeepers can eventually transform into invading forces.

In the Baltics, Lithuania holds a special status in terms of strategic importance. Lithuania’s border with Poland forms the so-called Suwałki Corridor, which runs between the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and Belarus. Security expert Jacek Bartosiak, in his interview on The Jamestown Foundation’s first episode of the Eastern Approaches webinar series, highlighted three main security issues for Lithuania and the Suwałki Corridor. First, this 65-kilometer strip of land contains the only two main roads on which NATO forces (other than the Baltic eFPs) could reach the Baltic States from Poland (only one of these roadways is sufficiently developed for troop mobility). Both routes, which go to Vilnius and Kaunas respectively, are vulnerable to rapid projections of military power from Grodno in Belarus and from Kaliningrad. The situation in Belarus has brought about greater Russian military activity, with a more permanent Russian presence potentially on the horizon (see EDM, September 17, October 20, 22). Kaliningrad, which is surrounded by NATO members, has undergone rapid military modernization over the past few years, including the development of a layered Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) system and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities (see EDM, February 23, 2018, December 11, 2018, January 17, 2019, April 1, 2020). Second, the Baltic States have vulnerable eastern and western flanks: the east is sparsely populated with Russian speakers, leaving it more vulnerable to information warfare and slow mobilization, while the west is open to naval and amphibious attacks through the many ports and beaches. Third, the geography of Lithuania is ideal for tank warfare but not for the use of Javelin anti-tank missiles; this issue is compounded by the inadequacy of armored NATO forces as part of the eFP battalions and the positioning of the NATO base at Rukla, which leaves the entire countryside vulnerable in the event of a Russian invasion (see Eastern Approaches, July 17).

The geographic compactness of the Baltics heightens the risk each vulnerability poses. Other than Lithuania and the Suwałki Corridor, Riga, which some consider the center of gravity for Baltic security (see Eastern Approaches, July 17), and the Estonian island of Saaremaa, whose location allows for control of this sector of the Baltic Sea, are the most exposed in the event of invasion (see Eastern Approaches, September 25).

Georgia’s location on the eastern coast of the Black Sea proves the country’s strategic importance twofold. First, Georgia helps limit Russia’s presence on the Black Sea, working in tandem with NATO members Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey and NATO partner Ukraine (see EDM, February 4). The Black Sea is becoming increasingly important due to energy and goods transit, in addition to bordering Russian-occupied Abkhazia and Crimea. Second, Georgia plays a key role in the Caspian–Black Sea transit corridor as the central stop of the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway and the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan and South Caucasus pipelines (see EDM, July 30). As a defense partner, Georgia has consistently stood by the West in Afghanistan, providing 20,000 troops to Resolute Support Mission since 2010, the most of any non-NATO country and more than many Alliance members (Nato.int, February 2020; State.gov, June 16). Georgian troops also participate in the annual Joint Noble and Agile Spirit exercises with the US.

Georgia, Lithuania and the other countries that have asked for a permanent US presence have clearly been motivated to speak up by the controversial decision to move troops out of Germany. And yet even opponents of the new basing decisions admit that Germany is a logistics and command hub, not the frontline (see Jamestown.org, August 18).

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US Messaging to Russian Citizens: Time to Step It Up?

In the first week of August, cellphones across Russia lit up with surprising text messages. They came from different numbers, but each said the same thing in Russian: “The US State Department is offering up to $10 million for information about interference in the US elections. If you have information, contact rfj.tips/bngc.” The State Department confirmed the messages were authentic (TV Rain, August 6). They came from the department’s “Rewards for Justice Program,” which had just expanded from hunting terrorists to tracking election interference.

Russian authorities ridiculed the messages. But their reaction suggested they saw something more sinister. “By offering money to talk about interference in American elections, American intelligence is blatantly interfering in our life,” declared Maria Zakharova, spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “What is this, if not the most real kind of hybrid attack?” (Vedomosti, August 6).

Zakharova’s reference to hybrid warfare suggested that Russian officials were paying as much attention to the medium as to the message. They undoubtedly realized the potential of the United States deciding to reach out to individual Russians so directly. In the future, US messages might not be about American elections, but about Russian foreign policy or internal conditions.

As it readies its policy toward Russia, the incoming Joseph Biden administration will need to decide whether to let Vladimir Putin’s government be its sole interlocutor in Russia, or if it will regularly go beyond the Kremlin to communicate directly to the Russian population.

In recent years, US government agencies have hesitated about messaging campaigns to Russian citizens. Several proposals have been considered but set aside. The reasons for pulling back ranged from a fear that such messaging would be too provocative to a belief it would have little effect given the power of Putin’s internal propaganda. At the same time, online platforms like YouTube and social networks offer access to Russian citizens as never before. “In an age of openness, we’ve stopped trying to communicate with the Russian people,” says Peter Pomerantsev, the British specialist on Russia and the information war. “The opportunities are just there to be seized” (see Jamestown.org, October 23).

Of course, two US government-financed broadcasting networks—Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America—have been speaking to Russian citizens for decades. They have never shied away from talking about internal conditions in Russia or the costs of its foreign adventures. Under the law, however, the broadcasters enjoy editorial independence. They cannot be harnessed to convey specific messages or told to turn up or reduce the heat on an adversary. If the new administration wants to communicate to Russians in a way that is precisely calibrated with its policy goals, it will need to develop its own messaging tools and doctrine.

Many US officials and analysts are wary of anything that looks like a US government “propaganda offensive” to Russia. They ask what such messages would even look like. If they bore the brands of US government agencies, they say, Russians would view them with contempt. If they were unattributed—not revealing where they came from—their source would likely be exposed anyhow. Then the US would be accused of descending to the same level as Russian covert information operators. (The nature of the August text messages suggested they came from US authorities, but they were not signed.)

Others, however, believe stepped-up communication to Russians is not only reasonable but essential. Dmitri Teperik of Estonia’s International Center for Defense and Security calls for a “ruthless projection of truth” to Putin’s people (Icds.ee, June 8, 2020). Such an effort might even add stability to the US-Russian relationship by establishing a balance of information power. Especially with a new administration that is highly aware of Russian operations, the United States cannot indefinitely tolerate Russia assaulting the US information space with impunity. Unless Washington develops a concept and capability for response, US frustration over Russian provocations could boil over into an overreaction that could escalate beyond the information realm.

During the 2018 midterm elections, US Cyber Command launched an electronic strike on Russia’s Internet Research Agency, a major troll farm, and briefly cut it off from the internet. (see EDM, February 27, 2019). Writing after that action, Benjamin Jensen and Brandon Valeriano of Marine Corps University said, “It’s valuable for the US to introduce friction against enemies who seek to harm the American way of life. But it’s equally important to consider the potential for escalation to more widely harmful forms of conflict. […] Quick wins, like shutting down a troll factory for a few days, could produce much bigger longer-term consequences in a connected world” (Navy Times, March 13, 2019).

US messaging to Russia, as a response to Russian messaging to the US, would be more symmetrical than a cyber strike and present less chance of a spillover to other domains. Any new campaign should be based on a coherent US policy toward the Kremlin, which the new administration is drafting now. Then, depending on how US-Russian relations evolve in the first part of the Biden administration, US messaging could be targeted to whatever goals policymakers found appropriate.

These could include:

Inflaming popular discontent in Russia, already on the rise, with the goal of sparking a “color revolution” that would bring down Putin’s regime.
Encouraging incremental change in Russia through pressure for basic freedoms and against adventurism abroad.
Improving Russians’ view of the United States by “telling America’s story” more effectively.
Demonstrating that the US, too, has “information teeth,” and can penetrate Russia’s own information environment if Kremlin operations cross red lines.
Simply creating new, well-promoted communication channels for the day they may suddenly be needed for urgent messaging.

Any hope that Western messaging to the general Russian population can chase Putin from office is probably fanciful. Should he fall from power, the impetus could well come not from ordinary people, but from a decision by Kremlin powerbrokers that his policies have outlived their usefulness.

If the goal is more incremental change in Russia, increased communication from the United States and its allies could play a role. A growing number of Russians already see the West as a potential friend or partner, and are unenthusiastic about seizing other countries’ territory (Levada, May 6, 2019 and February 28, 2020; Thechicagocouncil.org, April 3, 2019). “I wonder how many Russians, as opposed to what the Kremlin wants, want to actually be a normal European country in the international community,” asks Pomerantsev. “Can we start […] a broader dialogue with the Russian population about how they see Russia’s role in the world? Is it the same as the role the Kremlin has given them, which is these rogue pariahs?” (see Jamestown.org, October 23, 2020). US messaging might also be designed to aid and amplify Russia’s own liberal-minded independent journalists, social influencers and civil society. They have been courageous advocates for basic freedoms at home and constructive policies abroad.

Since much of Putin’s legitimacy rests on his being a bulwark against the West, US messaging should seek to improve Russians’ view of the United States. The goal would not be to whitewash the US’s failings, but to recognize its successes and demonstrate that few Americans have any interest in invading or humiliating Russia. The most effective communications will probably not consist of quoting US officials. More convincing voices might be those of US celebrities known in Russia, and recent Russian emigrants who have forged rewarding lives in the United States. However, Biden himself should consider an early address to the Russian people. It can be on YouTube if Putin will not grant him the appearances on Russian television that the Soviet Union allowed Ronald Reagan in 1986 and Margaret Thatcher in 1987 (Margaretthatcher.org, March 31, 1987; Reaganlibrary.gov, January 1, 1986). Such a speech would demonstrate to Russians that Biden sees them not just as disciples of their president, but as a people with their own dignity and agency.

Demonstrating “information teeth” would not aim to change anything inside Russia in the short term. Rather, the United States and its allies could launch small demonstration campaigns with political or non-political content, just to make clear they have the tools and social insight to affect Russian attitudes if they so choose. Such demonstrations would be the cognitive equivalent of the US government’s reported placement of potentially crippling software inside the Russian electrical grid, designed to be visible to the Russians as a signal of what the US is capable of (The New York Times, June 15, 2019).

As for establishing new channels to reach Russia’s population, failing to do so seems almost irresponsible—especially when Russia runs a 24-hour television channel visible across the United States, and AM and FM radio stations in Washington and Kansas City. If the United States government must suddenly reach the Russian people in an urgent situation, it cannot start building social accounts and websites at that moment. It makes sense to establish a panoply of sites and accounts now with a wide variety of content, and work to build audiences for the day they are needed. US branding is not necessarily a dealbreaker; at the very least, the United States is a constant subject of Russian curiosity.

Many of the tactics above can be implemented by a wide variety of actors. A growing number of non-governmental pro-democracy groups have appeared in recent years that have broad experience with social network campaigns and websites. Several are located in former Soviet-bloc countries, meaning they can work easily in Russian. Small amounts of US support could encourage them to engage Russian citizens, each group using themes it develops on its own.

Policy papers often imagine the United States “working closely with allies” on information strategies against Russia. Such cooperation may well founder on those governments’ reluctance to stand up to the Kremlin—for reasons of domestic politics, fear of Russian retaliation or an aversion to “doing propaganda.” Non-governmental activists have fewer such concerns. They also tend to be more creative and nimble than government departments.

A potential obstacle to messaging to Russia is the possibility that the Kremlin could close off its internet to content originating abroad. In May 2019, Putin signed a law that would allow authorities to disconnect the so-called Runet from the rest of the world in extreme situations. This project is technically problematic and may never succeed. However, even if the ultimate “cutoff switch” never appears, the Kremlin will likely develop some new barriers to foreign web and social network penetration (see EDM, June 23, 2016, March 27, 2018, February 27, 2019).

For this reason, any strategy to communicate with Russian citizens must include alternative technical options. Text messages are a simple possibility. Email, if allowed by the “cutoff switch,” can carry text and video attachments. Russians likely would become more adept at using VPNs and proxies to reach foreign destinations. A cutoff of foreign content would also raise the importance of Russia’s own independent journalists, social influencers and civil society—whom the West would do well to encourage now.

As the US looks for new responses to Russian information violence, there will likely be more pressure to shoot not only the arrow but the archer—not only to protect our own populations from Russian disinformation, but to respond with information tools directed at Russia’s own population. Strategies for the Biden administration must be built on a clear consensus of what such actions would aim to accomplish and the best tools to do the job.

 

Thomas Kent, a former president of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, teaches about disinformation and Russian affairs at Columbia University’s Harriman Institute. This article is based in part on his new book published by Jamestown, Striking Back: Overt and Covert Options to Combat Russian Disinformation, and on an October 23 Jamestown webinar with Kent and Pomerantsev on communicating to Russians.

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Former Abkhazian Separatist Official Calls for Joining Russia-Belarus Union State

Recent comments by former vice president of the separatist Georgian region of Abkhazia Valery Arshba indicate a split between the older political elite and the current administration of President Aslan Bzhania (Gazeta-ra.info, October 19; Civil.ge, October 23). Arshba called for the breakaway republic to join the Union State of Russia and Belarus, “without losing [its] sovereignty.”

Arshba himself has a turbulent history in Abkhaz politics. He served two terms as vice president (1995–2005) before being fired by then-president Vladislav Ardzinba, who accused him of supporting a coup (Ekho Kavkaza, August 23, 2018). During his time as vice president, Abkhazia sought an “associate status” with Russia, a vague term that acknowledged that the spheres of cooperation went beyond those defined by the Union State treaty (RFE/RL, October 29, 2001). Additionally, Arshba personally called for a treaty on peace and cessation of hostilities with Tbilisi several times following the Rose Revolution (RFE/RL, January 9, 2004). After a failed bid for the presidency in 2004, he stepped back from the spotlight but has maintained his connections to the top levels of government, currently serving as head of the Abkhaz Olympic Committee (Presidentofabkhazia.org, March 15, 2019).

Arshba’s comments come a few months after some emerging Russian politicians called for the outright annexation of Abkhazia (Jam-news.net, July 8), a call that was condemned by the Abkhazian parliament, discounted on Russian social media and treated warily by Georgians seeking a Kremlin connection. The Abkhazians themselves have not supported full annexation by Russia after the August 2008 War, but public opinions on joining the Union State are not known—a 2014 poll simply asked about “integration with Russia,” not specifying the method of integration (RFE/RL, February 18, 2010; Washington Post, March 20, 2014; Agenda.ge, June 10, 2016). It is worth noting that former president Sergei Bagapsh, whom Arshba backed after dropping out of the 2004 election, previously called for Abkhazia to join the Union State, and the Belarus-Kazakhstan-Russia Customs Union, during his first official visit to Moscow in 2010 (Kavkazsky Uzel, February 17, 2010), although there is no indication this proposal was publicly supported. The suggestions from hardliners in both Abkhazia and Russia contrast greatly with those of Bzhania, who took over from embattled president Raul Khajimba after winning the March elections.

The current Abkhazian de facto president has spoken openly about his desire for an open dialogue with Georgia, both before and after the election, while maintaining that any talks must occur with Abkhazia as an independent state (see EDM, June 15). Based on an interview with Georgian First Channel, the 2018 peace plan—which was proposed by Georgia and swiftly rejected by both Abkhazia and South Ossetia in a decision attributed to their reliance on Moscow—is not off the table for Bzhania (see EDM, April 18, 2018; 1tv.ge, July 9). The main political opposition, led by former presidential candidate and Minister for Economy Adgur Ardzinba, does not actually disagree with his positions regarding Russian citizenship and real estate rights, but its members are much less open toward Georgia (Jam-news.net, October 10).

Georgian politicians appear not to have officially responded to Bzhania’s calls for dialogue since January, prior to his victory (Jam-news.net, January 17; Oc-media.org, September 22). However, Georgia has made other kinds of overtures during the pandemic, such as offering to provide assistance in addition to already available Georgian medical care (Agenda.ge, March 24; Mei.edu, September 28). More recently, on a cultural note, Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili tweeted a video recording to commemorate Abkhaz Language Day (Twitter.com/Zourabichvili_S, October 27). In the recording, she said both sides could work toward the preservation of the Abkhaz language, “regardless of the line of occupation.” The self-proclaimed Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Republic of Abkhazia did not receive these comments favorably, disagreeing with Abkhaz’s status on the UNESCO list of endangered languages and accusing the Georgians of “committing a genocide of the Abkhaz people in 1992–1993” (Apsnypress.info, October 27).

It is difficult to evaluate the actual level of popular support for Arshba’s comments, since no public opinion polls exist concerning Abkhazia’s hypothetical accession to the Union State. With the current political leadership displaying openness toward Georgia, Sukhumi is unlikely to pursue closer ties with Moscow. However, Abkhazian politics is anything but stable, involving contested elections, poisonings, Russian involvement and revolutions; so current policy stances are not reliable indicators of future developments. Considering this, there are two reasons, long-term and extending beyond internal Abkhazian politics, why the so-called Abkhaz Republic will likely not join the Union State nor gain some other formal closer merger with Russia.

First, the Abkhazia-Russia relationship is already closer than contours of integration defined by the (only partially implemented) Union State treaty. Over the past decade, Russia has invested in Abkhazia’s infrastructure, electrical grid and military modernization (see EDM, October 24, 2014, September 25, 2019; Agenda.ge, February 27, 2019). However, the crucial, economically sustaining funds from the Kremlin have been drying up in recent years, a phenomenon only accentuated by the current COVID-19 crisis (Mei.edu, September 28). Despite this close relationship, there are still two major Russian policy goals Bzhania has stymied: he has prevented Abkhazians from being able to gain Russian citizenship and refused to grant the right to buy and own real estate to Russian nationals (see EDM, June 15). The latter point in particular has frustrated Moscow, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov commenting that they “are a little surprised that this problem remains unresolved” (Civil.ge, October 14). Abkhazia’s accession to the Union State would likely bring about a policy shift in these matters; however, conceding on the real estate issue would cause an uproar in Abkhazia, as it would negate decades of public cries against Georgianization and the dilution of Abkhaz power over their homeland.

Second, any further formalizing of the close Abkhazian-Russian ties would complicate the Circassian question. Russia is currently considering merging the Republic of Adygea with Krasnodar Krai in an attempt to reduce the number of North Caucasus republics, causing a great amount of backlash among local Circassians (see EDM, June 16, 2020; Regnum, September 24, 2018). The Abkhaz would likely support the Circassian cause, as they have before: In 2017, Ruslan Gvashev, a Shapsugh activist and Abkhaz war hero, faced prosecution by the Russian government for the “organization of an unauthorized action,” during which he and several other Shapsughs prayed around a tree on the Circassian memorial day of mourning (Chegem.su, September 28, 2017). But Arshba, at the behest of then-President Khajimba, accompanied a presidential envoy to visit Gvashev at his home, where he was carrying on a hunger strike to protest the court’s decision against him, to indicate the Abkhazian government’s support for him. The question then becomes whether the Abkhaz will extend their support beyond territorial boundaries, to topics such as the repatriation of the Circassian diaspora back to their homeland in the Northwest Caucasus.

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IDF floods Samaria with reinforcements in attempt to de-escalate security situation

Following a deadly Palestinian terrorist attack and rioting by Israeli youths, the Israeli military has deployed two back-up battalions as well as Border Police units • Alert level raised for Jerusalem, Gaza border area.

By Yaakov Lappin, JNS

The Israel Defense Forces deployed additional forces in Samaria on Monday in an attempt to de-escalate the deteriorating security situation in the area.

“Following an IDF situation assessment, it was decided to reinforce the Judea and Samaria Division with two additional battalions,” the military said in a statement. “Furthermore, as part of the expanding security activity in the city of Nablus, it was decided to increase the security checks on routes leading in and out of the city. IDF, Israel Police and Israel Border Police forces are currently operating in the Shomron [Samaria] Regional Brigade.”

The move comes a day after a Palestinian gunman murdered two Israeli civilians, brothers in their 20s, as they sat in traffic in the village of Huwara, following which a mob of local Israeli youths went on a deadly rampage through the Palestinian village.

The Israeli defense establishment has also raised the level of alert around Jerusalem and near the Gaza Strip. On Sunday night, rioters in Gaza burned tires and launched a disturbance near the border with Israel.

In an attempt to regain control of the situation, the IDF deployed two additional battalions in Samaria, as well as Border Police units. The forces have spread out around flashpoints, raising their visibility and seeking to prevent further violence, according to the IDF.

“We are sending more forces to try and calm things down,” IDF spokesman Lt. Col. Richard Hecht told JNS on Monday. “We want as many forces on the ground as possible,” he added.

Border Police are also responding to an attempt by hundreds of activists to set up a new outpost at Evyatar, near Tapuach Junction.

In the whole of Judea and Samaria, the IDF currently has some 28 battalions deployed.

One of the two Israelis murdered on Sunday was IDF Staff Sgt. Hallel Menachem Yaniv, 22, who served in the Israeli Navy as a sailor as part of a program for yeshiva students. His brother, Yagel Yaakov Yaniv, 20, was also murdered in the attack.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on Sunday held a situation assessment together with leading defense officials.

Gallant instructed security forces to focus operational and intelligence efforts on apprehending the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Huwara, while taking all measures necessary to prevent any additional attacks.

He also approved the reinforcement of troops in Judea and Samaria, according to a statement from his office.

“The Defense Minister instructed all security elements to act to calm the ground and to preserve law and order in the sector,” said the statement, adding that the IDF has been instructed to provide any necessary assistance to the Israel Police in securing Jerusalem.

On Monday, Gallant visited the scene of the attack.

“We are currently standing at the location where the terror attack took place in Huwara. It was a cruel attack. It is heartbreaking to think of the immense pain of the family that lost both its sons—Hallel and Yagel. It is a terrible thing,” said Gallant.

“I was here with commanders in the IDF. We expect difficult days ahead of us. It may be here in Judea and Samaria, in the Jerusalem area, or in the Gaza region. I gave clear instructions to…ensure readiness to face all threats, reinforce troops and activities on the ground, and most importantly, reach and apprehend the terrorists. We will not tolerate terrorism against Israelis and we will operate in every way necessary,” he added.

Last week, 11 Palestinians were killed, most members of the Lions’ Den terrorist group, in intense gun battles that erupted when Israeli forces came under fire during an arrest operation in Nablus.

Wednesday’s counter-terror operation in Nablus was launched to apprehend three individuals believed to be planning imminent terror attacks, and who were also suspected of involvement in the Oct. 11 murder of IDF St.-Sgt. Ido Baruch, who was shot from a moving vehicle while securing a civilian march near Shavei Shomron in Samaria.

Israeli forces securing the operation came under fire from Palestinian rooftops, motorbikes and vehicles, the IDF said, adding that it was looking into the circumstances surrounding the deaths of Palestinian civilians in the operation.

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Could Israel become a surprise cocoa superpower?

Israel has the wrong climate for growing cocoa but a new startup aims to grow it sustainably and ethically in a lab – and it’s already sparking interest with snack makers.

By Elana Shap, ISRAEL21c

Why would one of the world’s largest snack companies, whose brands include Cadbury, Toblerone, Oreo and Milka, bank on a supply of cocoa from Israel?

The cocoa bean, from which the key ingredient in chocolate is derived, has never been cultivated in Israel. It’s not difficult to understand why. Cocoa plantations need humid tropical weather, as found in Ghana, Ivory Coast and Ecuador, the top three producers in this $130 billion industry.

These climatic conditions are of no concern for one Israeli agrifood startup aiming to produce “the food of the gods.” Celleste Bio’s high quality cocoa will be produced in a laboratory.

The company, situated in the Misgav Industrial Park in northern Israel, aims to do this using conventional cell culture methods.

Chief Technology Officer Hanne Volpin explains to ISRAEL21c how it’s done:

“You can, in principle, grow plant cells almost as easily as growing yeast. Put them in a solution of sugar, water and vitamins and they will keep multiplying and growing. The trick is for the end result to be the product you want, in this case cocoa butter and powder,” she says.

“Now we are at the stage of trying to find what the optimal growth conditions are for the stem-cell-like plant.”

The next step will be to visit the World Cocoa Gene Bank in Trinidad and Tobago to collect cocoa varieties.

And Volpin is insistent there will be no genetic modifications thereafter, “no lab tricks to change natural variations.”

Underage labor, unsustainability

Celleste Bio was founded a year and a half ago by Volpin and fellow cellular biology experts and agri-food sector entrepreneurs Avishai Levy, Orna Harel and Daphna Michaeli.

“Besides loving chocolate,” says Volpin with a laugh, “we all realized the problems in the cultivation of cocoa and the challenges the industry was facing.”

In the past few decades organizations and journalists brought the chocolate industry under scrutiny for unethical farming and labor practices. A documentary, “The Dark Side of Chocolate” (2010), exposed illegal child labor and slavery on cocoa farms in Western Africa.

In an effort to reform the industry, a Fair Trade seal is now put on all chocolate products made from ethically farmed cocoa.

This allows consumers to know the farmers were paid a living wage (often above market value, which is very low) and that the workers were of a legal age and had safe working conditions.

Despite these advances, the prevalence of underage labor (around 1.56 million children) in cocoa-producing areas in Ivory Coast and Ghana has not substantially decreased over the last 10 years, according to a 2021 European Commission report.

Another problem plaguing the industry is unsustainable farming methods. In the Ivory Coast it is estimated that 70 percent of the country’s illegal deforestation is related to cocoa farming. Climate changes such as droughts or floods have also led to plant diseases and loss of harvests, making the supply chain unstable.

As Volpin tells ISRAEL21c: “There is no silver bullet where you find solutions to not tearing down the rainforest, not having child labor and making sure the farmer has a reasonable income. What we are offering is a technology that ensures that the cocoa yield supply is invariable, is not dependent on climate conditions and that the final product is of a superior quality.”

Taking farming to a new level

This makes clear why Mondelēz International — the third largest producer of snacks in the world, employing 89,000 people — would view lab-grown cocoa as an attractive solution.

Other seed investors in Celleste Bio include Israel-based The Trendlines Group, US-based Barrel Ventures and the Regba Group Israeli agricultural cooperative.

Trendlines, which is traded on the Singapore Stock Exchange, invests in agrifood startups and provides an incubator for them.

As CEO of Trendlines Agrifood Fund, Nitza Kardish, tells ISRAEL21c: “We are looking to solve big issues of the food chain and one of the biggest is raw materials that are produced in a sustainable way. We believe Celleste Bio takes farming to another level and can really make a change in the way cocoa is produced. It will impact the entire chocolate industry.”

Once the Celleste laboratory has built up a biomass of 1,000 liters, it will be transferred to a production facility.

The question will then be, says Volpin, whether small amounts of cocoa should be grown close to manufacturing facilities and lower the carbon footprint caused by transportation, or in spaces such as the Negev Desert where solar power could be used – and, she adds, “will make Israel a cocoa superpower.”

A different mindset

Danish-born, Volpin has a PhD from the Hebrew University’s Faculty of Agriculture, and is enthusiastic about the local agro sector.

“Israel is very exciting. We are good at problem solving and we don’t have a population of old seasoned farmers who have decided you can only farm one way,” she says.

“We have a lot of highly educated curious farmers who like to be on the forefront of using different technologies. They are always ready to implement and try.”

She does understand, however, those countries in which farmers have to take a far more conservative approach.

“You can’t play around with a family’s income. A tomato grower that hardly makes enough to have food at the end of the month can’t start experimenting. In Israel we are fortunate to have a different mindset.”

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WATCH: ‘Israel, take a side,’ Zelensky demands on anniversary of Russian invasion

On the first anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky is continuing his demands on Israel.

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Hundreds of Iranian girls poisoned to prevent them from going to school

Only “several students” in the city of Qom, not hundreds, were poisoned, Iran’s deputy health minister said.

By Batya Jerenberg, World Israel News

Hundreds of Iranian girls have been deliberately poisoned so they wouldn’t go to school, Iranian state media reported Sunday.

The IRNA news agency quoted Deputy Health Minister Younes Panahi as downplaying the incident by saying that only “several students” in the city of Qom had been poisoned. He did, however, release the motivation for the attack, saying “it was found that some people wanted all schools, especially girls’ schools, to be closed.”

He did not reveal additional information about the alleged perpetrators, nor was any announcement made about any arrests.

The numbers are much higher than Panahi said. Hundreds of young girls in the holy Shiite city have been complaining of breathing problems, coughing, nausea and headaches for the last three months. Some were even hospitalized.

Some two weeks ago, parents demanded action by the municipal authorities, and the government announced the very next day that it would look into the incidents.

According to the investigation, unknown persons have apparently been bringing some kind of chemical material into schools. The kinds of chemicals used are easily obtainable, it added, without providing specifics.

There are Islamic extremists who do not believe girls should have an education. The most well-known case is that of the Sunni Muslim Taliban in Afghanistan. Just as in their first run in government in the 1990s, after their second takeover of the country in 2021, the Taliban began preventing most girls from attending high school and prohibited all women from going to university.

The Wall Street Journal and other Western media reported in December that the ban now extends to primary school as well, although the Islamist government denied the charge.

Iran is a Shiite Muslim country, and its strict theocratic regime relegates women to a secondary role. However, most girls attend primary and secondary school, and a large minority go on to higher education, although there are restrictions, such as what fields they are allowed to study.

Iran has been embroiled for months in civil protests, with both women and men demanding more freedom in general and a loosening of restrictions on women in particular. Several hundred protestors have been killed by regime forces and thousands arrested.

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IDF evacuates Samaria outpost, Religious Zionism MKs back settlers

Former residents of Evyatar often return to the town after terror attacks, and hundreds of settlers spent the night on the site following the deadly shooting in Huwara on Sunday.

By Lauren Marcus, World Israel News

After an attempt to evacuate settlers in Evyatar overnight Sunday failed, IDF soldiers once again began forcibly removing people from the former community on Monday morning.

Evyatar, an outpost near Nablus (Shechem), has been repeatedly dismantled and depopulated by Israeli security forces since its founding in 2013.

The community was established after a 2013 terror attack that killed Evyatar Borovsky, and the outpost was named after him.

פחות מיממה לאחר הפיגוע כוחות צבא ומג”ב מפנים את היישוב אביתר

לאחר שבלילה מאות יהודים שבו הלילה ליישוב אביתר הבוקר החלו כוחות צבא ומשטרה לפנות את היישוב. במקביל הצבא מנע הגעה לאיזור כולל ממחזיקי תעודות לע”מ

(שוטרי מג”ב מפנים את יו”ר @T_Nachala דניאלה וייס צילום: איתן שויבר/TPS) pic.twitter.com/GeFd6sl4Hu

— הקול היהודי (@hakolhayehudi) February 27, 2023

Former residents of Evyatar often return to the town after terror attacks, and hundreds of settlers spent the night on the site following the deadly shooting in Huwara on Sunday

“The correct response to terror is settlement construction. That is what will deter the vile terrorists and that is how we should respond, including a full return to the Evyatar settlement today,” said MK Tzvi Sukkot of the Religious Zionism party, who slept at the site alongside settlers.

Videos circulating on social media Monday morning depicted IDF soldiers carrying settlers off the site, some of them laying on stretchers.

The settlers’ resistance to leave the site appeared non-violent, and there were no reported clashes between them and the security forces.

As part of a compromise agreement with the Israeli government in 2021, settlers who had recently returned to Evyatar promised to voluntarily evacuate in exchange for a promise that homes and buildings at the site would not be demolished.

The Israeli government also promised to allow a yeshiva to continue operating at the site and to carry out survey work to determine if the hilltop land is classed as state land, which would pave the way for the outpost to be legalized.

However, the government has not fulfilled either of those promises.

“The return to Evyatar is our mission, and we intend to fulfill the agreement to return very soon,” said MK Orit Strock of the Religious Zionism party.

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