Author: admin
DeSantis moves toward GOP presidential bid on his own terms
Classified U.S. document says Wuhan lab leak likely caused pandemic
Republicans are furious now that their contention has been validated, after being suppressed as conspiracy theorists by Democrats and most of the scientific community, backed by the media.
By Batya Jerenberg, World Israel News
A classified report recently sent to the Biden administration and Congressional leaders says that the Covid-19 pandemic that has killed more than 6.8 million people around the world could very well have been caused by a leak from a Chinese lab, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported Sunday.
The FBI had concluded in 2021 “with moderate confidence” that the virus was accidentally leaked, the paper said, and now the Department of Energy was joining that assessment with “low” confidence.
The two agencies reportedly had different reasons for reaching their conclusions, but the WSJ’s sources did not reveal the basis for the DoE’s decision. The report, they said, had been written due to new intelligence, further examination of academic research work, and discussions with outside experts. It is reportedly less than five pages long.
Four other agencies weighed in, saying that the other prevailing theory, that of the virus jumping from animals to humans, was one that they now treated with “low confidence.” The CIA was specifically named as not having come to a conclusion on which theory was correct.
There was a consensus, however, that the virus had not been engineered as a weapon by the Chinese.
The Wuhan Institute of Virology has been repeatedly named as the leak’s most likely source. One of its labs was known to conduct coronavirus research on live bats, and three of its researchers were eventually discovered to have been hospitalized in the fall of 2019, right before the worldwide breakout of the disease.
The document’s assertion has infuriated Republicans, many of whom had suspected the Communist country from the beginning of covering up an accident that had horrific global consequences, yet were shut down by the majority of Democrats, the scientific community and media as “conspiracy theorists.”
“The elites and academics owe everyone who had legitimate questions and concerns about the origins of COVID an apology,” Rep. Ken Buck (R-Col) tweeted. “The American people deserve to see all the information concerning the Chinese lab leak and the origins of COVID. This won’t be forgotten.”
“No more whitewash,” agreed Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo). “I will again introduce legislation to make the US government’s intelligence reports on covid open to the people.”
Arkansan Senator Tom Cotton was one of the first to question Dr. Anthony Fauci, the longtime director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases who contradicted then-president Donald Trump when he backed the lab leak theory. Although he was pilloried in the press and social media for opposing the government’s preeminent disease expert, Cotton took the high road on Sunday.
“Re. China’s lab leak, being proven right doesn’t matter,” he tweeted. “What matters is holding the Chinese Communist Party accountable so this doesn’t happen again.”
Others were rankled by the censorship issue as well.
“Big Tech censored information indicating COVID resulted from a lab leak,” Republican National Committee Chairwoman Ronna McDaniel tweeted. “Now, Biden’s own Energy Department is saying that’s the most likely cause. We need accountability – for both the Chinese Communist Party and Big Tech.”
Big Tech censored information indicating COVID resulted from a lab leak. Now, Biden’s own Energy Department is saying that’s the most likely cause.
We need accountability – for both the Chinese Communist Party and Big Tech.
— Ronna McDaniel (@GOPChairwoman) February 26, 2023
Speaking on CNN Sunday, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan hedged when asked about the report, saying, “There are a variety of views in the intelligence community. Some elements in the intelligence community have reached conclusions on one side, some on the other. A number of them have said they just don’t have enough information to be sure.”
The post Classified U.S. document says Wuhan lab leak likely caused pandemic appeared first on World Israel News.
As Ukraine Crisis Simmers, Russian Cossack Movement Tightens Integration With Military Reserves
The ataman (head) of the “All-Russian Cossack Society,” Nikolai Doluda, addressed a meeting of the Atamans’ Council, in Krasnodar Krai, on February 4, and instructed those gathered that “the time has come when the Cossacks are once again becoming a stronghold and reliable shield of Russia, a guarantor of unity and protection of its national interests” (Vsko.ru, February 4). The words take on a more ominous tone when considered against the background of the current security crisis around Ukraine. Namely, Russia has been massing increasingly large numbers of troops and heavy weaponry along the border with Ukraine for months (see EDM, January 26, 27, February 3, 8). Moreover, Doluda’s remarks were pointedly uttered in Krasnodar, a region close to Ukraine (whose Cossack population was, in fact, originally relocated from Ukraine). And finally, Cossacks from Krasnodar were employed by the Kremlin to help seize Crimea back in 2014, and their role in the annexation operation is openly celebrated by Russian Cossack authorities (Vsko.ru, accessed February 10). Considering Russia’s heavy reliance on “hybrid war” tactics, it is thus likely that the “official” (state-supported) Cossack movement will again be used in whatever plans Moscow has in store for its southwestern neighbor (see EDM, January 31).
Doluda’s speech last week in Krasnodar continued with the boast that “Russian Cossacks have shown themselves as a strong military community, capable of defending the borders of Russia, strengthening the state from within, and coming to the aid of people during disasters. Cossacks today participate in the protection of state borders and public order, emergency response and environmental protection measures. In Cossack classes and schools, in Cossack cadet corps and universities, a new generation of young citizens is being prepared, for whom patriotism and love for the Fatherland are in their blood. I will do everything to ensure that the Cossacks become powerful, strong, and necessary for our country” (Vsko.ru, February 4).
A government-organized non-governmental organization (GONGO), Russia’s contemporary state-backed Cossack movement plays the role of a vanguard of popular nationalism. Some of its members’ activities include patrolling the streets of Russian cities and creating “Cossack cadets corps” or youth camps similar to the Young Pioneers of the Communist era. However, up until the annexation of Crimea, the formal role of Cossacks in Russian defense policy was not overt. But now, the formalization of their role in the military seems to have reached a new phase: in particular, Doluda’s speech references plans to create a reserve army amongst the Krasnodar Cossacks—a continuation of the long process of integrating Cossack volunteers into the Russian Armed Forces (EDM, July 16 2021).
Three days after Doluda’s remarks, The All-Russian Cossack Society head arrived at the Russian General Staff, and the two sides signed a document describing the specific procedures for the interaction of registered Cossacks with the leadership of military districts and the commissariats of Russian Federal subjects. Doluda himself also signed a contract to become the first Cossack initiate to the Armed Forces reserve under this new system (Vsko.ru, February 7). The binding of the 69-year-old Doluda to the mobilization reserve is symbolic, but it also means that he will undertake two key tasks.
First, he will organize the interaction of military Cossack societies (voiska) with the commanders of the troops of military districts and with the Northern Fleet “to attract members of societies as candidates in the mobilized human reserve of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.” Second, his office will keep records of Cossacks in the reserve and “carry out activities related to the preparation and commission of conscription and sending members of Cossack voiska to military service.” Such agreements between the registered Cossacks and the Russian state will take their service “to a new level” (Vsko.ru, February 7).
Granted, there is sufficient overlap between the work of the Cossack voiska and the Russian state, and so such developments leave some room for ambiguity as to the purpose of those agreements. However, given the simmering situation in eastern Ukraine (see EDM, January 31) as well as the positioning of Russian combat forces around the theater, Doluda’s speech and subsequent agreement with the General Staff hint at more extensive military planning involving the Cossacks going on under the surface.
The post As Ukraine Crisis Simmers, Russian Cossack Movement Tightens Integration With Military Reserves appeared first on Jamestown.
The Many Faces of Nord Stream Two
Over the last several years, Ukraine’s leaders have expressed grave concern over the dangers posed to regional energy security by Russia’s Nord Stream Two natural gas pipeline. From Germany and, more broadly, from Europe, the answer we received was: “Do not worry, we will not let it become a problem, either for you or for Europe.” Yet today, with energy prices at record highs, it is increasingly clear that promises are easy to make but harder to deliver. Even more so when Russia is involved.
It is now November 2021, and Ukraine’s warnings about Nord Stream Two were not heard. The pipeline, whose main purpose is to make Europe more dependent on Russia, was built—on Europe’s dime but under Russian Gazprom’s ownership and control. Nord Stream Two has yet to be certified, but it is already causing substantial problems.
Because of the pipeline, the European Union is divided and Russia is all the more convinced that the EU is weak and corruptible. Moscow lobbyists around the world pontificate that, with energy demand as well as prices soaring, the West’s “green delusion” is finally over, and the world is back to an era of rule by nations that have what really counts: oil, gas and coal.
For quite a while, Moscow has pursued a three-fold strategy: fool Europe, corrupt Europe, seduce Europe. The Nord Stream Two saga included all three elements. It fooled Europe by promising an unnecessary pipeline that was rooted in geopolitical expediency. It corrupted Europe, by hiring its former leaders to lucrative advisory contracts and allowing Europe to finance what it promised would eventually be a cash cow. With the pipeline certification under consideration, Russia is now in the seduction phase, promising that once Nord Stream Two is certified, gas supply problems, will go away. Of course, that is like saying that one more bottle of vodka will make alcoholism go away.
The West should remain sober though. Here are five basic facts about the Nord Stream Two pipeline.
First, it will not bring more natural gas to Europe, but it will undoubtedly allocate Gazprom even more leverage than it already has.
Second, it will take decades for the pipeline to pay off economically. Yet this does not matter—the project is not about economics but about Russia’s attempted domination over the European energy market.
Third, Nord Stream Two (in its current form) ultimately eliminates Central Asia as a significant European supplier and makes Ukraine (the cheapest, shortest and most efficient gas transit route) reliant on Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Fourth, it undermines Europe’s “green deal” by spiking market prices, making the long-term transition to renewables even more expensive.
Fifth, it is a way to force Europe to pay for a pipeline that punishes Ukraine while simultaneously obliging Europe to compensate Ukraine for the punishment.
If certified, the project would have long repercussions for Europe—not only because of its dubious moral nature but primarily because of its geopolitical miscalculations. Europe is about to get in bed with someone who clearly believes the EU is on its way out. Should this someone really be trusted?
So, what is to be done here? Three things.
First, do not rush to anything. Take a deep breath and count to ten.
Second, start listening to what Russian propaganda says behind your back, not to your face: Energy prices are soaring; the Western economies are collapsing; the EU is drifting away from the US and towards Russia. This is the picture of the world the Kremlin propaganda mills have been selling to Russians for quite a while.
Third, if you do not want to be on a short leash, then either do not certify Nord Stream Two, or certify it on your own terms—not Russia’s. The latter means the full application of EU energy rules, including requiring the unbundling of gas production from gas transit, as well as moving the gas entry points of Ukrainian pipelines from the Ukraine-EU to the Ukraine-Russia border (Ukrainians have been urging this for years).
Do not make the mistake of handing an essential part of Europe’s future to a country that is demonstratively not the EU’s friend. Time will not be kind to such decision or to those who made it.
The post The Many Faces of Nord Stream Two appeared first on Jamestown.
Religion as a Hybrid War Weapon to Achieve Russia’s Geopolitical Goals
On July 28, Ukrainian Orthodox Christians celebrated the 1,033rd anniversary of the Baptism of Kyivan Rus—a remarkable annual event for Ukrainian history and another reason for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s political speculations. After the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, Bartholomew I, signed the Ukrainian Orthodox Church tomos in 2019, granting it autocephaly—independence from the Russian Orthodox Church (see EDM, July 26, 2018; RFE, January 23, 2020)—experts warned that Moscow would double its efforts to weaponize religious issues as an element of its “hybrid war” against Ukraine (Warsawinstitute.org, January 31, 2019).
In his recent article “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” (Kremlin.ru, July 12), Putin appeals to “Orthodox Christianity unity” in nearly every paragraph, with a special emphasis on Kyivan Prince Vladimir the Great’s adoption of the Christian faith in 988 as a symbol of kinship. Moreover, the fact of the Kyivan Rus’ ruler being baptized in Chersonesus (today, Sevastopol, Crimea) has been used by Putin as a justification for the occupation of Crimea, namely “to unify the sacred lands of the Slavic nations’ cradle—Kyivan Rus” (Parlamentskaya Gazeta, July 27, 2018). Yet not only is the association of the terms “Rus” and “Russia” historically erroneous (Fakeoff.org, February 18, 2015; RFE, April 12, 2020), but the fact of Russia’s adoption of Kyivan Rus Baptism Day in 2010—only two years after Ukrainian erstwhile president Viktor Yushchenko’s 2008 decree establishing the holiday—raises questions about Russia’s actual intentions (Rada.gov.ua, July 25, 2008; Kremlin.ru, June 1, 2010).
According to the most recent Razumkov Analytical Center poll, 34 percent of Ukrainians identify themselves with the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP), with only 13.8 percent of respondents leaning toward the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP). In turn, 27.6 percent of Ukrainians consider themselves Orthodox but not belonging to any specific church, 9.3 percent say they are Christian but not Orthodox, 8.8 percent do not affiliate with any religion at all, 5.6 percent claim to be atheists, and 0.6 percent lean toward other religions—the predominant views among youth who despise the interfaith conflicts inside the country (Razumkov.org.ua, February 3, 2020).
Therefore, the effectiveness of religion as the Kremlin’s hybrid war weapon against Ukraine, especially over the last several years, is questionable. Membership in the Moscow-affiliated Orthodox Church has been persistently dropping among Ukrainian society since the start of the war with Russia. The UOC-MP has been repeatedly rebuked and criticized for not officially condemning (and instead even supporting) Russia’s occupation of Crimea and eastern Ukrainian regions (see EDM, July 26, 2018). Since the beginning of Russia’s military intervention in 2014, pro-Moscow priests have been caught leading Russian ideological campaigns such as the notorious “The Gift of the Magi” (“Dary volkhvov”) operation. In February of 2014, the Gift of the Magi, a holy Orthodox golden adornment that was supposed to be transferred from Greece to Kyiv, ended up in Crimea under the guard of Igor Girkin—a separatist leader later responsible for the catastrophic shootdown of Flight MH-17 over Donbas (The Interpreter, July 27, 2014). The so-called “priests” subsequently gathered crowds of Crimean citizens to “observe the holy piece,” during which time the public was openly encouraged to pray for Crimea’s integration into Russia amid uncertainty caused by the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine (RFE, February 27). Large numbers of Ukrainians have also been repelled by mandatory prayers within UOC-MP parishes for church leader Patriarch Kirill of Moscow—a close ally of Putin—as well as numerous incidents of local UOC-MP clerics refusing to conduct funeral services for Ukrainian soldiers killed on the front lines (Religion.in.ua, August 4, 2014).
The Kremlin’s religious propaganda is not limited to internal affairs, however. After Patriarch Kirill’s letter to Pope Francis, United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron complaining of the “Moscow-backed Church’s oppression by the Ukrainian government” (Mospat.ru, December 14, 2018), a wave of Russian Orthodox religious leaders added to this onslaught of disinformation. Thus, pro-Russian Bishop Gedeon complained to the US Department of State about his deportation from Ukraine and alleged abuses leveled against the UOC-MP by Kyiv (Spzh.news, February 16, 2019). This was followed by another bishop, Viktor Kotsaba, composing a letter with similar charges addressed to the European Parliament (Risu.ua, February 28, 2020). None of these appeals were taken into consideration by the West—another failure of Russia’s “religious” policy.
Of course, all such complaints to the West about purported attacks on the Russian Church in Ukraine disregard or draw attention away from actual abuses occurring inside Russia. Indeed, just a year before Patriarch Kirill addressed the Normandy Format representatives about what he claimed were infringements of human rights in Ukraine (Patriarchia.ru, May 17, 2017), he had explicitly referred to the concept of human rights as a “global heresy” (Interfax, March 20, 2016). And later, he openly demonized the LGBTQ+ communities in both Ukraine (Dumskaya.net, August 20, 2019) and Georgia, mainly amid recent violent protests in the latter (Kommersant, July 8, 2021). Moreover, while promoting Russia as a supposed luminary of Orthodox Christianity and a holy savior around the world, Moscow ignores the persecutions of other religious groups in its “multiculturally friendly” state (Hrw.org, January 9, 2020; Crisisgroup.org, May 12, 2021), including the intimidation of Crimean Tatar Muslims in occupied Crimea (State.gov, May 12).
Because the Moscow Patriarchate has lost significant support among progressive Ukrainian citizens, Putin’s continuing line of “religious” attack is now arguably targeted toward only two main groups: the country’s remaining UOC-MP parishioners, such as those who gathered on Tuesday in the Ukrainian capital (despite COVID-19 restrictions) for a Kyivan Rus Baptism Day procession (Hromadske.ua, July 27), as well as Russian devotees willing to fight a “holy war” in Donbas (BBC, December 18, 2014). While the UOC-MP’s influence has continued to decline sharply since 2014, mainly due to the Church’s obsolete practices and notorious examples of disrespect for Ukraine’s modern aspirations, the danger of Russian “religiously” minded militants remains. Therefore, Ukrainian officials will need to be on guard for possible outbreaks of new clashes in the occupied territories and the rest of the country that coincide with the upcoming visit of Bartholomew I of Constantinople to Ukraine—another great outrage for the Kremlin (RFE, April 25).
The post Religion as a Hybrid War Weapon to Achieve Russia’s Geopolitical Goals appeared first on Jamestown.
Namakhvani HPP: Georgian Hydropower Between Energy Security and Geopolitics
On May 25, just ahead of the 103rd anniversary of the First Georgian Republic’s (1918–1921) independence, Georgian protesters paralyzed the streets of the capital city of Tbilisi in the largest rally to date against the Namakhvani Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP) project (Civil.ge, May 25, 26). Relatively small demonstrations against the planned dam, by locals organized under the banner “Guardians of the Rioni Valley,” began years ago around the construction site on the Rioni River in western Georgia. These rallies gradually expanded in number and participation, eventually reaching a nation-wide character by January 2021. On May 23, the demonstrations shifted to Tbilisi, where Rioni inhabitants were joined in solidarity by striking workers from other regions of Georgia (Facebook.com/rioniskheobisgadarchenistvis, May 23). These protests stretched on for three consecutive days before a decision was made to return to the Rioni Valley (Agenda.ge, May 26).
Criticism of the Namakhvani HPP project was first raised by inhabitants of the Rioni Gorge, who complained they were not involved in the negotiations of the agreement with the foreign contractor companies. Those grievances were augmented by serious environmental and procedural concerns. On the other side, the Georgian government considers the infrastructure fundamental to bolstering the country’s energy security. Moreover, the authorities claim the associated foreign direct investment will benefit Georgians by creating new jobs and reducing prices for household electricity.
The Namakhvani HPP project envisages the construction, by 2024, of a double-dam facility on the Rioni River in the Racha-Lechkhumi and Western Imereti regions of Georgia. The two dams, measuring 59 and 100 meters in height, respectively, are expected to produce 1.514 gigawatt hours (GWh) of electricity yearly and have a capacity of 433 megawatts (MW). The reservoirs created by the damming will cover 610 hectares surface and will be linked by a 4.4-kilometer-long power tunnel. The southernmost chunk of the facility is around 30 km from Georgia’s third largest city, Kutaisi. The biggest construction project since Georgian independence, the Namakhvani HPP has received $800 million in foreign direct investment from its main contractor, the Turkish company ENKA Renewables, which will hold a 90 percent share in the project; the Norwegian Clean Energy group will hold 10 percent (Enka.com, Cleanenergy.no, accessed June 1).
Georgia’s annual energy consumption of 12.37 terawatt hours (TWh) amounts to a per capita average consumption of 3,300 kilowatt hours (kWh). Georgian citizens spend an average of roughly 660 lari ($200) per year on electricity (Geostat.ge, accessed June 1). Domestic electricity supply relies mainly on hydropower and thermal plants as well as, to a minor extent, wind turbines. Georgian generation capacity fails to meet domestic consumption, however, especially in winter months (Iea.org, accessed June 1). The single most important source of electricity is the critical Enguri complex, partially situated in the occupied region of Abkhazia. A temporary halt in production earlier this year, due to maintenance work, made Georgia’s dependence on the Enguri HPP even clearer (Agenda.ge, January 18).
The Namakhvani procurement comes with a 15-year Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) that entitles the owners to auction the generated electricity yearly on the free market during the May–August period. For the remaining eight months of the year, electricity must be sold directly to the Georgian government. Details of the contract, first publicized in February by a Georgian newspaper, raised criticism over the price of the electricity expected from the hydroelectric plant, the fiscal burden on the Georgian state, environmental and territorial issues, and the ultimate value of Namakhvani as an additional source of electricity (Iset-pi.ge, May 3; Socialjustice.org, March 3). On May 25, the newspaper Mtisambebi obtained and released a document, dated March 30, 2019, in which Georgia’s Ministry of Justice gives a negative assessment of the project (Mtisambebi.ge, May 25).
In contrast, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili, along with his entire cabinet, asserts that the Namakhavani HPP is fundamental to the country’s development because of its prospects of boosting domestic electricity production by 12 percent—especially in light of projected increases in consumption over the next several years (Gov.ge, April 3). Additionally, a higher reliance on domestically generated electricity from renewable sources would reduce Georgia’s dependence on imports from Russia, help the country meet its pledges under the Paris Climate Accord, as well as improve Georgian compliance with European Union accession criteria.
While controversy over the HPP certainly touches on legitimate concerns related to the project’s technical aspects, the Namakhvani dams have, lately, also assumed a political and geopolitical character.
On the political front, the Rioni Valley Movement has been targeted by misleading social media campaigns that exploit the cause to disseminate nationalist and xenophobic content, slander protest leader Varlam Goletiani, and promote political advertisements on news and events sponsored by right-wing, Russia-backed, populist politician Levan Vasadze (Civil.ge, May 19). Moreover, the widely cross-cutting nature of the Namakhvani opposition attracts diverse social groups from opposing political backgrounds. Episodes of violence were reported on May 24 against LGBT groups that joined the rally marches, which also included far-right nationalists. Such incidents further polarize the discourse and dilute the original cause (Facebook.com/equalitymovementgeorgia, May 24).
The Namakhvani issue has additionally been exploited to incite anti-Turkish sentiment, particularly since the main contractor is a Turkish company. In April, Turkey’s ambassador to Georgia, Fatma Ceren Yazgan, addressed the problem by reminding of the importance of ties between the two countries and affirming the benefits of the HPP for Georgian communities (Civil.ge, Apr 16). Good relations between Georgia and Turkey are not only based on economics; they also have a central strategic component in the form of shared transit and energy corridors as well as trilateral defense cooperation with Azerbaijan (see EDM, June 7, 2017). Russian-backed media has long promoted misleading and conspiratorial narratives about alleged Turkish irredentism in the region of Adjara, and insinuated Georgia is giving up its territory to a “Turkish invasion” (see EDM, July 30, 2019).
Currently, with the Georgian government increasing its rhetoric about integrating closer with the Euro-Atlantic community, and the South Caucasus not yet fully pacified following last year’s Karabakh war, the Russia informational offensive targeting Georgia and the wider region has been growing. Not only anti-Western but also anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim rhetoric have all grown louder. Playing on internal political cleavages and exploiting the variegated ethnic, linguistic and religious composition of Georgian society, Russia is backing extremist leaders as well as promoting divisive narratives to split the society and hinder friendly ties with Georgia’s neighbors.
The post Namakhvani HPP: Georgian Hydropower Between Energy Security and Geopolitics appeared first on Jamestown.
All Russian Cossacks Increasingly Resemble Krasnodar Movement
The Russian Cossack movement is emerging as one of the key social pillars supporting the regime, and increasingly it is taking on the mold of Kuban Cossackdom, found in the southern part of the country. An outline of plans for the further institutionalization of the movement at the administrative levels makes this clear. Officially, the Kremlin has been working on developing relations among Cossacks across the territorial subjects of the Russian Federation (see EDM, January 22), and so the shift to a model resembling that used in the Kuban region is plausible. Namely, in the Kuban’s Krasnodar Krai, in the 1990s and early 2000s, the regional administration co-opted a grassroots movement and made them emblems of the federal subject through such gestures as creating public memorials, facilitating Cossack education, holding weekly parades in the summer, using Cossack troops to punish liberal activists, and letting them patrol the streets of cities in the region. The Krasnodar Cossacks also played an important role in the annexation of Crimea (see EDM, September 30, 2020), providing a kind of gendarme for Russian forces to relieve them of the need to provide public order.
The importance of the Krasnodar movement for the national Cossack archetype is epitomized in the fact that Nikolai Doluda—who had been ataman (head) of the Kuban Cossack force since 2008—was appointed ataman of the all-Russian Cossack host in 2019 (Fedpress.ru, May 1, 2021). Doluda took part in the annexation of Crimea and attended a victory parade in Moscow in 2015. He has since been named vice governor of the Krasnodar region and a member of the Russian public chamber. He also sits on the “Presidential Council for the Rebirth of Cossacks,” inter alia committed to the creation of a central historical Cossack museum, including memorials to those who fell in defense of the fatherland (Kremlin.ru, April 9). The Council also mentions the return of Cossack regalia from outside the country, similar to what was done in Krasnodar.
Doluda has been busy furthering this model of Cossack development, telling journalists that he had traveled to 11 Cossack hosts throughout Russia and found uneven levels of development for the nurturing of patriotism. To counter this, the Russian government has created 35 indicators that atamans of Cossack societies and representatives of government bodies should consult in this endeavor—thus, de facto bestowing on government plenipotentiaries an administrative role over the Cossacks. Indeed, Doluda said, “for the even development of 12 registered Cossack troops, it is necessary to develop a single standard for organizing work in all areas of activity. To this end, Kuban Cossacks held an educational and methodological seminar on May 18–20, during which the host’s representatives shared their experiences with representatives of all military Cossack societies of Russia” (Kazakisibiri.rf, April 26). In education policy, then, the Kuban Cossacks are clearly the model to which every other host should aspire.
The traditional Cossack regions of Russia are located in the south—in the Kuban, Rostov, Volgograd and Stavropol. While Cossacks played an important role in expanding the Russian Empire and were dislocated by Soviet modernization, Siberia never had the same resonance as a locus of Cossack identity. Nevertheless, Doluda chose the base of the Yaik (Ural) Cossacks to make his speech about the importance of Cossack education, saying,
Our meeting is taking place today in new historical realities. Responding to the challenges of the times, the Russian Cossacks are becoming a notable force. The tasks before them are of state importance, connected, first of all, with national security, protection of public order, guarding state borders, environmental protection, and elimination of the consequences of emergencies. For their successful solution, the collective efforts of the branch departments should be involved in the first place on the preparation of the personnel reserve of the Cossack societies… The results of today’s work should be the definition of ways to form a single education standard, a single understanding, what the responsibilities of the future ataman of Cossack society should be, the real leader of the Cossack movement must correspond (Kazakisibiri.rf, April 26).
He continued that today, “the Cossack cadet corps and universities help to solve the most acute problems to date—the deficit of highly educated personnel,” gesturing toward efforts to include Cossack educational components at universities (Kazakisibiri.rf, April 26). This largely replicates patterns seen in the Kuban.
The same appears to hold true for empowering Russian Cossack hosts to punish domestic liberal activists and liberalism in general: the promoted activities increasingly resemble those already employed in Krasnodar. For example, in Tula (120 miles south of Moscow), on January 23, Cossack patrols were “very active”—and used nagaika (traditional Cossack leather horse whips)—in helping the police arrest supporters of opposition leader Alexei Navalny (Sova-center.ru, February 1). In Yekaterinburg, Cossacks were outraged by the sight of a new bar in the city with the provocative name “Gastrobar of Temptations.” Ataman Oleg Senenko rebuked the Ministry of Justice for permitting a business to register such a “demonic” moniker and implied that Molotov cocktails could be thrown at the establishment (Anews.com, September 21, 2020).
When searching for the future shape of Russia’s Cossack movement, then, one would do well to examine Krasnodar.
The post All Russian Cossacks Increasingly Resemble Krasnodar Movement appeared first on Jamestown.
Russia Cracks Down on ‘Foreign Threats’
On April 21, Vasily Piskarev, the head of the State Duma’s commission to investigate the facts of interference in the internal affairs of Russia, announced that his body was preparing legislative initiatives to combat foreign interference in Russia, including in its elections, by non-profits and non-governmental organizations (NGO). Piskarev said that “insults against Russia” will receive a “worthy response, including at the legislative level” (RIA Novosti, April 21). In President Vladimir Putin’s speech to the joint session of parliament that same day, he warned that those who organized against Russia’s interests would “regret their actions like they have not regretted anything for a long time” (Radio Sputnik, April 21). Taken together, these policies and rhetoric confirm once again spotlight Russia’s attempts to casts itself in the role of victim even when it is the antagonist on the world stage.
It is not for nothing, for example, that Piskarev announced his commission was investigating foreign interference into the 2021 Russian parliamentary elections just days after a report from the United States’ National Intelligence Council proposed sanctions on Russia for interfering in the 2020 presidential election (RBC, March 17; RIA Novosti, March 20). Russian politicians allege their victimhood in cases like this, when the reality of Russian interference in US elections is plain to see. In his statement on Instagram, Piskarev said that elections should be “open, competitive, and in full compliance with Russian electoral legislation” (Instagram, March 20). One would be hard-pressed to find many experts who would call Russian elections over the last 20 years truly open and competitive, but Piskarev paints foreign powers as the threat to free elections rather than internal forces.
At the same time that the government is preparing legislative action against NGOs and non-profits it deems as acting on behalf of foreign governments, it is labeling media outlets as foreign agents, too. Meduza, an independent Russian- and English-language news site, received that label on April 23. The outlet now has to warn readers on every post that they are on the foreign agents list; and the worry is that readers will be wary of Meduza going forward. Even more significantly, advertisers may pull out, and Meduza may fold. “We really don’t know what to do next,” wrote Editor-in-Chief Ivan Kolpakov (Meduza, April 26).
The narrative that is being proposed by the government is clear: foreign forces are attempting to interfere in Russian matters, by means of elections, by means of the press and by means of NGOs, so Russia has to protect itself. This messaging plays well among a citizenry with low trust in institutions, particularly the press. According to a Levada survey from 2018, only 31 percent of Russians completely trusted the press (Levada.ru, October 22, 2018). That same survey, interestingly, found that 58 percent of Russians called Putin “completely trustworthy.” The dynamics at play here allow for Putin and his government to attack other institutions as foreign actors, thereby discrediting them.
Of course, there is a denial of reality occurring here, too. Russia’s interference in foreign elections, be it in the US or in smaller countries like Moldova, is well documented (see EDM, January 31 2019). By proclaiming its commitment to the sovereignty of all countries, Russia is articulating a worldview it has no interest in actually prescribing to. Ultimately, Russia seems defensive on this issue because it feels it needs to be. Russia has learned to speak the language of international order, even as it defies that order in its actions. It is one more example of a mismatch between rhetoric and reality that pervades Russian political life.
The post Russia Cracks Down on ‘Foreign Threats’ appeared first on Jamestown.
Alexei Navalny’s Support in the North Caucasus: More About Corruption Than Navalny
On February 20, Ruslan Ablyakimov was walking in Makhachkala, the capital of Dagestan, with two friends when he was stopped by six young men who proceeded to beat him. “Where did you come here from?” they asked, “You are from Moscow, right? What are you doing here?” Before the men left Ablyakimov, they told him, “You have until tomorrow to get out of here” (Meduza, February 20).
Why did these men choose Ablyakimov to beat up? The answer is straightforward: he was the coordinator of the new Navalny Regional Headquarters in Makhachkala. Following this violent event, Ablyakimov complained that he could not find any space to rent for the headquarters, and he ultimately left Dagestan. He promised that this did not mean the headquarters would not open eventually; but its future is uncertain (Kavkazsky Uzel, February 22).
Authorities in Dagestan have not been friendly to supporters of Russian opposition leader and anti-corruption crusader Alexei Navalny in recent months. In late January, protests erupted across Russia, including, on a small scale, in Makhachkala. On January 21, a lone protester was detained by the police with his sign that read “Freedom for Navalny/Freedom for political prisoners” (Kavkaz Realii, January 21). Two days later, over 40 protesters were arrested, including students, in the center of Makhachkala, a city of about half a million (Kavkaz Realii, January 23).
According to journalist Magomed Magomedov, there are two groups of Navalny supporters in Dagestan. The majority of them support his anti-corruption efforts but do not necessarily share his political views; the rest are those who would like to see Navalny as president (Kavkazsky Uzel, January 21). Neither of these groups are particularly large, and videos of protests in Makhachkala show only a small crowd—tens, not hundreds (Kavkaz Realii, January 23).
These protests, which occurred all across Russia, took on a different meaning in the North Caucasus. Indeed, in Makhachkala, protesters frequently distanced themselves from Navalny and said that their actions were in response to dissatisfaction with the authorities in general (Kavkazsky Uzel, February 1). While protests against corruption in the North Caucasus are not an everyday occurrence, there is precedent. In 2017, a few hundred demonstrators came out to support Navalny’s anti-corruption message (Kavkazsky Uzel, June 12, 2017). Earlier, in October 2011, hundreds protested corruption in Makhachkala itself (see EDM, October 12, 2011).
Still, support and turnout for the Navalny protests in particular was low in the region (Kavkazsky Uzel, January 21). So why were authorities so quick to arrest protesters and reticent to allow these actions in the first place? What threat did they perceive? The answer lies not in Makhachkala, but in Moscow. The authorities in the North Caucasus understood that to allow these rallies to move forward would not align with Moscow’s directives to quash any Navalny-related activity, however small the demonstrations may be (Kavkazsky Uzel, January 21). And in the North Caucasus, alignment with Moscow is often vital for regional elites to maintain their power and privilege. Both economically and administratively, Moscow pulls many strings in the region, by appointing outsider governors like Dagestan’s Sergei Melikov and by ordering financial policy in republics like Ingushetia (see EDM, November 16, 2020). In 2014, subsidies to the North Caucasus Republics were all higher per capita than the average in Russia with the exception of Stavropol Krai (Edward C. Holland, “Economic Development and Subsidies in the North Caucasus,” Problems of Post-Communism, December 2015).
The hard line on even limited protests in Makhachkala suggests that any open displays of discontent in opposition to Moscow’s official stance will not be tolerated in Dagestan. At the same time, this implies that Alexei Navalny is likely not the man to mobilize the masses in the North Caucasus, even though some citizens there are sympathetic to his anti-corruption campaign.
The post Alexei Navalny’s Support in the North Caucasus: More About Corruption Than Navalny appeared first on Jamestown.