Twenty Years After Invading Iraq, American Liberalism Is Discredited Yet Still Dominant

US imperialists’ post–Cold War directionlessness was solved by 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq — only for Iraq and the entire “war on terror” to lead to disaster. The imperialist liberal vision has been thoroughly discredited. So how is it still staggering on?

US president George W. Bush gives an address aboard the nuclear aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln on May 1, 2003. Behind him a banner reads “Mission Accomplished.” (Stephen Jaffe / AFP via Getty Images)

In 1989, Francis Fukuyama predicted that the human species had reached “the end of history.” Throughout the world, elites had recognized that liberalism, characterized by political democracy and free markets, was the only ideology capable of addressing humanity’s problems. To Fukuyama, this suggested that eventually, whether it took a year, a decade, or a century, at some point in the future, all of humankind would embrace technocratic liberalism.

It was unclear, though, what the end of history would mean for US foreign policy. Since liberalism’s advent in the era of the French Revolution, the ideology was connected with empire. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, liberalism served as a primary justification of empire, as states from the British to the French to the American insisted that it was right and good to “promote” liberal values at the barrel of a gun. The word “liberal” itself was spread across Europe by Ur-liberal imperialist Napoleon Bonaparte.

The modern American empire was part of this proud tradition. During the Cold War, the United States became the global hegemon, and like previous hegemons, it constantly undertook military interventions abroad. To justify their nation’s wars, US elites claimed that they were defending liberalism against communists who wanted to destroy it.

But in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the imperialists faced a problem: as the Cold War wound down and the Soviets, per Fukuyama, began to accept liberal capitalist principles, the US empire started to lose its raison d’être. If the United States no longer faced an existential communist enemy, there was no justification for a globe-spanning empire. What were the imperialists who were still bent on maintaining that empire to do?

The answer: go on the offensive. Instead of waiting for history to end abroad, the United States would force its end — with missiles and troops, if necessary.

The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was part of this post–Cold War liberal project. (While the term neoconservative has the word “conservative” in it, neocons are basically just Cold War liberals with a different name. Moreover, in a technical sense, both Democrats and Republicans embody different species of liberalism.) The military-industrial complex’s profit-seeking motives and the never-ending US thirst for oil were key causes of the invasion, but leftists should be careful not to downplay its ideological origins. Not every imperialist is as nakedly and unabashedly power-hungry as Dick Cheney; some need to imagine that they are good people carrying out a noble cause. They are able to do so by persuading themselves that their efforts are righteous and necessary for human progress.

The war and occupation that followed the March 2003 invasion, though, failed to realize imperialist dreams. It turned out that democracy could not be exported with weapons and that the promises of “liberal” imperialism were a fantasy. The Iraq War put the kibosh on the idea that “democracy promotion” was a viable political project. Today, one rarely hears it invoked by those trawling the corridors of power.

From the perspective of 2023, the Iraq War fiasco was the first of many events that suggested that “the end of history” might be less stable than Fukuyama imagined. Since Iraq, we’ve witnessed the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s inability to save a drowning New Orleans; experienced a Great Recession from which many in the United States never fully recovered; a “humanitarian” mission in Libya that wound up collapsing the state and reviving that nation’s slave trade; and the repeated collapse of seemingly legitimate businesses, from Theranos to FTX to Silicon Valley Bank. End-of-history liberal hegemony, it seems, might not have been all it was cracked up to be.

But this leads to a question: Why haven’t these manifold disasters engendered a coherent and broad-based ideological response to such liberalism? Though we’ve seen the reemergence of reactionary populism on the Right and democratic socialism on the Left, neither has proven capable of seriously challenging Fukuyaman liberalism. For all his bluster, Donald Trump was a one-termer who basically governed like a typical Republican, while Bernie Sanders was unable to defeat Joe Biden. Tragically, liberalism’s continued dominance suggests we remain at history’s end.

This is the problem that socialists must confront on the twentieth anniversary of the Iraq War, a war that killed and deracinated millions of innocents. Why has this blundering and imperialist liberalism proved so resilient? And more importantly, what can we do about it?

Nicaragua recrudece persecución religiosa

Marzo de 2023 será recordado como el mes en que la guerra del régimen de Nicaragua contra la Iglesia Católica se radicalizó. Durante años, incluso cuando el régimen brutal de Daniel Ortega y Rosario Murillo tomaba medidas cada vez más drásticas para perseguir a sacerdotes y someter a fieles, el Papa y sus representantes buscaron minimizar el conflicto y adaptarse al régimen. Pese a esto, la sentencia contra Monseñor Rolando Álvarez a 26 años de presión fue la gota que derramó el vaso. 

Incapaz de permanecer callado por más tiempo, el 10 de marzo el Papa Francisco concedió una extraordinaria entrevista en la que condenó públicamente al régimen como “hitleriano”, llamando a sus líderes mentalmente inestables y groseros. El Sumo Pontífice también se pronunció en favor de la liberación del Obispo Álvarez, quien se negó a aceptar el exilio forzado con más de 220 presos políticos, ahora desterrados de Nicaragua, despojados de sus pertenencias y su ciudadanía.

La respuesta de la dictadura de Ortega fue rápida e intransigente. El régimen cerró la misión diplomática de Nicaragua en el Vaticano y exigió a la Santa Sede reciprocidad. Es un punto de inflexión histórico; la última vez que una nación latinoamericana rompió relaciones con el Vaticano fue en 1861. Ni las dictaduras de Cuba o Venezuela han dado un paso tan radical.

La presión se ha estado acumulando desde 2018, cuando las protestas cívicas contra el régimen fueron reprimidas violentamente. Cientos fueron asesinados por las fuerzas de seguridad que tenían órdenes de disparar a matar. A medida que las diferentes instituciones nacionales fueron cooptadas o capturadas directamente por el régimen de Ortega-Murillo, la iglesia permaneció firme e independiente, pese a la intensificación de la campaña de intimidación. 

En marzo de 2022, la expulsión del Nuncio Apostólico Waldemar Sommertag, el Embajador del Papa, desató una nueva fase de acciones policiales y paramilitares contra líderes eclesiásticos, laicos, feligreses e incluso contra sus templos. Hasta finales de 2022 fueron documentados cerca de 400 actos violentos contra la iglesia.

En Nicaragua, una nación altamente religiosa, la situación está llegando al nivel de lo absurdo. A medida que se acerca la Semana Santa, que junto con la Navidad es una de las fechas más importante en el calendario litúrgico católico, el régimen de Ortega-Murillo ha prohibido las tradicionales y apolíticas procesiones de Cuaresma, que marcan públicamente esta temporada. Estas celebraciones jamás habían sido ilegalizadas. Hasta ahora. 

Pero esto es, en última instancia, un enfoque contraproducente. Más que atacar a la jerarquía católica, como pretende el régimen, prohibir la manifestación de la fe es realmente un ataque a todos los creyentes nicaragüenses, incluidos los evangélicos protestantes, que durante años han ido ganando terreno en Centroamérica. Ortega camina sobre la cuerda floja; otros dictadores han permitido expresiones de fe para apaciguar las preocupaciones sociales y políticas. Incluso la mayoría de los sandinistas no parecen estar muy contentos con estas últimas maniobras.

La dictadura está cada vez más aislada, sus ataques la ponen en compañía de países como China y Corea del Norte. Incluso sus compañeros dictadores de América Latina no están dispuestos a unirse a Ortega y Murillo en su cruzada equivocada contra el primer Papa latinoamericano. La valoración de numerosos observadores es que el régimen está cada vez más fuera de control. El Congreso de los Estados Unidos está organizando audiencias para abordar esta preocupante situación.

Mientras tanto, un Ortega aislado y enfurecido, sigue reprimiendo a sus adversarios, aumentando dramáticamente el riesgo de aquellos encarcelados, incluido el Obispo Álvarez. Monseñor Silvio Báez, Obispo Auxiliar de Managua en el exilio, lo ha expresado así: “Temo que la dictadura se ensañe más contra él (Monseñor Álvarez). Ruego a la comunidad internacional que presione más al régimen exigiendo que lo libere de inmediato”. La presión internacional significativa, sostenida y coordinada, es esencial para frenar los abusos del régimen.

¿Qué hay que hacer? Varias cosas, incluyendo una campaña de rechazo internacional a la persecución de los creyentes nicaragüenses, liderada por organismos humanitarios como Naciones Unidas, Cruz Roja y la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Curiosamente, Nicaragua mantiene privilegios de libre comercio con los Estados Unidos y otros países en América Central, incluida la República Dominicana. Bajo ninguna circunstancia Washington debería considerar extender los privilegios comerciales del CAFTA a una dictadura como la de Ortega y no hay razón por la que Managua siga cosechando los beneficios de este acuerdo, sin haber dado antes señales claras de retornar a la senda de la democracia.

El régimen también disfruta de acceso al sistema financiero mundial, incluidos préstamos en condiciones favorables de instituciones como el Banco Mundial, el FMI y el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo. Lo más escandaloso es que el Banco Centroamericano de Integración Económica (BCIE), sigue ofreciendo un significativo financiamiento a la economía nicaragüense, fondos que el régimen utiliza para mejorar su posicionamiento y recrudecer el control social. 

Estados Unidos no es miembro del BCIE, pero ha brindado, a través de la Corporación Financiera de Desarrollo y otros vehículos, un apoyo significativo que el banco utiliza para proyectos regionales bajo el actual presidente, Dante Mossi. Taiwán es un financiador aún más grande de esta institución, una situación cada vez más insostenible ya que un país centroamericano tras otro ha cambiado el reconocimiento de Taipéi por Beijing.

En resumen. El dinero es fungible. El régimen de Nicaragua se ha radicalizado. Ya es hora de considerar un camino diferente.

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The Bloodbath in Iraq Shows the US Can Never Be a “Global Policeman”

The anniversary of the Iraq War has led to widespread discussion of the US’s “mistaken” invasion. But the deeper problem is Washington’s continued claim to be judge, jury, and executioner for the rest of the world — bringing international law to its knees.

Today the nature and scale of US military engagements across the globe has certainly changed since it first invaded Iraq, but the underpinning ideology that the United States is not bound by the same rules that govern others remains fundamentally unchallenged. (Marwan Naamani / AFP via Getty Images)

“The idea that over 100,000 forces would invade another country since World War II, nothing like that has happened,” said US president Joe Biden last month, referring to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Twenty years after the United States sent hundreds of thousands of troops to launch a full-scale, unwarranted invasion of Iraq, Biden’s assertion suggests that the United States has erased the unwanted memories of the war. Biden’s failure to see the hypocrisy in his statement is a testament to the enduring dominance of American exceptionalism: the belief that the United States is fundamentally different from other nations and has a unique mandate to dominate and impose its values across the world. It holds that America is synonymous with freedom, and that the liberal world order is structured around its hegemony.

Today the nature and scale of US military engagements across the globe has certainly changed since it first invaded Iraq, but the underpinning ideology that the United States is not bound by the same rules that govern others remains fundamentally unchallenged.

Every anniversary regurgitates “fresh” articles reflecting on tactical and operational mistakes. The recurring question is whether Iraq is better off today because of American intervention. Those defending the war may point out that many more Iraqis now have a cell phone plan, and that life expectancy increased from sixty-seven in 2001 to seventy-two today, conveniently omitting that this increase still lags behind the global average increase. Self-justificatory pieces, like one by former George W. Bush speechwriter David Frum, often argue that the United States saved Iraq from a Syria-style civil war by establishing some form of democratic governance. “They [Iraqis] gained a chance,” Frum writes.

It would be hard to overstate the devastation wrought by the Iraq War. Brown University’s Cost of War project estimates that roughly three hundred thousand innocent Iraqi civilians were killed as a result of direct fighting. Millions more died indirectly from its consequences, such as malnutrition, disease, and poverty. More than nine million were displaced from their homes. Today much of the political instability, corruption, and sectarian violence in Iraq can be traced back to the devastation of the war. Domestically, the invasion of Iraq cost US taxpayers $2.4 trillion and fueled the military-industrial complex. Regionally, it birthed an Islamist insurgency that would become the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), destabilizing the region from Syria to Yemen and Libya.

Despite this, the invasion of Iraq continues to be held in American consciousness and the mainstream political establishment as a mistake, yes, but one that had good intentions and that was based on sound logic — namely, that Saddam Hussein represented a threat to the US-led world order and needed to be removed. Despite a track record of disastrous wars and interventions like Vietnam, Libya, and Afghanistan, Iraq is seen as an aberration in American foreign policy rather than a symptom of American hubris.

Iraq bore no responsibility for or links to those responsible for 9/11, but then president George W. Bush and vice president Dick Cheney began arranging plans for its invasion just days after the planes struck. Not a single hijacker was Iraqi, and claims that Iraq had links to al-Qaeda were shaky at best. But that didn’t matter. In the aftermath of the attacks, America needed to reassert its hegemony. Saddam’s Iraq provided the perfect opportunity for it to showcase what would happen to those that threatened its power, and the disposability of the lives that happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.

With the help of mainstream media, the Bush administration spun a narrative of Iraqi WMDs. They found the few Iraqis, most who had been living in exile, who would support their war and cherry-picked evidence to support their claims. In the two years after 9/11, Bush and top officials in his administration repeated lies about the threat Iraq posed to the US public nearly a thousand times. Mainstream media largely failed to challenge these claims, silencing any dissenting voices. In the two weeks before and after Colin Powell’s United Nations speech, just 17 percent of commentators on major networks expressed skepticism at the war. These efforts to shape public opinion worked: by September 2003, seven in ten Americans believed that Saddam was in some way responsible for 9/11.

Officials and media would later claim that they were misled, that the intelligence was faulty, and that they did the best they could with the evidence they had at the time. But even in 2003, at the height of the propaganda campaign, not everyone believed the official narrative. In the lead-up to the war, an estimated 36 million people across the world took to the streets to oppose the invasion in what is now considered the world’s biggest coordinated protest. These protesters did not take to the street that day just because they did not believe the claim of WMDs, but because they fundamentally rejected the notion that the United States had any moral justification to launch a war. They rejected the role America had designated itself as the global police and defender of the liberal world order.

From Boots on the Ground to Drones in the Sky

President Obama presented a flickering hope of confronting American exceptionalism and the hold it had on the political establishment. In a speech he gave on the campaign trail in 2008 in which he discussed the failures of the war in Iraq, he told voters, “I don’t want to just end the war, but I want to end the mindset that got us into war in the first place.” He used the failures of Iraq and his opposition to it as a major talking point of his campaign to set himself apart from Hillary Clinton and John McCain, both of whom were outspoken supporters of the invasion. He preached the need for diplomacy and international cooperation over military engagement.

Obama morphed the ‘war on terror’ into a covert one, trading nation-building and democratization for counterterrorism and replacing boots on the ground with drones in the sky.

But this promise proved to be short-lived. By the time Obama took office, Americans no longer supported the wars in Afghanistan or Iraq, and it became increasingly clear that the United States’ traditional approach to warfare was not only ineffective against insurgents, but would not sell. So, Obama morphed the “war on terror” into a covert one, trading nation-building and democratization for counterterrorism and replacing boots on the ground with drones in the sky.

Obama vastly and dangerously expanded the US’s drone program, making them his weapon of choice. In his time in office, Obama authorized 1,878 strikes, including 563 in nonactive conflict zones in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. But his real legacy in the war on terror is how he legitimized drones as the legal and moral choice.

“By narrowly targeting our action against those who want to kill us and not the people they hide among, we are choosing the course of action least likely to result in the loss of innocent life,” Obama asserted during a speech defending the use of drones in May 2013.

But reality proved otherwise. Under Obama, the definition of a combatant was expanded to include all “military-aged males‘,” allowing the CIA to classify many innocent civilians as terrorists simply because of their age and gender, masking the actual civilian death toll. Obama also dramatically expanded the use of “signature strikes,” where the identity of a target is not known and based simply on behavior. Double-tap strikes, firing two strikes consecutively to target those first on the scene, also became a feature of Obama’s drone program.

By the end of his presidency, Obama had implemented a set of practices and norms that sanctioned a system of extrajudicial killings with very little oversight or transparency. Like his predecessor, Obama took for granted that the United States had the legal right and moral duty to bomb targets that it perceived as threats to its interpretation of global order.

When Donald Trump took office, preaching the need for “America First”, he revoked what limited oversight existed under Obama and ended the requirement to report on casualties. He continued to ramp up extrajudicial killings unchecked. In his first ten days in office, President Trump authorized three drone strikes and a US military raid in Yemen, reportedly killing up to thirty civilians. In just two years, Trump authorized 2,243 strikes.

America has shifted to a policy of preemptive and preventive self-defense to defend itself against threats that have not yet materialized, a practice that violates international law.

Biden’s presidency has so far marked a significant decrease in drone strikes. The disastrous withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the Taliban’s swift return to power despite two decades of American fighting has defined Biden’s foreign policy in the Middle East. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has certainly diverted attention away from the war on terror.

“​​I stand here today, for the first time in twenty years, with the United States not at war,” said Biden speaking at the UN in September 2021. “We’ve turned the page.”

It was a brazen and misleading statement. In fact, the war on terror has never been declared to be over. The legislation that the United States has relied on to conduct its military operations for the past twenty years, particularly the Authorization for the Use of Military Force Act, is still in place. Today America has more than 750 military bases spread across 80 countries with more than 40,000 troops in the Middle East, including 2,500 in Iraq. The drone program continues. And President Biden just requested a record-breaking defense budget of $886 billion.

International Law in Ruins

On September 20, 2001, nine days after the terrorist attacks on US soil, George W. Bush announced the start of the “global war on terror.” He told Americans: “Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” He issued the United States a blank check for a war not bound by temporal or geographical boundaries, and a mandate to attack anyone anywhere deemed a threat.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the US invoked its right to self-defense, enshrined by international law. But as the years passed, the right to self-defense from an imminent attack became harder to claim. Instead, America has shifted to a policy of preemptive and preventive self-defense to defend itself against threats that have not yet materialized, a practice that violates international law.

Until the ideology of American exceptionalism is reckoned with, the true lessons of the Iraq War will remain unlearned.

The war on terror’s impact on the principle of sovereignty and legitimacy of the international order and are most evident today in Ukraine. In this case, Russia also justified its unilateral invasion with a weak claim to preventive self-defense against growing NATO influence. Today, as the world watches another illegal occupation go unchecked, the United States is repeating the mistakes of Iraq in its response to the Ukraine war. The reductive narrative of “good versus evil” is repeated over and over, while dissenting voices are silenced. International law has become an empty slogan.

Today, when the US and its allies condemn Putin’s actions, the rest of the world’s memories of Iraq diminish any principled stance they may claim to have. Major allies of the United States, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and India, have refused to join the Western sanctions bloc. Across Africa and Asia, from South Africa to Indonesia, Uganda to Pakistan, politicians and leaders have called out America’s selective concern for human rights and international law. Even Bush himself, when he accidentally called his Iraq War “wholly unjustified” instead of the invasion of Ukraine, can’t hide the hypocrisy.

Perhaps what is most detrimental to the authority of international law is the complete lack of accountability that the United States has faced for the invasion of Iraq and larger war on terror. It refuses to subject itself to the International Criminal Court (ICC) or the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or abide by any international systems of law. No formal apology has ever been issued. The architects of the war have never been tried, and many of those responsible for carrying out war crimes have evaded justice. There has been no meaningful conversation about reparations for the Iraqi people or the nearly one million victims of the war on terror, from Fallujah to Guantanamo Bay.

The United States is not exceptional in its violation of international law, or even in lying about it. In fact, this is one of the most constant realities of the international world order. But what is exceptional is the underpinning belief in its own moral superiority, and the double standards it allows itself as the defender of freedom and democracy while simultaneously acting as the world’s main aggressor, with a global empire that answers to no one.

For now, the US continues to behave as the judge, jury, and executioner of world order. Until the ideology of American exceptionalism is reckoned with, the true lessons of the Iraq War will remain unlearned.

The Iraq War Was One of History’s Greatest Atrocities

The US invasion of Iraq was a crime, a calculated act of aggression that left immense destruction in its wake with almost no redeeming benefits to anyone — including its villainous architects.

US Marines take up position on the perimeter of a mosque while patrolling in the Iraqi city of Yusufiyah, south of Baghdad, on December 1, 2004. (Odd Andersen / AFP via Getty Images)

For all its destructive magnitude and historical significance, the US invasion of Iraq has prompted remarkably little commemoration in advance of its twentieth anniversary. It’s as if the world just wants to forget an episode whose senselessness makes it difficult to extract any meaning at all.

But for anyone who does want to understand the war and its consequences, there are few more knowledgable guides than Glen Rangwala, associate professor in the Department of Politics and International Studies at Trinity College, Cambridge.

A specialist in Arab politics and international relations, Rangwala was a founder of the Campaign Against Sanctions in Iraq in the 1990s and gained perhaps his greatest notoriety during the run-up to the war, when he exposed what became known as the “dodgy dossier” — Tony Blair’s publicly released compendium of alleged evidence concerning Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, which was supposed to justify an invasion — as a largely plagiarized fraud.

In 2006, he published, with Eric Herring, Iraq in Fragments, a scholarly study of the disintegration of Iraqi society under the yoke of US occupation.

Rangwala spoke with Jacobin’s Seth Ackerman about the causes of the war, the logic of the postwar occupation, and the legacies it has left behind in Iraq, the Middle East, and the wider world. It is a disconsoling story with few silver linings.

Seth Ackerman

Give us a picture of Iraq on the eve of the 2003 invasion, after twelve years of United Nations sanctions.

Glen Rangwala

Over the course of the 1990s, Iraq moves from being a relatively highly educated, highly literate, politically engaged, and economically fast-developing society, with generally quite good infrastructure, to being one of the most notable instances of de-development: public infrastructure falling to pieces, all trade essentially being curtailed or being converted into illicit trade (smuggling) or UN humanitarian programs (the Oil-for-Food Program).

It was a situation in which people had no realistic economic opportunities for advancement other than emigration. So the extent to which Iraqis from across all parts of society left the country if they could, is significant for understanding Iraq over that period.

The government retained a fairly high level of control — coercively — over most of the country and over large parts of Iraqi society, apart from the Kurdish region in the North. But there was a degree of desperation for many Iraqis over the course of the 1990s. This was beginning to turn a corner a bit by the end of the decade, though — so by 2001, 2002, more money is coming into the country, largely through the new oil deals that Iraq had made with Syria.

In a sense, the appearance of opportunity was back in Iraq, but it was still far less cohesive as a society, far less hopeful, and far less structured in how people went about their social and economic lives. Their educational opportunities were still quite limited, even though the country was, at least on the face of it, wealthier than it had been. And it’s reflected in the stories that Iraqis have of that period, which was one of desperation, a period in which the country went backward. Their children, their siblings, their relatives, left the country to seek a better life abroad.

Seth Ackerman

Of course, from the point of view of the the key players on the UN Security Council who were most responsible for maintaining the sanctions, officially their intention was to force compliance with UN resolutions, chiefly disarmament, though they didn’t make much effort to disguise the fact that they also — at least the United States and Britain — hoped that the desperation you’re talking about could somehow result in a change of regime.

The way the sanctions debate was set up in the West, there was a kind of shadow question: If the Iraqis were free to speak their minds would they say that the regime is to blame for (allegedly) refusing to do what was needed to lift the sanctions, or was the West to blame for imposing sanctions? Or would they even say, we’re grateful for the sanctions for weakening the regime?

Glen Rangwala

Yes of course. I mean, Iraqis blamed everybody for having no concern about their humanitarian welfare, either their government or the international community. There’s a sense of abandonment that I think was the general experience of most Iraqis through the country through that period, where nobody was really that concerned about whether they lived or died. So there is no gratitude to the Americans for invading. There is no gratitude for the US and UK for maintaining sanctions.

In 2003, they enter Iraq as powers that, from an Iraqi perspective, have a proven track record of having no concern for their well-being. These are the countries that put them through that process of material deprivation, of limited opportunities, of air strikes. (Of course the British and American governments maintained a policy of air strikes in the northern and southern no-fly zones, as they were called, so Iraqi casualties were a regular part of how they understood the effects of those policies.)

The key issue that comes in right away was the sense of Iraq being a divided country.

So right from the start, to most Iraqis there is a sense that these are hostile powers — which they nevertheless have the opportunity to align with if they want to. But most Iraqis, of course, don’t want to align with hostile powers, even for the most cynical of reasons. And so the key issue that comes in right away — and I was there immediately after the invasion in 2003, in Baghdad and in parts of Western Iraq — was the sense of Iraq being a divided country.

There were a few people who were with the Americans, who were operating with the Americans in the Green Zone. There were parts of the population that were affiliated to political parties that had signed up to the “transition,” as it was called at that time. But there were many Iraqis who saw them as traitors, who saw them as having sold out their country, and who often resorted, especially over the course of 2003, to violent struggle, to oust the Americans from Iraq, thinking that was the only way in which the Americans would ever leave from the country.

And of course, they were branded by those parts of the population as terrorists. And so what you have, all the way through from the invasion onward, is the creation of a very divided population, a sense of division within the country that will take generations to overcome, where different parts of the population blame each other for the long war that followed in which tens of thousands of Iraqis were killed by their fellow Iraqis. So it is that lasting division which becomes, I think, the most obvious, most destructive legacy.

Seth Ackerman

In the Western discourse, this is always filtered through the idea of ethnic or religious divisions, with the implication that these are ancient and permanent.

Glen Rangwala

There are, and there always have been, lots of different identities that Iraqis have inhabited at one moment or other. They affiliate with their towns, their cities, and often they affiliate with their neighborhoods. They affiliate with their ethnicity, their language, their cultural traditions, their religious identity. They affiliate with their class: sometimes those have been significant markers of political orientation, to talk about oneself as upper-class or middle-class or working-class. These are all divisions that exist in any modern society.

There are multiple identities at work and most Iraqis, throughout most of the twentieth century, have inhabited those multiple identities, in which religion has not been a particularly prevalent one. Sunni and Shi’a were categories that largely disappeared from Iraqi public discourse over the course of the middle part of the twentieth century. There are ways in which in the 1990s, the Iraqi government started using that language back against its own population. And there are ways within which political activists who sought to oust the Iraqi government also started using those terms.

So they’re not unknown to Iraqis in 2003. It’s not that people don’t know what the difference between a Sunni and a Shi’a is, but they’re not particularly politicized at that point. There’s no real political implication that comes from identifying oneself as Sunni or Shi’a. But what the US does is engage in a process of trying to build alliances around those divisions. So, Shi’a will identify with us, they will support us, we will fund them, we will support their political parties. We will arm their militia, which is what they did, because they are the groups, it was thought, who will support us in the long term, will carry the majority of the population with us.

And of course, that fails in lots of different ways. But what I think has been the most destructive form of failure is in creating that long-term sense of division within the country along those sectarian lines, in which those who supported the Americans, who joined the militias that fought with the Americans, are seen by a significant proportion of Iraqis today as having sold out their country to the invader.

Seth Ackerman

Organizationally, what were the units that were affiliated with the Americans?

Glen Rangwala

The US created a number of different brigades essentially made up of Shi’a militia members who came from what was then called the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or SCIRI, which recognized within five or six years that it had lost a lot of its support by having such an overt policy of aligning with the US and having its militia essentially funded through the Americans. They set up a number of different brigades, with names like the Wolf Brigade, which were basically American top-down organized institutions that worked essentially as agents of ethnic cleansing within parts of Iraq.

So they would target Sunni Muslims whom they suspected of being allied with the Americans, often driving families, groups, whole populations out of areas of Baghdad. And so over the course of that period, from 2003 to 2006, you get what is a very multiethnic, multicultural city becoming essentially cantons, with different people from one religious group or one ethnic group, solely resident in one area of the city, rather than it being a mixed population as it was before.

Seth Ackerman

And it remains like that.

Glen Rangwala

It does. Iraq remains a country in which those divisions are significant in people’s minds, in people’s forms of life, in ways that haven’t really been repaired over the past twenty years.

Seth Ackerman

The movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr was supposed to represent a challenge to those alignments.

Glen Rangwala

So the one militia that remained was the so-called Sadr movement, which never aligned with the Americans. The movement was based essentially around the large eastern slum of Baghdad, which was largely Shi’a Muslim, with significant numbers of Kurdish and other ethnic minorities there as well. But they acted as a mobilizer. They were the movement that spoke up for the disenfranchised of Iraq. This is a population that has been served well by no government since the 1950s. Largely manual laborers and other low-paid occupations, with long periods of unemployment for many members of that community. And they were mobilized most actively within a militia and a political organization that has never substantially aligned itself with the US occupation, and which retains a significant role in Iraqi politics today.

So there are ways in which those affiliations that developed over the course of that early period after the invasion have continued to be significant, but without building any sense of a cohesive national community. Parties speak on behalf of a particular population and often claim that other parts of the country, other communities within the country, somehow act as their oppressors or have what’s rightfully theirs. So there’s that discourse of internal opposition within the country, which comes out in the inability of Iraqi parties to work together, and which remains significant today. You don’t get cohesive political factions formed across the country. What you get is highly localized groups who fight against each other still.

Seth Ackerman

This is said to be the major factor that has allowed Iran to gain influence in the country.

Glen Rangwala

That’s true, though many Iraqis also have come to realize the extent to which their large neighbors, both Saudi Arabia and Iran, don’t have their interests in their calculations — that they’re doing this for their own reasons. So you do get many Iraqis who reject foreign interference in their country. You get many Iraqis who see political parties that have their origins in alliances with Iran or with Saudi Arabia as being illegitimate.

But still you get governments that come to power in Iraq that have very low levels of real authority over or support from many Iraqis. They have very limited levels of responsiveness to popular need. They have very limited capacities to do anything about Iraq’s problems. So things like the provision of electricity, the provision of schooling, basic government responsibilities, are still at a very low level — worse than Iraq in the 1960s or 1970s. There’s still a significant inability of the government to undertake projects that will benefit Iraqis. And there is a lack of confidence in any organized political group to achieve these objectives.

Seth Ackerman

During the war — say, during the 2004 US presidential election campaign, when the Democrats were trying to formulate something resembling a critique of the Bush administration’s Iraq policy without actually being antiwar, the line they would use was that “Bush took us to war without a plan.” So the critique was about incompetence.

Glen Rangwala

A lot of attention is focused on policy mistakes, commonly on the disbandment, essentially, of the Iraqi civil service — the limitation that those within senior ministries could no longer stay in those roles — essentially sacking large parts of the senior civil service, who were mostly members of the Ba’ath Party. They had to be members if they wanted to retain those roles.

Seth Ackerman

And the army.

Glen Rangwala

And the army, yes. Those are the two main criticisms: the effective sacking of large parts of the civil service and the disbandment of the military forces of the country. And in some sense I think that’s right, that these were significant mistakes. They were significant flaws in the US policy especially in the case of the civil service, which did not pose a challenge to the Americans. It wasn’t going to seek the restoration of the old government. These were largely professional people who had worked all their lives in the institutions and had generally done the best job that they could in very difficult circumstances. And to sack them all of course posed really severe difficulties for the Iraqi state to go back to providing for its population in any meaningful way.

I think to focus on policy errors makes the mistake of not seeing the bigger problem, which was just that the invasion itself was almost inevitably going to turn Iraqis against each other.

That said, I think to focus on policy errors makes the mistake of not seeing the bigger problem, which was just that the invasion itself was almost inevitably going to turn Iraqis against each other. There was no way that was not going to happen. Setting up a foreign power as, essentially, the authority in the country was not going to bring Iraqis onside.

Iraqis generally understood the invasion for what it was, an attempt by an outside country to dominate them. And inevitably, many Iraqis fought back, creating the long term context of violence that’s been seen in the country since then. So it’s not just that there were policy mistakes, but that the invasion itself had certain more or less inevitable consequences, which were going to lead to long-term violence.

Seth Ackerman

What’s ironic is that in the internal policy debate within the Bush administration, the critique you’re articulating now was actually made by the most extreme elements of the Bush administration. Before the war, and during its earliest stages, they said, if we do a prolonged occupation of the country, we will get entangled in internal Iraqi politics and become the object of resentment. So let’s just invade and then immediately leave, and the result will be good for us somehow.

Glen Rangwala

Yes, and of course, all American governments have a wide coalition with different interests represented in the cabinet at any one point. So the oil barons were represented alongside the highly ideological people who were motivated by a sense that radical Islam was the threat to America and that somehow an invasion would demonstrate American power to the rest of the world. These combined with defense companies that want to build up the US military and show it off to the world as a force of intimidation, coupled with those whose interests were more focused on American security and combating the effects of 9/11 and all of that.

So you had a range of different groups there. And what you got was a shift in policy from one faction, the invade-punish-and-run group, to the prolonged occupation group. And so over the course of 2003, you get those in power who say, we should be here for five, ten, fifteen years in Iraq as the governing authority. And that view finds itself winning out in mid-2003 — but then losing out in late 2003 as the costs of what it would mean to engage in a long-term occupation of the country, to have exclusive political power, became clear. So you get a move back to, not quite the invade-and-run view, but those who say “light touch,” “scale down,” “handover,” “train the Iraqi Army.”

Seth Ackerman

Indirect rule.

Glen Rangwala

Yes, indirect rule. But obviously, that perspective came a cropper when the idea that you could build an army from scratch that would effectively control a highly disordered country — which is what Iraq became over the course of the first year — fell apart. When challenged, the Iraqi army since 2003 has never been a viable mechanism of national control. And so, none of these policy options — the cut-and-run option, the long-term occupation, the indirect rule method — had a realistic chance of success. Again, it’s not really any individual policy mistake that’s the issue.

Seth Ackerman

In the US, this episode — in fact the whole sequence of interventions going back to 1991, ultimately leading to the invasion — was mainly justified by this idea that Iraq had failed to disarm and therefore it posed aa serious threat.

Glen Rangwala

It was an issue that was easy to explain to populations around the world, to argue that Iraq should be an issue of concern. The idea that it was developing chemical, biological, nuclear weapons was a way to present Iraq as having the potential to challenge regional and global security. To some extent, of course, that rhetoric could draw upon Iraq’s attempts over the course of the previous decade to experiment with each of these three different forms of weaponry. There was an attempt in Iraq to develop chemical and biological weapons — the first much more so than the second. There was the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War. And there was the beginnings of the nuclear program in the 1980s.

None of these programs continued after 1991. We know now for sure that these programs were all terminated by 1991. But the fact that the US and UK could show that Iraq could not prove that — could not prove a negative — gave it a consistent linchpin to say there is still a danger from Iraq. There was still a reason why we should sanction Iraq, why we should blockade Iraq, why we should prevent Iraq’s reintegration into the international community, ultimately leading to the invasion, of course. So this remained an issue for concerted global attention over the course of the whole twelve-year period between the Gulf War and the 2003 invasion.

So the threat of Iraq was consistently exaggerated. It was consistently portrayed as something that had to be challenged by outside actors. And to go from that to saying the only way to deal with this threat is to invade was, at least rhetorically, not that much of a leap. The problem of course was that there were no weapons. And it was obvious this story could not end well because all the intelligence estimates were quite clear that, while there was a possibility that Iraq retained weapons, realistically there was no chance for them to use any of these weapons if they existed. And even if they did try and use them, it would be on a very small scale and it wouldn’t be a threat to global and regional security.

Seth Ackerman

Presumably those in the Bush administration and elsewhere who made these accusations must have hoped that they could just show off some vestige of a splinter of an ongoing weapons program and that that would be accepted as vindicating them.

Glen Rangwala

Yeah, I think that’s the best they could have hoped for. I think generally there was a sense that the story would just move on, and of course it didn’t move on. So much attention had been placed on those weapons claims. They were made in such a high-profile way, and when leaders from the US and UK were challenged on their Iraq policy before the invasion, they reiterated those claims in an ever more exaggerated way.

With those claims, they trapped themselves in forms of justification that they had not anticipated. Just tracing out the ways in which those claims became more and more exaggerated in the lead-up to the war — that was also part of their way of dealing with a skeptical public. I mean, there was no concerted support for the invasion across Europe. In the US it was thin. And so the attempt to get around that was by making these seemingly highly technical claims about the threats of particular weapons types. And those who didn’t have the time or knowledge to critically explore those claims had to take those claims on the basis of trust.

Seth Ackerman

Twenty years later, what consequences, if any, have there been for the United States’ standing as a great power?

Glen Rangwala

There were very few countries that stayed out of the invasion that later assisted with the occupation. There was that process whereby those countries that had supported the US at the start — some of them left, like the Spanish government, which took its troops out of Iraq. But there were very few governments that had not initially endorsed the invasion, which later came to participate in supporting the American occupation of Iraq after 2003. It did show the limited willingness of many countries to support military action of a sort that they could not win their populations over to. And it also showed the limited extent to which the US could be trusted in international politics as an actor that worked on behalf of common goals on the international stage.

There remains a high level of skepticism of claims that are made by the United States about its objectives, which are increasingly seen as self-interested rather than serving shared goals.

You see this in the European context where there is still a very high level of skepticism that didn’t exist before 2003 about US military policy around the world. There remains a high level of skepticism of claims that are made by the United States about its objectives, which are increasingly seen as self-interested rather than serving shared goals.

Seth Ackerman

And yet the drive among Europeans to have any kind of an autonomous foreign and defense policy seems much less today than it did twenty years ago.

Glen Rangwala

Perhaps the bigger issue is that Iraq was a significant moment for populations in finding a level of mistrust in the claims made by political leaders — especially those that concern matters of international peace and security. There remains a very high level of mistrust in claims made by British and American governments about things they claim are essential for security, which I think comes out of the Iraq episode and persist today.

Seth Ackerman

There’s that famous story about the Cuban Missile Crisis, when [John F.] Kennedy offered to show [Charles] de Gaulle the satellite imagery evidence of the Soviet missiles and [Charles] de Gaulle saying essentially, I don’t need to see it, if the American president says it, then I accept that. It seems like nowadays any world leader — even if they were personally inclined to take that attitude —  would be mercilessly ridiculed at home for such naivety in dealing with the US.

Glen Rangwala

I’ve lost track of the number of times I’ve seen evidence presented by one government or other described as “the new dodgy dossier.”

Seth Ackerman

This heightened suspicion you mention, about US’s commitment to work for “common goals” — that strikes me as significant because that is the basis on which a hegemonic power is opposed to maintain its authority.

Glen Rangwala

Yes, that’s the point exactly. There is no confidence that the US is willing to pursue goals beyond just the narrowly self-interested. That is a legacy of Iraq that has persisted since 2003.

Commemorating Iraq’s Three Wars (1991, 2003, 2014): Looking Back : ‘Internationally Sponsored Genocide’. Felicity Arbuthnot

Editors have a mantra, do not look back, move on, write what is current. But sometimes looking back is vital. Those who ignore even the recent past are doomed to understand nothing, sink deeper into quagmires – and bleat again …

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Sheriff and Deputies Help Man Kidnap His Daughter

Jeff Burkett, the 46-year-old sheriff of Iron County in Missouri, and two deputies, Matthew Cozad, and Chase Bresnahan, have been charged with kidnapping, conspiracy, and criminal street gang activity for attempting to help Donald Gaston kidnap his daughter following an argument with her mother.

According to the documents by KSDK, the father and deputies first called 911 in February to have the mother arrested, then put a “stop and hold” on her record and tracked the mother and daughter’s locations via their cell phones.

The sheriff allegedly told the dispatcher that the mother was intoxicated and that she had kidnapped her injured daughter while a man’s voice seemed to be telling the sheriff what to say.

Gabe Crocker, Burkett’s lawyer, alleges the charges are politically motivated. Burkett, Gaston, Bresnahan, and Cozad have all been charged with participating in gang activities and conspiracy, as well as Burkett and Gaston receiving additional charges including attempted kidnapping, stalking, and making a false report.

Bresnahan and Burkett have been charged with obtaining under a false pretense criminal history record information and also misusing 911, and Cozad has been charged with being an accessory to stalking.

Burkett is being held on a $500,000 bond, and the other three are being held on $400,000 bonds.

MK pushing for judicial overhaul floats compromise, gets flak from both sides

Simcha Rothman, chair of the Knesset Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee, was criticized by both sides after proposing a compromise.

By Pesach Benson, TPS

During a Sunday night meeting of the Knesset’s Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, chairman Simcha Rothman proposed a compromise for selecting judges, then caught flak from both his coalition colleagues and the opposition.

Meanwhile, leaders of Israel’s governing coalition vowed that legislation to reform the process of appointing judges would be passed by the Knesset ahead of the upcoming Passover recess.

Rothman suggested that the government choose the first two justices to fill vacancies during a Knesset’s term, by a simple majority of the selection committee’s 11 members. Additional judicial appointments during that Knesset’s term would require the support of an opposition lawmaker and judge sitting on the selection committee.

Legislation currently making its way through the Knesset gives the governing coalition an automatic majority on the judicial selection committee. A compromise framework recently proposed by Israeli President Isaac Herzog removes that majority.

Rothman’s proposal was criticized from both camps.

Likud MK Moshe Saada tweeted, “I did not participate for two months in the protracted discussions of the Constitutional Committee, in order to end up with an outline that would effectively empty the reform of its content. If it is indeed true, then the published proposal perpetuates the existing situation and prevents the correction we wish for in the judicial system.”

Opposition MK Merav Michaeli, leader of the Labor party, tweeted, “Appointing two judges to the Supreme Court in a direct and blunt appointment by the coalition is not a softening of the reform. It is the complete opposite.”

The governing coalition’s judicial reforms are controversial. Legislation advancing through the Knesset would primarily alter the way judges are appointed and removed, give the Knesset the ability to override certain High Court rulings, restrict the ability of judges to apply standards of “reasonableness,” and change the way legal advisors are appointed to government ministries.

Supporters of the legal overhaul say they want to end years of judicial overreach, while opponents claim the proposals are anti-democratic.

Hundreds of thousands of protesters against the reforms have been demonstrating in Tel Aviv and across the country since the new Netanyahu government took office in January. On Sunday, hundreds of IDF reservists refused to show up for duty.

President Isaac Herzog has been urging the prime minister and opposition to work towards a compromise, warning that otherwise, the volatile situation could result in a civil war.

World Israel News contributed to this report.

The post MK pushing for judicial overhaul floats compromise, gets flak from both sides appeared first on World Israel News.

The US Has the World Setup for a Worse Financial Crisis Than in 2008

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ICC’s Putin Arrest Warrant Signals Long Overdue Unraveling of So-called ‘Rules-based World Order’

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