The Cell Phone Is a Pair of Red High Heels

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What’s inside the memoirs of the late Palestinian architect of the Oslo Accords?

Since Qurei’s  death last month, the people closest to him have revealed some surprising information.

By Baruch Yedid, TPS

On February 22, Ahmed Qurei, the Palestinian architect of the 1993 Oslo Accords, died of a blood infection at the age of 86.

In the drawers of his house in the Jerusalem suburb of Abu Dis, there are — along with various books he published about the Mideast peace process — nine more books he wrote about Fatah and one single book about his personal life. These have not yet seen the light of day.

Qurei, aka Abu Alaa, joined Fatah in 1968 and held various positions in the movement as well as in the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority, including his term as prime minister of the PA.

Since Qurei’s death, the Tazpit Press Service has met with the people closest to Qurei, who accompanied him for decades and who shared some surprising revelations.

It should be noted that some of the revelations were published in different places, and it is possible that they refute or confirm what was previously known.

Qurei on the Palestinian leadership

The first revelations of contacts between Israel and the PLO caught the Palestinian public at a low point. PLO institutions suffered from degeneration, internal problems and an economic crisis stemming from their support for Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and his invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

The Oslo Accords, in essence, revived the PLO just when it seemed destined to fade into irrelevance.

The seeds of Oslo were planted in Qurei’s “academic” meetings between Israeli Professor Yair Hirschfeld  and journalist and historian Ron Pundak. They were organized with the assistance of a PLO representative in London and Faisal Husseini, a prominent Palestinian official based in Jerusalem. Hirschfeld currently teaches Middle Eastern history at the University of Haifa. Pundak died of cancer in 2014.

After a few meetings with Hirschfeld and Pundak, Qurei asked them to speak with the consent of authorized officials in Israel. That’s when Uri Savir, then director-general of Israel’s Foreign Ministry, stepped in. Then-Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin was well aware of the gatherings. Thus, the first contact between Israeli and Palestinians was made.

Then-foreign minister Shimon Peres was exposed to the talks in the early stages, while Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin became involved only when the time was ripe, according to Qurei’s confidants.

Arafat gave Qurei full backing for the talks from the earliest stages. “Arafat knew every step and therefore trusted Abu Alaa,” Qurei’s people said. But as Qurei’s role in establishing the accords became clear, Arafat envied his new international status. Nevertheless, Arafat treated Qurei with respect because Qurei remained loyal and careful about Arafat’s honor.

“On the Palestinian side, Abu Alaa was careful to keep his leader informed, which did not happen on the Israeli side until later stages,” those close to Qurei said. But as for the Israelis, Rabin told Peres, “I have to convince myself, so I will be able to convince my people.”

When Arafat entered Jericho in 1994, dozens of people from Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine showered him with difficult questions about recognizing Israel and making a political compromise. Arafat responded that the Palestinian Authority would be sulta moharba, a fighting authority.

Qurei’s people say that Arafat didn’t mean that literally; Qurei, rather, saw this as an attempt to silence Palestinian criticism.

According to Qurei’s associates, Arafat’s decision to renew “the armed struggle” in the Second Intifada stemmed from an American mistake of forcing the Palestinians to meet with then-Israeli president Ehud Barak at the Camp David II summit in 2000.

According to Qurei, the gaps between the two sides were too big, that the Palestinians were not ready for further political steps, and he accused Barak of having no genuine interest in peace. According to Qurei, Barak sought to use the summit to embarrass the Palestinians.

Regarding Mahmoud Abbas, Qurei’s people said the current Palestinian Authority president “prefers the existing situation and the continuation of the impasse, because a breakthrough would force him to make difficult decisions.”

Qurei on the Israeli prime ministers

Over the years, several Israelis who were close to former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said he considered withdrawing from the Oslo Accords because the nature of the Palestinian Authority became clear to him. Qurei told his people that he was never given that impression.

In one of the early meetings between Rabin and Arafat — in 1994, at the Erez checkpoint between Israel and Gaza — Rabin undertook to surround all Israeli settlements with a fence, ensuring that they would not expand. Qurei and Peres were present at the meeting.

When a wave of Palestinian suicide bombers struck Israel in 1996, Peres pleaded with Arafat by phone, “Stop the terrorism of Hamas. I am about to face Netanyahu in decisive elections, the attacks will hurt my chances.” Peres, who was shocked by Rabin’s murder, told Arafat, “In May, we will lose to Netanyahu.”

Qurei believed that Barak and Benjamin Netanyahu were very far from accepting the Oslo Accords, but in contrast, Olmert showed surprising political generosity towards Abbas, who became Palestinian president in 2004 following the death of Arafat. According to Qurei, Olmert wanted to be remembered as the Israeli leader who broke through the conflict with the Palestinians.

Olmert actually took over the negotiations when then-foreign minister Tzipi Livni was making progress in the peace talks. According to Qurei’s people, Qurei and Livni made significant progress, but Olmert wanted to advance himself and be the person alongside Abbas who brought about the final agreement.

But Olmert cooled off and “failed to show courage and at the end of the process. Olmert’s weakness and lack of courage defeated him, not the corruption scandals in which he got involved,” they said.

According to Qurei’s confidants, many in the Palestinian leadership regarded Olmert’s predecessor, Ariel Sharon, as the greatest Israeli leader since David Ben-Gurion. Ramallah viewed Sharon as a visionary able to act boldly and decisively, compared to other Israeli leaders.

Sharon showed great respect and courtesy in the meetings with the Palestinians, they added.

On the other hand, the Palestinians viewed Ehud Barak as cold and arrogant.

Qurei’s people said that Arafat visited Barak three times at his home in Kochav Yair, near Netanya, and that on the first two visits, the former prime minister did not even bother to accompany him to his helicopter. On Arafat’s third visit, Barak’s associates warned him about the lack of etiquette, and Barak accompanied the Palestinian leader.

Qurei saw this as a false show of respect, and in 2000, during the Camp David II summit, when Barak was photographed playfully pushing Arafat into a cabin as President Bill Clinton looked on, Qurei said he was not impressed and “knew” Barak did not intend to move forward on peace.

Moreover, Barak did not meet privately with Arafat at any point during the two-week summit, which drew the ire of Shimon Peres, who told Qurei that if it were up to him, he “would have slept with Arafat in the cabins at Camp David until the two of them left there together with a signed agreement.”

Barak v. Netanyahu

Qurei’s impression was that many Israeli leaders “wanted to cut the ribbon” at the end of the Oslo process — Olmert above all. Barak set impossible conditions from the very first stage, while Netanyahu expressed a principled opposition to any progress.

According to Qurei, the Hebron deal agreed upon by Netanyahu and the Palestinians in 1997 breached the Oslo accords. The Hebron agreement divided the city into Jewish and Palestinian areas, which Qurei called “a dangerous precedent.” Arafat accepted the agreement over Qurei’s objections.

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Energy Politics Will Define the Future of Europe

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine transformed the energy politics of Europe: America became Germany’s main importer of liquid natural gas and Putin pivoted east. This new order is likely to generate more conflicts than the one that came before it.

Manuela Schwesig (R), state premier of the federal state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, and Markus Soeder, state premier of the federal state of Bavaria, visit a site of Gascade and Deutsche ReGas where it is planned to feed the existing OPAL/NEL pipeline network with liquefied natural gas Lubmin, Germany, on August 30, 2022. (Odd Andersen / AFP via Getty Images)

Almost overnight, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine transformed energy politics and disrupted supply chains around the globe. Europe and the international community are now having to reckon with a world in which the largest energy oil producer is having to accommodate itself to a situation of increased economy autarky.

On the day of Russia’s invasion, Helen Thompson, a professor of political economy at the University of Cambridge, published Disorder: Hard Times in the 21st Century. Her book, which outlines the geopolitical fault lines caused by global energy production and distribution, spoke to a moment in which Europe faced its greatest conflict since the end of World War II.

Thompson spoke to Jacobin about the extent to which Russia’s invasion has upturned the energy politics of Europe and the world. This interview has been edited for readability and clarity.

Samuel McIlhagga

You were writing Disorder before the Ukraine war started. It has become a prescient book on the topics explored. Indeed, energy politics have reentered public perception. What about our current energy politics, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, aligns with your book, and what about our current impasse in terms of energy politics surprises you?

Helen Thompson

This is actually quite a hard question because I think there are two dynamics that pull in opposite directions. There is some continuity, clearly, between the story that I’m telling in Disorder and 2022 after the [the invasion on] February 24 of that year. One part of this is because I’ve made Ukraine pivotal as a European fault line going back to the beginning of the Cold War era.

The second reason is that 2022 made a lot of people more energy-conscious than they originally were. In terms of my ability to say, “I might have something in this book that we should take seriously,” that was very easy — a lot easier than it would have been without the war, which was quite disturbing. Where energy is concerned, continuity was already there before the war. The autumn of 2021 had been pretty difficult where energy was concerned. I remember at some point joking with my editor before the war, “Can’t we publish it in December on the coldest day of the year?” There was a sense, in the autumn, that there was an energy crisis brewing.

On the other hand, a good part of me, in those first weeks when the war began, thought that there was a world that ended on February 23 — a world that my book captured reasonably well. Now, there is a world that began on February 24, on the day of the book’s publication, that has somehow left the book behind. There’s a difference between saying that there are these long geopolitical fault lines in Europe — in particular, those bound up with fossil fuel energy — and then the outright war, in which you have the largest territorial state in Europe subjected to conquest by its neighbor.

You can tell a continuous story about the structural competition between the United States and Russia for European gas markets throughout the 2000s and 2010s.

I don’t want, in any way, to underestimate the rupture that the invasion was. It does belong in the world that I’m describing, in the sense that Russia and Ukraine were a growing problem. However, the way in which Putin chose to deal with that persistent fault line also radically changed the world.

Samuel McIlhagga

You write about how the shale export boom from America, in conjunction with Angela Merkel’s energy strategy around Russia, set the parameters of European politics in the 2010s.

Are we seeing a similar configuration regarding liquid national gas (LNG) exports, which are being hiked right now in the United States? There is also a discussion regarding a contemporary decline in industrial manufacturing capacity in Germany. Could German decline and American buoyancy be described as a follow-on from the 2010s? Or is this a new development? How much continuity is there? Is this a similar dynamic but in reverse — because Germany is now having to turn toward American gas exports rather than Russian?

Helen Thompson

There’s obviously a rupture, given that on February 24 Germany didn’t have any LNG ports — let alone the import ability to source LNG from the United States or anywhere else. I think you can tell a continuous story about the structural competition between the United States and Russia for European gas markets throughout the 2000s and 2010s. This was a competition that Russia had, largely, though not entirely, seen off in the 2010s.

Although, I think Putin was terrified by the emergence of competition at the beginning of the decade. While Poland and the Baltics see American LNG as a sovereignty lifeline, the big prize for the United States was always Germany. Germany didn’t move from the status quo. This is despite the fact of the transit issue of Nord Stream 2, and the United States’ ability to put a lot of pressure on Germany — which it did through the Trump years.

In May of 2021, when the Biden administration removed the sanctions on Nord Stream 2, you could say that Germany had won, in the sense of being able to assert its autonomy in deciding between Russian and American supply. What the war represents is a complete reversal. This is not a U-turn that Germany is entirely responsible for bringing about.

Indeed, Germany continued to import oil from the east through the Yamal-Europe pipeline. So although [Germany’s chancellor] Olaf Scholz rhetorically separated Germany from the gas relationship with Russia on February 27, 2022 in the Zeitenwende speech, nothing actually changed materially until Russia made its move. After the Nord Stream explosions in September, it is now pretty difficult for Germany to change its mind without having to go through a major crisis with its relations with Washington.

Samuel McIlhagga

A key theme in Disorder is the tension between the EU and NATO over security and energy, which is characterized by both competing interests and a synthesized mélange of geographic priorities. France and Germany stick out, historically, in terms of both monetary policy and energy policy, as being willing to distinguish themselves from the broader Atlanticist project.

France attempted to achieve this through energy autonomy and nuclear power, and Germany via stringent monetary policy. Obviously, Germany is now much more reliant on the United States for energy while France under Macron is still pursuing a nuclear strategy. Do you think that the tensions you charted through the 2000s and 2010s are going to continue? Or are we going to see a broader alignment between NATO and the EU? Or are the material contradictions between the two still a constraining factor? Is the current rhetorical alignment over Ukraine something of a blip in a longer story of tension?

Helen Thompson

I think if you look at the French-German position and, particularly, the French position under Macron, then this is clearly the end of the road. If you think back to the summer of 2019, Macron was making speeches saying that if Europe isn’t going to get swallowed up in the competition between the United States and China and disappear, then Europe needs a reset with Russia.

He talks in civilizational language about Russia being part of Europe and seems to admire Putin’s willingness to do the same. If you look at the other speeches that Macron is giving around that time, he argues that “NATO is brain-dead.” The world now — on NATO, the EU, and European strategic autonomy — is miles away from 2019. There is a chasm between what Macron had in mind in 2019 and where we are now.

You can’t achieve associate EU membership for Ukraine without NATO membership. Macron clearly says he doesn’t want Russia to be humiliated, yet NATO membership for Ukraine is clearly a humiliation for Russia.

Samuel McIlhagga

There is a definitive rhetorical alignment over Ukraine with both NATO and the EU. But whether that aligns materially is another question. I read the economic historian Adam Tooze recently on the gap between the rhetoric surrounding aid for Ukraine and actual spending. For instance, Poland, Estonia, and Lithuania, per capita, are spending far more on aid for Ukraine than Germany, France, or the UK. Obviously, there are historical and geographic reasons for this difference. But a “united front” is hiding a granularity of priority in relation to EU security: Will this open up again?

Helen Thompson

Absolutely. If you take the issue of Ukraine’s candidate status for the EU, it’s pretty clear that Macron is, at best, lukewarm. He would prefer a European political community that would include Britain, Ukraine, and a couple of other countries as outliers in a hierarchy. Once you consider that in order for Ukraine to enter the EU, it would need to enter NATO (because there is no concrete or actionable EU security policy), then things get complicated.

The thing I said about Ukraine, in relation to the EU associate membership in 2014, was that when you look at all the other cases of membership, either you get prior NATO membership and then EU accession or you get both in the same year, like the Baltics. You can’t achieve associate EU membership for Ukraine without NATO membership. Look what happened in 2014. That raises profound questions because Macron clearly says he doesn’t want Russia to be humiliated, yet NATO membership for Ukraine is clearly a humiliation for Russia. There is a chasm between the words of support for Ukraine, in this regard, and its long-term material trajectory.

Samuel McIlhagga

There hasn’t been too much serious and public discussion about where Ukraine stands once the war is over. Is it a satellite of Russia? Is it an independent but neutral buffer state? Is it a fully integrated member of the EU and NATO? Or does it buck the trend and somehow join just one organization?

Helen Thompson

I think Macron would prefer to think of it in buffer state terms rather than through the prism of membership in either NATO or the EU.

Samuel McIlhagga

We’re not hearing much from Macron on this at the moment.

Helen Thompson

I think every time he tries to say something it’s interpreted less than charitably.

I would say that where the fraught EU-NATO relationship really does not go away is the Turkey question. The war has brought back up why the EU-NATO fault line cuts as deep and problematically as it does. I spent a lot of time on Turkey’s foreign policy in Disorder, probably as much time as I spent on Ukraine. I ran them as parallel stories

Samuel McIlhagga

Yes — the parallels between Turkey and Ukraine are interesting. You present this image of an energy arch, consumed in Central Europe, that has two competing streams — one originating in Azerbaijan and transiting through Turkey and another originating in Russia and transiting through Ukraine and Poland.

Helen Thompson

They are both transit states. Turkey’s hope is that it is going to have it both ways — being a transit hub for non-Russian gas, particularly Azerbaijanian and maybe in time Iranian supplies, and a route for Russian energy. The war has shown how problematic Turkey still is concerning the EU-NATO relationship.

What the Ukrainian war has demonstrated is that if there is a conflict in the Black Sea, Turkey is absolutely indispensable to NATO’s security.

We have Macron coming out with the “brain-dead” comment about NATO, specifically in response to what Turkey was doing in Syria against both the Kurds and the Assad government. Yet, what the Ukrainian war has demonstrated is that if there is a conflict in the Black Sea, Turkey is absolutely indispensable to NATO’s security. You cannot sort the EU-NATO misalignment out by banishing Turkey from NATO. This has been made abundantly clear by what’s happening in Ukraine.

Samuel McIlhagga

Looping back to Azerbaijan — we saw Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission president, talking to Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s president, in Baku last year, to secure an energy deal for the EU. There is a weird disjuncture between stating that one is going to reduce one’s energy usage and reliance on Russia because of its human rights record, expansionism, and aggression and yet, in parallel, going cap in hand to a government that is committing brutal war crimes against Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Yet, this seems to be strategically fine for some politicians in the EU. There is a catch-22, whereby if we argue that we can’t get energy ethically from Russia, we fundamentally undermine our ability to morally get it from anywhere outside a select few countries. Would you say moral hypocrisy currently seems the better option than extreme scarcity for the EU ruling class?

Helen Thompson

It’s a pick-your-poison dilemma. Obviously, not everybody in Europe can get more supplies of gas from Norway. Even an energy supplier like Algeria poses a set of complications, not least because of the disputes between Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara and the fact that the United States recognizes Rabat’s claim against Algiers’s.

If you go back to the history of the gas relationship, in particular between the Soviet Union, Central European countries, and Italy, the big move for mutual energy relations came in the immediate aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In the 1980s, when the volume of gas to Europe was increased because of the construction of the Trans-Siberian pipeline, the Soviet Union was also invading Afghanistan and imposing martial law in Poland. There has been a history of complete indifference in Europe — complete ethical indifference. Although, I’m not saying that’s right or wrong geopolitically.

This Isn’t the First Time Conservatives Have Banned Cross-Dressing in America

The recent spree of cross-dressing bans has a precedent in the harassment, imprisonment, and deportation of so-called sexual deviants in the US since the 19th century. Civil rights campaigners defeated reactionaries in the ’60s. They can do the same today.

Drag Queen Brigitte Bandit laughs with supporters during a story-time reading at the Cheer Up Charlies dive bar on March 11, 2023 in Austin, Texas. (Brandon Bell / Getty Images)

Two weeks ago, Tennessee passed a new state law that limits drag shows. Under the law, male and female impersonators who appeal “to a prurient interest” are classified as adult-oriented entertainers and banned from performing on public property or in places where children might be present. Similar bills are pending in at least fourteen states, and more are likely to come.

These bills are the latest in a recent wave of attacks on trans and queer communities, emerging in the wake of multiple state laws that restrict trans people’s access to public bathrooms, school sports, and gender-affirming health care, and that ban teachers from discussing sexual or gender identity with elementary school students. Drag bans, however, also have clear connections to earlier laws against public cross-dressing that swept the nation in the nineteenth century and terrorized queer and trans communities in the 1950s and 1960s. The history of anti-cross-dressing laws provides useful context for understanding how gender nonconformity was policed in the past, and how similar laws might be challenged today.

Nineteenth-Century Cross-Dressing Laws

During the second half of the nineteenth century, multiple cities across the United States passed laws against public cross-dressing. The first appeared in St Louis, Missouri in 1843, followed by Columbus, Ohio in 1848 and Nashville, Tennessee in 1850. Over forty US cities passed similar laws before the end of the nineteenth century, and by the 1920s nineteen additional cities had adopted cross-dressing laws of their own.

Most anti-cross-dressing laws banned public appearance in “a dress not belonging to his or her sex” or “wearing the apparel of the other sex,” although some towns and cities passed laws against “indecent dress” or the wearing of “disguises” instead. Anti-cross-dressing laws were typically passed as part of broader anti-vice campaigns that also targeted prostitution, vagrancy, public drunkenness, and disorderly conduct. San Francisco’s 1863 law was typical of the time, outlawing cross-dressing as one manifestation of the broader offense of indecency, alongside public nudity, indecent exposure, lewd acts, and immoral performances.

During the nineteenth century, anti-cross-dressing laws operated as flexible tools for policing a wide range of gender transgressions.

In turn, nineteenth-century anti-vice campaigns gained traction during a period of rapid social and economic change, characterized by urbanization, industrialization, changing patterns of immigration, shifting sexual and gender norms, and the end of slavery. As federal and state governments passed restrictive immigration policies and segregationist Jim Crow laws to protect the economic and political interests of white propertied men, local governments enacted a range of indecency and public nuisance laws — including cross-dressing laws — to impose their vision of social order onto city space.

Anti-cross-dressing laws were the exclusive province of local governments, and no state or federal legislature directly outlawed this type of dress. Several states did, however, pass anti-disguise or masquerade laws that encompassed cross-dressing when enforced. In 1845, for example, New York’s state legislature passed an anti-disguise law that made it a crime to appear in public with a painted face or when wearing a disguise designed to prevent identification. Passed in response to rural workers who wore women’s dresses and masks while participating in anti-rent protests, the law was later used to criminalize a wide range of cross-dressing practices.

Similarly, in 1874, California’s state legislature passed a masquerade law in response to gambling saloon dealers who wore disguises to avoid identification by undercover police. As with New York’s anti-disguise statute, local police repurposed California’s masquerade law to arrest multiple people for public cross-dressing over the next one hundred years.

During the nineteenth century, anti-cross-dressing laws operated as flexible tools for policing a wide range of gender transgressions. Thousands of people were arrested under these laws, including feminist dress reformers, female impersonators, women who wore men’s clothing for travel or work, people who cross-dressed to express same-sex desires, rebellious young women who dressed as men for a night out on the town, and people whose gender identifications did not match the sex they were assigned at birth. Some people were punished with small fines, while others received jail sentences of up to six months. Police harassment and abuse were common, and public exposure in city newspapers could destroy people’s lives.

From the late nineteenth century onward, cross-dressing arrests occasionally led to psychiatric institutionalization. In 1895, for example, New York authorities sent a person to Bellevue Hospital’s psychiatric wing following their arrest for wearing women’s clothing on a body the law deemed male. Similarly, on the other side of the country, Los Angeles police arrested a man named Jack Garland in 1917 and placed him in a state psychiatric institution for refusing to wear women’s clothing, after they classified him as female.

In 1890, a San Francisco judge sent a person named Dick/Mamie Ruble to the Stockton Insane Asylum for wearing men’s clothing in violation of cross-dressing law. In court, Ruble disputed the charge, insisting that ‘I’m neither a man nor a woman and I’ve got no sex at all.’

For some arrestees, detention in a psychiatric hospital was a traumatic short-term experience; for others it was a life sentence. In 1890, a San Francisco judge sent a person named Dick/Mamie Ruble to the Stockton Insane Asylum for wearing men’s clothing in violation of cross-dressing law. In court, Ruble disputed the charge, insisting that “I’m neither a man nor a woman and I’ve got no sex at all.” Judges and doctors viewed this claim as clear evidence of insanity, and Ruble remained in the state asylum for eighteen years, until dying of tuberculosis in 1908.

For people born outside the United States, cross-dressing arrests could also trigger deportation, under an 1891 federal immigration law that facilitated the removal of noncitizens who were convicted of a range of “morals” offenses. In 1917, a San Francisco woman named Geraldine Portica fell afoul of this policy when local police identified her as male and arrested her for wearing women’s clothing as prohibited by law. Although Portica had lived as a female in San Francisco since her childhood, she was deported to Mexico after her cross-dressing arrest. Immigration officials also denied some people entry to the United States for wearing clothing that did not match their assigned sex, including Otillie Castnaugle in 1902 and Alejandra Velas in the 1910s.

In the face of arrest, harassment, and punishment, individuals resisted cross-dressing law in multiple ways during the nineteenth century. Some people simply refused to comply with the law, despite being arrested multiple times. In 1870s San Francisco, for example, Jeanne Bonnet faced constant arrest and punishment under the city’s cross-dressing law, appearing in court more than twenty times. Despite stiff fines and jail time, however, Bonnet was unrepentant, telling the judge: “You may send me to jail as often as you please but you can never make me wear women’s clothing again.”

Other people challenged the underlying logic of the law. From the 1860s onward, feminist dress reformers spoke up in court to assert their legal right to wear pants and to dispute the assumption that such clothing belonged exclusively to men. Judges were sometimes sympathetic to these claims, but only dismissed charges against individual offenders, failing to invalidate the law itself.

Another set of people challenged cross-dressing law by asserting their identification with a sex that ostensibly did not “belong” to their body. In 1903, for example, Milton Matson appeared in a San Francisco courtroom following his arrest as a “female in male attire.” Addressing the judge, Matson explained that he had lived as a man for over twenty years and demanded legal recognition of his manhood and the accompanying right to wear men’s clothes. Matson’s challenge was unsuccessful, but it did prompt considerable cultural debate about the legitimacy of cross-dressing law and anticipated one of the legal strategies that lead to the law’s demise in the mid-twentieth century.

Twentieth Century Enforcement and Repeal

Although cross-dressing laws had their legal and social roots in the mid-nineteenth century, they remained in force for more than one hundred years, becoming a central tool for policing queer and trans communities in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. During these decades, antigay and anti-trans policing intensified across the nation, and the visibility of clothing made cross-dressing an easy target.

Police raids on mid-twentieth century queer bars, for example, regularly led to the arrest of butch lesbians, trans women, and gay men in drag for violating cross-dressing law. Firsthand accounts of these raids describe police enforcing a “three items of clothing” rule that required people to wear three articles of gender-appropriate clothing or face arrest.

Defendants brought cases that successfully challenged two assumptions of cross-dressing law: first, that clothing could be easily identified as belonging to one of two discrete sexes, and second, that people could be similarly neatly classified.

In most cities, police departments relied upon earlier cross-dressing laws in their assault on queer and trans communities, but some cities adopted new laws that extended the criminalization of cross-dressing even further. In 1944, for example, Detroit extended its cross-dressing ban to private premises that were open or visible to the public. Miami followed suit in 1956 and also passed a law in 1952 that banned female impersonators from performing in the city. During these decades, hundreds of people were arrested each year for cross-dressing in major cities, and from the 1960s onward, reports of these arrests filled the pages of the burgeoning gay and trans press.

By the 1970s, however, the days of cross-dressing law were numbered. Throughout the mid-twentieth century, queer and trans communities grew in visibility and power, and during the 1960s, activists pursued new militant modes of collective resistance to police harassment. These included spontaneous street protests, such as the 1969 Stonewall riot in New York City and the 1966 Compton’s Cafeteria riot in San Francisco, which were triggered in part by police harassment under cross-dressing law. They also included the formation of new transsexual and transvestite organizations that provided resources, support, and advocacy for challenging cross-dressing laws in court. Such activism, of course, did not occur in a vacuum, but emerged in tandem with the era’s radical social movements, including the Black Power movement, the Chicano movement, second-wave feminism, gay liberation, and the antiwar movement.

From the late 1960s through the 1980s, people convicted of cross-dressing offenses brought new and successful challenges in court to the legitimacy of cross-dressing law. These challenges built on earlier histories of individual resistance and culminated in a series of state supreme court rulings that found cross-dressing law to be unconstitutional. Supported by activist organizations and sympathetic lawyers, defendants brought cases that successfully challenged two foundational assumptions of cross-dressing law: first, that clothing could be easily identified as belonging to one of two discrete sexes, and second, that people could be similarly neatly classified.

In challenging the first of these assumptions, defendants and their lawyers pointed to the growing popularity of unisex fashions during the 1960s. Promoted by hippy youth subcultures and broader fashion trends, gender ambiguous clothing styles blurred the line between men’s and women’s dress, rendering bans on clothing that “did not belong to his or her sex” unconstitutionally vague.

In making this argument, lawyers drew from a recent US Supreme Court ruling, Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville (1972), which invalidated a local vagrancy law for failing to clearly define illegal conduct. In 1975, the Ohio Supreme Court agreed with this reasoning and ruled that a cross-dressing law in the city of Columbus was unconstitutionally vague, due to shifting definitions of men’s and women’s clothing. Following this ruling, defendants in other cities issued similar challenges to cross-dressing law, and multiple local ordinances were overturned on these grounds.

In other cases, defendants and their lawyers challenged cross-dressing law as a form of cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, because it prevented transsexuals from following medically necessarily treatment protocols. Although individuals arrested under cross-dressing law had long argued that gender identity could diverge from the sex assigned at birth, this argument gained new legal credibility in the 1960s due to increasing medical recognition of transsexuality.

In multiple courtrooms, doctors appeared as expert witnesses to testify that cross-dressing law interfered with their treatment of transsexuality, because it criminalized patients’ efforts to live as the opposite sex for lengthy periods of time, as established standards of care required. At least some state courts accepted this argument, and cross-dressing laws in Columbus, Chicago, and Houston were invalidated on these grounds.

There are several similarities between earlier anti-cross-dressing laws and the drag bans of today. Both sets of laws are concerned with the public visibility of gender nonconformity, and both conceive of drag as a form of indecency. Anti-cross-dressing laws and drag bans also share a reliance on vague language that makes them flexible tools for policing and vulnerable to constitutional challenge. Importantly, the history of cross-dressing law points to the tenacity of people arrested, as well as the power of collective organizing and struggle. Although current drag bans are in their early stages and have not yet gone into effect, the history of cross-dressing law provides useful information on how they can be challenged and ultimately overturned.

LancetGate: “Scientific Corona Lies” and Big Pharma Corruption. Hydroxychloroquine versus Gilead’s Remdesivir

The campaign against HCQ is carried out through slanderous political statements, media smears, not to mention an authoritative peer reviewed “evaluation” published on May 22nd by The Lancet, which was based on fake figures and test trials.

The post LancetGate: “Scientific Corona Lies” and Big Pharma Corruption. Hydroxychloroquine versus Gilead’s Remdesivir appeared first on Global Research.

WATCH: Cuomo launches ‘Progressives for Israel; ‘time for Shabbos goy to turn on the lights’

“Never again!” Disgraced former New York State governor Andrew Cuomo, speaking at the World Values Networks’ 80th commemoration of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, announced the launch of ‘Progressives for Israel.’

It was my honor to speak in support of Israel for the World Values Network’s 80th commemoration of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising @carnegiehall. And to honor the life of @RabbiShmuley‘s mother, Eleanor Esther Elka Paul.

You can view my full speech here: https://t.co/9qZebGFntq pic.twitter.com/uSU92bErBy

— Andrew Cuomo (@andrewcuomo) March 15, 2023

The post WATCH: Cuomo launches ‘Progressives for Israel; ‘time for Shabbos goy to turn on the lights’ appeared first on World Israel News.

WATCH: Think tank behind Israel’s judicial overhaul calls for compromise

HonestReporting Executive Director Gil Hoffman says the Kohelet Policy Forum was under pressure to come out in favor of compromise, paving the way for the government to back down from the legislative process.

The post WATCH: Think tank behind Israel’s judicial overhaul calls for compromise appeared first on World Israel News.