Category: Uncategorized

Eurosceptism will only deepen as Brussels fails to deal with European issues.

Two men shot and wounded by terrorist in eastern Jerusalem on Holocaust Remembrance Day; manhunt for shooter is ongoing.

By World Israel News Staff

Two Israeli men were shot and wounded by a terrorist with an improvised machine gun as they drove through the eastern Jerusalem Shimon HaTzadik (Sheikh Jarrah) neighborhood on Tuesday morning.

According to Hebrew language media, the two men, aged 48 and 50, were en route to morning prayers at a nearby synagogue when they were targeted by the terrorist.

“They continued driving and stopped near a police car and reported the incident to them,” MDA medic Nir Buzaglo told Hebrew language media.

“We arrived at the scene quickly… one of the victims was lying on the road and the other was walking nearby, they were fully conscious and suffered from gunshot wounds to their upper bodies,” he said.

The victims, who are hospitalized at two different Jerusalem hospitals, are both currently listed as being in stable condition.

At press time, police were searching for the assailant, who fled the scene without being apprehended.

Near the scene of the shooting, authorities found a “Carlo” submachine gun – an improvised machine gun often used in Palestinian terror attacks, which is assembled in illegal workshops in Arab enclaves within Judea and Samaria.

The weapon is compact and can be easily hidden on a terrorist’s person, without attracting attention.

Tuesday’s attack occurred as Israel observes Yom HaShoah, a national day of mourning for the victims of the Holocaust.

Last night, as the memorial day began, terrorists near Jenin fired across the Green Line towards Kibbutz Merav, striking several homes. No casualties were reported.

Earlier in the day on Monday, a female terrorist stabbed an Israeli man waiting at a bus stop in Gush Etzion. She was shot in the leg by soldiers stationed nearby.

The victim, a father of three, underwent surgery at a Jerusalem hospital and is expected to survive.

The post 2 wounded in Jerusalem shooting; terrorist at large appeared first on World Israel News.

There is an ongoing discussion about a potential coup d’état against the Islamic Regime in Iran. Protestors have been heard chanting “be our ally” during anti-regime protests as they sought support from the military. Evidence of dissent and dissatisfaction in the armed forces during the 2022 uprising suggests that a coup may be a matter of discussion within the organization. The feasibility of military action requires more attention as it could accelerate the fall of the Islamic Regime. For the armed forces to back the Iranian nation against the regime, certain conditions must be met. 

Firstly, the army needs assurances that, in the case of a coup, the West would not hinder but rather support its efforts. But beyond that, a successful coup d’état requires a unifying authority to rely on. Prince Reza Pahlavi’s monarchic heritage and military background enable him to be that authority. 

The recent campaign to give the Prince the power of representation is a milestone in facilitating this imperative. Further, a recent study from February 2023 on the political views of Iranians demonstrated that nearly 80% support Prince Reza Pahlavi, with nearly 60% favoring the return of the constitutional monarchy. Iranians asked Prince Reza Pahlavi to act as their representative in international organizations. They demanded that the Prince ought to be consulted by Western powers on any decision that would affect the future of Iran. Prince Reza Pahlavi is deemed the most trustworthy opposition figure to unify and coordinate Iran’s political diaspora.

The Prince responded enthusiastically to calls for leading the uprising and his return to Iran by speaking at the European Parliament and consulting officials from the EU. He made it clear that for any meaningful cooperation in the Iranian diaspora, three minimal principles ought to be respected: Iran’s territorial integrity; secular democracy; free and fair elections to decide on the specifics of the political system (e.g. monarchy or a republic). Thus far, the Prince is the only opposition figure with a transparent agenda for the transition period.

It is a widespread belief among Iranians that army officers hold a proclivity toward the Pahlavi dynasty and the sentiments of the uprisings. The army was established by the first king of the Pahlavi dynasty, Reza Shah, and has always been held in suspicion by the Islamic Regime’s intelligence services for its said monarchic inclinations. In November of 2022, a document with orders to “increase security and supervision” was leaked. Orders were issued to increase supervision of the army and look out for any signs of dissent. Higher authorities also wanted to see an increase in members’ knowledge of matters related to Islamic ideology.

Dissatisfaction has been observed in other bodies of the armed forces as well. Prince Reza Pahlavi indicated his desire to also see dissenting military officers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps backing Iranians when the time comes. He calls this strategy “maximum fall from the regime.”

The question of whether the army is capable of a coup bears two implications: feasibility and timing.  Iranian history attests that coups in favor of freedom and modernity are feasible. The 1921 coup by military officer Reza Khan — who was later appointed king by the parliament, establishing the Pahlavi dynasty — ascertained that a coup with internal support and the eradication of external hindrances could pave the way for a new era. After the 1921 coup, Iranian elites witnessed the modernity in Reza’s thought and supported his efforts toward women’s rights and religious freedoms. It was only after the coup that the Constitution-era pursuits of Iranian elites became reality and no longer only words in articles and poems.

The caveat is in the timing. The army can only act once. It would either succeed in overthrowing the Islamic Regime or fail miserably. Should a national coup in favor of the Iranian liberal and democratic movement succeed, the army would ensure that the Prince and international organizations oversee a free and fair election to decide on the specifics of this new political system. Further, it would protect all Iranian ethnicities and vulnerable groups from harm and anarchy during the transition period. A successful military coup ensures a stable and less costly transition.

However, there is no room for trial and error. If the army acts and fails then mass arrests, executions, and purges will occur, voiding the army of its essence. Subsequently, any hope for future support from the army would diminish.

The army will not want to risk a disaster of this sort, so it awaits the right moment. This ‘right moment’ is when the Islamic Regime has lost all support and is no longer appeased by Western powers. The West should take concrete actions toward this imperative that assures the army of logistical and moral support in the case of a coup. The international community should give direct and indirect assurances that, in following a coup, it would not hinder or interfere with the efforts of Iranians toward freedom.

The appeasement policies of the West toward the Islamic Regime have left little room for deliberations on the potential of a coup. Nonetheless, the question of how and when the army would back Iranians is remarkably alive inside the country.

The post Could a Coup d’état Lead to Revolution in Iran? appeared first on Providence.

The entire government is in breach of the ministerial code, meaning there may be more undeclared ministers’ interests

A neighborhood in Kansas City, Missouri, was stricken with sorrow this past Thursday evening when a 16-year-old African American teen, Ralph Yarl, was shot in the head after unintentionally ringing the wrong doorbell as he went to pick up his siblings.

Yarl was instantly brought to the hospital with life-threatening injuries and is still recovering. The owner of the residence where the young man had gone was apprehended by police officers and released within 24 hours.

The Kansas City Police Department (KCPD) mentioned the shooting is being looked into as a case of mistaken identity and is still gathering evidence to fulfill the investigation.

Stacey Graves, Chief of the KCPD, said authorities would be in contact with the Clay County Prosecutor’s office with the evidence they have collected. It was heartbreaking to learn that Ralph had intended to go to an address just a block away from the scene of the incident.

As reports of the shooting spread, city government leaders shared their sentiments of outrage. Mayor Quinton Lucas voiced his concern, saying the Kansas City Police Department is devoting the full attention of their force and that the case was not being ignored.

Lawyer Ben Crump stated in an interview with the Kansas City Star that citizens could not shoot people without proper justification and that knocking on one’s door does not grant an individual such permission.

The shooting of Ralph Yarl is a tragic event for the community. The Kansas City Police Department is gathering evidence to bring justice to the case and confirm the shooter’s actions. Individuals must acknowledge the gravity of this incident and the consequences of their actions.

When Nigerian president Muhammadu Buhari came to power in 2015, some hoped his administration would enact a left-populist agenda. A close examination of his administration’s ideological roots reveals that was always wishful thinking.

Muhammadu Buhari delivers remarks to journalists in Belem Presidential Palace in Lisbon, Portugal on June 30, 2022. (Horacio Villalobos / Corbis via Getty Images)

In the wake of the hard-fought and widely unpopular presidential victory of the All Progressives Congress (APC) in Nigeria’s 2023 presidential election, it is easily forgotten that the ruling party’s initial triumph in 2015 seemed to represent the flowering of popular aspiration.

Bearing “change” as its campaign slogan, the party came to power in the first victory by an opposition party, with its presidential candidate Muhammadu Buhari defeating Goodluck Jonathan of the incumbent Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), which had held power since Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999.

But the APC seemed to represent change in more fundamental ways. The party’s rise was propelled by popular protest against austerity policies, chief of which was the PDP’s attempt to remove Nigeria’s fuel subsidy. Having overseen a period of commercial expansion, GDP growth, and intensified privatization of state-owned enterprises, the PDP, it appeared, had overplayed its hand in attempting to remove Nigeria’s “meagre but essential form of social welfare, derived from the country’s vast petroleum resources.”

When the PDP government announced a planned removal of the subsidy in 2012, prominent opposition party leaders — who only a year later would unite to form the APC — joined unionists, civil-society groups, and youth activists in a nationwide protest. The ensuing general strike and #OccupyNigeria protests contributed to the downfall of the PDP government at the same time as social movements and political parties were challenging orthodox economic regimes across the globe.

Thus, seen as arriving in the wake of candidates such as Bernie Sanders and Jeremy Corbyn, and parties such as Podemos and Syriza, who “used popular discontent with austerity as a springboard to elected office,” it is understandable that some observers hoped the APC could succeed in breaking “with the assumptions of neoliberal technocratic management.”

As such, Buhari’s victory can be considered a product of what has been called “the end of the end of history” — a period concurrently marked by the breakdown of the neoliberal order and the rise of the “global populist wave,” which appeared to gain pace across consolidated and electoral democracies alike.

The Buhari administration’s attempted challenge to neoliberalism has been as ineffective as it has been fraught with contradictions.

However, approaching the end of its tenure, it is clear that the Buhari administration’s attempted challenge to neoliberalism has been as ineffective as it has been fraught with contradictions — both those inherent to the nature of the ruling party’s coalition and driven by exogenous economic and political events. This essay focuses on the former. Specifically, it considers the ideological foundations of the Buhari administration, assessing how far they shaped the economic policy pursued by the administration and what might come after it.

A Progressive Era Dawns?

Some early explorations of the ideological underpinnings of the APC administration under Buhari — in terms of both its campaign promises and its approach to economic governance — viewed the party as an attempted left-wing challenge to neoliberalism, effectively taking at its word the APC’s “progressive” self-ascription.

Prominent members of the APC at various points seemed to echo this narrative. Bola Tinubu, a mastermind of the APC coalition and Nigeria’s current president-elect, said during the 2015 campaign:

On the one side, the PDP champions a conservative, elitist economic model based on the theory that wealth money (sic) must first go to the already rich and well-heeled who shall determine how small a fraction of it will trickle-down to the rest of society. On the progressive side, we believe government can fillip economic growth and development in such a way that brings the fairness of prosperity to all of society.

This “progressive” vision also appeared to be borne out in several aspects of the administration’s economic approach during Buhari’s first term. In addition to increasing spending on infrastructure, the administration also moderately expanded existing conditional cash-transfer programs.

Even more striking, perhaps, was the administration’s attempt to manage the value of the national currency, pushing the Central Bank of Nigeria to restrict domestic access to foreign exchange. This apparent abandonment of central bank independence, a norm often identified as a pillar of neoliberal common sense, alarmed many Nigerian commentators and suggested to some that President Buhari harbored “socialist leanings.”

Yet, the comparative record of the global populist wave suggests that implementing protectionist policy has been as much a part of the tool kit of a diverse array of governments on the populist right — including those led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Narendra Modi, and former US president Donald Trump — as on the populist left.

Accounting for the Buhari administration’s economic impulse in terms of a progressive inclination within the APC overstates the party’s ideological coherence.

Moreover, accounting for the Buhari administration’s economic impulse in terms of a progressive inclination within the APC overstates the party’s ideological coherence. In reality, the APC remains a fragile coalition between the two main opposition party-families that came together in 2013 to form the Congress for Progressive Change/All Nigeria Peoples Party led by Buhari, and the Action Congress of Nigeria led by Bola Tinubu. The latter faction — which does self-describe as “progressive” — remained the junior partner in the coalition until Tinubu’s recent presidential victory.

This segment of the APC, with its base in southwest Nigeria, traces its genealogy to Obafemi Awolowo, the Nigerian independence leader and statesman who was among a generation of anglophone African independence leaders affiliated with the socialist Fabian Society in the UK. However, scholars of contemporary southwest Nigerian politics have long noted a departure from these earlier roots. Instead, they point out that the trajectories of states led by members of the Tinubu fold have now largely conformed to the Lagos Model, an ethnically inflected articulation of neoliberal governance reforms anchored on developing “world-class cities” and epitomized by the recent development trajectory of the city of Lagos.

More importantly, to generalize left-populist progressivism as the APC’s economic philosophy would also be to gloss over the more interesting (if less frequently acknowledged) ideological genealogy of the leading faction of the APC, spearheaded by Buhari.

Crucially, many of the central architects of this faction — often associated with the cryptically named “Kaduna Mafia” — have been among the leading lights of a school of northern Nigerian academics and public intellectuals who are self-described as “radical conservatives.” (A lot of their writings have appeared in the publication gamji.com, named after the Gamji club, which was founded by Ibrahim Tahir at Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) in 1967 as a social club in honor of Nigeria’s archconservative independence leader, Ahmadu Bello). This camp has counted some of the most influential Buhari administration players within its fold, including Buhari’s closest advisers, such as Abba Kyari and Mamman Daura. Though the philosophical sources of their economic vision are likely as varied as any other school of political thought, many members of this grouping — including Kyari and Daura — acknowledge their intellectual debts to the late Tahir, a Cambridge-educated sociologist and political strategist.

While ideologically idiosyncratic, Tahir and the school of thought he helped nurture have been united by a mix of cultural conservatism and respect for traditional hierarchy, as well as a firm belief in the power of a strong nationalist state to stabilize the market economy through maintaining a meritocratic basis for capital accumulation. During Tahir’s time as a head of the sociology department at ABU, his conservative, state-capitalist perspective — compared by some of his disciples to the “one-nation Toryism” of the UK context — brought Tahir into frequent and heated intellectual conflict with a politically less influential school of ABU-based communist and socialist academics, including Yusufu Bala Usman and Patrick Wilmot.

While ideologically idiosyncratic, Tahir and the school of thought he helped nurture have been united by a mix of cultural conservatism and respect for traditional hierarchy.

Tahir would later become an early champion of Buhari’s presidential bid, serving as his campaign’s spokesperson in 2003 and 2007. It might not be overly presumptuous to surmise that Tahir’s service as one of Buhari’s intellectual inspirations shaped the administration’s decision in 2022 to posthumously award Tahir an Officer of the Order of the Federal Republic (OFR), among Nigeria’s highest national honors.

In addition to the pride of place afforded to Tahir and other avowed right-wing ideologues within his inner circle (the late Mahmud Tukur, another ABU-based academic and statesman, deserves honorable mention here), Buhari’s long association with conservative cultural politics is a further reason why his party’s “progressive” self-ascription carries a note of irony.

Considering the party’s wider ideological underpinnings, it is evident that contemporary attempts to ascribe socialist leanings to the APC or Buhari are, at best, misinformed. If this begins to clarify what, in ideological terms, the Buhari-led APC government was not, it still leaves open the question of what the administration was. Have the ideological influences spelled out above had an impact on some of the key politico-economic pursuits of the administration? How might the legacy of “Buharism” influence what comes after Buhari?

Revisiting “Buharism”

One of the initial obstacles to understanding the economic vision of the Buhari administration is that most commentators begin with an ipso facto dismissal of its economic approach, taking as a given that economic policy under Buhari has been essentially directionless. Lacking serious critical assessments of the ideological identity and legacy of the APC’s first presidential administration, we are left to consider how defenders of the administration have articulated its vision. How, in other words, has what has been called “Buharism” been understood on its own terms?

As one of its earlier proponents, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi — the outspoken former governor of the Nigerian Central Bank and emir of Kano — proposed the clearest articulation of Buharism, pointing out the neoclassical basis of the fiscal and monetary policies pursued by Buhari’s first military government (1983–1984), most of which have resurfaced under the current administration.

In Sanusi’s reading, while Buharism entailed a form of nationalist resistance to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)–encouraged prescription of currency devaluation that gained prominence in Nigeria in the early 1980s, it was also “based on a sound understanding of neo-classical economics.”

For Sanusi, Buhari’s military administration mounted this resistance based on the expectation that given Nigeria’s dependency on oil — a commodity denominated in dollars — the devaluation of the naira would not improve Nigeria’s disadvantaged balance-of-payments condition. Instead, he argued, Buharists held that:

the only groups who would benefit from devaluation were the rich parasites who had enough liquidity to continue with their conspicuous consumption, the large multi-national corporations with an unlimited access to loanable funds and the foreign “investor” who can now purchase our grossly cheapened and undervalued domestic assets. In one stroke we would wipe out the middle class, destroy indigenous manufacturing, undervalue the national wealth and create inflation and unemployment. This is standard economic theory and it is exactly what happened to Nigeria after it went through the hands of our IMF economists under IBB.

Usefully, this clarifies that a key segment of the Buharist social base included a domestic elite, typified by Sanusi himself, who desired to see the Nigerian state turn more strongly in favor of domestic capitalist production over the interests of foreign investment. Sanusi says as much, mischievously opting to put the issue in Marxian language when he goes on to refer to Buharism as a “bourgeois nationalist” ideology, forced to take “extreme measures” to resist “Global capitalism (externally)” and “its parasitic and unpatriotic agents and spokespersons (internally).”

A key segment of the Buharist social base included a domestic elite who desired to see the Nigerian state turn more strongly in favor of domestic capitalist production over the interests of foreign investment.

Indeed, the necessity and urgency of such resistance form part of Sanusi’s justification for the administration’s imposition of “Draconian policies,” which Sanusi saw as the basis of economic success in “the ‘tiger economies’ of Asia such as Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia and Thailand.” He further argues that “the harsh exchange control and economic sabotage laws of Buharism were a necessary and logical fallout of its economic theory,” before evocatively concluding that, “At his best Buhari may have been a Bonaparte or a Bismarck. At his worst he may have been a Hitler or a Mussolini.”

What most commends Sanusi’s elaboration of Buharism is not only his compelling assessment of the economic regime as effectively right-wing nationalist, but also the remarkable extent to which his analysis of this economic philosophy in its initial military guise preempted the economic trajectory of Buhari’s democratic government.

Yet, where my disagreement arises with Sanusi’s early definition of Buharism is that his largely glowing portrait de-emphasizes crucial features of this economic approach which, in both its initial and current iteration, presage its downfall. In the first place, Sanusi overstates the extent to which Buharism aims to erect a genuine roadblock — as opposed, say, to a temporary and corrective pit stop — to further liberalization. In A History of Nigeria, historians Toyin Falola and Matthew Heaton lend credence to this pit-stop alternative when they argue that:

Buhari’s main emphasis was to root out corrupt persons and practices so as to ensure that [the IMF-proposed] austerity policies were followed appropriately. The idea was that, if Nigerian government and business made a concerted and conspicuous effort to live by ethical and legitimate business practices and to pay off loans in a timely manner, foreign investors would be more willing to see Nigeria as a safe and potentially lucrative place to do business.

Similarly, in the 1980s. Adebayo Olukoshi and Tajudeen Abdulraheem, as well as Olatunde Ojo and Peter Koehn, pointed out that with the exception of the junta’s resistance to devaluing the naira at a rate acceptable to the IMF, Buhari’s wider economic policy regime was pursued within the broad framework of continuing negotiations with the IMF, which the administration hoped would result in a $2.5-3 billion loan.

Indeed, as Sanusi ultimately acknowledged in a follow-up essay responding to critics of his original piece, the first Buhari government oversaw currency depreciation, but in a gradual and controlled manner, concluding that this “gradualist approach to deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation” was preferable to the “big-bang approach” preferred by proponents of immediate deregulation.

Rather than a narrative of valiant resistance against “multinational corporations” and “parasites,” such discreet gradualism seems to better account for why the current Buhari administration has been more successful than its ostensibly more (neo)liberal immediate predecessor at pushing through the further depreciation of the naira, the historic privatization of Nigeria’s state-owned petroleum company, and the gradual removal of petrol subsidies.

Buharism consistently fails, not only on its own terms but also in constantly creating the political conditions for its undoing.

Furthermore, while conceding some flaws in this model, Sanusi’s largely laudatory account also stops short of acknowledging the spectacular extent to which Buharism consistently fails, not only on its own terms but also in constantly creating the political conditions for its undoing. The former failing is most obvious in the administration’s signature demand-management policy, which restricted dollar access to only sanctioned imports and served to create rackets around currency trading and import licensing, with those closest to both policy levers benefiting from rent-seeking. Though Sanusi has more recently spoken out against the opportunity for currency roundtripping created by the policy, he stops short of recognizing it as a failure inherent to the Buharist paradigm. It is clear that the parasitism that Buharism purports to eliminate remains among its essential products. What is less clear is whether this outcome is best understood, in contemporary parlance, as a feature or a bug.

After the Populist Wave

Perhaps the greatest failing of Buharism, past and present, is the fact that it consistently generates such a large scale of popular and elite discontent that succeeding governments have little choice but to return to the well-worn path of economic orthodoxy. Once again, political-economic governance after Buhari appears poised to return to a paradigm more friendly to international finance and its domestic allies. This likely trajectory is apparent in the fact that the three main presidential candidates in Nigeria’s 2023 election — including the APC’s flag bearer, Tinubu — agreed on the need for currency deregulation and fuel-subsidy removal, amid the continued privatization of state enterprises.

Thus, while emerging at a moment of global optimism about an alternative to neoliberalism, Buharism sought not a path to an alternative economic order, but Nigeria’s gradual acceptance of the seemingly inevitable fate of economic globalization. The victory in the 2023 election of the more market-friendly Tinubu camp of the APC suggests that after a half-hearted and ultimately abortive detour, Nigeria’s “end of history” moment has resumed.

While emerging at a moment of global optimism about an alternative to neoliberalism, Buharism sought not a path to an alternative economic order, but Nigeria’s gradual acceptance of the seemingly inevitable fate of economic globalization.

Politico-economic developments in Nigeria thus appear to align with the wider record of the global populist wave, which has seen the rise of various idiosyncratic but ultimately abortive challenges to economic globalization, only to be followed by a resurgence of neoliberal technocratic governance. Perhaps the apparent populist challenge to the economic establishment was always likely to be more rhetorical than practical.

Yet, despite its many liberal-sounding campaign proclamations, an APC administration led by Tinubu will likely struggle to relinquish aspects of Buhari’s regulation of the national currency and import regime. In addition to the political necessity of retaining some of the Buharist policy apparatus, the incoming APC administration — facing pressure to consolidate a divided party and shore up its weak mandate — is unlikely to relinquish control of these valuable sources of rent entirely to the caprices of market forces.

Though spurned in the campaign discourse of the main parties, it thus appears likely that some key pillars of the Buharist economic policy regime will be retained by the incoming administration. Regrettably, then, it appears that the waning days of the Buhari administration are unlikely to mark the definitive end of Buharism.

Some fear Brandon Johnson, Chicago’s new mayor-elect, as a longtime union organizer, can’t serve the public. That’s exactly wrong: the public is served by electing workers and trade unionists to office.

Brandon Johnson speaking during an event at La Vallita Community Church on March 17, 2023 in Chicago, Illinois. (Scott Olson / Getty Images)

As soon as the votes were counted in Chicago’s mayoral election, declaring Brandon Johnson, a longtime Chicago Teachers Union (CTU) leader as both a rank-and-file member and staffer, the winner, the concern trolling began. Conservative and liberal pundits had questions. Or rather, one question: How could Johnson represent the “public” when he’s “beholden” to the teachers’ union?

Since Matt Yglesias is the smartest of these pundits, I’ll pick on him. Writing in the Washington Post, he deplored the choices before the voters in Chicago’s mayoral election, with Paul Vallas representing the police unions and Johnson representing the teachers’ unions, calling the situation “a warning to anyone who cares about the future of American cities.” Yglesias’s big fear? Johnson won’t “allocate fiscal losses among the city’s relevant stakeholders.” In other words, Yglesias fears that Johnson won’t deliver the austerity that Chicago’s imagined “public” needs — that Johnson won’t screw over the city’s workers.

Yglesias is probably right that Johnson will not throw the city’s workers to the wolves of Reaganite, Heritage Foundation–style fiscal logic. But he’s wrong to worry about this. Unions are the principal and one of the only institutions in American life that democratically represents workers. The union is the only collective form we have that allows workers to contest bosses’ power and fight for their own interests — and occasionally, to win.

Even though most people are workers, not owners — and while most workers are not represented by a union, studies show most want to be — workers have little representation in government. Elected officials whose personal sympathies, political instincts, and concrete ties are rooted in working-class institutions are all but nonexistent. There are few electeds who see their position in office as fundamentally about fighting for workers.

The boss class is more fortunate in this regard. Just look at the contribution list of any random Republican or Democratic politician, and you’ll find corporate America well-represented. That was the case in Chicago: Vallas, Johnson’s wildly corporate-friendly opponent, outspent Johnson two to one, with the majority of his donations coming from big-money individuals and organizations. Johnson’s funding, meanwhile, came overwhelmingly from unions.

Indeed, the same companies — even the same individual capitalists — often contribute to both parties to ensure that the status quo of a government by and for the boss class is maintained.

Not only that but members of the boss class constantly run for office themselves and win. Most US presidents, beginning with George Washington, have been extraordinarily wealthy. Most of the middle-class exceptions served in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; the Founding Fathers and the entire lot since Harry S. Truman have been rank plutocrats. Over half the members of today’s Congress are millionaires. The five richest have over $1.4 billion combined, with Darrell Issa (R-CA) alone worth a whopping $460 million.

As a result of this plutocracy, the United States is probably the worst rich democracy in which to be a working-class person. And it’s getting worse. As the rich have gotten richer, we’ve seen joining a union, obtaining an abortion, getting an education, and affording basic necessities like food and shelter move out of reach for millions.

Unions contribute to candidates, but compared to millionaires, it’s unusual for union activists to run for public office. That leaves the rich far better represented than most of the population.

While Johnson’s path to power is unusual in the United States, it’s strikingly similar to that of current president of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Lula is probably the most important leftist head of state this century, judging by his ability to deliver meaningful material improvements to working-class people and protect the natural environment during his last administration, as well as to fight the far right. As a metalworker and trade unionist, he led major strikes in the late 1970s and helped found the Workers’ Party, all years before becoming president of Brazil. Johnson’s context in Chicago is far different, but he too comes out of a working-class upbringing and has had his formative political experiences through the CTU. This includes multiple experiences of going on strike and experiments with independent political action through United Working Families, the political arm of the CTU and the broader left-labor movement that it anchors.

Political involvement of unions was equally critical to winning Swedish social democracy in the twentieth century. Sweden developed a society with some of the best living conditions in the world, if we measure that by wages, health care, childcare, income supports, education, and much more. And sociologist Adaner Usmani has found that across the world, unions have played central roles in democratizing societies.

The notion that Johnson, as a unionist, can’t represent “the people” is not only an anti-union argument, though it is certainly that. It also comes from a convoluted idea — nourished by years of right-wing anti-government propaganda and racist stereotypes — that the “public interest” and “public sector workers” are in opposition.

Yglesias argues that “what’s best for public sector workers… is not necessarily what’s best for the public.” But the vote in Chicago shows that this argument no longer has much traction. After years of organizing and striking on behalf of better services and better funding for the schools — as well as better working conditions for teachers — voters in Chicago understand that kids’, teachers’, and parents’ interests are intertwined.

Precisely what has made the Chicago Union so effective is their ongoing argument that austerity politics hurts everyone and that teachers, students, families, and neighborhoods all benefit from well-funded schools. Teachers who are paid well can do their jobs better and stay in their schools longer — all kids benefit from their experience and from that consistency. And good public sector jobs help more working-class people achieve a middle-class standard of living, putting pressure on other employers to offer better wages and benefits in order to compete.

Electing working-class candidates doesn’t solve everything, of course. Unions that back candidates who think of themselves as working-class champions need to develop serious plans to hold those candidates accountable to a working-class agenda. Johnson will need political support in order to resist the corporate pressures that have already started bearing down on him. Trade unionists in Chicago need to hatch such plans for accountability sooner rather than later.

Still, the lives of working-class people in the United States — the vast majority of us — could be significantly better with more Brandon Johnsons in office. Public services and the people who provide them could be robustly funded. Union organizing rights would be enforced and laws protecting them strengthened so more people would have a voice at work. The interests of the majority would be central to the policymaking process. It’s hard to imagine a better definition of democracy.

The world is changing at a dizzying pace. Two powerful blocs that can determine the future of humanity are rapidly solidifying

The Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry opened its office in New Delhi with an intention to enhance trade and economic cooperation, according to the official statement

China and Brazil recently finalized a trade deal in their own currencies completely bypassing the dollar, but that’s not the only bad news for the world’s reserve currency