Canada’s Largest-Ever Strike Against a Sole Employer Is Underway

Setting up 250 picket lines across the country, 155,000 members of the Public Service Alliance of Canada have gone on strike. The walkout, the country’s largest strike ever against a sole employer, is a fight against inflation eroding wages into a pay cut.

Federal government workers stage a protest outside a Service Canada building in Scarborough district of Toronto, Canada on April 19, 2023. (Mert Alper Dervis / Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)

Canada is in the midst of the largest strike against a single employer in the country’s history. On April 19, 155,000 public sector workers — who have been without a contract for more than two years — walked off the job, setting up 250 picket lines across Canada. Thus far, the government’s approach to negotiations with the Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC) has been, at best, ham-fisted.

The bulk of the workers — 120,000 employees of various government departments who answer to the Treasury Board — are asking for an annual 4.5 percent wage increase retroactive to June 2021, when negotiations with the government began. The government initially offered them 2 percent, which is why many workers on picket lines across the country held placards reading, “2% is for milk.” In the days leading to the strike, the government belatedly came around to the compromise of 3 percent, as offered by the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board in February. But with inflation sitting at 4.3 percent, after reaching a high of 8.1 percent in June 2022, the government’s offer amounts to a significant cut.

Workers at the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), represented by the PSAC-affiliated Union of Tax Employees (UTE), are asking for a more ambitious 7.5 percent annual raise. The government, however, is offering the same 3 percent to all federal employees. The reason UTE is asking for a larger wage increase is the imbalance that exists between its earnings and those of Canada Border Service Agency workers, who serve a similar function in administering excise taxes.

The workers who walked off the job aren’t the fat cats living off the public dime that right-wingers like to portray. They make an average of Can$40,000 to $65,000 a year, meaning many make below the average Canadian salary of $58,800. They issue passports, process immigration applications, deliver income support (including the support rushed out at the pandemic’s outset), assist veterans, and work in correctional facilities. Due to Canada’s troubled Phoenix payroll system, adopted in 2016, some employees were underpaid and forced to take on debt. Meanwhile, others were overpaid and forced to work for free to repay the excess income, even though it wasn’t their fault.

Treasury Board president Mona Fortier says the government can’t “write a blank check” for public employees, yet a union contract is precisely the opposite of a blank check. It clearly outlines wage and salary expectations for its duration. These workers are simply asking to prevent the further erosion of their wages through inflation, as well as for a suite of other sensible, inexpensive demands.

Remote Work: A Top Concern

PSAC is not only pushing for a wage increase but also aiming to establish the right for workers — whose jobs can be done remotely — to choose whether they want to continue working remotely or return to the physical workplace. By fiat, Fortier demanded public sector workers return to the office at least two days a week by the end of March. “In-person work better supports collaboration, team spirit, innovation and a culture of belonging,” she said. Elsewhere, the government was more blunt, arguing that the ability to work remotely would “severely impact the Government’s ability to deliver services to Canadians and would limit its ability to effectively manage employees within the public service.” In other words, it’s about management’s control over the workforce under the guise of fostering a sense of community.

Workers, of course, began working remotely because they were forced to do so during the pandemic. Now they’re once again being forced to change their work arrangements on the government’s command. For workers who were hired during the pandemic, remote work is all they’ve known. “We’d like the terms of our work to be subject to negotiation, not dictation,” Keegan Gibson, a strike captain with UTE in Edmonton, told me on the picket line.

Chris Aylward, PSAC’s president, said many offices were poorly prepared for workers’ return. “We’ve got members that go into the workplace now, there’s no desk, there’s no computer for them to work at. They’re getting back in their cars and driving back home again,” he told the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. PSAC is calling for the government to provide workers with “ergonomic workstation furniture,” as well as a computer and monitor, if necessary. It’s remarkable that this even needs to be requested.

Intimately connected to the freedom to work remotely are questions of work-life balance, particularly for those who commute to work from the suburbs in Canada’s largest cities. Heather Adair, who works for Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada in Vancouver, lives in the suburb of Langley. She told online news outlet PressProgress that the three hours she spends commuting to Vancouver every day could be better spent with her family. “Not only are they dipping into my pocket, they’re really affecting my work life balance,” Adair said. “A big reason why I joined the government was work life balance, my family is important.”

Toward a More Inclusive Workplace

Workers also want to see enhanced diversity and inclusion efforts in workplaces, including mandatory unconscious-bias training, more support for workers who’ve faced harassment or discrimination, and efforts to have Canada’s diversity reflected in the workforce. Currently, unconscious-bias training is only mandatory for management, while new employees must take an orientation course “which includes diversity and inclusion components,” according to the Treasury Board. Other courses on indigenous issues, anti-racism, and how to deal with harassment in the workplace are optional. A 2020 survey of public sector workers shows that just 8 percent are satisfied with how concerns of racism are addressed in their workplace.

To recruit more indigenous employees, the union is requesting a $1,500 annual bonus for workers who can speak an indigenous language, almost double the $800 bonus for bilingual workers who speak English and French. PSAC is also asking for indigenous employees who have been employed for at least three months to receive five paid days off annually to engage in traditional practices, such as hunting, fishing, and harvesting. The provincial government of British Columbia and territorial government of Nunavut already offer paid leave for indigenous cultural practices.

Additional enticements are necessary to convince indigenous people to work for the very government that dispossessed them and stole children from families to fill Canada’s residential schools. A briefing document from PSAC notes that it’s “incomprehensible” that the federal government, with its stated commitment toward reconciliation with indigenous peoples, “would not offer a modest financial recognition to those (very few) employees who use their Indigenous language at work in service to Canadians.”

Two-Faced Trudeau

In its most recent budget, the federal government committed to passing anti-scab legislation by the end of the year. Additionally, companies that want to take advantage of the full subsidies for green energy investments outlined in the budget will have to pay union wages. These are no doubt positive developments, but the way the government has handled this labor dispute raises questions. “They support us when it’s convenient for their messaging purposes, but when it comes time to pull out the cheque book, they’re a little hesitant for some reason,” Caitlin Fortier, an Edmonton-based Service Canada worker who processes employment insurance and pension payments, told me, expressing a frustration felt by many public workers.

The government hasn’t ruled out imposing back-to-work legislation to break the strike, as it has already done twice during its tenure in power — in 2018 to force postal workers back to work, and again in 2021 to force dock workers at the Port of Montreal to end their strike. This threat has similarly loomed over this current labor dispute. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has only said PSAC must return to negotiations “right now,” adding that “Canadians have every right and expectation to see the services that they expect delivered.”

The government has made an effort to notify CRA workers that they will continue to receive full pay if they cross the picket line. As UTE president Marc Brière notes, this is a confounding message to hear from a government that promised anti-scab legislation less than a month ago. The longer the strike continues, the “more temptation there will be . . . for some people” to cross the picket line, Brière added. The government maintains that it is merely apprising everyone that there’s nothing stopping workers from returning to work during the strike. But this is disingenuous — it conveniently omits the fact that this would amount to being a scab, which would have profoundly negative consequences for the strikers.

To his credit, New Democratic Party (NDP) leader Jagmeet Singh has ruled out supporting back-to-work legislation, but this is not enough. The minority government led by Liberals made a deal with the NDP to gain the necessary support to form a government. For its part, the NDP entered this arrangement in order to secure concessions, such as introducing a means-tested dental-care program and strengthening labor rights. However, the Conservatives, in spite of their right-wing populist leader Pierre Poilievre’s purported support of working-class Canadians, are almost certain to support back-to-work legislation.

Singh has the power to abandon his agreement with Trudeau, forcing the prime minister to rely on the support of Conservatives to implement his agenda. He should do so the second the Liberals violate the spirit, if not letter, of their agreement by ordering public servants back to work. At that decisive moment, Singh must let Trudeau show his true colors while the NDP leader washes his hands of any involvement with a government intent on union busting.

The union’s demands are eminently reasonable. All PSAC asks is for its workers to have the same spending power that they’ve had previously, to allow them to choose where they can work in instances where remote work makes sense, and to build more inclusive workplaces. If that’s a bridge too far for the government, then it says more about Trudeau’s priorities than PSAC’s.

Video: America is at War with Europe

The evidence amply confirms that The Nord Stream was the object of an act of sabotage ordered by President Joe Biden.

Nord Stream –which originates in Russia– transits through the (maritime) territorial jurisdiction of 4 member states of the EU. From a legal standpoint (International Law: UN Charter, Law of the Sea) this was a U.S. Act of War against the EU.

The post Video: America is at War with Europe appeared first on Global Research.

The Bombing of Nord Stream — This Act of War Against Europe Requires Congressional Investigation: Dennis Kucinich

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We Must Not Ignore the Ongoing Plight of International Students in Ukraine

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year, the EU granted asylum to millions of Ukrainian refugees. However, international students and other non-Ukrainians caught in the conflict have struggled to receive similar protection.

Relatives of a Zambian student who died in the conflict in Ukraine last September console one another as his coffin arrives at the Kenneth Kaunda International Airport in Lusaka on December 11, 2022. (Salim Dawood / AFP via Getty Images)

After the Yugoslav wars that rocked Europe between 1991 and 2001, the European Union established a system of temporary protections for displaced people outside the bloc’s external borders. It would take the EU over two decades to activate this directive, which stood unused even during the height of the refugee crisis that began 2015, during which the absence of safe means of entry into the bloc has thus far led to the deaths of 22,993 people at sea.

Following the start of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the EU triggered the Temporary Protection Directive, offering asylum to the millions of Ukrainians displaced by the bloody war from March 2022. Since then, the number of people who — fleeing either permanently or briefly — left Ukraine since February 24, 2022, when the war began, is estimated at 19,505,596. This is a largest influx of migrants that the EU has witnessed since its founding in 1993.

The Temporary Protections Directive, despite its clear benefits, has one glaring problem: it does not offer protection to everyone in Ukraine suffering from the effects of the war. To be eligible for international protection, you need to be either a Ukrainian national or be a close family member of Ukrainian nationals. Though this covers the vast majority of people living in the country, it leaves out many vulnerable groups. These include non-Ukrainian nationals and stateless people whose legal status in Ukraine is guaranteed by international law, refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection and their families, and non-Ukrainian nationals with a permanent residence permit who cannot return to their country of origin for safety reasons.

Many Ukrainians whose African or Asian partners, spouses, or parents did not have citizenship were forced to make the difficult decision of leaving their loved ones or staying with them in a country ravaged by war.

The problem with the directive is that there is no country in the world in which every inhabitant is also a citizen. The Temporary Protection Directive consequently overlooks a considerable number of migrants in Ukraine who are international students — who have also been living, working, and studying in the country since before the war.

It is estimated that there were around seventy thousand international students in Ukraine before the war, many of whom would have been midway or even almost finishing multiyear degrees before the war started.

International students in Ukraine aren’t a particularly recent phenomenon. Over one hundred thousand of them had studied in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic during the existence of the USSR. The close ties between the socialist bloc and countries predominantly in the Global South, from which much of the current intake of international students is still drawn, persisted despite the collapse of state socialism. Many citizens of countries in the developing world have remained in Ukraine for years and had children and careers there. The main subjects that were studied by international students were medicine, dentistry, veterinary medicine, pharmacology, computer science, mechanical engineering, and aeronautical engineering, as well as business management, economics, banking, finance, and business administration programs.

In the first weeks of the war, I found myself involved in a number of grassroots online networks to help people escape Ukraine. At first, I seemed to be using my rather rusty Russian to help people with type one diabetes flee the country in order to gain access to insulin in Poland and Hungary. But the more time I spent in the networks of refugees based in Ukraine, the more I found myself meeting people from countries outside of the West and the EU.

These people, mainly from Africa, Asia, and Latin America, faced huge difficulties in trying to flee Ukraine. Although some of them were technically eligible for support via the EU’s directive, border police pushed them back as they attempted to flee Ukraine into the EU. They faced racism and harassment for the crime of trying to cross a border during a war.

A lot of the people I encountered were international students, but many had also been living in Ukraine for years and so were permanent residents. They had been working in Ukraine for many years. Some were married and/or the parents of Ukrainian citizens, or their children were born there and had permanent residency. These networks of support and advice were facilitated by Twitter and Telegram groups shared by non-Ukrainian nationals to discuss the difficulties they were facing with one another.

According to many of the people I spoke to, border officials (and in some cases charities) encouraged other non-Ukrainian nationals to offer bribes in exchange for safe passage. Deprived of the international attention that has rightly been focused on the plight of Ukrainian citizens, these refugees often waited for hours without food or water, and were often neglected by international charities.

Online, the global network (onto which I had inadvertently stumbled) that had emerged to help non-Western nationals spread worldwide. I only came across it after a friend sent me a link to one of the many Twitter pages on which refugees discussed their experiences of how difficult it was for them to try and find safety.

International students are often viewed in the West as affluent. From speaking to and reading the testimonies of non-Western refugees online, it is clear that many of them have had to make massive personal sacrifices in order to study in Ukraine. The families of some of these international students sold their property back home just so they could study in Ukraine. Others had their families borrow from loan sharks. These lenders have gone on to harass the families of students who, stuck in Ukraine and in bordering EU countries, are unable to complete their studies.

Some universities held onto first-year students’ passports as part of their application process. Due to the war, these students couldn’t contact the university to go pick up their passports during a very active conflict. These individuals were forced to head straight to the border with hopes for the best, accompanied by their friends, many of whom were other non-Western nationals.

A considerable amount of the students used “education agencies” to help them with the visa and application processes in getting into a university in Ukraine. In exchange for this support, agencies ask students to pay lofty fees, even if they have fled Ukraine and are unable to continue studying. Some of these agencies have used horrific tactics to prey on students and scare them into sending them more money.

International students have shared with me letters they have received from these agencies. In these letters, which are often littered with spelling mistakes, agencies threaten to fine and report to Interpol students unable to satisfy these aggressive demands. Of course, these threats have absolutely no basis in reality. Interpol has far bigger concerns than chasing international students who have crossed a border due to war. The only point of these lies is to spread fear in order to make students fork out cash.

For the non-Western students who have remained in Ukraine, their main reason for doing so is the high cost of migrating. Some students had saved for years to be able to study STEM subjects, and it was their entire life dream to become a doctor or an engineer. While many Ukrainian universities have moved their classes online, remote learning has not been possible for dentistry and other practical degrees. The Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria in June of last year issued a statement that degree certificates from Ukraine will no longer be honored by the of council “until when normal academic activities resume”.

The way the EU, UK, United States, and Canada have eased their border regimes for Ukrainian nationals should be a model for a more inclusive and open migrant policy for refugees of all nationalities. Instead, the EU bloc and its allies have reinforced a two-tiered refugee status system, grounded in ideas of citizenship that exclude some of the most marginalized people.

The Constitution Is a Plutocratic Document

There’s no reason to venerate the framers of the US Constitution. The document they created was explicitly designed to check the democratic will of ordinary people and protect the plutocratic interests of the propertied elite.

The US Constitution was designed to protect capitalist social relations from democratic challenge. (Getty Images)

Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene, the notorious far-right congressperson from Georgia, recently made headlines for her call for a “national divorce” between red and blue states. This did not stop her, of course, from showing up in lower Manhattan to protest the arraignment of former president Donald Trump and to garner more media coverage for herself.

Whether the likes of Taylor Greene actually believe what they say is somewhat beside the point. Such calls for a national breakup are a recurrent feature of US politics — we fought one of history’s bloodiest civil wars in the 1860s — and remind us of the uneasy compromises that underpinned the drafting of the Constitution in 1787.

US political culture venerates the Constitution for its supposed genius in setting up a system of government that could last forever, if only we could abide by its timeless wisdom. The conflict and dysfunction that plagues our political system, in this view, stems from a heedless disregard of the framers’ intentions, not the system itself.

This view still predominates, but there seems to be a growing sense that a constitutional framework established in the late eighteenth century may not be up to dealing with the challenges of the twenty-first. New York Times columnist Jamelle Bouie, for example, has been writing a running commentary on our “constitutional stagnation” and what might be done to break out of it.

Robert Ovetz is a lecturer in political science at San José State University. His new book, We the Elites: Why the US Constitution Serves the Few, provides a detailed but accessible critique of the Constitution as a system designed to protect capitalist social relations from democratic challenge. Our constitutional system, Ovetz argues, cannot address the many crises we face because it was designed precisely to frustrate and contain collective action, not facilitate it.

He spoke to Jacobin’s Chris Maisano about the book, whether meaningful change can be achieved through the current political system, and potential alternatives rooted in decentralized, directly democratic political institutions.

Chris Maisano

There seems to be renewed interest in constitutional questions on the Left today. Why do you think that is?

Robert Ovetz

We’re seeing a resurgence of class struggle in the United States. I think there’s some dissatisfaction following the past two elections and the failure to get important legislation passed. Many of the people who have been involved with electing democratic socialists to Congress and trying to get Bernie Sanders the Democratic presidential nomination are turning toward labor organizing because they see things are blocked in terms of being able to elect the right person and having that result in meaningful changes in policy.

Also, the long-running crises we face continue to go unaddressed — gun violence, climate catastrophe, homelessness, explosion of housing costs, low wages, anti-union repression. As a result, people are looking for a more systematic explanation and analysis for why we can’t get things done. We’re starting to look at the design and organization of the political process itself.

Chris Maisano

Walk us through some of the main themes and arguments of your book.

Robert Ovetz

We can’t understand our undemocratic constitution without understanding our capitalist constitution. Many who write about the Constitution don’t take its political economy into account. As someone who teaches political science, we often focus on the rules, procedures, and processes.

But what I argue in the book is that the framers (who are also called the “Founders” or “Founding Fathers,” a term I greatly dislike) designed a system that protects the interest of property. There are what I call “minority checks” throughout the Constitution that constrain political democracy and prevent economic democracy. The “minority” they sought to protect are not who we think of today as ethnic, racial, and gender minorities, but the minority of the propertied elite.

We can’t understand our undemocratic constitution without understanding our capitalist constitution.

Chris Maisano

The Constitution replaced the Articles of Confederation, the country’s first system of government after the end of the Revolutionary War. Historians call the 1780s the “Critical Period” because there was a lot of social, economic, and political conflict that put the future of the new country in question. Why did the framers feel the need to come up with a new system to replace the Articles?

Robert Ovetz

The Critical Period was a time when economic elites were kicked back on their heels in many states. They were losing some significant battles in what I call the three insurrections.

First, there were slave rebellions, which escalated during the revolution. Remember that most of the slaves that ran away joined up with the loyalists and the British, and the rebellions continued when the fighting stopped. Next, there was organized Native resistance to white settler colonialism. Out in the West, Native peoples were getting organized into a confederation to resist the theft of land and genocidal attacks.

Finally, there were uprisings of small white subsistence farmers, who for the most part were outside the cash economy. They grew what they ate. They were in conflict with large commercial farmers, merchants, bankers, and traders. And in some states, they were a powerful force to be reckoned with.

They organized their own political parties, and if they could meet the property requirements to serve in office, they or their allies would get elected. They were able to pass some significant forms of economic democracy in their state legislatures under the Articles of Confederation — things like debt relief and land banks that provided cheap loans to small farmers using their land as collateral. They issued paper money and allowed it to be used to pay private and public debts. Some states taxed imported goods from other states to generate revenue and lower taxes on the local population.

The framers were extremely concerned about these three insurrections. They referred to the economic majority as the “meaner sort of people,” or my favorite phrase, the “people out of doors.” They thought the people who were literally outside working with their hands and getting them dirty should not be inside the meeting rooms with their hands on the levers of power.

The framers thought the people who were literally outside working with their hands and getting them dirty should not be inside the meeting rooms with their hands on the levers of power.

This was a short period after a revolutionary period of upheaval when ordinary people shared power with elites. Because some states were unicameral with short terms, few had an executive veto, and none had judicial review, it was easier to pass new laws quickly. State laws were the final word because Congress didn’t have “supremacy” power or judicial review. While they still had property requirements to run for and serve in office, these democratic elements are mostly missing from our current Constitution. This is not to idealize the states but to show how the Constitution was a reactionary outcome to the revolution.

Chris Maisano

People on the Left have usually seen the state and local governments as bastions of reactionary power and sought federal government intervention against them. The Constitution created the federal government that has often played a progressive role in US history, in relation to the states in particular.

Robert Ovetz

During the 1950 to 1960s, the center left looked to the courts and the federal government. But conservatives also used federal power to intervene against liberal or progressive states to shoot down what they were trying to do. Each side uses Article VI federal “supremacy” power when they have it to intervene and suppress any attempts at innovation by the other side.

We should forget about the partisan use of supremacy power and think about why the federal government has it at all. The center left sees supremacy power as something we can use to push our policy demands forward. But the reality is that the framers inserted the supremacy power into the Constitution because they wanted to give a minority check to propertied interests to block innovations at the state level that threatened property.

Instead of deciding which level of government is “best,” we need to look at why the federal government gets the final say in our system. This was intentional, because the framers wanted to have a brake on democracy from below to prevent any movement that today we would call socialism.

Chris Maisano

You briefly mentioned the national debt earlier, but it was such an important issue that we should talk about it in more depth. The country had huge debts coming out of the Revolutionary War and was having trouble paying them off. Why did the framers feel they needed an entirely new federal government to address the national debt?

Robert Ovetz

The revolution was very costly. They borrowed, by Alexander Hamilton’s estimates, several hundred million dollars — and that’s the valuation from the 1780s, not adjusted dollars.

The states and Congress issued multiple types of IOUs and paper money. They also borrowed money from the Spanish, the Dutch, and the French. The Confederation Congress actually defaulted on a loan by the French shortly after the revolution ended. Because there wasn’t enough gold and silver in circulation, paper money was needed to get economic activity going. Furthermore, economic elites were on a capital strike because they refused to borrow or invest, and foreign loans stopped. This was a period of deep fiscal and financial crisis.

An early 20th-century portrayal of Daniel Shays’s forces fleeing from federal troops after an attempt to lay siege to the Springfield Arsenal in Amherst, Massachusetts. (Wikimedia Commons)

Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress didn’t have the power to tax. So they would tell the states, this is how much you have to contribute to the national treasury — what was then called “requisitions.” They didn’t even have a good way of figuring out what each state’s share should be. Each of the states pretty much paid its share during the revolution, but when the fighting stopped, most stopped paying in full or at all. As a result, Congress couldn’t pay its debt and went into default with France. Only a few of the states were able to pay off all or some of the debts by using internal tariffs called “imposts.”

In some states, like Massachusetts, the conservatives tried to impose numerous taxes on the economic majority to generate the revenue to repay creditors. That triggered the famous Shays’s Rebellion in 1786, by small white subsistence farmers who were Revolutionary War veterans. When creditors tried to foreclose on their farms and meager possessions, they put on their old uniforms, took up arms, and marched on local courthouses in the western part of the state to shut them down.

The taxes were very unpopular because many farmers were mad they were never paid for fighting in the revolution — they were “paid” with those IOUs. Desperate for cash, many small creditors sold their IOUs to creditors, and soon most of those IOUs ended up in the hands of a very small number of rich speculators. One of the most famous speculators was Abigail Adams, the wife of soon-to-be-vice-president John Adams. Although they bought the IOUs for pennies on the dollar, the speculators demanded them to be paid at their face value from when they were originally issued, not at what they paid or their depreciated value.

There was a lot of political opposition to raising taxes to enrich the speculators. This was widely seen in class terms as an attempt to redistribute wealth upward that would result in many losing their land and being forced into wage work — what Karl Marx later called “primitive accumulation.” Also, the Congress was unable to pay not only rank-and-file soldiers but also officers, which almost resulted in an attempted coup by military officers when the fighting stopped.

This all leads to the Constitutional Convention, in which the issue that’s discussed over and over is how to address the demands of the creditors. This is achieved in the Constitution by establishing a stable government that can set up, manage, and protect the capitalist economy. In Article I, the regulation of interstate and foreign commerce and contracts and the establishment of bankruptcy laws are moved from state to federal authority. Now Congress exclusively has that power. Authority to repay debts and the power to issue money is taken from the states and given to Congress, preventing the states from printing or coining their own money anymore. Article VI says that all debts are the responsibility of the new federal government and must be paid by it.

Once Hamilton became the first secretary of the treasury, the national debt became the means of creating what he called the public credit system, which allowed the federal government to roll over outstanding debts. Hamilton received approval from Congress to consolidate the debt and roll it over into new interest-bearing bonds at very generous rates. This transformed the economic elites of the separate states with various competing interests into a single ruling class with shared economic interests.

The Act of the Maryland legislature to ratify the Articles of Confederation, February 2, 1781. (Wikimedia Commons)

Hamilton also got Congress to authorize the creation of the First Bank of the United States, a semiprivate bank that held all the federal revenue and debts of the federal government. The federal government would now collect taxes and use that revenue to pay the creditors — the same way it works today. From that revenue they also vastly expanded the military and ensured the consolidation of a stable national government.

And as Hamilton argued, this public credit system — in actuality, a publicly funded private financial system — was a prerequisite for creating a new empire. The first targets of the newly expanded, tax-funded military were the native peoples arming themselves in the West against genocidal settler colonialism and insurrectionary white subsistence farmers resisting primitive accumulation. To understand why the United States became the dominant economic and military power in the world, you have to understand how the Constitution provided the tools by which such power was created, and Hamilton immediately put them into action.

Chris Maisano

Every US movement for social change after the founding period has run into the question of what to do about the Constitution. There were huge debates, for example, in the abolitionist movement over whether the Constitution was a proslavery or antislavery document. People like William Lloyd Garrison denounced it as a “covenant with death,” but others like Charles Sumner and Frederick Douglass argued that it provided resources to restrict the growth of slavery and ultimately end it.

Robert Ovetz

The abolitionist debate is essentially repeated in every powerful movement of every generation: does the Constitution allow for systemic change, or tinkering around the edges with reforms that do not threaten the structure of political power and the capitalist economy? If the Constitution does not allow us to make the changes we need, should we try to bypass it and go a different direction?

Here I fall on Garrison’s side. He made the excellent point that slavery was well protected throughout the Constitution — it’s mentioned about twenty different times without actually using the word “slave” or “slavery” anywhere. They use all kinds of euphemisms, like “Person held to Service or Labour” in Article IV and “other persons” in other places.

This all leads to the Constitutional Convention, in which the issue that’s discussed over and over is how to address the demands of the creditors.

Remember that we got the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery in 1865, at the end of the Civil War, when the Confederate states were outside the union. The film Lincoln gets a lot of things wrong, but it shows how hard it was to get the amendment through Congress even when most of the slave states weren’t in Congress. Abolition ultimately required this rupture that we call the Civil War, in which hundreds of thousands of people were killed, many more maimed for life, and half of the country burned to the ground to overcome the impediments the Constitution put in the way of abolishing slavery.

Fast forward to today: when we attempt to change policy at the state level it’s overturned at the federal level because the courts use the supremacy clause. In the last two chapters of the book, I ask what we can do about the Constitution. We essentially have three choices. Two of the options are in the Constitution itself. Article V establishes the process for amending the Constitution and for calling a constitutional convention. But those are really long shots because of the high supermajority thresholds for all four methods. We’ve had over ten thousand officially introduced constitutional amendments in our country’s history, but only 27 of them were successful — about one-quarter of one percent. The extremely high threshold in the Article V amendment process is an effective minority check that has rarely been overcome.

The same goes for calling a constitutional convention. Right now, there’s an effort to call a constitutional convention backed by the last active living Koch brother. That’s very dangerous for the Left. If they succeed, we are likely to be beaten badly. They are outorganizing and certainly outspending us. A constitutional convention is not going to make any changes in our favor right now.

Instead, we need to use the same strategy the framers did when they bypassed the Articles of Confederation. We need to design a new system of direct democratic self-governance. Instead of creating a new constitutional system, I argue, we can design a decentralized confederation of local and regional worker-controlled economic democracies. It would involve people organizing themselves to take over the economy in a general strike and transform it through direct democracy to serve the interest and the needs of the many rather than the interest of property.

Abolition ultimately required this rupture that we call the Civil War, in which half of the country burned to the ground to overcome the impediments the Constitution put in the way of abolishing slavery.

Chris Maisano

I can imagine a reader agreeing with your critique of the Constitution while also being very skeptical of the alternative strategy you just proposed.

Robert Ovetz

It’s occasionally possible to make change under the Constitution if it doesn’t threaten the supremacy of property. We have to be careful about how our demands get diffused, diluted, and translated as they are transformed into regulations. When laws are passed, we tend to forget about them and move on to the next issue. But in the meantime, they get challenged in the courts and the regulatory bodies create new administrative law. And over time, those laws get transformed and turned into something very different.

Before we advocate for reform, we need to address the problem of why so many people become dissatisfied with the political process. Every election cycle we become hopeful and energetic. We get involved and we elect people to office who have the intention of doing many great things. And even if we do get good things done, they ultimately don’t turn out to be what we expected them to be.

The Constitution was designed with all these pitfalls and roadblocks that make it very difficult to get the changes we need unless we give the economic elites what they want so they no longer block it. This is how the economic minority is empowered by the Constitution to impede political democracy and prevent economic democracy.

I live in California, where we’ve been hit by several atmospheric rivers in the last few months. We don’t have time to negotiate with the fossil fuel companies, because they have blocked everything that has been proposed or gutted it when it gets passed. We have to understand the Constitution as the main impediment to making urgently needed systemic changes. We are long past due for a new political strategy that bypasses the constitutional system altogether if we are going to survive.

How a Marketing Agency Is Using Farmer Protests to Take Over Dutch Politics

The Farmer-Citizen Movement topped last month’s Dutch elections, claiming to stand up for overlooked rural populations. Yet the party is really a creation of a marketing agency — and its political agenda is a call to allow multinationals to go on polluting.

Farmer-Citizen Movement (BoerBurgerBeweging) leader Caroline van der Plas speaks during a brunch at the party office a day after the provincial elections in Colmschate on March 16, 2023. (Sem van der Wal / ANP / AFP via Getty Images)

In last month’s provincial elections, the right-populist Farmer-Citizen Movement (BBB) took Dutch politics by storm. It took fifteen seats out of seventy-five, making it the single largest force in the country’s Senate. While the breakthrough had been expected, it was a major blow to Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s liberal-conservative coalition government.

The party was established in 2019, following a series of farmer protests. The immediate cause was a ruling by the Dutch Supreme Court that led the government to enforce European Union standards, according to which nitrogen emissions have to be reduced in protected natural areas. The ruling was the consequence of years of campaigning by environmental NGOs, which have filed countless lawsuits against the government for its neglect of ecological matters. Because building work emits nitrogen, construction permits were suspended — a major problem in the ongoing Dutch housing crisis. Yet the agricultural sector is responsible for the highest national emissions. Although the Netherlands is a small country, it is the world’s second-largest exporter of agricultural products, exporting especially to neighboring EU countries such as Germany. Intensive livestock farming is responsible for the highest nitrogen emissions in Europe, causing, among other things, soil acidification. In order to reduce emissions, livestock numbers need to be halved.

The ruling led, from October 2019, to waves of protests. Farmers headed out with tractors to The Hague (the country’s political capital), blocked highways and supermarket distribution centers, and intimidated politicians. These protests soon became a cause célèbre of the global conservative movement, making it to Tucker Carlson’s Fox News show. This March, on the brink of the elections, a demonstration was held in The Hague, heavily curtailed by restrictions imposed by city hall (of the announced one hundred thousand protesters, only a quarter as many were allowed to participate). The same day, Extinction Rebellion blocked a major highway.

Though emerging from this farmer revolt, the BBB was in fact launched by a marketing agency. Lead by Caroline van der Plas, a journalist on agricultural issues, the party claims to speak up for the neglected countryside and the “ordinary citizen.” Its purported aims are to reverse the environmental policies of the Dutch government and to safeguard nature. Yet ironically, for all its apparent concern with protecting the countryside, the party in practice defends big multinationals’ right to pollute it.

New Right-Wing Populism

The 1990s saw the consolidation of neoliberalism in the Netherlands, and the final abandonment of the idea of the Keynesian welfare state. Since 2010, the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) has been the largest party, making Rutte the longest-sitting premier to date. As a champion of neoliberal reforms, the VVD is characterized by a top-down, highly technocratic approach to politics. Rutte routinely refers to the country he leads as “the Netherlands Corp.”

Once known for its social progressivism, in the last decade the country made a further shift to the right. Far-right populist forces like Geert Wilders’s Islamophobic Freedom Party (PVV) and Thierry Baudet’s elitist Forum for Democracy (FvD) have succeeded in pushing the whole spectrum in this direction. Within this context, the massive victory for the BBB has reshuffled the Right. Whereas the PVV and FvD mainly focused on classic far-right themes such as immigration, Europe, and the culture wars, the farmers’ party seems to address a broader array of concerns of “ordinary citizens.”

Van der Plas, the party leader, embodies the cherished Dutch self-image of “normality”: conservative, unassuming, and above all very reasonable. Compared to Wilders, with his visions of an eschatological struggle with Islam, or Baudet, whose popularity with the electorate has plummeted due to his autocratic party leadership and his open advocacy of conspiracy theories (spanning from the “Great Reset” to the world dominance of malignant “Reptilians”), this represents a major advantage. It enabled the party to draw voters from across the political spectrum: not only from the radical right, but also from the VVD, the Christian Democrats (CDA), and the Socialist Party (SP). The party’s list of candidates also has drawn former members of the VVD and CDA.

Since its entrance into parliament with one seat in 2021, the BBB has voted along with the Right on cultural issues (such as migration) and with the Left on social issues (such as health care and youth policies). But though it describes itself as a “social left wing,” there should be no illusions about the reactionary elements of its program. Until very recently, for instance, it plead for a hotline at schools to report teachers who “spread ideology in the classroom.” And while it does not deny climate change, the party consistently employs a rhetoric that undermines the idea of an ecological crisis. In a parliamentary debate, Van der Plas recounted that a rare species of moss had been spotted in a national park, concluding: “nature is not collapsing.”

Nothing could be more misleading than this movement’s grassroots image, since it maintains close ties with the agricultural lobby.

Although a European directive concerning nitrogen emissions was laid down as early as 1991, the Dutch government and the powerful agricultural lobby have long tried to downplay and deny the problem. The technocratic way in which the government presented its plans to enforce the regulations in 2019, combined with extreme media exposure, explains the explosive character of the farmer protests. As an antiestablishment party, the BBB presents itself as the mouthpiece of this popular revolt. Yet nothing could be more misleading than its grassroots image, since the movement maintains close ties with the agricultural lobby. The social media platform from which the party emerged was founded by Van der Plas and ReMarkAble communicatie BV, a marketing agency employed by several food giants. This includes the multinationals Vion, SAC, and Bayer. Even more importantly, the agency also funded the entire election campaign. Some of its staff even occupy prominent positions in the party.

Commentators have pointed out how the BBB’s election victory signals a return of agrarian populism. It is reminiscent of the Dutch Farmers’ Party, which achieved success in the mid-1960s through its protest against government interference. At the same time, it is a form of rural populism typical of European countries with a historically large agricultural sector. In terms of program, it has affinities with Scandinavian agrarian centrist parties, such as the Norwegian Senterpartiet, or the Finnish Suomen Keskusta.

The Myth of the Countryside

In his book The Country and the City, Raymond Williams discusses how literary works since antiquity have employed the urban-rural distinction. With the rise of capitalism, an ideological view has appeared that holds that the “innocent” countryside is exploited by the “corrupt” city. It is ideological, not merely because the property relations on the countryside lead to the exploitation of people and nature, but additionally because the city also plays host to the interests of the rural elites. Fiction written about the city and the countryside often served, Williams noted, “to promote superficial comparisons and to prevent real ones.”

It is not necessarily small farmers but big multinationals that have the most to lose from the green transition to a more ecological, socially sustainable agriculture.

The same holds true for the narrative of the BBB. In its election program it talks nostalgically about the threatened “unique landscape” of the Dutch countryside, of which farmers and horticulturalists are said to be the guardians. At the same time, it notes the disappearance of “age-old rural traditions.” It wants to bring back “common sense” and a “healthy countryside.” The party thus builds up the myth of an authentic and idyllic countryside, bravely resisting the technocratic interference of The Hague.

Since the mechanization of the postwar years, the number of workers in the Dutch agricultural sector has steadily dropped. In 2019, around 0.6 percent of the labor force was employed in this sector. One in five farmers is a millionaire, and agriculture is heavily subsidized. Contrary to what is suggested by the phrase “No farmers, no food” — a slogan appearing everywhere during the protests — the proposed measures will not so much impact local food provision as agricultural exports (which in any case only account for a small part of Dutch GDP — in 2020, for instance, just 1.4 percent). Therefore, it is not necessarily small farmers but the big multinationals that have the most to lose from the green transition to a more ecological, socially sustainable agriculture.

Agricultural workers only make up a small part of the electorate that voted BBB; a large part of its base consists in the population from peripheral areas and voters from urban centers voicing their protest against the government. The BBB voter is typically working class and over fifty years old. As the Dutch writer Menno ter Braak once remarked, the farmer is often used as the imaginary “other” of civilization. Many Dutch working-class voters perceive the farmer as the opposite to the vegetarian “oat-milk elite”: the self-satisfied urban middle and upper classes.

Looking beyond the clever rhetoric of the farmers’ party, there are two important factors that have contributed to its success. The BBB is capitalizing on the way national politics has neglected many peripheral areas. Characterized by capital flight, and thus a shrinking population, some regions have been in steady decline for decades. With its neoliberal policies supporting the urban centers, the winners of globalization, the Dutch government has neglected to economically invest in these forgotten regions and to provide social services, leading to ever-increasing inequality. Public transport disappears; schools and libraries are closed. Another important factor lies in the failures of the Rutte government across many fields: the childcare scandal, the housing crisis, the gas-extraction crisis, and the way in which it handled the COVID-19 pandemic have all become a breeding ground for popular resentment.

A Laboratory for Right-Wing Populism

The BBB combines a populist appeal with a successful mythologization of the interests of the small famers and the big food multinationals. It has caused the CDA, the traditional representative of the agricultural sector, to plunge into an identity crisis. It also reveals how for years the left-wing flank of Dutch politics — the social democrats, the greens (GroenLinks), and the SP — have structurally failed to address regional concerns. That the social democrats and the greens (despite their recent alliance meant to reestablish a strong left-wing front) have remained more or less the same size can be considered a defeat.

With its apparent moderate tone, the BBB manages to draw both from the far right and right-wing liberals and conservatives. Its victory in the Dutch regional elections marks a significant development. It reveals what could happen when a technocratic government, after decades of denial and dithering, tries to hastily enforce the green transition. The recent farmer protests that have swept across Europe — in France, Germany, and Belgium — originate from a similar discontent. In this sense, the Netherlands might just become a laboratory for further forms of European right-wing populism. For the Left, an important lesson can be learned: if climate measures are perceived as technocratic fixes favoring the middle and upper class, it leaves space open for the Right to capitalize on frustration.

The Lord of “Vaccines” and the “Health Terrorist Ideology”. Where Do You Think this Is Going? Get Off that Crazy Train

“A tyrant needs above all a tyrant-state, so he will use a million little civil servant tyrants who each have a trivial task to perform, and each will perform that task competently, and without remorse”

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Spain’s Labor Minister Yolanda Díaz Is Working to Rebuild the Left

Spain’s labor minister Yolanda Díaz is a Communist — and her success restoring workplace protections has made her the country’s most popular politician. Now her new electoral platform Sumar is trying to use that popularity to revitalize the Spanish left.

On April 2, Spanish labor minister Yolanda Díaz launched her candidacy for the new left unity platform Sumar. (A. Perez Meca / Europa Press via Getty Images)

I want to be this country’s first female prime minister,” Spanish left-wing leader Yolanda Díaz announced on April 2 as she launched her candidacy for the new left unity platform Sumar. Since taking over from Podemos founder Pablo Iglesias as Spain’s deputy prime minister in April 2021, Díaz has repeatedly polled as the country’s most popular political leader — even outperforming prime minister Pedro Sánchez, of the center-left Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE).

A labor lawyer from Galicia and a rank-and-file member of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), Díaz did not enjoy a high profile nationally before she took up her ministerial role in January 2020. But she quickly gained prominence for her negotiation of the Spanish state’s COVID-19 furlough scheme, which guaranteed the wages of 3.5 million workers. Since then, her labor ministry has continued to spearhead some of the PSOE–Unidas Podemos coalition’s most impactful policies, such as the landmark 2022 progressive reform of Spain’s labor laws.

Polling now suggests that a reorganized and united left under her leadership could make important gains in this December’s general election — with Sumar currently projected to secure between 15 and 16.5 percent of the vote (compared to Unidas Podemos’s 13 percent and former ally Màs País’s 2.3 percent in 2019). This would translate into between forty-five and fifty-three MPs.

If the Left did come out in a stronger position, after its four-year term as PSOE’s junior partner, this would be an impressive achievement — not least because it looked a somewhat exhausted force when Iglesias stood down in 2021. But internal divisions are now placing such advances in doubt. Relations have deteriorated between Díaz and the Podemos leadership over the last year as the former has sought great autonomy of action from the latter.

No representatives of Podemos attended Díaz’s candidacy launch, as party leader Ione Belarra insisted a bilateral agreement between Sumar and her formation on left primaries and the internal distribution of funds would be needed to secure her presence. In the wake of this public display of disunity, both sides have gone on the attack in the media ratcheting up tensions further.

Yet in an interview with Jacobin’s Eoghan Gilmartin, PCE leader and Izquierda Unida MP Enrique Santiago argues that the Left is ultimately “condemned to work together.” For his party, Sumar represents an opportunity for a broader reorganization and renewal of the Spanish left ahead of December’s general election. Santiago believes that if the Left manages to bury its differences, it is capable, under Díaz’s leadership, of fundamentally altering the balance of power in the country’s politics.

Reorganizing the Spanish Left

Eoghan Gilmartin

Over the last three and a half years, Spain has had its first left-wing coalition since the civil war of 1936–39 — an administration that includes two members of the Communist Party, Yolanda Díaz and Consumer Affairs Minister Alberto Garzón. In terms of the positives, Unidas Podemos has advanced a series of important gains around workers’ rights, increases in the minimum wage, and state pensions, as well as implementing historic feminist legislation. But at the same time, you have had to swallow various reactionary policies from core ministries of state controlled by PSOE, such as those around immigration and defense, and Sánchez’s recognition of the Moroccan occupation regime in Spain’s former colony Western Sahara. How do you assess the Left’s balance sheet in office?

Enrique Santiago

In 2019, we had a major debate about whether we should enter government as a junior partner, and across all the organizations that make up the Unidas Podemos alliance, there were distinct positions over this question. Within Podemos, there was a large majority in favor, but it was not unanimous. In Izqueirda Unida and the Communist left, there was a majority in favor of a parliamentary pact with PSOE but not formally entering government, while within Catalunya en Comú, there was a 50-50 split. But right now, nobody even within the Communist Party regrets having entered the government coalition.

We are proud of our record. Particularly within the context of having to govern in the face of a global pandemic and the war in Ukraine — a situation of near-permanent exception. We have overseen a raft of social protection measures that have clearly distinguished our response to the current crises from that implemented in the wake of the 2008 financial crash. Back then, you saw billions of euros transferred to the banks, whereas during the pandemic, the coalition guaranteed the wages of 3.5 million workers through the furlough scheme as well as introducing various new welfare schemes and new workers’ and women’s rights.

Right now, nobody even within the Communist Party regrets having entered the government coalition.

The current Spanish government has also been instrumental in shifting the consensus, however modestly, within the European Union away from a strict austerity agenda and opening up a certain space within which to question neoliberal dogmas. For example, the 2022 labor law reform, which cracks down on short-term precarious work contracts and secures new trade union protections, was not vetoed by the EU. Or after the European Commission repeatedly told us that we could not intervene in the energy markets, it ultimately had to accept the so-called “Iberian Exception” [under which Spain and Portugal passed a partial cap on the cost of electricity production].

For us, these are social democratic and Keynesian policies, many of which are designed primarily to stimulate the economy. They are very far from the policies that we would defend in strategic terms. We aim for a society in which the means of production are socialized and that is organized free from exploitation. But we are also aware of the world in which we live and the existing balance of power in which we operate.

So, with the limited power at our disposal, we have concentrated on protecting the incomes of working people and expanding their rights.  You have to remember that we only had 10 percent of the MPs in Parliament in 2019 and had to accept PSOE’s red line in the coalition negotiations around not demanding posts in the four ministries of state: foreign affairs, defense, interior, and finance. Our major criticisms of government policy have been in the first three of these areas.

In these ministries, we have seen the least change in government policy, and this reflects deeper issues around the democratic nature of the state. Freely elected governments do not have sufficient capacity to implement policy changes because of permanent state structures. Spain is one of the oldest states in the EU, with five hundred years of history, and one that also underwent a very particular transition to democracy in the 1970s. This has meant that very powerful institutional and administrative apparatuses, which operate beyond democratic control, are able to reproduce and protect themselves.

In Spain, very powerful institutional and administrative apparatuses, which operate beyond democratic control, are able to reproduce and protect themselves.

 

It is clear that PSOE does not have the courage to confront such undemocratic structures. And this has been proven time and again in the last three years. Among Western European states, Spain is probably the most pro-NATO, and our lack of strategic autonomy on defense was decisive in terms of PSOE’s ill-judged move on Western Sahara. It is also impeding Spain from pushing for a different approach within the European Union on the war in Ukraine.

We have to clearly distance ourselves from such policies while also trying to ensure PSOE meets its commitments in other areas where we are better placed to enforce the coalition’s program.

The polls are very tight, but any renewed progressive majority after December’s elections will likely have a more favorable balance of power, and so we will be in a much stronger position to negotiate joint ministerial teams in these portfolios.

Eoghan Gilmartin

Yolanda Díaz is a lifelong member of PCE, though she holds no formal position within the party leadership. What is her particular political trajectory?

Enrique Santiago

Yolanda grew up in the labor movement. Her father was a leading figure in the Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) trade union, and she became involved in social and political activism from an early age, before going on to work as a labor lawyer. This background means she not only has a clear sense of working-class identity but also has extensive professional experience of working with the unions and understands the fundamental role they can play in society.

Her long involvement in labor struggles also means she has honed her skills as a negotiator and, above all, is able to distinguish what is fundamental in politics from secondary issues. In government, she has centered her efforts on material issues impacting people’s lives, and it is around such an agenda that a new majoritarian consensus can be built in the current moment.

Yolanda Diáz grew up in the labor movement. Her father was a leading figure in the Comisiones Obreras trade union, and she became involved in social and political activism from an early age.

When Pablo Iglesias resigned as deputy prime minister in 2021, after years of intense pressure and dirty-tricks campaigns against him, the leadership of the Left naturally fell to Yolanda. She was not only the person who could attract the most support within Unidas Podemos, but is also capable of reaching out to other progressive parties that have broken away in recent years and, most important, of attracting new voters and wider layers of society to our project.

Eoghan Gilmartin

Is it fair to say her broad popularity, even among center-left voters, is tied to her strong institutional profile as a minister and a certain moderation of discourse? In this respect, Sumar seems a somewhat unusual left-wing platform in that it is being built from government — in contrast to Podemos, which was the electoral expression of a new wave of popular mobilization around the 15M movement.

Enrique Santiago

Sumar as a political project is not about moderating political discourse or renouncing principles but rather widening the Left’s limits to form a majoritarian project capable of changing the political balance of forces in this country. We want to win the votes not only of those who explicitly question the current system but also those who have been hurt by neoliberal policies or realize we need well-funded public services and a strong welfare state.

At the rally to launch Díaz’s candidacy earlier this month, there were representatives of fifteen parties, as well as the leaders of both the Party of the European Left (PEL) and the European Greens. The key to uniting this broad political spectrum will be the platform’s program. Sumar is fundamentally about articulating a project for a new country, with a series of proposals coming from parties, unions, and social movements, and which will reflect and build on our experience in office.

But while we are in government, Sumar is not a project being built from government. We are trying to build on the popularity of Díaz so as to open up new spaces of citizen participation beyond the existing party structures. In this sense, Sumar is an electoral alliance between left-wing formations but one that is also seeking to open up a new cycle of popular mobilization. In contemporary societies, which are ever more complex, parties alone only have a certain social reach; but new processes of political aggregation require opening up participatory mechanisms beyond internal party structures.

Unlike in France, no one here is going to take to the streets around pensions, when our recent pension reform protects existing retirement rights and when we passed an increase in public pensions of 8.5 percent this year.

We are also responding to a certain contradiction here. For us, social and labor mobilization is a strategic component of our politics and necessary for tilting the balance of forces in our favor. But one consequence of the current coalition government having dealt with social issues in a progressive manner has been a drop off in mobilization. Unlike in France, no one here is going to take to the streets around pensions, when our recent pension reform protects existing retirement rights and when we passed an increase in public pensions of 8.5 percent this year. To offset such demobilization, Sumar must constitute itself as a participatory movement capable of engaging people around a new political proposal for the country.

Eoghan Gilmartin

How do you see the role of the trade unions here? The two major unions, CCOO and the General Union of Workers (UGT), have gained a renewed centrality in Spanish politics since the pandemic, above all as key social allies of the coalition government, and in particular they have offered strong support to Díaz’s legislative agenda. Many prominent trade unionists from CCOO also seem to be playing a role in Sumar’s launch. But as you said, at the same time, we have not seen the type of strike waves that have taken place in France and the UK, even as salaries in the private sector are stagnating and real wages are being badly hit by inflation.

Enrique Santiago

We view the two major class-based unions as strategic allies, who have played an essential role in advancing the government’s social and labor agenda. Above all, we in Unidas Podemos would not have been able to advance a series of key measures, such as the Rider Law [regulating false self-employment in the gig economy] or the labor law reform without their clear backing.

The coalition has also worked with the unions to secure a public sector wage agreement and historic increases in the minimum wage, while also implementing anti-inflationary measures that have seen Spain register the lowest inflation rates in the EU. The latter include major reductions in the cost of public transport, even making commuter trains free of charge. But yes, it is also true that employers’ representatives have taken a political stance ahead of the elections, aligning with the Right so as to block a national pay agreement. We have, however, seen the unions secure various collective bargaining agreements at the regional level that have resulted, at least partially, in a recovery in the real value of wages.

We have seen a reduction in social conflict because people know that this government is working to advance the welfare of the social majority. Only recently we have passed a new housing law [which will see the introduction of rent controls and offer new protections around evictions].

Divisions

Eoghan Gilmartin

According to the polls, the Left has the chance to emerge in a stronger position electorally from its term as PSOE’s junior partner, potentially winning up to between fifteen and twenty more seats with a unity Sumar ticket. This will be vital if the wider progressive bloc is to secure victory over a highly mobilized right. But such a result is being placed in doubt by internal divisions and a power struggle between Díaz and the Podemos leadership.

You mentioned the fifteen formations that attended Díaz’s candidacy launch, many of which are smaller regional forces, but the major party of the Spanish left, Podemos, did not attend and has so far resisted being integrated into the Sumar platform. What has happened over the last year and a half to produce this conflict, which could hand the elections to the Right?

Enrique Santiago

The Spanish left is in a period of transition. Does this mean that Podemos has lost its hegemony [on the Left]? Not necessarily. Rather, we are in a situation of greater shared hegemony in which existing political organizations have ceded certain of their weight to new cadres coming from the unions and other social movements. In PCE, we view this reorganization not in terms of starting from zero but building on the existing Unidas Podemos alliances and expect that all those that form a part of this grouping will remain close allies and form a part of Sumar.

We are condemned to work together and to reach an agreement. There is no other option. One Podemos leader told me the other day, as we were negotiating coalition for May’s local and regional elections, that “we don’t like that you are sitting down with splinter groups that broke off from us [such as Íñigo Errejón’s Más País].” My response was, “You were formed as a splinter group from us, and we are constantly working with you.” And if we go back far enough, we are all splinter groups from the Socialist International!

The real issue is that we are in a transitional phase. It is the Gramscian dilemma: the old has yet to die and the new has yet to be born, and this is resulting in internal turmoil and conflicts [on the Left]. But I am convinced this will be solved, and we can come out of this with a stronger project.

Eoghan Gilmartin

I presume part of the issue here is also the lack of collective institutional structures that could act as shared rules of the game. In this respect, one of the sticking points for Podemos is that it wants assurances on holding open primaries. Can you expect the party to sign up to Sumar without meaningful guarantees that its weight will translate into proportional representation?

Enrique Santiago

This whole debate around primaries being a red line for Podemos has really surprised me, because everyone is in favor of open primaries. How else are we going to work out electoral lists with so many groups involved? The real issue is that there is one sector that wants to concentrate on the makeup of electoral lists nine months out from the poll and on securing its internal status within the platform while another wants to put the emphasis on our collective project and the hopeful vision we can offer the social majority.

These tensions always exist in political movements, but it is interesting that this is the inverse of what happened in 2015. Then Izquierda Unida wanted guarantees around its status, while Podemos’s focus was on trying to make a qualitative leap and redraw the Spanish electoral map. Eight years later, Podemos is now in a more institutionalized position and its nervousness around losing its standing is understandable in that sense.

Eoghan Gilmartin

One of Podemos’s other grievances is Yolanda Díaz’s unwillingness to use her political capital to push for unity lists in May’s local and regional elections. Was it not possible to roll out Sumar for these elections, or some equivalent, and avoid damaging rival lists in certain regions?

Enrique Santiago

Spain has a particular state model that has to do with the fact it is a multinational territory. This creates further differences and divisions, which have historically been used by the Right and the country’s oligarchy to take advantage of a divided left bloc to govern against the interests of the social majority. Across these national and cultural differences, we are all exploited by the same oligarchy, and our only path to governing is reaching agreements among a plurality of left identities so as to work together.

I am sure you would agree that municipal elections are not the best place to begin such a unity project when you are faced with working across so many local differences. It is a much easier objective to achieve in the general elections.

Eoghan Gilmartin

That is certainly true in places like Valencia, where there are distinct regional dynamics; but for example in Madrid, the only reason for Más Madrid to go it alone against Izquierda Unida and Podemos is furthering its own particular interests. There are no meaningful differences beyond discursive tactics.

Enrique Santiago

Totally. I am very critical of Más Madrid in this respect — and you cannot place all the responsibility for the difficulties that have arisen on Podemos. There are many political formations that are not acting as they should when faced with the need to defend our people from a potential right-wing government that would include Vox. But you don’t get to choose your allies. You have to work with what there is.

In this respect, throughout its history, PCE has always assumed its responsibility when confronted with the rise of the extreme right. During the Francoist uprising against the Second Republic, when Spain was faced with international aggression from European fascist powers, we were willing to place the struggle for democracy above the struggle for socialism. This is because when faced with the fascist threat, we knew how to distinguish what was fundamental in that moment from what was secondary.

Eoghan Gilmartin

We’re having this conversation on April 14, the ninety-second anniversary of the Second Republic. What does it mean to be a republican in Spain in 2023?

Enrique Santiago

Republicanism is imperative for the democratic health of Spain. As I mentioned at the beginning, the existing state structures in this country are highly conservative. We have seen throughout the last four years that in moments of crisis, particularly during the pandemic, state bodies such as the police, and their unions, along with the judiciary and diplomatic corps, have been the real opposition to a democratically elected government.

Republicanism means creating another state. It means a democratic renovation of Spain, in which the oligarchies that have plagued the country for centuries disappear, and where we generate a new set of democratic institutions that are much more open to transparency and equal treatment for all. Other European countries managed to undertake such a renovation after World War II, but we had the terrible luck to be the only state that did not have this opportunity, and this has left us with major structural problems around institutional corruption.

Republicanism means creating another state. It means a democratic renovation of Spain, in which the oligarchies that have plagued the country for centuries disappear.

So the republic is about modernization, ethics, equality, and a deepening of democracy. It is also about memory and ensuring that, against the Right’s anti-communism, nobody is able to erase the role countless PCE activists played in the struggle for democracy.

Eoghan Gilmartin

And right now, a right-wing Popular Party–Vox coalition risks a serious democratic regression.

Enrique Santiago

Yes. You have to remember Vox tabled two laws during this parliamentary term to outlaw [pro-independence Basque and Catalan] parties it did not agree with. This is the threat we are up against, and behind that a whole network of economic, media and religious institutions with deep roots in Spanish society that back this extreme-right agenda. The struggle for democracy in Spain is not simply a historic one. For a party like ours, which during our hundred-year history has suffered decades of repression, this threat is not an issue to be taken lightly.

Spain About to Send Naval Defense Equipment to Kiev

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