Tucker Carlson Is a Repugnant, Pseudo-Populist Fraud

Tucker Carlson likes to posture as a bold populist truth-teller. But when push comes to shove, he sides with the ruling class and bosses, not workers.

Tucker Carlson speaks during the Mathias Corvinus Collegium Feszt on August 7, 2021 in Esztergom, Hungary. (Janos Kummer / Getty Images)

Right-wing pundit Tucker Carlson has broken his silence for the first time since he was fired by Fox News at the beginning of the week. He released a short video full of scathing criticisms of the bipartisan establishment and the barren wasteland of cable news. It ends with a strong implication that we’ll be hearing from him soon in a new venue.

I’m sure that’s true. In 2023, no one with a significant following goes away just because they lose a job. He might end up with a smaller platform, but he’ll undoubtedly land somewhere.

Good evening pic.twitter.com/SPrsYKWKCE

— Tucker Carlson (@TuckerCarlson) April 27, 2023

But what message will he be promoting on the new platform?

The impression you’d get from the video is that Carlson is someone who worries about “war” and “corporate power” and sides with the working class. Or at least the native-born section of the working class — he mentions “demographic change” along with the other two topics when he lists important things we don’t see substantive debates about on cable news.

But it’s all hot air. He doesn’t even support a higher minimum wage. And he’s all too eager for a new Cold War with China. The truth is that while he’s deviated from conservative orthodoxy on some issues, at his core Tucker Carlson is the same preppy Republican he was twenty years ago when he was wearing a bowtie and defending the Bush administration on CNN’s Crossfire. “Heterodox antiwar populist” is the character he plays on TV.

From Neocon to Libertarian . . . to “Populist”?

The germ of truth in the myth of Carlson the Populist is that he really has shifted on some important questions over the decades. He’s defended Julian Assange’s right to publish information the Pentagon would prefer to keep secret, for example — a stance that would have been unthinkable during his Crossfire era.

Not all of this evolution is recent. Back in 2009, he joined the libertarian Cato Institute as a senior fellow. Cato’s press release skimped over his full-throated defense of Bush’s hawkishness in the early years of the “war on terror,” which notoriously included calling Iraqis “semiliterate primitive monkeys” who should “shut up and obey” the United States because they “can’t govern themselves.” Instead of dwelling on his past positions, Cato in 2009 stressed that Carlson “became” a critic of “numerous Bush administration policies, including wasteful spending and the war in Iraq.”

Even now, that evolution away from neoconservatism is incomplete. Carlson often talks like a critic of the military-industrial complex when he discusses America’s global rivalry with Russia — a right-wing isolationist critic rather than a left-wing internationalist one, but a critic nonetheless. Compare, for instance, Carlson’s segment pushing back against the idea that we should “hate” warmongering Russian president Vladimir Putin with the attitude of socialist leader Eugene V. Debs, who went to jail for his fiery speech opposing US entry into World War I — but took it for granted that he should also denounce the German kaiser and show solidarity with his antiwar comrades in Germany.

But as Branko Marcetic points out, when it comes to America’s global rivalry with China, Carlson switches gears and becomes the biggest booster of the military-industrial complex. He’s suggested that America should be doing more to build up a “strong military and, yes, a strong CIA” to counter the Chinese threat. Connecting the two subjects, he’s said that “our main enemy is China” and that “the US ought to be in a relationship with Russia, allied against China.”

So the “antiwar” part of the “antiwar populist” image is more than a little dubious. But it’s true enough that he’s improved on civil liberties since his Crossfire days, that he went from supporting America’s wars in the Middle East to seeing them as misguided, and that he’s been dovish on relations between Russia and the United States.

That evolution was already well underway in 2009. But what about the issues where he’s supposed to have changed since leaving Cato in 2015?

A “Populist” Who Sides With Your Boss

Here’s what Carlson wrote about Medicare for All in 2019, well after his “populist” rebranding:

“Medicare-for-all” is actual socialism, for-real socialism. Health care spending amounts to about a fifth of the entire American economy. Elizabeth Warren demands total control of all of it — immediately. . . .

So how do you pay for “Medicare-for-all”? It’s not a minor detail we can settle later. It’s the single most important question about the program. Why do you think we don’t have it already? Because we can’t afford it.

Reality check: The reason we don’t have Medicare for All isn’t that the United States is less capable of making the finances work than other advanced democracies that have implemented similar programs. It’s that the bipartisan establishment Carlson rails against when it suits him does the bidding of the powerful and profitable private health-insurance industry.

In fact, the year before Carlson wrote this, the libertarian Mercatus Center — hardly primed to back such proposals — crunched the numbers on Bernie Sanders’s Medicare for All plan and found that it would be more cost-efficient than the current system. (They tried to bury that finding by emphasizing how much money it would cost rather than the fact that this price tag is less than our society spends on health care right now.) A middle-income taxpayer who currently has private insurance might pay a higher tax rate, but the combined cost of their current taxes and their current premiums, co-pays, and deductibles would be greater than that higher tax bill.

You might think a “populist” like Carlson would care about putting more money in the pockets of ordinary people. You’d be wrong. He prefers to spout insurance-industry talking points.

Similarly, Carlson is opposed to raising the minimum wage to $15 an hour. Talking very much like the Cato Institute senior fellow he used to be, he claimed in 2021 that the wage hike would cost the economy a million jobs. He awkwardly tried to turn this into a “populist” talking point by claiming that “these big businesses would actually be in favor of a higher minimum wage if they thought it would drive their competitors out of business” and saying that he’d be fine with raising the minimum wage for large firms but not small ones.

Similarly, in a conversation last year with Amazon Labor Union leader Chris Smalls — whom Carlson seems to have invited on his show in the hopes that Smalls would take the opportunity to criticize progressive congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, with whom Smalls had previously argued on Twitter — Carlson casually said that he’d never been “particularly pro-union” but that he’d like to see Amazon owner Jeff Bezos have his business unionized.

These attempts to split the difference between libertarianism and “populism” are telling. At best, the regular people Carlson sympathizes with when he rails against Wall Street or corporate America aren’t the working class. They’re small-business owners. If you’re one of the sixty million Americans who works for a small business, Carlson wants you to continue to earn poverty wages to prop up your employers against their larger competitors.

And even that might be giving him too much credit. He claims he’d favor a hypothetical à la carte minimum wage hike on big companies, but the top-line consequence of his position is that he rejects attempts to raise the minimum wage in the real world — and thus lands on the side of big corporations that like wage rates just fine as is.

Carlson’s response to the baby formula shortage last year wasn’t to blame the profit-seeking greed of the giant companies that manufacture the great bulk of the product in the United States. It was to blame a government program that provides vouchers for low-income mothers to buy formula.

Carlson wrote:

The problem right now is that the Abbott Nutrition Company has made the baby formula for the vast majority of WIC contracts. The government had all its eggs virtually in Abbott’s basket. Unfortunately, Abbott just closed its plant in Sturgis, Michigan because of contamination, and that means that millions of people who used WIC to buy Abbott products are forced to buy competing formulas and they’re doing it all at once.

Got that? Carlson doesn’t even pause to ask why the contamination happened, what this had to do with Abbot’s lax safety practices, or whether more regulation might have helped stop this from happening. He just homes in on too many poor mothers getting baby formula with government vouchers as “the” problem leading to shortages for everyone else.

But perhaps most telling of all is Carlson’s response to the fentanyl crisis. The supposed antiwar populist’s preferred culprit for the tens of millions of fentanyl death every year isn’t widespread poverty and despair caused by decades of capital running roughshod over a disempowered working class.

Instead, his preferred story about the roots of the fentanyl crisis can be summarized in one word: China.

Carlson Versus His Viewers

Many of Carlson’s admirers assume that he was fired for one or more of his genuinely heterodox positions — like opposing US intervention in Ukraine. But right now, evidence strongly suggests that he was let go for more mundane reasons.

Multiple lawsuits against Fox implicate Carlson in one way or another, and in some of the text messages and off-air videos that have recently emerged, Carlson expresses opinions that are embarrassing to his employer. Some involve insults directed at Fox News management. Others reveal a severe gap between how he talked about Trump and claims about election fraud on air and how he spoke about these subjects in private. Still others include off-camera jokes about his “‘postmenopausal fans’ and whether they will approve of how he looks on the air.”

Carlson is, in other words, the kind of brave truth-teller who thinks very little of his audience and avoids telling them things they don’t want to hear. And the kind of antiwar populist who longs for a full-fledged Cold War with China and opposes raising the minimum wage.

What he really is, at the end of the day, is a clown. This is a man who devoted multiple segments to ranting about “woke” candy manufacturer Mars Wrigley changing its animated green M&M to make her less sexy.

He might have lost his gig at Fox, but I have no doubt he’ll be reapplying his clown makeup and setting up a tent at some other circus soon enough. Tucker Carlson isn’t going anywhere. We should be so lucky.

The 1993 Montreal Hockey Riot Raged Against Political Dysfunction and Deindustrialization

Montreal’s 1993 hockey riot wasn’t about one nation’s anger at another’s victory — it was an expression of fury over Quebec’s experience of neoliberalism and deindustrialization in the province.

Rioters tipping over a car in the 1993 Montreal Stanley Cup riots, from news footage of the event. (CBC)

It was surprising to see Montreal’s 1993 Stanley Cup riot included in the “Blood Sports” section of Jacobin’s “Nationalism” issue. While most of the details were correct, it was the explanation that the riot had been caused by “incensed Los Angeles Kings fans” that hit a discordant tone. There were many contributing factors that led to that riot, but nationalist rivalry wasn’t among them.

After all, Montreal fans have a history of rioting when the Canadiens win.

News reports clearly identified Montreal fans as being responsible for the riot, and linked it with what was considered a growing global phenomenon of “hooliganism.” It wasn’t without precedent either: fans rioted the previous time the Canadiens won the cup as well. The 1986 riot — which saw several thousand jubilant fans looting stores along Montreal’s main commercial thoroughfare, Saint Catherine Street — caught the city and its police force by surprise. Most of the blame was attributed to police’s slow response rather than the “few bad apples” whose “exuberance got the better of them.” Then chairman of Montreal’s public security committee, Guy Descary, defended police inaction at the time, saying that had police employed their batons it would have made things worse.

While competition between nations was not the underlying cause of the 1993 riot, nationalism still played a role — albeit indirectly. The riot wasn’t a consequence of one nation’s anger at another’s victory. Rather, it was an expression of intense frustration resulting from Quebec’s fading hope for self-determination, misgivings over the appropriation of an important cultural export, and the crushing experience of neoliberalism and deindustrialization in the province and its metropolis.

The End of the Twentieth Century in Montreal

The 1990s was a tough decade for Montreal. The difficulty of the decade was presaged by the horror of Montreal’s day of infamy, December 6, 1989. Until it was surpassed by the Columbine High School massacre a decade later, the École Polytechnique massacre held the ignoble distinction of being the world’s worst school shooting. The dead and most of the wounded were women, representatives of the first generation of Quebec women to enter STEM fields in large numbers. The killer entered a classroom, ordered the men to leave, accused the women of being feminists, and then began shooting. Politicians and pundits chastised male students for not overpowering the gunman, and scolded women for having the temerity to suggest a mass femicide might be driven by, in Quebec’s case, a deeply rooted societal tradition of misogyny.

A few months later Canada entered a major recession, by some accounts the worst since World War II, and the effects of which would be particularly pronounced in Montreal. The city had already spent much of the 1980s losing economic ground to archrival Toronto. The passing of the title of “Canada’s economic capital” from Montreal to Toronto had begun in earnest in the latter half of the 1970s, with the election of the sovereignist Parti Québécois (PQ) government in 1976. The PQ was nationalist — in the sense that it wanted to create an independent Quebec nation — albeit within the context of what its supporters saw as a larger global effort at decolonization.

The PQ had clearly articulated goals: a public referendum on the future of Quebec’s place within Canada (generally interpreted as a referendum on whether or not to secede), and making French the sole official language of the province. These two factors convinced several major corporations to move their operations to Toronto (an instance of such significant capital flight that the effects of it can still be seen today) and kickstarted an exodus of the province’s English-speaking minority.

By the time the early-1990s recession began, Montreal’s economy had been weakened by these factors as well as the deleterious impact of free trade agreements on the city’s urban blue-collar sector. Additionally, three decades of population loss to the suburbs had siphoned away a large chunk of the city’s tax base.

According to one estimate, in 1991, roughly 25 percent of Montreal’s population was living below the poverty line.

Free trade’s impact on Montreal’s textile and apparel sector was particularly devastating, as almost overnight what was once a vibrant sector of the economy imploded. One estimate suggested that as many as half a million Canadian manufacturing jobs, many of which would have been unionized and located in urban areas, were killed off in just a few scant years after the signing of the Canada-US free trade agreement in 1989. Montreal lost forty-two thousand jobs in 1991. A devastating sixty-two thousand jobs were lost — including over seventeen thousand in the clothing industry and over fourteen thousand in the hotel and restaurant industry — in 1992. A further twelve thousand jobs would be lost in August of 1993, two months after the riot, while another fifteen thousand workers gave up looking for work altogether.

By June of 1993, Montreal and Quebec were still struggling to recuperate from a recession the rest of Canada had already recovered from, with real unemployment standing stubbornly above 11 percent in the city. According to one estimate, in 1991, roughly 25 percent of Montreal’s population was living below the poverty line.

Hockey in Quebec

The origins of professional ice hockey in North America can be traced back to the elite schools and exclusive athletic clubs of Montreal’s English-speaking elite. But hockey became a lucrative business and professional sport in large part because of working-class French-Canadian players and spectators. And if hockey is Quebec’s secular religion, then the Montreal Canadiens are its saints. The team is deeply rooted in the culture and society of Quebec, such that the team’s official name (Canadiens) and its nickname (the Habs — short for ‘Les Habitants’) are both references to the French-speaking population that colonized Quebec beginning in the fifteenth century.

Between 1965 and 1980 the Canadiens brought the Stanley Cup home no less than ten times, and in the late 1970s won the cup four times in a row.

The Canadiens are the most-winning team in the National Hockey League (NHL), holding twenty-four Stanley Cup titles. They are also the longest continuously operating professional hockey team in the world, and the only NHL team whose founding predates the creation of the league. The connection between Montreal and professional hockey goes even further: the first modern game of ice hockey was played there in 1875, the length of a modern ice hockey rink is the distance between two streets in downtown Montreal, and the NHL was founded in a Montreal hotel. To say that Montrealers have a proprietary interest in hockey is something of an understatement.

Between 1965 and 1980 the Canadiens brought the Stanley Cup home no less than ten times, and in the late 1970s won the cup four times in a row. But the 1980s would mark the beginning of a new era, both for Quebec and Montreal, as well as professional hockey. The NHL began an aggressive expansion project in 1967 with the addition of six new teams, all of which were based in the United States. With the exception of the Canadiens’ win in 1986, the cup would be won by an expansion team every other year of the decade. Tying the city’s economic decline to its apparent loss of dominance over the game it helped create, the NHL left Montreal for New York City in 1989.

Quebec’s game was lost to other cities in the United States and Western Canada as Stanley Cup wins accrued outside Montreal throughout the 1980s. At the same time, the province’s economic situation was being aggravated by political instability. Though federalists won the 1980 Quebec independence referendum, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau undertook an aggressive program of constitutional reform with the hope that Quebec’s frustrations might be quelled through a negotiated settlement.

Political Turmoil and Police Brutality

For the next fifteen years, Canadians would be engaged in a nearly unending series of acrimonious constitutional negotiations between the federal government and Canada’s provinces. Though these negotiations would bring about Canada’s constitution in 1982, Quebec never ratified the agreement. Additional constitutional accords, negotiated between 1987 and 1990, and then again in 1992, would prove fruitless.

The first of these accords failed because of the objection of an indigenous legislator from Manitoba, Elijah Harper, who refused to ratify an accord negotiated without the input of the indigenous community. Because the Manitoba legislature required unanimous consent to approve the accord, it ultimately failed, with the proposed amendments lapsing on June 23, 1990, the day before Saint-Jean-Baptiste Day — Quebec’s “national” holiday.

Within Quebec the failure of the accord was seen as a rejection of the province by “English Canada,” and half a million Quebecers demonstrated for independence at Quebec City’s Saint-Jean-Baptiste Day celebrations. Eighteen days later, Quebec’s provincial police force raided a Kanienʼkehá:ka (Mohawk) barricade protesting a planned expansion of a golf course onto traditional Kanienʼkehá:ka land in the Montreal suburb of Oka. The raid was a disaster. Not only was the raiding SWAT team repelled by Kanienʼkehá:ka land defenders, one of its officers — Corporal Marcel Lemay — was killed in what was likely a friendly-fire incident.

The Kanienʼkehá:ka Resistance of 1990 would involve blockades of Quebec highways and bridges around Montreal for seventy-eight days, and would further involve the deployment of thousands of Quebec police officers and the lion’s share of a historically French-speaking brigade of the Canadian Army.

Five days after the botched sneak attack against indigenous land defenders, Montreal police raided a nightclub popular within the city’s LGBTQ community. Though overtly homophobic nightclub raids had been fairly common in Montreal in the 1970s, the attack on Sex Garage seemed to come out of left field — unexpected, unwarranted, and particularly brutal. Photos of police phalanxes mock-masturbating their batons and badge-less constables smashing their truncheons into terrified patrons were carried by Montreal’s newspapers the following day. When city and police officials failed to meet with community representatives, a mass “kiss-in” was held in the middle of an intersection next to a major downtown police station.

With television cameras broadcasting live from the scene, Montreal police were filmed once again beating people senseless. Throughout 1990, there would be several more incidents of police brutality, and an equal number of incidents demonstrating jaw-dropping police incompetence.

Rule of Three

Faith in the political establishment was fading as well. The ascension of three politicians of different political stripes — at different levels of government — had seemed to offer a degree of stability in the middle years of the 1980s. But their luster was gone by the early 1990s.

At the federal level, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney led a Progressive Conservative Party that won a landslide victory in 1984. Mulroney, a Quebec native, promised renewed prosperity through privatization and free trade. Unlike his predecessor, Pierre Trudeau (the brief premiership of John Turner being more a blip than a changing of the guard), Mulroney was viewed as a unifier who could find common cause amongst Canada’s divergent regional interests.

At the provincial level, the PQ government that had lost both the 1980 referendum and constitutional debates was swept from power by the economist Robert Bourassa in 1985. Bourassa aimed to develop a strong Quebec within a united Canada.

At the municipal level, Jean Doré ascended to the mayoralty of Montreal in 1986 after the twenty-six-year reign of the previous mayor, the autocratic Jean Drapeau. A breath of fresh air seemed to waft across the political spectrum.

But whatever promise these men presented in the mid-1980s was gone by 1993. Mulroney would resign at the end of June 1993 as one of the least popular prime ministers in Canadian history, his government embroiled in scandal and his two principle economic policies — free trade and a general services tax — both deeply unpopular and ineffective.

Bourassa was similarly unpopular, having missed two opportunities to secure Quebec’s position in Confederation and also dealing with ineffective economic policies that couldn’t raise Quebec out of the early-1990s recession. And at Montreal’s city hall, the progressive “people power” policies that had brought Doré to the mayoralty were losing ground to the politics of staying in power.

Despite widespread social, political, and economic problems facing his citizens, Doré overfocused on bread-and-circus solutions, going all-in on celebrating the city’s 350th anniversary in 1992. A riot at Montreal’s Olympic Stadium following an aborted Metallica–Guns N’ Roses double bill in August presaged the Stanley Cup riot ten months later. Both upheavals featured unexpected violence, and an equally surprising unwillingness of the police to intervene.

By 1993 Doré was being lambasted for spending $300,000 on a new window for his recently renovated office. He was pilloried as well for his involvement in an ill-conceived (and ultimately aborted) dinosaur museum meant to capitalize on the popularity of Jurassic Park, promoted by a convicted fraudster.

Just ten days before the riot, perhaps as many as one hundred thousand public and para-public workers held a massive demonstration against government austerity measures.

Government priorities increasingly seemed completely detached from reality. A billion dollars in tax increases were levied against the already-cash-strapped population, while the government continued to pour money into building a retractable roof for a professional baseball stadium and spent $95 million on a new casino. Just ten days before the riot, perhaps as many as one hundred thousand public and para-public workers held a massive demonstration against government austerity measures.

A Hat Trick of Anger, Disillusionment, and Frustration

Hockey was a popular cultural export for Quebec, but its wasn’t of any particular economic benefit. Rather, Canada and Quebec’s poor economic performance was making the game appear to be untenable in its home country. The NHL’s successful expansion was bringing Quebecois hockey talent to exotic locations with no history of or cultural attachment to professional hockey, like San Jose, Tampa Bay, and Anaheim. At the same time, Canadian teams faced the possibility of relocation despite collections of Stanley Cup trophies and loyal fan bases.

And while the Hollywood glitterati took their seats at the Los Angeles Forum, the working class Montrealers who had seen the team through thick and thin were largely shut out of the 1993 contest, with most of the tickets held by wealthy season-ticket holders. Those few tickets that were left for the general public were often snapped up in minutes, while scalpers demanded extraordinary sums for the stands.

Whereas blame for the 1986 riot focused on the police’s unpreparedness, blame for the 1993 riot was cast on the police as much as the revelers. Mayor Doré blamed the looting on organized gangs, while store owners and merchants put the blame back on the police. Perhaps mindful of the then-shocking displays of police brutality (and its consequences) coming out of Los Angeles in the early 1990s, police defended their apparent disinterest in crowd control by arguing that they didn’t wish to violate people’s human rights.

Police chief Alain St Germain argued that his strategy was to avoid confrontation, while also suggesting that the looting was carried out by organized gangs of teenagers, something that seemed to be confirmed by eyewitnesses both at the time and in retrospectives years later.

However, the idea that millions of dollars of damage and looting could be caused by well-organized gangs of youths, intent on using postgame revelry as a cover for their coordinated looting operation, seems implausible on its face. There was no guarantee the Canadiens would win that night, and there were hundreds of police officers deployed around the Montreal Forum and on Saint Catherine Street. The partial explanation of police reluctance to intervene seems more likely, particularly given that just days before the riot, a judgement issued by a Quebec Superior Court investigation of the 1986 riot placed at least some of the blame on negligent officers.

While there are plenty of examples of nationalism infecting the world of sport, Montreal’s 1993 Stanley Cup riot was not a blood feud between nations. It was a unique expression of anger, disillusionment, and frustration masquerading as jubilation. It is worth noting that, by contrast, there were no major incidents of violence two years later in the context of the 1995 Quebec sovereignty referendum. Nor was there any rioting by Canadian nationalists after the Unity Rally (potentially the largest single demonstration in Canadian history), or by Quebec nationalists after their razor-thin referendum defeat.

St Germain called the riot a breakdown of the social order. He was right, though he may not have fully articulated or realized the breadth of that breakdown. An anonymous looter, interviewed on the street by an Associated Press reporter, succinctly summarized a widely-shared social and cultural emotional state when they said, “The Habs won the cup and big bonuses. This is what we get.”

When Jerry Springer Bucked the DC Foreign Policy Consensus in a Straight-to-DVD Movie

After his death earlier this week, the whole world is remembering Jerry Springer’s trashy talk show. But nobody is talking about Springer’s 2004 role as an antiwar US president who took on the military-industrial complex and won.

Jerry Springer attends the Galaxy British Book Awards at Grosvenor House Hotel on April 3, 2009 in London, United Kingdom. (Danny Martindale / Getty Images)

Jerry Springer, who died this past week at the age of seventy-nine, might end up being remembered for being a lot of things: the disgraced city councilman who paid for sex with a check; the Cincinnati mayor with a social conscience who once said, “if a man has five bucks that he wants to use to take his wife to a movie, but there’s a poor person out there with a real need . . . it’s a legitimate function of government to reallocate that man’s entertainment money to help out the poor”; the daytime TV talk-show king who was accused, not unfairly, of later exploiting those same people for ratings and entertainment.

What he’s not likely to be remembered for is the little-known 2004 Dolph Lundgren movie The Defender.

That’s too bad. Because while The Defender isn’t anyone’s idea of great cinema, today it’s a fascinating artifact from the George W. Bush years. The film is a rare cultural product that didn’t just sound the alarm about the dangers of Bush’s presidency or the “war on terror” — it dared to suggest that the entire foundation of that war and how it was fought was backward, and then full-throatedly endorsed a nonmilitary alternative.

The Defender, Lundgren’s directorial debut, effectively presents a liberal alternate reality of Bush’s America, one governed by an unnamed president played by, and who for all intents and purposes is, Springer himself. In this world, three years into the war on terror, President Springer has decided that the country’s approach to combating terrorism has hit a dead end and aims instead to pursue a bold alternative: a peace initiative.

“We’ve stood firm and fought strong,” his national security adviser, Dr Roberta Jones — unmistakably this world’s dovish version of fellow PhD Condoleezza Rice — tells a reporter. “But when that effort itself gives rise to a state of fear and deception around the world, what have we accomplished?”

But this runs afoul of a shadowy Deep State faction that views Springer as a “traitor” who is “ruining the country.” That faction is a right-wing cabal that, in a somewhat unsettling parallel to recent history, has its tentacles in the very Secret Service meant to be protecting the president. Of course, it’s not just a matter of ideology.

“War is big business, Lance, and that means a lot of money,” Jones later explains.

The Lance in question is Dolph Lundgren’s stoic Lance Rockford, a loyal, heroic Secret Service agent who’s Seen Some Shit, and ends up the only thing standing between Jerry Springer and a Deep State coup.

He’s got his hands full, because besides the occasional bout of PTSD and the small army of mercenaries sent to assassinate Jones, there’s also the high-stakes pressure and secrecy of Springer and Jones’s diplomatic project.

Dolph Lundgren as Lance, under fire. (Bauer Martinez Studios, 2004).

Jones, you see, is secretly meeting with terrorist Mohamed Jamar, the film’s Osama bin Laden analogue, and if anyone finds out about it, Jones warns Rockford, “the entire credibility of the United States would be destroyed, and with it will go any sense of stability around the world.”

If the risk of assassination weren’t bad enough, the Springer administration also has to contend with an arguably fiercer enemy: a recalcitrant Washington establishment opposed to the president’s initiative, in the form of a hawkish press corps and grandstanding congressmembers lecturing about weakness and surrender. (Europe, on the other hand, is fully on board with the Springer peace plan, viewing it as “the only way forward.”)

“If this goes wrong, it could bring down your entire administration,” an adviser warns Springer.

“Don’t kid yourself,” says Springer. “If this goes wrong, it brings down the entire Western alliance.”

In the end, the forces of peace and restraint prevail, not just because of Rockford’s handiness with a gun and bowie knife, but because of what turns out to be a clever (and somewhat inexplicably successful) trap run jointly by the CIA and FBI — an institutional faith that a little jarringly exposes the film’s fundamental liberalism. Jones wasn’t meeting with Jamar as part of a peace process, it turns out. Jamar and his Middle Eastern–looking handler are actually CIA and MI5, respectively, and the meeting was part of a plan to flush the coup-plotters out.

In the aftermath, the treacherous Secret Service official shoots himself, the plotters are arrested, Congress passes the president’s peace initiative, Rockford gets a medal, and Springer delivers a generic prime-time address about America as an idea.

It doesn’t pay to think too hard about what you’re watching — like the fact that were it not for Rockford’s extraordinary killing ability, Jones would have been effectively condemned to death as part of this plan, given how severely undermanned and under-resourced the team protecting her was.

The movie is, of course, fiction, and to a large extent, liberal Bush-era wish fulfillment. But over two decades on, Bush’s war on terror is still with us — in fact, Afghanistan withdrawal aside, it’s expanded well beyond where it was under Bush, as this week’s failed vote to get US troops out of Somalia reminds us. So is the military-first anti-terrorism logic that Bush sold the country on, which, as Joe Biden’s triumphant announcement of yet another dead terrorist leader exhibits, still has no real challenge or alternative in mainstream discourse.

With this in mind, today it’s somewhat startling to watch characters, let alone a fictional president, unapologetically voice entirely correct antiwar talking points that are almost completely absent from our political vocabulary today.

“Giving concessions, won’t that be called, ‘giving in,’ ‘being weak,’ by a great many people?” a reporter asks the president at one point.

“No, I call it, ‘Giving peace a chance,’” Springer replies. “The war on terrorism is not a conventional war, and it therefore cannot be won by conventional means.”

Jerry Springer (L) in The Defender. (Bauer Martinez Studios, 2004)

Meanwhile, for all its low-budget schlock, the film’s portrayal of US foreign policy debate is depressingly true to life. Congress greets President Springer’s peace initiative with “skepticism” and “mixed reviews,” we’re told, while conservative groups call it “irresponsible and un-American.”

“If the president attempts to negotiate, if the president vacillates, then this will be seen by our friends and our enemies abroad as a sign of weakness,” the California senator opposing Springer’s plan (and who, incidentally, ends up being one of the coup-plotters) tells TV viewers. If he was in the president’s shoes, he later says, he wouldn’t negotiate — “not now, not at this moment in time.”

This is hardly brilliant writing. Yet you could virtually cut and paste these lines into the ultra-hawkish discourse regarding US diplomacy and the Ukraine war that we’ve watched play out this past year and never tell the difference. It’s beyond depressing that the actual, real-world nature of US political debate on matters of war and peace strays so little from a straight-to-DVD Dolph Lundgren action flick.

So if you want to pay tribute to the late daytime TV king this weekend, but feel understandably icky about firing up one of his old talk show episodes, you could do worse than spending ninety minutes watching The Defender and marveling at how a twenty-year-old movie starring Jerry Springer is more thoughtful about US foreign policy than most of what happens in Washington. If nothing else, it’s all worth it to watch the man himself sternly admonish the coup leaders: “You messed with the wrong country, and you fucked with the wrong president.”

Calling for Dianne Feinstein’s Retirement Is Stating the Obvious, Not Ageism or Sexism

The California senator Dianne Feinstein is losing her capacity to engage in basic Senate business, yet she refuses to step down. It’s a disgraceful finale to Feinstein’s career, which has been spent faithfully serving the rich.

California senator Dianne Feinstein walks through the Senate subway on her way to a procedural vote at the US Capitol on November 28, 2022 in Washington, DC. (Drew Angerer / Getty Images)

You’ve probably heard that California senator Dianne Feinstein, eighty-nine, has been too ill to show up to the Senate yet hasn’t resigned. As a result of her absence, the Senate on Thursday voted to overturn a critical Biden administration effort to control truck emissions. Feinstein has been in the hospital with shingles, has missed 75 percent of the Senate votes this session, and has not indicated when (if ever) she plans to return.

Shingles aside, there are serious questions about whether she is up for this job, cognitively and physically. The vote on truck emissions was fifty to forty-nine, with Joe Manchin, coal baron and ally of the death-drive faction of US politics, joining the Republicans, who said the Biden regulations were too “burdensome” on the trucking industry.

People will die because of this vote — a disgraceful yet fitting finale to Feinstein’s career, which has been spent faithfully serving capital.

With the Democrats’ Senate majority so thin and some of the conservative Democrats at constant risk of voting with Republicans, it’s a disaster having a Senator who can’t or won’t show up. Allowing the trucking rule to die is bad enough, but Feinstein’s absence is also hindering the Senate from confirming Biden’s judicial nominees (previously a relatively effective dimension of his presidency).

Predictably, Feinstein has her defenders, all accusing the critics of various “isms.” Nancy Pelosi suggested that the calls for Feinstein to step down were sexist. New York senator Kirsten Gillibrand agreed, as did California representative Norma Torres, Michigan senator Debbie Stabenow, and even some Republican women, like Senators Marsha Blackburn and Joni Ernst of Tennessee and Iowa, respectively. Others have cried “ableism” and “ageism,” real problems but not applicable to a situation in which one person not showing up to work has such a devastating impact on the larger society.

Some of these callouts were directed at California representative Ro Khanna, who rightly blamed Feinstein for the horrible truck vote and has been insisting that it’s time for Feinstein to resign since she is “not showing up.” Said Khanna on “Fox News Sunday”: “Only in Washington would you get criticized for saying something so obvious.” Democratic socialist congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York has also called for Feinstein to step down.

Thursday’s trucking vote has dire implications. Biden’s rule would have greatly eased pollution from heavy-duty trucks, especially nitrous oxides, which contribute to acid rain. It also would have reduced carbon emissions, necessary to avoid the worst effects of global warming. As well, asthma from air pollution caused by cars and trucks is a serious public health problem, especially in poor and working-class communities, which are much more likely to be exposed to heavy traffic. Biden’s Environmental Protection Agency estimated that the rule would have, by 2045, saved 2,900 people from early death and prevented eighteen thousand children from developing asthma.

Who benefits from Feinstein’s absence from the Senate? The rich. Of course, corporate interests did not want the trucking rule. The Republicans had their backs, but the Democrats complied by not forcing Feinstein to show up or quit. Capital would also prefer that Biden never got to appoint any judges, since a Republican president would shape the judiciary with an even more reactionary vision.

This whole saga seems like a logical coda for a person who has been loyally serving the plutocracy for half a century. The first woman to be mayor of San Francisco, she came into office in 1978, a distressing time when the city was still reeling from the assassination of its previous mayor, George Moscone, and Supervisor Harvey Milk, by fellow supervisor Dan White. (Feinstein had been president of the city’s board of supervisors.) Her mayoralty was characterized by intensely developer-friendly policies.

Longtime Bay Area journalist Larry Bensky, writing in the Anderson Valley Advertiser in 1994, described her time as mayor this way:

Her contributions were led by a wealthy father, an even wealthier husband and a constellation of powerful business leaders who — correctly — assumed she would be a safe vote for their interests. . . . she was an unabashed cheerleader for the easy-money game of downtown office construction. 30 million soulless square feet were added during her administration.

Bensky contrasted Feinstein’s attentiveness to the real estate titans with her neglect of the city’s working class.

As Senator, she continued this pattern of serving the rich at the expense of the rest. Feinstein opposed single-payer health care, even as it became a mainstream political priority during Bernie Sanders’s last two presidential campaigns. She has been a hawk on deficits and on defense. She was rightly criticized for praising — and (yuck) hugging — Lindsey Graham during the disgraceful Amy Coney Barrett hearings, in which California representative Katie Porter, NARAL, and other liberals pointed out that Barrett was in no way forced to explain or elaborate on her deeply reactionary antiabortion and anti-worker politics.

Feinstein was often criticized for pursuing policies that could benefit her investor husband, Richard Blum, a billionaire who died last year. The private-equity tycoon had major holdings in firms that have benefitted from hundreds of millions of defense contracting dollars; some on both the Left and Right have been vulgar enough to point out that Feinstein was, during that time, a fan of robust defense spending.

In sum, the criticisms of Dianne Feinstein are not sexist or ageist. Rather, they are long overdue. Not only is she not showing up for work — this billionaire has been serving the billionaire class for far too long. It’s past time for her to retire.

Bush Family Links to Nazi Germany: “A Famous American Family” Made its Fortune from the Nazis

Bush family links to Nazi Germany were first revealed at the Nuremberg trials in the testimony of Nazi Germany’s steel magnate Fritz Thyssen. “Prescott Bush & Herbert Walker, Thyssen’s partners in crime were the father & grandfather of a future US President”

The post Bush Family Links to Nazi Germany: “A Famous American Family” Made its Fortune from the Nazis appeared first on Global Research.

Plato’s Philosophy Is an Aristocratic Attack on Democracy and Popular Rule

Plato developed his philosophy in ancient Greece during an early experiment in democratic government that threatened the power of his class. He responded with an argument for rule by aristocratic elites that has appealed to conservatives ever since.

Cave of Plato, Jan Saenredam, Cornelis Cornelisz. Van Haarlem, 1604. (Sepia Times / Universal Images Group via Getty Images)

Modern commentators trace the emergence of Western philosophy back to Plato. Karl Popper once suggested that Western thought has been Platonic or anti-Platonic but rarely ever non-Platonic, while Alfred North Whitehead famously quipped that the history of Western philosophy has been little more than “footnotes to Plato.”

One reason for his enduring influence is the sheer breadth of Plato’s writing. Across three dozen dialogues, Plato tackles everything from theology, metaphysics, and epistemology to political theory, the nature of love, and the theory of language. Another reason is the undeniable depth of Plato’s thought, which assimilates insights from his predecessors — Parmenides and Pythagoras in particular — while breaking new ground in many of the areas highlighted above.

A third reason, far less remarked upon, is the historical role that Plato’s philosophy has played in attacking democracy. His most influential work, The Republic, is a highly sophisticated argument against the democratic approach to government that had taken shape in Plato’s time. Plato’s uncompromising defense of human inequality has appealed to conservatives ever since.

The Natural Order

By the time Plato was writing in the early decades of the fourth century BCE, Athens had been a democracy for more than a century. Starting with Solon’s reforms in the early sixth century BCE and continuing with the Cleisthenian reforms in 507, thousands of Athenian males won citizenship rights in the teeth of opposition from conservative aristocrats — members of the Eupatridae — who objected to this upending of the “natural order of things.”

Plato’s most influential work, The Republic, is a highly sophisticated argument against the democratic approach to government.

Plato was a member of the Eupatridae on both sides of his family. His father was descended from the old kings of Athens, while his mother’s family was even more prestigious, tracing its roots to the great Athenian lawgiver Solon. Members of Plato’s family were also heavily involved in contemporary politics. When he was in his early twenties, Plato’s uncle and his mother’s cousin led a coup against Athenian democracy in the aftermath of defeat in the Peloponnesian War.

Writing about these events fifty years later, Plato recounts how he initially supported this antidemocratic coup in the hope that its leaders would “set the city back onto the path of justice.” Instead, they acted with brutality, slaughtering their opponents and tearing up the rule of law.

Plato wants his readers to know that he abhorred the behavior of his friends and relatives, but it is worth remembering that his letter was written long after the failure of the coup was a well-established fact. We cannot know what role Plato might have played had the coup been successful, particularly as he went on to have intimate relations with more successful tyrants in the region.

In this context, it is worth nothing that the letter outlining Plato’s opposition to his associates in Athens was actually written to exonerate his own record in the politics of Syracuse, where one of his long-standing supporters played a central role in turning a once-vibrant democracy into a bloodbath of civil war and internecine violence.

Plato never gave up his conviction that ordinary men and women were incapable of ruling themselves.

Members of Plato’s Academy were also directly involved in the Syracuse bloodletting. Plato’s Letter to the Friends of Dion was essentially written to eulogize his protégé, despite Dion’s role in the cycle of violence, to denounce Dion’s rivals as men whom Plato had tried (and failed) to turn into philosopher-kings, and to exonerate Plato himself, in view of the disaster that was unfolding for ordinary people.

In spite of the killing and chaos that ensued, Plato never gave up his conviction that ordinary men and women were incapable of ruling themselves. He also retained his conviction that the easiest way to bring justice to the city-state would involve converting autocrats into philosopher-kings and that the nature of such “justice” could only be truly discerned from Plato’s own idealist philosophy.

A New Society

Western philosophy was a product of the polis, a new form of political organization that arose in Greece during the period from 800 to 500 BCE. These city-states grew out of a Dark Age centered on warrior bands and rural villages. The value system that underpinned the older society was based on military achievement. Men followed leaders who could protect the family unit (oikos) and display excellence in battle.

In the period between 1100 and 800 BCE, warrior chieftains coalesced into a military aristocracy who controlled the land and differentiated themselves through noble lineage. As before, it was military virtue that commanded respect, as aristocrats secured honor through success in warfare and victory against rival noblemen. These values were encapsulated in the ideal of aretḗ — the strength and skill of a noble warrior coupled with his superiority over commoners.

The most important catalyst for the emerging polis was a population explosion facilitated by improvements in agriculture associated with the shift from bronze to iron. According to one estimate, the population increased by a factor of seven between 780 BCE and 720 BCE, creating a struggle for land that in turn resulted in a series of important consequences for the development of the polis.

The most important catalyst for the emerging Greek polis was a population explosion facilitated by improvements in agriculture.

An urban civilization slowly developed, helping to create the legal and spatial centers for these new communities. At the same time, there was a wave of outward migration, with Greeks founding hundreds of new colonies and re-establishing trade with older empires to their east and south. The struggle for land also brought the masses more fully into politics as they began to claim political representation, land redistribution, and debt forgiveness.

The latter point indicates the growing importance of a monetary economy, which further destabilized an aristocracy who needed wealth to maintain their power without wanting to lower themselves to commercial activity. Over time, the rise in commerce created differentials within the aristocracy as some families adopted to the new economic reality while others failed to do so. It also created a class of prosperous farmers who demanded political representation as their economic fortunes improved.

The development of hoplite warfare in the middle of the seventh century was another important milestone in the move toward citizen-states, as warfare was no longer the preserve of the aristocracy. Instead of noble warriors fighting on horseback, warfare was carried out by around a third of the adult male population who had the resources to afford the equipment of a hoplite infantryman.

The fact that political rights had historically been associated with participation in battle meant that it was very likely that power now would begin to open up, particularly as internal competition within the nobility meant that they never imposed a class state over the commoners. In this respect, the collapse of the Mycenaean Empire during the twelfth century BCE allowed essential space for the development of more democratic forms of decision-making centuries later.

Solon’s Reforms

One consequence of struggle among the elites was the rise of tyrants. These were aristocrats who emerged in a period of conflict to grab power for themselves. From 650 to 500 BCE, strongmen emerged in various poleis with the aim of breaking the political, familial, and religious bases of their aristocratic rivals.

The best way to achieve this was to elevate the importance of the polis as a civic and religious center. Tyrants were associated with investment in civic and religious infrastructure that fostered a sense of citizen-solidarity. They also offered small commercial loans to break the economic power of the aristocracy and enacted legal codes that replaced the informal judgements of the nobility with more formal laws erected by the polis itself.

Meanwhile, the gradual rise in commercial logic was dissolving traditional relationships while also increasing economic inequality. In Athens, the resulting struggles became particularly sharp around 594 BCE, as the development of a rising class of prosperous farmers was mirrored by a growing mass of poorer peasants. Renowned as a lawmaker, Solon was tasked with restoring civic harmony among the contending parties: the nobility, the yeoman farmers, and the poorer peasants.

Solon was tasked with restoring civic harmony among the contending parties: the nobility, the yeoman farmers, and the poorer peasants.

To help the poorest farmers, he abolished the quasi-feudal hektḗmoroi system along with the debt slavery that resulted from it. He also opened political office to men of wealth and made the aristocracy more accountable to justice administered through the polis. His aim was to ensure a hierarchical form of social order (eunomia) based on the proportionate contributions made by different classes to the good of the state.

However, within half a century, the reforms of Solon had given way to an Athenian tyranny under Pisistratus. In the same mode as tyrants elsewhere, Pisistratus fostered a sense of Athenian citizenship while further weakening the power of the Eupatridae. In the subsequent battle to overthrow Hippias, the son of Pisistratus, Cleisthenes sought a base among the masses against the conservative wing of the aristocracy, led by Isagoras.

War and Empire

The victory of Cleisthenes was also a victory for the lower orders. To confirm it, Cleisthenes further weakened the traditional nobility by abolishing their kinship groups, known as phratry. The newer kinship groups were tied directly to the polis, making sure the Athenian citizenry would become a self-conscious and a self-defined political body.

The political reforms of Cleisthenes came seventeen years before the invasion of Greece by an enormous Persian army.

Cleisthenes expected his own family to remain close to the center of power, but his reforms soon took on a momentum of their own, deepening the role of the demos while creating new demands for genuine equality throughout public life (isonomia). One factor in this development was internal to the reforms themselves, as adult men gained unprecedented influence through their majorities within the assembly and the law courts.

The second factor was historical. The reforms of Cleisthenes came seventeen years before the invasion of Greece by an enormous Persian army. Against all odds, the Athenian citizen-army helped defeat the Persian attempt to conquer Greece, first on land at the Battle of Marathon (490 BCE), and then more decisively at sea in the Battle of Salamis (480 BCE).

The second of these battles announced the Athenian navy as a major military force — a force that was manned by the poorest Athenians, known as thetes. In the aftermath of this great victory, Athens developed a maritime empire that relied heavily on the contribution of the fleet.

This contribution, combined with the wealth of empire, helped to attenuate class struggle in Athens during much of the fifth century and created the conditions for the final strategy employed by the most farsighted aristocrats. These were men like Pericles, who forged his own influence in the middle decades of the century by supporting key demands from the democratic polis.

Class and Democracy in Athens

The rise of democracy entailed a radical departure from the norms of the ancient world. For the first time in recorded history, significant numbers of people made their own decisions. However, the force of this revolution was constrained by a number of important factors:

Athenian democracy was limited to adult-born Athenian males, who made up 10-20 percent of the total population.
Slavery was widespread: there were always two to four times as many slaves as citizens.
The nobility maintained their wealth and status, and a slave mode of production was welded together with a participatory democracy for the minority of citizens.
Athenian democracy existed in a hostile environment where the dominant external powers were antidemocratic.
The Athenian polis remained a war society and quickly grew to become a maritime empire.

The resulting class relations were suitably complex. On the one hand, the Athenian citizenry became a unified political elite, making common cause in military campaigns and in the protection of their domestic privileges. On the other hand, class struggle persisted within the citizenry itself as the nobility sought to project their remaining privileges further into the polis, while poorer citizens used their greater numbers to counteract them.

The Athenian nobility sought to project their remaining privileges further into the polis, while poorer citizens used their greater numbers to counteract them.

The value system reflected these contradictory class relations in important ways. As it was a society engaged in regular warfare, aretḗ remained the central virtue of Athenian citizens with excellence now tied to one’s achievements while fighting for the polis. Citizens were encouraged to conceive of their city-state in semidivine terms. They were expected to fight ferociously in the citizen-army and to see their own success as intimately bound up with success for their compatriots.

To counterbalance these centrifugal forces based on courage and military achievement, the democratic polis also fostered cooperative virtues based on moderation and self-control (sophrosyne). Avoiding hubris became an essential attribute of citizenship, as every citizen was encouraged to “act with measure and within fair limits,” allowing justice to emerge within a community of political equals.

A second development was a fusion of reason, politics, and social superiority felt by men deliberating in the polis and judging in the law courts. Citizens were expected to listen to an argument, weigh up the evidence, and make their own decisions. The result was a sense of equality among the citizenry mixed with a sense of superiority over everyone else.

Reason (logos) became a defining feature of the democratic polis, while wisdom — or the excellence of reason — became associated with public speaking in the assembly and the law courts. The result was a set of cardinal virtues that went significantly beyond military prowess:  wisdom, courage, prudence, and justice.

Equality and Order

Another expression of the connection between politics and reason was the political nature of Greek metaphysics, as philosophers projected the laws of their poleis into the laws of the universe. Replacing the arbitrary judgements of the old aristocracy, Greek legal codes — written down and on public display — regularized relations among the citizenry, ensuring that justice became objective, universal, and predictable.

The sense of order that resulted from this process was soon writ large in the laws of the universe. Greek thought developed an analogy between the justice of the polis and the justice of the universe — a form of cosmic moral order that was present in the souls of men, in the relations of the city, and in the wider pattern of the universe.

A further development was a contest over the nature of this order between representatives of democracy and those aristocratic philosophers who sought a return to more traditional forms of hierarchy. For those in the former camp, the polis was enriched through democratic reforms aimed at creating isonomia — a political ideal that simultaneously meant “equality in law” and a genuinely equal distribution of political power.

Plato reached the conclusion that democracy was full of sycophants and ignoramuses, who governed through irrational whims rather than genuine knowledge.

Conservative thinkers championed an alternative form of “geometric equality” that they defined as eunomia. Here the guiding principle was that men are unequal by nature and that those who make proportionately greater contributions to the polis should be afforded proportionately more responsibility for its running.

The latter doctrine was to prove extremely important for Plato as a young aristocrat growing up during the horrors of the Peloponnesian War. Witnessing mass decision-making during the war, Plato, like his maternal relatives, reached the conclusion that democracy was full of sycophants and ignoramuses, who governed through irrational whims rather than genuine knowledge.

He further assumed that democracy upset the natural order of things as it allowed inferior men to control their superiors, often with disastrous consequences. Indeed, the depravity of Athenian democracy was confirmed for Plato when it executed his great mentor Socrates in 399 BCE. Yet when they had their chance to replace this democracy, Plato’s associates had proven no less depraved, murdering their opponents and tearing up the rule of law.

For Plato, this was evidence of moral degeneration across the state. It also demanded an entirely new basis for political organization — one that would be rooted in divine first principles of ultimate reality. It was to achieve this task that Plato undertook his most famous work, The Republic.

The Theory of Forms

Plato’s earliest dialogues use his master Socrates to highlight the ignorance of the masses. Socrates typically engages a fellow Athenian in a process of elenchus, a process of questioning and answering that exposes error in their common-sense explanation, allowing the interlocuters to move closer to the truth. However, the results often lead to aporia (perplexity), as the truth proves elusive under the scrutiny of the Socratic method.

Plato’s earliest dialogues use his master Socrates to highlight the ignorance of the masses.

To escape this perplexity, Plato turns in his middle-period dialogues to divine inspiration in his theory of forms. He argues that while the material world is subject to generation and degeneration, the ultimate ground of this world — its ontological first principle — is a realm of perfect, eternal, and absolute forms. The phenomena of everyday life are best understood as imperfect manifestations of divinely sanctioned structuring principles responsible for the order exhibited throughout the visible cosmos.

Knowledge of these forms is essential for understanding how an intelligent logos has arranged the visible cosmos into a hierarchy of beings, reflecting the hierarchy of the forms themselves. It is also essential for ruling justly, as those who spend their time contemplating the form of justice will be determined to see its pattern imitated in society as well.

The Ionian materialists had assumed that the order of the universe was immanent within matter itself. Politically, this had egalitarian connotations, as everything results from patterns of material necessity rather than divine intervention. Since human beings are all part of this material necessity, there is nothing to differentiate them from each other.

Plato, following Pythagoras, rejects the metaphysics of the Ionian philosopher Anaximander as incapable of explaining the obvious intelligence underpinning the material world. Matter is base and disordered without a higher form to give it structure. This is the basis for his reactionary metaphysics, as everything becomes part of a hierarchy of being.

Indeed, Plato’s most famous dialogue attempts to elicit justice in the city and soul by grounding it in the form of justice revealed as divine and eternal. To achieve this, he creates a famous analogy between the inner lives of men and their outer lives as citizens — between the relations of the parts making up their souls and the relations of the classes making up their city. In both cases, justice emerges from the proportionate ordering of the parts within a hierarchically structured totality.

There are six principles to this ordering process that ensure justice will emerge:

The parts in any whole make a unity but not an equality. Parts are unequal by nature but complementary in function.
Unity is created — it is not a random process of material necessity, but an intelligent process achieved by the logos through rational design.
Unity is hierarchical — there are higher and lower parts in each totality based on the level of logos they possess.
Higher parts should rule over lower parts — they have more natural capacity by virtue of their reason, but they must rule for the good of the totality.
Higher parts are proportionately more important than lower parts, but all of the parts should hang together in mathematically harmonious ratios.
This process is morally good as well as ontologically optimal — it allows the parts to reach their potential being as good and as rational as possible.

Variety of Natures

Plato’s first task is to apply this framework to relations in the city. To achieve this, he constructs a thought experiment — an ideal city-state — with the help of his two aristocratic interlocuters, Glaucon and Adeimantus.

Plato’s first assumption is his most important one. He assumes that nature makes men and women of different qualities and that these natural differences mean that society must be made up of separate classes, each with their own role within a harmonious totality. His discussion initially focuses on the benefits of economic specialization, arguing that “different people are inherently suitable for different activities, as people are not particularly similar to one another, but have a wide variety of natures.”

Plato assumes that nature makes men and women of different qualities and that society must be made up of separate classes.

In this context, Plato begins with the majority of citizens who spend their days in different occupations. Their work will provide resources for the polis, but unlike the farmer-hoplites in democratic Athens, they will not be responsible for any military activity. Plato envisages a fully professional army freed from the demands of manual labor, following the model of Sparta.

However, he also assumes a further division within the auxiliaries to ensure that those who have a “philosopher’s love of knowledge” become the rational element within the state, while those who are naturally courageous take direction from the guardians proper. This leaves us with a class of producers, a class of auxiliaries, and a class of guardians. It soon becomes clear that the thrust of Plato’s argument is not about economic specialization at all but rather is designed to erect a rigid class system, with the majority excluded from access to political decision-making and the means of violence.

Historically, warrior-aristocrats tended to use their control of violence to further their own sectional interests. But Plato believes that this can be avoided if those with the most rational natures train the auxiliaries to work within proper bounds — to show courage and ferocity when meeting the enemy, but gentleness and honor when dealing with their fellow citizens.

Division of Labor

At this point, Plato makes the fundamental political argument of the Republic, which is that a harmonious community can only emerge when there is proportionality within the social totality, with all three classes working together for the good of the whole. Organized through the wisdom of the guardians, the ideal city exhibits a form of hierarchical order that allows all of the parts to reach their potential.

For Plato, wisdom is possessed by only one class of citizens, courage by another. These two groups make up the ruling classes.

The wisdom of the guardians will be complemented by the courage of the warriors. Workers will display moderation by accepting that they have no business in ruling while their superiors will act moderately by ensuring that their rule will be in the interests of all. The overall result will exhibit justice and morality as every part receives the amount of honor and responsibility commensurate with its natural ability and social training:

When each of the three classes — the ones that work for a living, the auxiliaries, and the guardians — performs its own function and does its own job . . . then this is justice and makes the community a moral one.

Accepting the four cardinal virtues of the Athenian city-state, Plato has given them an aristocratic twist. For the Athenian citizen, all four virtues make up the excellence of his character. For Plato, on the other hand, wisdom is possessed by only one class of citizens, courage by another.

These two groups make up the ruling classes, with moderation and justice formed around a compact between rulers and ruled. Members of one class will accept their subjection, while members of the other will rule them justly.

The next step in the argument is to draw an analogy between the well-functioning city and the well-functioning soul. Having shown that a just society contains three classes arranged into a hierarchic totality, Plato insists that there are three analogous parts to the soul, with reason mirroring the role of the guardians, passion that of the auxiliaries, and desire that of the workers.

The central argument in his discussion of the state is that justice requires all three classes to work together. Here we find Plato arguing that a well-ordered soul can only flourish when each of its parts does its appropriate function and allows the others to do the same.

Reason and Passion

Reason, for Plato, is the highest faculty in the human soul. It is the soul’s connection with divine intelligence and, as such, it is the only part capable of understanding the good of the whole. Its role is to order the parts into proportionate relations so that goodness will emerge.

To achieve this, it must enlist the passions as its loyal auxiliary — as its emotional drive — to ensure that each human being can live a well-ordered life. Rational people successfully recruit their passions to ensure that only those desires that facilitate their long-term flourishing (eudaemonia) will be acceded to. Desire plays the part of the worker in Plato’s analogy, as the lowest, most inferior, and most numerous faculty within the soul.

In this schema, well-regulated desires have their proper place in the well-lived life. However, when they are left unchecked, desires have the potential to overstep their boundaries, undermining proportionality and throwing a harmonious totality into disorder. Unruly desires, like unruly workers, “try to dominate and rule over things which they are not equipped by their hereditary status to rule over, and so plunge the whole of everyone’s life into chaos.”

At this point, the two parts of Plato’s analogy can be brought into harmonious alignment. Nature makes different kinds of people with different kinds of souls. Those with the most rational souls and the right education will have wisdom enough to organize their own souls — and the classes in the polis — into mathematically proportionate relations modeled on the pattern of justice evident in the forms.

Those who lack sufficient wisdom and social training can still play their part by allowing the guardians to temper unruly desires and make political decisions for the good of everyone. At its core, this is a sophisticated version of Solon’s eunomia referenced above.

The neoconservative philosopher Leo Strauss once described The Republic as ‘the harshest possible indictment of the reigning democracy . . . which was ever uttered.’

Plato has accepted the centrality of equality in the democratic polis but once again given it an aristocratic twist. Men who contribute proportionately more should be rewarded with proportionately more. Treating men who are equal in capacity as equals is justice — everything else is injustice.

Metaphysics Against Democracy

The neoconservative philosopher Leo Strauss once described The Republic as “the harshest possible indictment of the reigning democracy . . . which was ever uttered.” Strauss was no democrat either, but his point is well made when viewed in the light of Plato’s metaphysics.

Rooting his analysis in the nature of the divine, Plato argues that democracy represents a disastrous attempt to overturn the hierarchic order of reality itself. Distinctions between higher and lower, better and worse, are woven into the fabric of reality — a reality that is also mathematical in structure, containing proportionate relations among its parts.

Justice relies on the different parts getting their due, with mathematically proportionate relations among the hierarchy of forms, the hierarchy of citizens, and the hierarchy of soul constituents. Justice in the state requires the distribution of relevant political goods so that those who contribute the most receive the most in return.

Plato contrasts this model to democracy, which insists on treating naturally unequal men as if they were equal. This gives such inferior types more than they are morally entitled to receive, destroying the proportionality that underpins justice, and creating chaos in every domain.

People in democracies laud their freedom and equality. Yet for Plato, this masks a deeper servility as disordered men and women get pushed from pillar to post by desires that enslave them. Chaos in their internal lives in compounded by chaos in their city-state. The result is the proliferation of sycophants in public life, as demagogues peddle their wares among ignorant masses.

A second result is the defilement of philosophy, as those who cannot hope to understand the nature of the forms nevertheless encroach on the work of those who do. Respecting the hierarchic ordering of the universe, aristocratic rule not only expresses the natural order of things. It is morally just and supremely good.

Plato has therefore made class rule universally beneficial on a threefold basis. He has presented reality as infused with a reason that operates behind the backs of ordinary people; he has presented his own class as the inheritors of this reason, once they have been reformed in line with philosophy; and he has utilized his metaphysics to sanctify class rule as the reflection of a deeper cosmic justice.

The Republic rationalizes class as part of the natural order of things. Its enduring influence and success was surely linked to the death of Athenian democracy a mere twenty-five years after the death of Plato himself.

The Democrats Plan to Steal Another Election?

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Not a Green Bone in Their White Bodies

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