Ron DeSantis Is Helping Utility Companies Keep Floridians in the Dark

Utility companies flooded Ron DeSantis’s campaign coffers with donations. Now, the Florida governor is allowing them to withhold information about widespread power shutoffs to their struggling customers.

Florida governor Ron DeSantis speaks about his new book The Courage to Be Free in the Air Force One Pavilion at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library on March 5, 2023 in Simi Valley, California. (Mario Tama / Getty Images)

As more than $9 million in utility and utility-connected cash flooded the coffers of Florida governor Ron DeSantis’s campaign and the state Republican party he controls, his appointees to a little-known body allowed utility companies to stop disclosing information about how they are shutting off the power for thousands of struggling Florida residents.

In November 2021, Florida’s Public Service Commission (PSC) issued a memorandum allowing electric utilities to stop disclosing their shutoff data. The memorandum, which reversed the commission’s September 2020 decision to collect the data to track the pandemic’s effects on utility customers, came after DeSantis stacked the board with his appointees. The move came less than a month after commission members approved the largest electric rate hike in Florida’s history, resulting in a 20 percent increase in costs to residential ratepayers.

Now it’s impossible to know how many customers have been disconnected from their electric utilities for being unable to pay their increasing power bills. NextEra — the parent company of Florida’s largest utility, Florida Power & Light — disconnected 738,000 Floridians in 2021 and 1.1 million Americans nationwide since 2020, according to a report from Bailout Watch last month. If that disconnection rate continued, noted the report, NextEra would have shut off 1.2 million customers in 2022. But we do not know the total, because the DeSantis-appointed Florida PSC allowed the company to hide the data.

Besides NextEra, another utility company operating in Florida, the Southern regional monopoly powerhouse Duke Energy, cut off power to over six hundred thousand customers since 2020. Nationwide, utilities shut off power 5.7 million times since 2020.

There is no systematic disclosure of utility shutoffs across the country. Data provided to us by the Energy and Policy Institute, which coauthored the report with Bailout Watch and tracks utility influence, shows that thirty-two states report utility disconnection data. According to the data, only Florida and Wisconsin allowed utilities to reduce the amount of data they provided in 2021.

When he announced his campaign for the governorship in January 2018, DeSantis pledged to “drain the swamp in Tallahassee, which needs to be drained, just like Washington.” But shortly after he was elected, DeSantis aggressively began raising money from businesses with interests before his office.

Of the $9.5 million that has flowed into the Republican Party of Florida from electric utilities and their affiliated PACs since 2019, $2 million has come in in the past nine weeks, as DeSantis preps a widely anticipated run for the presidency as the main GOP primary opponent to former president Donald Trump.

In particular, NextEra and Duke are the two biggest electric-company donors to DeSantis and the Florida GOP since 2019. Duke has donated $4 million to the Florida GOP since 2019, while NextEra has given more than $2.2 million to DeSantis and the Florida GOP, according to our analysis of state campaign finance reports.

Former top DeSantis aide Susie Wiles, who is expected to be a senior official in Trump’s 2024 campaign, previously wrote in a memo that the Florida GOP was “interchangeable” with DeSantis’s main campaign account as he prepared for his competitive 2022 reelection campaign, according to a 2019 document that was leaked to the Tampa Bay Times.

Roughly $1.5 million of the total amount flowing to Florida Republicans came from the Associated Industries of Florida (AIF), a utility-backed political committee. Florida utility companies NextEra, Tampa Electric, Gulf Power, and Duke have funneled more than $1.6 million into AIF since 2019.

AIF also receives support from other major business interests in the state, including Disney, HCA Healthcare, and sugar conglomerates.

Since the 2020 election cycle, NextEra and Duke have additionally contributed more than $760,000 and $180,000, respectively, to the Republican Governors Association, which donated more than $21 million to DeSantis’ reelection campaign, Florida campaign finance records show.

Meanwhile, the Florida GOP’s gifts to utility companies keep coming. In early December, the Bailout Watch report noted, Florida regulators approved a fuel rider, or a cost increase tied to the price of fuel, allowing utilities to pass the cost of higher fuel prices to consumers, without affecting their enormous profits. Company executives have been handsomely rewarded for such political wins. Top executives at NextEra gave themselves a 59 percent raise between 2020 to 2021. Both Duke Energy and NextEra spent $8.3 billion on dividends from 2020 through the third quarter of 2022, according to the Bailout Watch report.

You can subscribe to David Sirota’s investigative journalism project, the Lever, here.

Unnecessary Traffic Stops by Police Make Public Safety Worse

All too often in America, stops for minor traffic offenses turn into deadly episodes of police violence.

A Massachusetts state police officer performs a traffic stop on I-93. (Matthew West / MediaNews Group / Boston Herald via Getty Images)

Tyre Nichols was just two minutes away from his house when a group of Memphis police officers from the city’s so-called Scorpion unit pulled his car over. When Nichols was taken out of his vehicle, his protest was simple. “I didn’t do anything,” he can be heard saying in police body camera footage.

Less than an hour later, Nichols was en route to the hospital, having suffered a police beating that would ultimately claim his life. In the aftermath of Nichols’s death, the Memphis Police Department disbanded the Scorpion unit that was designed to target crime in the city’s poorest neighborhoods.

It is also, now, considering limiting how and why police can make traffic stops — a familiar municipal response to a brutal episode of police violence in a country where, according to data from Mapping Police Violence, police have killed more than eight hundred people following traffic stops since 2017. The victims of that violence have, like the victims of all police violence in the United States, been disproportionately black. In the aftermath of particularly high-profile police killings, like that of Patrick Lyoya in Grand Rapids, Michigan, Daunte Wright in Brooklyn Center, Minnesota, and Nichols in Memphis, media outlets like the New York Times and the BBC have run stories asking the same basic question: What is it about traffic stops that causes them to turn deadly?

There are several possible answers. Police officers and criminologists, for example, often blame the prevalence of violence following traffic stops on police training that frames those stops as inherently unpredictable and dangerous for officers. The notion that traffic stops are especially dangerous for officers isn’t conclusively backed by data: an estimate published in the Michigan Law Review three years ago pegged the rate at which officers are assaulted during routine traffic stops at just one in every 6,959 stops, and the rate at which they’re feloniously killed at just one in 6.5 million stops. But police trainings haven’t adjusted.

Another view is simply that police interactions are always dangerous, particularly for people of color, whether at traffic stops or anywhere else. Traffic stops just happen to be the primary way the general public interacts with police officers. “Traffic stops turn violent because the act of policing is rooted in force and violence,” Woods Ervin, communications director for Critical Resistance, told Jacobin.

The police officers who beat Nichols have been charged with second-degree murder, but they’re anomalies. The New York Times surveyed four hundred cases in which a police officer killed an unarmed motorist; of all those cases, only five officers were ever convicted of a crime — even though the Times found that police officers making traffic stops all too often unnecessarily escalated confrontations with motorists and then shot them in “self-defense.”

Pretextual Stops

Traffic stops have long played an outsize role in American policing. Akhi Johnson, director of the Reshaping Prosecution Initiative at Vera, told Jacobin that this is no coincidence.

“Not only are police trained that those are stressful situations, they are also trained to use them as investigative tactics to try to ferret out evidence and that traffic stops are this incredible public safety tool,” Johnson said.

Johnson, a former assistant US attorney, said that traffic stops fall into two categories: what police officers describe as “must-stop” situations, where a person is driving recklessly or endangering the safety of other people on the road, and “can stop” situations, where a person is not endangering anyone’s safety but an officer decides to pull them over anyway for a reason often tenuously related or completely unrelated to public health.

Pretextual stops, in which officers pull over drivers for a minor traffic-related infraction in order to investigate them for an unrelated offense, fall into the latter category — and it’s those stops that disproportionately impact people of color and low-income neighborhoods. A study of fourteen years of traffic stop data in North Carolina found that black drivers were 95 percent more likely than white drivers to be pulled over and 115 percent more likely than white drivers to be searched during a stop, even though searches of white drivers more often uncovered contraband.

“The real damage in that is if you’re a driver, and you were speeding way over the limit and you get pulled over, you get it — you know you weren’t supposed to be doing it [and] it doesn’t tend to impact your perceptions of law enforcement,” Johnson said. “When you aren’t doing anything wrong and you get pulled over time and time again, it erodes your trust in law enforcement, it erodes your trust in government, and that makes all of us less safe.”

Johnson’s claim has empirical backing. A recent study conducted in Tampa found that getting stopped by police makes a person less likely to vote — a point that Ervin argues underscores how policing, like the rest of the carceral system, is used as a method of exerting social control and effectively excluding certain groups of people from the democratic process.

In few places was that clearer than in Ferguson, Missouri, in the lead-up to the killing of Michael Brown. A study conducted by the St Louis nonprofit Better Together found that court fees made up a quarter of Ferguson’s budget, giving police officers an effective imperative to pull drivers over in a scheme that former St Louis alderman Antonio French described as “taxation by citation.” In 2013, the year before Brown was killed, 86 percent of police stops in Ferguson and 92 percent of searches were of black people.

Reform Measures

There is an emerging consensus in major cities that these “can stop” traffic stops aren’t doing anything to improve public safety. San Francisco is one of a number of cities that have recently moved to limit the circumstances under which officers can make pretextual stops — banning officers from making stops for low-level offenses like driving without working taillights or driving with an item hanging from a mirror. The San Francisco order also limits when officers can ask to search a person’s vehicle or ask investigatory questions following a stop to when they have concrete evidence of criminal activity.

“The overall goal is to be smart about how we use the limited law enforcement resources that we have,” Max Carter-Oberstone, vice president of the San Francisco police commission, told Jacobin. “A huge volume of our stops are for low-level offenses that don’t pose any threat to people on our roadways, and for which we are not recovering guns, drugs, or making arrests. These stops are just a horribly inefficient use of our law enforcement resources.”

Philadelphia and Pittsburgh have also passed laws limiting the use of pretextual stops. Minneapolis two years ago began exploring the creation of an unarmed Traffic Safety division that would take traffic law enforcement away from the city’s police department following public safety logic popularized during the 2020 Black Lives Matter uprising; Berkeley has attempted to institute a similar plan but has thus far been stopped by California state law.

A handful of national politicians are beginning to pick up the picture as well — a bill introduced in the US House by Rep. Ritchie Torres of New York would establish a $100 million annual grant program for cities that reassign traffic law enforcement to unarmed officers or technology. The fact that police unions in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia are fighting limitations on their traffic stop powers suggests in itself that the stops serve a purpose aside from public safety.

Whether or not reassigning the work of policing away from police would make a decisive long-term impact remains to be seen. But if limiting the police officers’ ability to make arbitrary stops is important because it limits their ability to spin those stops into other charges and fines, it’s also important because there is scant evidence that any other sort of police reform measure effectively cuts down on police violence. The officers who beat Nichols were all black. They wore body cameras. They were armed, but they didn’t use their guns. None of it mattered.

“Police are trained to read the need for force in most situations,” Ervin said. “That is actually core to what their function is. It’s the actual act of policing that leads to the violent police encounter. Yes, it’s the cops, but more it’s doing cop work.”

The “Equality vs. Equity” Distinction Doesn’t Explain What Matters for Social Justice

The nonprofit jargon of “equity” isn’t helping us tackle basic questions of how to live in a better, more equal society.

Protesters promoting the idea of “equity” during a demonstration in Auburn, Massachusetts, on July 24, 2021. (Joseph Prezioso / AFP via Getty Images)

Over the last decade or so, a confused idea that started in the nonprofit sector has gradually seeped into liberal discourse more generally. According to this idea, “equality” is bad or inadequate and what we need instead is something called “equity.”

Bernie Sanders was asked to explain the difference between them on Real Time this weekend and he didn’t really know what to say.

On @billmaher @CNN Tonight, @SenSanders did not know the difference between equality and equity, and yet the federal govt spending billions of dollars on equity training right now in every single federal agency. If a U.S. Sen doesn’t know the diff why are we spending that $? pic.twitter.com/KAaUXjBUZB

— Brian Doherty (@BDOH) March 4, 2023

This exchange lit up both conservatives and liberals. Conservatives lit up because they associate the word “equity” with Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) trainings, which have proliferated across the corporate sector despite being pretty obviously stupid. Liberals lit up because they have adopted this word very vigorously and think it reflects badly on Sanders that he doesn’t have a spiel about it ready to go.

In the meta-discourse about the exchange, the debate has devolved into whether it is good or bad for politicians to use the linguistic innovations of the nonprofit or academic sectors, which at this point is a fairly well-rehearsed kind of affair where one side says that language is very key to oppressed peoples and the other side says that it is not key to them and alienates others.

But missing in this discourse is an actual answer to the question presented to Sanders: How does equity differ from equality?

In my early twenties, I spent much of my time reading and thinking about egalitarian political philosophy of both leftist and liberal varieties. And so when people started saying they were against “equality” but for “equity” shortly after that, I was well-positioned to integrate that claim into my understanding of existing egalitarian philosophy. And it was clear then as it is now that “equity” is being used to mean “equality of the correct unit of equality.”

To understand what I mean, let’s look at the foundational philosophical text of the “equity” revolution, which is actually just a two-panel cartoon meme.

In the “equality” panel, there is an equal distribution of boxes. In the “equity” panel, there is an equal distribution of sight lines. So it’s equality in both cases. To the extent that you are supposed to glean anything from the panel, it’s that, in the case of watching a baseball game, the correct unit of equality is sight lines not boxes.

At times, people try to boil this move down into just being a linguistically novel way to advocate for equality of outcomes over equality of opportunity. Proponents of “equity” consistently reject this simplification and, from what I can tell, those proponents are actually correct to reject it. “Equity” is not used to promote any particular unit of equality — whether outcomes, opportunities, boxes, sight lines, luck-adjusted outcomes, primary goods, income, wealth, or capabilities — but is instead a word that you invoke any time you object to the unit of equality someone else is using, regardless of what, if any, your preferred alternative unit of equality is.

A good case of this I saw recently was when, back in COVID days, the United States Postal Service (USPS) announced that it would be sending four COVID tests to each household in the mail. In a wildly popular tweet, a prominent “equity” advocate said that this was a perfect case to illustrate why “equality” is so inferior to “equity.” They elaborated that this program was “equal” because it sent the same number of COVID tests to each household but “inequitable” because different households have different numbers of people in them.

Of course, in more natural language where we don’t keep flipping back and forth between two words, what you would say, using just “equality,” is that the USPS program was equal on a per-household basis but unequal on a per-person basis, and that, in the case of distributing diagnostic tests, the per-person basis is the more appropriate one.

The point that whether something is considered “equal” or not is sensitive to what unit you use to measure equality is a pretty introductory concept in egalitarian thought. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy spends a huge chunk of its article on egalitarianism detailing the issue. In egalitarian thought, it’s generally referred to as the “equality of what” question, which is also the title of a famous Amartya Sen lecture on the question from 1979. In the lecture, Sen rejects “utility” and Rawlsian “primary goods” in favor of his own “basic capabilities” as the best unit of equality.

If the advocates of “equity” had a specific unit of equality that they were consistently pushing, then it would be fairly easy to explain what it is. You’d just say “equity means equality of X” as contrasted with other units of equality like Senian capabilities, Rawlsian primary goods, Dworkinian resources, etc.

But advocates of “equity” instead use the word to mean “equality of the correct unit of equality” where “the correct unit of equality” changes speaker to speaker and case to case and is sometimes not actually defined at all. And given this reality, it’s genuinely difficult to answer the question, “How does equity differ from equality?” when asked in the general way Bill Maher did.

As a final note, I will say that there is one thing that slightly annoys me about the meta-discourse on this exchange that focuses on the value of academic language. This is a worthwhile discourse generally, but it actually has it slightly backward in this case. The academic discourse on egalitarianism is both interesting and clear in tackling the “equality of what” question. What we have with “equity” is nonacademics who clearly have no familiarity with the relevant academic discourse coming up with a half-baked and badly theorized version of it.

Martin Heidegger’s Nazism Is Inextricable From His Philosophy

“Back from Syracuse?” That was how Heidegger’s colleague greeted him when he returned to teach after the postwar government barred him from the profession for collaborating with the Nazi regime. Heidegger had, like Plato to the tyrant Dionysius of Syracuse, sought to “lead the leader.” He had set himself up to be Nazism’s philosophical preceptor. […]

How Turkey’s “Construction Amnesties” Created a Ticking Time Bomb

In 2018, Turkish president Erdoğan boasted that an “amnesty” allowing builders to ignore safety codes had “solved the housing problems of 144,556 people.” In last month’s earthquake, tens of thousands of those people were crushed to death.

An aerial view of collapsed buildings in Islahiye, Turkey, on February 21, 2023. (Halil Fidan / Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)

In front of a collapsed apartment block in the eastern Turkish city of Islahiye, a pile of rubble grows day by day. Rescue workers — most of them volunteers, many of them foreign — are depositing the bits and pieces of people’s lives that need to be removed to get to the bodies. Books, dresses, chairs, toy bikes. One apartment block has collapsed and spilled onto the street, blending with the pile of debris. Large-scale detritus — staircases, walls, columns, ceilings, floors — mingle with the more mundane. The wedding photos, the teddy bears.

A man named Mehmet Ali takes my hand. He is frantic — in a green camouflage jacket his eyes bulge from under the rim of a thick knit cap. He tries to tell me something, but his words are jumbled. “Columns,” he says. “Metal.” Where words fail, he gestures at the pile of rubble in front of us and then pulls me toward it. He gestures for me to squat down and look at the detritus.

Each column, more than a meter wide, is supported by just a few pieces of rebar — an average of six per square meter. Mehmet Ali reaches down and pulls off a piece of the column with his fingers. When he makes a fist, it crumbles in his hand.

“My children are in there,” he says: his son, his wife, and their young daughter, who was just four years old. Atop the enormous pile of rubble, an Iranian search team works to extract a family of eight, crushed by the weight of their home. It is the seventh day after the earthquake, and the rescue workers have only made it from the sixth to the fourth floor of the building. In the two hours that we stand in front of the building, they manage to extract one body, that of a middle-aged man, in a blue shirt and gray sweatpants. His wife and six children — the police say — are still buried. When they pull him out, his brother, waiting on the street, yells.

Day after day, he waits for his children, staring at the pieces of the shoddily constructed building that killed them.

Mehmet Ali says his son and his family were in the apartment under this large family’s own. He has been at the site every day for a week, he says, struck practically silent in disbelief. His shock, it is clear, is beginning to distill into anger. Day after day, he waits for his children, staring at the pieces of the shoddily constructed building that killed them.

“That’s it, that’s all,” he manages to say, pointing at a marble staircase that has just one piece of metal woven through each rung, “That’s all that was holding it up.” A police officer puts a hand on his shoulder. “That’s enough, Uncle,” he says and guides him away.

The Turkish government helmed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been widely criticized in the wake of two earthquakes — 7.8 and 7.6 in magnitude — that struck southeastern Turkey on February 6. More than forty-seven thousand people have died and millions of people have been displaced, though experts estimate the number of dead to be far higher, closer to two hundred thousand. The scale of the destruction and the number of dead, they say, is directly linked to government policies that allowed developers to skirt building codes, as well as a delayed official response.

Search-and-rescue teams as well as aid were late in coming, and the president did not mount a coordinated response until three days after the earthquake. Many victims, including those in Islahiye, said that they could hear people trapped under the rubble in the first days after the quake. By the time heavy equipment came, almost a week later, there was silence. In Islahiye, victims’ families waited six days for a winch strong enough to lift the heavy concrete trapping their relatives.

For the past forty years, the government has championed a policy that allows builders to officially register structures not built to code for a fee.

The government has blamed the delayed response on the sheer scale of the disaster — any country, they say, would have struggled to respond. However, experts say that the government itself is directly responsible for the number of collapsed buildings and the number of people dead in their destroyed homes. For the past forty years, and especially since the rise of the AKP in 2002, the government has championed a policy called imar affi or imar barisi — construction amnesties — that allows builders to officially register structures not built to code for a fee. The lottery-like system is often “opened” for a designated period in politically sensitive moments, such as before an election. The last time the imar barisi system was open for applications was before local elections in 2018.

At that time, president Erdoğan boasted of the success of the program in the city of Kahramanmaraş, one of the areas hardest hit by the quake.

“With the construction amnesty, we have solved the [housing] problems of 144,556 people in Maraş,” Erdoğan said at a meeting in that city in 2018.

Tens of thousands of those people are now dead.

Deadly Amnesty

Construction amnesty was officially introduced in 1984 under the government of Kenan Evren, who came to power in a military coup in 1980. The practice unofficially dates to the late 1940s, however. Evren’s government was a conservative, nationalist military junta that focused primarily on two things — “restoring order” to Turkey by eliminating leftist and Marxist elements (as Evren said in a military address after he came to power), and the privatization of the Turkish economy.

Evren’s government promoted “market-based” solutions in contrast to the more Keynesian system that had dominated Turkey since its founding. Like many governments around the world in the 1980s — including in the United States under Ronald Reagan — the Turkish authorities under Evren aimed to minimize the role of the state in the economy. Washington, for its part, was a tacit backer of Evren’s government despite widespread human rights abuses.

Construction amnesty was one of the programs introduced to this end. It allowed the government to curry both favor and profit — owners of illegal structures became legal landowners, while the government collected a handsome sum from its new supporters.

This practice continued through the end of the Evren government and into the 1990s, when the government was controlled by a more democratic government led by the True Path Party (DYP) and the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP). In total, from the 1950s until the rise of the AKP in 2002, construction amnesty was implemented an estimated eight times.

Then came the earthquake of 1999. On August 17, 1999, a magnitude 7.6 earthquake struck the Turkish province of Izmit, to the east of Istanbul on the Marmara Sea. As they did in Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, and Gaziantep in February, buildings pancaked, tumbling in on themselves and killing over eighteen thousand people. The army was dispatched, and both Turkish and foreign search-and-rescue teams reached the area within forty-eight hours. But that response, too, was widely condemned as insufficient.

Particularly critical of the government’s response was the young, Islamist former mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. When he visited the earthquake zone, he asked, “where is the state” and told reporters that he found the state response “very weak.” He said that the country should “come together” in the wake of such a tragedy. The visibility and support he gained from this response were central to the rise of his party, the AKP, in 2001, and his eventually becoming prime minister in 2003.

As a result of an International Monetary Fund package, the government pushed for privatization and the expansion of the Turkish economy, especially in the realm of construction.

President Erdoğan and the AKP came to power amid an economic crisis with promises of economic reform. As a result of an International Monetary Fund package secured by the AKP government worth tens of billions of dollars, the government pushed for privatization and the expansion of the Turkish economy, especially in the realm of construction. Large holding companies, including Cengiz Holding and Limak Holding, linked to the government, undertook large-scale construction projects under a tender system that has come to control much of the Turkish economy. The AKP government, in the name of economic expansion and development, created an economy and country that prioritized the interests of builders over the rights and lives of tenants.

The Turkish government introduced strict building codes following the 1999 quake, but because of this building boom and because of the continuing practice of construction amnesty, many buildings did not meet the standards. Between 2002 (when the AKP came to power) and the earthquake this year, construction amnesty was offered to the public nine times.

These programs were often introduced shortly before elections, such as in 2018, prior to tightly contested local elections. In total, the government collected an estimated $19 billion (or about 300 million Turkish lira) in amnesty fees.

On May 15, 2018, an article was added to the construction amnesty law introduced in the 1980s that said that over 50 percent of buildings in Turkey were not up to code. Therefore, the government would, until the end of that year, accept amnesty payments from builders totaling 3 percent of a property’s value for residences and 5 percent for commercial buildings. This led to a surge in the official registration of illegal structures.

The main opposition also supported the program — it was immensely popular. However, politicians from smaller opposition parties, seismologists, and building engineers warned of the program’s dangers.

“There has never been such a disgraceful zoning amnesty,” opposition Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) member Garo Paylan said in a speech in 2018, calling the law a “plague.” He said the law would affect fifty million people in thirteen million buildings. For every shoddily built ten-story building that collapsed in an earthquake, he said, at least one hundred people would be trapped beneath it. “Who will bear the responsibility for this?” he asked.

After the implementation of this law, President Erdoğan visited Kahramanmaraş and boasted about giving homes to hundreds of thousands of citizens. According to the now opposition-led Istanbul municipality, 294,166 amnesty certificates were issued in 2018 to buildings in the ten provinces affected by the earthquake.

‘Our citizens were living in a time bomb,’ said Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality deputy secretary general Buğra Gökçe.

“Our citizens were living in a time bomb,” said Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (IMM) deputy secretary general Buğra Gökçe. Fifty-nine thousand building registration certificates were issued in Adana, fifty-six thousand in Hatay, forty-thousand in Gaziantep, and thirty-nine thousand in Kahramanmaraş, he said.

Now, many of those illegal buildings have been transformed into mass graves.

The Wailing Falls Quiet

Down the road from Mehmet Ali’s daughter’s apartment, another building had collapsed. Volunteers, miners, and rescue workers climbed and milled over it. It looked like an anthill, the volunteer workers desperately trying to reach its core. The air stank of death.

Down every street, down every corner, there was a new tragedy at a scale almost impossible to comprehend. This building had been seven stories tall, one taller than the height allowed by the earthquake codes, and a few years prior a new market had been built on the ground floor. To make room for the food, contractors had gotten rid of columns and support beams. According to bystanders and people rescued from under the rubble, the entire building had collapsed in the first few seconds of the earthquake, almost instantaneously.

The building, according to family members there, had been built in 1998 by a company called Tekin Insaat, before the new earthquake regulation standards. It had been granted legal status by construction amnesty. The company built several more buildings in the neighborhood over the past two decades, including an almost-new building next to the complex now reduced to a pile of rubble. Signs on its side advertised new, modern, luxury apartments. Cracks ran through the walls of the building, just a few years old, while entire sections of its facade had fallen onto the street. A “Tekin Insaat” sign proudly emblazoned the top of the building, while the contents of a home hung, like wounded flesh, out of its side.

People wailed; the air smelled of rotting flesh and buzzed with the commotion of volunteers trying to dig into the rubble. But, a week after the earthquake, no more sound came from inside the ruins of the building. Everyone there had died, crushed under too-weak walls made legal by a stroke of the president’s pen.

Graduate Student Workers at the University of Southern California Have Won a Union

The unionization wave in higher ed continues apace, with grad student workers at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles winning a union election in mid-February. Jacobin spoke to USC worker-organizers about their win and their contract demands.

Grad student workers at the University of Southern California after voting yes on a union, February 16, 2023. (GSWOC-UAW USC / Twitter)

On February 17, the Graduate Student Worker Organizing Committee–United Auto Workers University of Southern California (GSWOC-UAW USC) announced that it won its National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) union election at USC by a 93 percent margin. USC grad workers join a wave of recent union victories at private universities across the United States, including Yale, Northwestern, and Johns Hopkins. The USC union election also comes on the heels of a massive academic workers’ strike across the public University of California system. Jacobin’s Sara Wexler spoke with two GSWOC-UAW worker-organizers about their effort and what comes next.

Sara Wexler

Can you tell me why you’ve been fighting for a union at USC?

Yoni Hirshberg

First and foremost, the reason we’re looking to form a union at USC is to get an equal position at the bargaining table with the university and have a say in our working conditions. Right now our entire working conditions are determined by the university. Our pay, our class sizes, any sort of disciplinary procedures — it’s all decided without our input. With the union, we’ll be able to negotiate for higher wages and more, and have input into our working conditions.

Megan Cassingham

From the perspective of the sciences and what we’ve heard from people working in labs, the expectations and workloads are excessive. That’s definitely something we want to fight hard for: decreasing that excessive workload. And also in the sciences, I think harassment from advisers or PIs (principal investigators) tends to be very common; we’ve definitely heard a lot of those stories. That’s something we want to address through a more effective grievance process than Title IX.

Sara Wexler

Who would be recognized, or who do you hope to be recognized in the union? It is pretty unique, I think, to have master’s students involved.

Megan Cassingham

In mid-February, we voted to certify our union. Before that we had conversations between the union, the USC administration, and the NLRB. We ended up agreeing on a unit that consists of anyone who has the job title of research assistant, teaching, or assistant lecturer, as well as internal fellows in STEM. A couple categories were put under challenge, but we were able to include a lot of people in this unit who have often been disenfranchised by other universities and other union drives.

Yoni Hirshberg

To my knowledge, it’s one of the most expansive units in terms of who’s included.

Sara Wexler

Can you give me a general timeline of the organizing and how it happened? Was it through mostly in-person conversations?

Yoni Hirshberg

We started organizing in the fall of 2020; things really kicked off in fall 2021. We built a strong, diverse leadership committee that then expanded to build majority support through a card drive. Once we had supermajority support, we filed for an NLRB election, which we won by a 93 percent margin. Now we’re in the process of bargaining. So we are going to be figuring out our bargaining demands. We’re going be figuring out who will be on the bargaining team, and then we’re going to negotiate with the university and hopefully come to a strong contract.

Megan Cassingham

To your question about how we went about organizing, we focused on one-on-one conversation tactics, encouraging people to talk to their lab mates and coworkers, answering questions, and addressing misinformation that USC was spreading. That was the strategy that worked really well for us — relying on a grassroots-style, one-on-one-conversation drive.

Sara Wexler

Was the union drive sparked by certain conditions?

Yoni Hirshberg

There were a few things. One was the pandemic, which showed a lot of people that the university doesn’t really care about them. A lot of people were all of a sudden thrown on their own without any support.

The other thing is, Joe Biden became president and Donald Trump’s NLRB became Democratic, which is important in our case because grad students do have the right to unionize, but the Republican NLRB could have potentially made that difficult. So having a Democrat in office meant that the people at the NLRB were now more on our side.

Sara Wexler

You’ve already touched on this, but I wanted to ask about the fact that the union received a 93 percent yes vote.

Megan Cassingham

In addition to getting such a strong yes vote, we also saw that a majority of folks who are eligible voted yes. So we’re proud of the strong mandate that we were able to turn out to vote yes, and we’re hoping that it’ll put us in a great position when we go to bargaining. USC will see that the majority of graduate students voted yes.

Sara Wexler

What do you hope to win in a contract? What are your demands?

Yoni Hirshberg

That’s what we’re working to formulate right now. We’re going to put out our initial bargaining demands within the next few weeks. I can tell you now that they will certainly involve things like higher wages (getting us to a living wage), protections from harassment and discrimination, having a real independent grievance procedure, better health care, better benefits (especially for dependents), and protections for international students.

Sara Wexler

How has the university responded to the union so far?

Megan Cassingham

Between when we filed and when the election was held, the university sent out maybe four or five emails with a version of an FAQ. It made it very clear that it did not think that this was a good move for us. It very explicitly said that it doesn’t think graduate students should unionize. When we initially filed, the university didn’t want to have a conversation with us about voluntarily recognizing the union or anything like that.

Given that stance, we might not be the most optimistic about bargaining, but we’re hoping the strong mandate that we were able to get through the election will show the administration that we’re serious about this. Despite it not thinking that this is the best choice for us, we’ll still come to the table and bargain in good faith.

Sara Wexler

What challenges did you face in organizing?

Yoni Hirshberg

Things are very siloed at the university. If you’re in English, you’re not really talking to anybody in chemistry, you’re not talking to anybody in engineering. So I think the biggest challenge we had was breaking through those disciplinary silos, to build a union that is strong across the entirety of the university.

Megan Cassingham

One of the big challenges organizing in STEM is that folks often are just very busy. It can be difficult for folks in STEM to prioritize this kind of effort over lab work. It’s something that I prioritize very highly during my time in grad school, so I’ve definitely put a lot of time toward it, but I think for some people it can be hard to take time away from the lab. I’m hoping now that our union has been certified and that we’re moving toward bargaining, people will see that this is actually happening, and realize, I need to put time toward this to make sure that my voice is heard.

Sara Wexler

Have you been in touch with other grad unions? UCLA was just part of the historic University of California strike.

Yoni Hirshberg

We’ve gotten a tremendous amount of support from UAW locals nearby. [University of California grad worker union, UAW Local] 2865 has been incredibly supportive of what we’ve been doing, and we’ve gotten a lot of help from them. Their strike was very inspiring; they won an amazing contract, and it’s fired people up here. I talk to people, and they tell me that they saw massive raises, and they want to get that here as well. I think having the strike happen so close to our election is partially why we had that big margin.

Sara Wexler

How do you imagine a union changing grad student life on your campus?

Yoni Hirshberg

It would really be night and day. The experience of grad school can be very isolating; it can be extremely challenging. People feel like they’re on their own. They’re putting off adulthood in many ways; they’re not being paid enough to have stable housing, to have kids; they live at the whim of their adviser and their department.

With more schools unionized, there’s a path to being able to have a dignified life with protections, with good pay, while you’re in grad school. There’s no reason it shouldn’t be that way.

Sara Wexler

Will the union make any demands in the contract or bargaining process about USC and its relationship to the Los Angeles community at large — concerning rents, inequality, gentrification?

Yoni Hirshberg

I think those types of things fall outside of the scope of labor negotiations. So the contract will include things like our wages and working conditions.

In terms of the wider scope, because we’re organized as a union we’re able to do other things. The union isn’t just: every three or four years you have a contract, and that’s it. It’s an institution that can do so much more. I think there’s going to be a lot of interest in our union working with community partners, working with elected officials to not just make USC a better place to work, but to make Los Angeles a better place to live.

Megan Cassingham

We’ve already seen organizing and relationships starting to build between our union members and elected officials; we saw a lot of support from elected officials after we announced that we won our election. So I think we’ll be able to build on that — not necessarily through a contract, but just because we’re so organized and there’s so many people who see these needs as urgent and important.

Yoni Hirshberg

[Democratic Socialists of America–endorsed Los Angeles city councilor] Hugo Soto-Martinez gave us a huge amount of support ahead of the campaign, including a really nice video. UAW has endorsed him, and I’m sure that we’ll work with his office on a whole scope of progressive changes to the city of Los Angeles.

We Aren’t Talking Enough About Wage Theft

Every year, $50 billion are stolen from American workers by their bosses. The Left and labor should be working tirelessly to pass anti-wage-theft legislation at every level of government.

On January 9, Denver City Council unanimously voted to pass Resolution 22-1614, an anti-wage-theft bill that significantly increases Denver workers’ ability to reclaim wages stolen by their bosses. (Alvaro Gonzalez / Getty Images)

Denver City Council started 2023 on the right foot. On Monday, January 9, the council unanimously voted to pass Resolution 22-1614, an anti-wage-theft bill that significantly increases Denver workers’ ability to reclaim wages stolen by their bosses.

Almost four years in the making, Resolution 22-1614 is not only a victory for the Mile High working class but an opportunity for the American left as a whole. By advocating for similar anti-wage-theft bills across the country, socialists will be able to simultaneously protect workers, punish offending businesses, and rise above the culture war noise to show the working class that the Left is the only political force seriously committed to improving their material conditions.

The Denver Bill

“Wage theft” is broadly defined as when a boss doesn’t pay a worker what is legally owed. Its most common forms are minimum wage violations, unpaid overtime, forcing employees to work through meal breaks, illegal paycheck deductions, and straight-up theft. When taken together, these offenses reach a staggering amount. According to the research of the Denver City Council, up to $728 million is stolen from Colorado workers every year.

In addition to taking money out of individual workers’ pockets, stolen wages compound to deprive working-class communities of much-needed economic activity and taxes to fund crucial social programs such as schools, transportation, and health care. Instead, stolen wages are stashed in the bank accounts of thieves, far from the places they are needed most.

But thanks to the efforts of Denver’s labor unions, left-wing groups like Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), and DSA-backed city councilors, Resolution 22-1614 now severely hampers would-be criminals by empowering workers to easily reclaim what is rightfully theirs while punishing businesses that steal from Denver’s working class.

The new bill gives aggrieved workers two paths to reclaim stolen wages. The first is through the Denver Labor office, which will investigate the claim and has the ability to charge employers wages owed plus 12 percent interest. The second option is the right of private action, which enables workers to sue in court for treble damages, attorney’s fees, reinstatement of employment, and $100 for every day they went with wages unpaid.

In addition to these avenues, the bill also increases the statute of limitations for wage theft to three years, expands the definition of “worker” to include independent contractors (Uber drivers, DoorDashers, etc.), and institutes “up the chain” restitution, enabling workers to pursue wages from businesses that hired their direct employer.

With clear restitution processes, stern penalties, and expanded protections, Denver’s Resolution 22-1614 is the gold standard model of anti–wage theft legislation. The Left should look to replicate it in every city and state in America.

The National Issue

Unfortunately, wage theft is not confined to the Rocky Mountains. The research conducted by Denver City Council found that up to 68 percent of low-wage, city-based US workers suffered at least one wage-theft violation during the typical workweek. According to the Economic Policy Institute, up to $50 billion is stolen from American workers through wage theft every year. For comparison, the FBI estimates the total value of 2019 robberies to be $482 million, meaning employers stole one hundred times more from Americans than did traditional thieves.

And while any dime stolen from any worker is an inexcusable crime, like most forms of exploitation, the most common victims of wage theft are the most marginalized. As women, migrant workers, and workers of color are the most likely to have their wages stolen, anti-wage-theft protections are a social justice issue as well as a labor one.

With wage theft posing a daily threat to the United States’ working class, left-wing and labor groups across the country should make the passage of anti-wage-theft bills a top priority. While some areas do have existing anti-wage-theft legislation — and there’s the “Wage Theft Prevention and Wage Recovery Act of 2022” currently sitting in the House of Representatives — it’s evident that what’s already in place isn’t enough to stop this pervasive threat. Given the pressing need to protect US workers’ hard-earned pay, socialists should look to implement anti-wage-theft protections at every level of government.

Legal protection is not the only benefit such a push would bring. In addition to combating injustice, advocating for anti-wage-theft bills would draw a clear line between the political actors who actually seek to help workers and those who employ pro-worker rhetoric to obscure their reactionary politics. To the detriment of the Left, the pro-capitalist establishments of both major political parties are adept at parroting pro-labor sentiments, diverting working-class attention and sapping the socialist movement of potential supporters.

Donald Trump and the Republicans position themselves as “a working-class party” by scapegoating immigrants as the cause of wage stagnation. Meanwhile they cut corporate taxes and endanger workers with deregulation, as seen in the horrific East Palestine train disaster. And as we saw from President Joe Biden’s decision to preemptively break the railroad workers’ strike earlier this year, the Democratic Party rests on its union-endorsement laurels while doing very little for workers themselves.

It could be a long time before socialists have the power to bring about an effective anti-wage-theft bill at the national level. Introducing them to local polities is both more attainable and promising, as political tribalism and the distortions of corporate media are much less prevalent at the lower levels.

Once anti-wage-theft bills are before state legislatures and city councilors, there is little room to waver. Either the politicians are for protecting workers, or they stand with the thieving bosses. If they choose the former, the Left has just delivered important legislation protecting the marginalized and curtailing corporate theft. And if politicians choose the latter, they will be revealed as anti-worker politicians who talk for labor but walk for the bosses. Both outcomes have the potential to bolster our project of building a fighting working class.

The New Right Wants Activist Judges to Rule, Not the People

Liberal “anti-populists” often portray grassroots democracy as more a threat than an asset. But as reactionaries turn to judges to win their political battles for them, it’s time the Left got serious about putting power in the hands of the majority.

People wait in line outside the US Supreme Court in Washington, DC, on February 21, 2023. (Jim Watson / AFP via Getty Images)

Interviewed in 1991, after more than a decade of Republican rule, liberal legal scholar Ronald Dworkin was asked whether he feared that, if the political tide changed, his model of an activist supreme court might be wielded by conservatives to strike down progressive legislation. Dworkin’s answer was revealing: yes, he had “nightmares” that it could happen; that placing his faith in the judiciary could be “betting on the wrong horse.”

He conceded that if this were to happen, it would weaken his faith in the principle of a powerful court overseeing a liberal interpretation of the constitution. But, he added, he wouldn’t be around to see that. And, he concluded, it was a gamble he was willing to take, because it was a structure worth preserving. He had elaborated this structure in his work in painstaking detail, advocating a principle of integrity centered on a “moral reading” of the constitution, which would be developed through the rulings of Herculean (liberal) judges.

Dworkin’s interviewer, human rights lawyer and academic Conor Gearty, then a strong opponent of judicial review, highlighted the precariousness of Dworkin’s apparently principled position in a system where political and judicial power were intertwined. He joked that perhaps Dworkin was willing to take the gamble in the hope he would be appointed to the Supreme Court by a future Democrat, President Mario Cuomo (father of the recent governor of New York). Gearty noted how grim prospects were from a progressive perspective: the celebrated constitutional right to abortion, protected since 1973 in Roe v. Wade, was in danger of being abolished over the next twelve months, the US Supreme Court having moved a long way from the liberal Warren Court of the 1950s and 1960s, and by the early 1990s having the numbers to overrule Roe.

Gearty was ahead of himself. In the ruling in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a year after his interview with Dworkin, the Supreme Court upheld the essentials of Roe and established that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected a woman’s right to an abortion prior to fetal viability. But fast forward thirty years, and in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organisation, decided in June last year after a controversial leak of the draft opinion, the court finally overturned Roe (as well as Planned Parenthood v. Casey).

With the appointment of Justice Amy Coney Barrett, controversially nominated by Donald Trump just before the 2020 presidential election, the ideological shift of the court had been cemented. But no legislation needed to be struck down for this conservative coup to take effect. Social conservatives had already passed legislation against abortion in several states, in anticipation of the ruling by a newly configured court. A challenge to one of these trigger laws, in Mississippi, had led to the ruling in Dobbs. With a majority of justices holding that there is no constitutional right to abortion, the green light was given to state legislation banning it. Doubts were also cast over the status of other rulings protecting constitutional rights, such as the right to same-sex marriage.

Had Dworkin’s worst nightmare come to pass? Not exactly, or, at least, not yet. The fear expressed in his 1991 interview was about progressive majorities being thwarted by conservative justices; Dobbs merely returned the issue to the states via a new, but in other ways traditional, interpretation of the Constitution. Some states have since adopted or begun to enforce laws banning abortion; but others have expanded abortion rights and amended state constitutions to include them, including California and Michigan. In Vermont, voters overwhelmingly chose to approve, by referendum, an amendment to guarantee sexual and reproductive freedoms, including the right to abortion. The backlash against Dobbs may well have politically benefitted the Democratic Party, boosting support for Biden and the Democrats in recent midterms.

Will of the Majority?

But the current situation is even more unsettling than the nightmares envisaged by Dworkin in 1991. Back then, the mainstream debate in Anglo-American constitutional theory took place on the terrain of the justification of constitutional review of legislation and over the so-called counter-majoritarian dilemma: Why should the judicial branch be entitled to overrule the will of the majority? It pitted scholars such as Dworkin against those keen to defend majoritarian democracy as represented by Westminster-style parliamentary regimes.

As a matter of US constitutional law, however, Dworkin’s antagonists were elsewhere. The justices spearheading the conservative turn of the Supreme Court, such as Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and now Barrett, are associated with “originalism,” the belief that the constitution should be interpreted as originally intended. In the interview with Gearty (as well as in his broader body of writing), Dworkin explicitly dismissed that theory, by arguing that it doesn’t answer, but merely defers, the key question: What is the best way of interpreting that intention given all the possible ways it could be understood?

That ambiguity, and the flexibility of meaning of the original text, allowed originalism to be taken up by an array of constitutional scholars, including progressives who argued that the meaning evolves to adapt to new circumstances. Some even proposed hybrids of originalism and living constitutionalism under the rubric of “living originalism.” While diverse in detail, a feature of these debates over constitutional interpretation was that the political radicalism of originalists, as well as of their adversaries, was limited by the authority vested in the constitution itself. To the counter-majoritarian problem, these scholars had an answer unavailable to Dworkin: the founding constitutional text is underscored by the authority of “the people,” whether dead or living.

The terms of the debate began to change after September 11, 2001, when it transpired that executive power posed the real threat to civil and political liberties, as waves of emergency measures were enacted, ostensibly in response to terrorist threats concurrent with the spread of the global “war on terror.” Measures would be pushed through with little or no oversight or parliamentary scrutiny, and often by liberal governments: from torture and drone attacks, to surveillance and detention without trial, liberties were traded off for security. The massive “infrastructure of fear” created in the wake of 9/11 survived, even as the threat dissipated. This was no tyranny of a legislative majority; it was a power grab by the executive.

New Right Project

During the most recent decade, liberals (in Europe as well as the United States) have been tormented by a more troubling prospect than a piece of rogue legislation or a discrete legal transgression: the fear that conservative populists will rip up the basic rules of the game in alliance with judicial elites, and with the vast administrative state built up over the previous decades at their disposal. It is against this background that a new brand of conservatism is emerging, which rejects fidelity to the constitution and, ironically, appropriates Dworkin’s work to circumvent it.

This New Right project speaks the language of judicial deference while embracing the tremendous power and governing apparatus of the administrative state. Unfettered by any allegiance to the constitutional text, or to the principle of popular sovereignty underwriting constitutional authority, it argues for a much more aggressive and unapologetic conservative agenda. It is based, like Dworkin’s project, on political morality, but it is directed in polar opposition to his liberal worldview and without any constraints of integrity.

This new constitutional theory is based not on a reading of the constitutional text at all, but on the principles of natural law as declared by medieval theologians such as Thomas Aquinas. It abandons the liberal emphasis on the equal protection of rights in favor of government directed toward the “common good.” But it doesn’t go far in saying what that means — beyond stipulating the rejection of progressive rights such as same-sex marriage and freedom of speech and dismissing libertarian rights to unfettered use of individual property. And it doesn’t advocate any project of explicit constitutional change to get there.

While confused as constitutional theory, politically, the idea of the New Right appears to be to unite a “post-liberal” bloc in the United States, galvanizing those alienated from liberal elites and seizing on the widespread discontent with the vast inequalities in American society (and replicated elsewhere). In this way it has attracted support beyond the conservative right. But it offers up no actual political economy to substitute for neoliberalism or to redress its various social deficits. Should it therefore be ignored, or dismissed because of its obvious opportunism?

A closer look suggests that the rub lies elsewhere. In the new battle lines being drawn, the terrain has shifted from the evergreen debate about the legitimacy of judicial review to the situational one of justifying unbound executive power. But “situational,” here, is given the broadest meaning; the moment of exception is not restricted to any imminent threat. The judicial power that Dworkin’s model appeared to celebrate is now to be manipulated to sanction dramatic and indefinite executive intervention, including the dictatorial powers necessary to restore social order and revitalize the common good. A conservative elite will replace the liberal elitism of the past decades, unleash itself from rhetorical ties to the existing settlement and overturn a century of mistaken constitutional practice.

How is this to be achieved? The New Right dismisses appeals to popular sovereignty, as well as day-to-day democratic legitimacy. It gives democracy no particular value. Deference to the legislature is urged only to the extent necessary to ensure the stability of the political settlement. But stability, it turns out, is highly subjective. In an emergency situation, it is trumped by considerations of natural law.

In an unsettling echo of German jurist Carl Schmitt, the exception justifies the use of extraordinary power to return to the norm, only the norm is now said to have been extinguished a century ago with the interwar break from classical jurisprudence and buried with the postwar progressivism that followed. Stability, though valued by conservatives, must not become fetishized. The true end of government is to secure the natural law as understood in Catholic social doctrine; institutional hurdles must give way.

Constitutional Renewal?

If the hope is that the end justifies the means, the “bet” taken by the New Right appears quite different from the originalists’ one — and a far heftier gamble. But why take the bet at all? Conservatives have largely been able to pursue their projects or at least frustrate those of their opponents using the vehicles of the Constitution and the existing institutions of power. It was the electoral college that put Trump into the White House, not the popular vote.

The New Right suggests no program of democratic or constitutional renewal. As Corey Robin noted in the lead up to the 2020 presidential elections, “Conservatism has ceased to be a political project capable of creating hegemony through majoritarian means.” And despite the appropriation of liberalism’s jurisprudential hero, neither will it be able to do so through judicial fiat alone. If not through constitutional or through majoritarian means, then how? From the perspective of this new movement, Dworkin’s mistake was not to bet on Hercules, but to put Hercules in the wrong role. Its remaining hope appears to lie with an authoritarian figure of Herculean power to restore the natural order of things in a period of deep crisis for the US system of constitutional government. Are all bets off?

Liberals themselves have long given up pushing for a vibrant democracy or, like Dworkin, they have an awkward relationship with it; often preferring to double-down on constrained versions of democracy in their rhetorical battles against populism. It has been critical legal scholars in the United States who have consistently argued that the Constitution was never meant to install a democracy (an argument flatly rejected by liberals like Dworkin) and who now insist that the United States needs radical constitutional renewal in order to overturn political elitism and embrace majoritarianism and grassroots democracy.

In his seminal work in jurisprudence, Dworkin projected the constitutional contest as a two-horse race, between Court and Congress. He missed the threat of expanding executive power. But in seeing only a contest between institutional authorities, he also missed the diminishing status of democracy in practice. He was betting not only on the wrong horse, but on the wrong race.

The Tragic Lives of the Communists Trapped in Stalin’s Shadow

Communists who came to the Soviet Union seeking refuge found themselves caught up in the madness of the Stalinist purges. But many, argued Isaac Deutscher, still couldn’t think of breaking with the system that Stalin created and ended up working for their former persecutors.

Following the death of Josef Stalin on March 5, 1953, his friends and political colleagues, including a number of communist leaders from Central and Eastern Europe, gather at the tribune of the Moscow mausoleum. (Keystone-France / Gamma-Keystone via Getty Images)

The historian Isaac Deutscher was a member of the Polish Communist Party until he was expelled for opposing Stalin’s political line in the 1930s. In this essay, first published as “The Tragic Life of a Polrugarian Minister” in 1952, Deutscher wrote about the fate of East European communists who had been imprisoned in the Soviet Union, accused of treachery and espionage, only to be put in power by Stalin’s army and secret police after the war. Deutscher’s fictitious “Polrugaria” was a composite of several East European countries, including his native Poland.

Polrugaria need not be exactly located on the map. Enough that it lies somewhere in the eastern reaches of Europe. Nor need the name of Vincent Adriano, a high Polrugarian official, be looked up in any Who’s Who, for he is a half-real and half-imaginary character. Adriano’s features and traits can be found in some of the people who now rule the Russian satellite countries, and not a single one of his experiences related here has been invented.

It need not be specified what post Vincent Adriano holds in his government. He may be the president or the prime minister or the vice-premier, or he may be only the minister of the interior or the minister of education. In all likelihood he is a member of the Politbureau, and he is known as one of the pillars of the People’s Democracy in Polrugaria. His words and doings are reported in newspapers all over the world.

It is common to refer to men of Adriano’s kind as “Stalin’s henchmen,” “Russian puppets,” and “leaders of the Cominform fifth column.” If any of these labels described him adequately, Adriano would not be worth any special attention. To be sure, he is unavoidably something of a puppet and an agent of a foreign power, but he is much more than that.

Formative Years

Vincent Adriano is in either his late forties or early fifties — he may be just fifty. His age is significant because his formative years were those of the revolutionary aftermath of the First World War. He came from a middle-class family that before 1914 had enjoyed a measure of prosperity and believed in the stability of dynasties, governments, currencies, and moral principles. In his middle or late teens, Adriano saw three vast empires crumble with hardly anybody shedding a tear.

In his middle or late teens, Vincent Adriano saw three vast empires crumble with hardly anybody shedding a tear.

Then he watched many governments leap into and tumble out of existence in so rapid and breathtaking a succession that it was almost impossible to keep account of them. On the average, there were a dozen or a score of them every year. The advent of each was hailed as an epoch-making event; each successive prime minister was greeted as a savior. After a few weeks or days, he was booed and hissed out of office as a misfit, scoundrel, and nincompoop.

The currency of Polrugaria, like the currencies of all neighboring countries, lost its value from month to month, then from day to day, and finally from hour to hour. Adriano’s father sold his house at the beginning of one year; with the money he received he could buy only two boxes of matches at the end of that year. No political combination, no institution, no established custom, no inherited idea seemed capable of survival.

Moral principles, too, were in flux. Reality seemed to lose clear-cut outline, and this was reflected in the new poetry, painting, and sculpture. The young man was easily convinced that he was witnessing the decay of a social order, that before his very eyes, capitalism was succumbing to the attack of its own deep-seated insanity.

He was aroused by the fiery manifestos of the Communist International signed by Lenin and Trotsky. Soon he became a member of the Communist Party. Since in Polrugaria the party was savagely persecuted — the penalties for membership ranged from five years’ imprisonment to death — the people who joined it did not do so, in those days, for selfish or careerist motives.

Adriano, at any rate, gave up without hesitation the prospect of a secure career in the academic field to become a professional revolutionary. He was prompted by idealistic sympathy with the underdog and by something he called “scientific conviction.” Studying the classics of Marxism, he became firmly convinced that private ownership of the means of production and the concept of the nation-state had outlived their day, and further, that they were certain to be replaced by an international socialist society which could be promoted only by a proletarian dictatorship.

Proletarian dictatorship meant not the dictatorial rule of a clique, let alone of a single leader, but the social and political predominance of the working classes, “the dictatorship of an overwhelming majority of the people over a handful of exploiters, semifeudal landlords and big capitalists.”

Far from disowning democracy, the proletarian dictatorship, so he thought, would represent its consummation. It would fill the empty shell of formal equality, which was all that bourgeois democracy could offer, with the content of social equality. With this vision of the future he plunged deep into the revolutionary underground.

Hard and Rusty Edges

We need not relate in detail Adriano’s revolutionary career — its pattern was, up to a point, typical. There were the years of his dangerous work in the underground, when he lived the life of a hunted man without name or address. He organized strikes, wrote for clandestine papers, and traveled all over the country studying social conditions and setting up organizations.

Adriano organized strikes, wrote for clandestine papers, and traveled all over the country studying social conditions and setting up organizations.

Then came the years of prison and torture and of longing in solitude. The vision of the future that had inspired him had to be somewhat adulterated with expedients, tactical games, and tricks of organization — the daily business of every politician, even of one who serves a revolution. For all that, his idealism and enthusiasm had not yet begun to evaporate.

Even while imprisoned he helped sustain in his comrades their conviction, their hope, and their pride in their own sacrifices. Once he led several hundred political prisoners in a hunger strike. The strike, lasting six or seven weeks, was one of the longest ever known.

The governor of the prison knew that in order to break it he had first to break Vincent Adriano. Guards dragged the emaciated man by his legs from a cell on the sixth floor down the iron staircase, banging his head against the hard and rusty edges of the steps until he lost consciousness. Vincent Adriano became a legendary hero.

With some of his comrades, he at last managed to escape from prison and make his way to Russia. Inasmuch as he spent several years in Moscow, it is now often said and written about him that he belongs to that “hard core of Moscow-trained agents who control Polrugaria.” Such words, when he happens to read them, bring a sadly ironical smile to his lips.

When Adriano arrived in Moscow in the early 1930s, he was not among the chief leaders of the Polrugarian party. Nor was he greatly concerned with his place in the hierarchy. He was more preoccupied with the confusion in his own mind that arose when he first compared his vision of the society of the future with life in the Soviet Union under Stalin.

He hardly dared admit, even to himself, the extent of his disillusionment. This, too, has been so typical in the experiences of men of his kind that we need not dwell on it. Typical, too, were the truisms, the half-truths, and the self-delusions with which he tried to soothe his disturbed communist conscience.

Russia’s inherited poverty, her isolation in a capitalist world, the dangers threatening her from outside, the illiteracy of her masses, their laziness and lack of civic responsibility — all this and more he evoked to explain to himself why life in Russia fell appallingly short of the ideal.

“Oh,” he sighed, “if only the revolution had first been victorious in a more civilized and advanced country! But history has to be taken as it is, and Russia is at least entitled to the respect and gratitude due the pioneer, whatever that pioneer’s faults and vices.” He did his utmost not to see the realities of life around him.

Beast of Burden

Then came the great purges of 1936–38. Most leaders of the Polrugarian party who had lived as exiles in Moscow were shot as spies, saboteurs, and agents of the Polrugarian political police. Before they died, they (and even their wives, brothers, and sisters) were made to bear witness against one another.

Among the dishonored and the executed was one who more than anybody else had aroused Adriano’s enthusiasm and sustained his courage, who had initiated him into the most difficult problems of Marxist theory, and to whom Adriano had looked up as a friend and spiritual guide.

Adriano, too, was confronted with the usual charges. By a freak of fortune, however, or perhaps by the whim of the chief of the GPU, Yezhov, or of one of Yezhov’s underlings, he was not made to face a firing-squad.

Adriano could not reconcile himself to the fact that he, the proud revolutionary, was being used as a beast of burden in the country of his dream.

Instead, he was deported to a forced-labor camp somewhere in the subpolar north. With many others — Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites, kulaks, Ukrainian nationalists, bandits and thieves, former generals, former university professors and party organizers — he was employed in felling trees and transporting them from a forest to a depot.

Frost, hunger, and disease took their toll of the deportees, but the ranks were constantly filled with newcomers. Adriano saw how people around him were first reduced to an animal-like struggle for survival, how they next lost the will to struggle and survive, and how finally they collapsed and died like flies. Somehow his own vitality did not sag. He went on wielding the axe with his frostbitten fingers.

Every third or fourth day it was his turn to harness himself, along with fellow prisoners, to the cart loaded with timber and to drag it across the snow- and ice-covered plain to the depot several miles away. Those were the worst hours. He could not reconcile himself to the fact that he, the proud revolutionary, was being used as a beast of burden in the country of his dream.

Even now he still feels a piercing pain in his heart whenever he thinks of those days — and that is why he reads with a melancholy smile the stories about the mysterious “training in fifth-column activity” he received in Russia.

Shouting Into the Ether

With a shred of his mind he tried to penetrate the tangle of circumstances behind his extraordinary degradation. At night he argued about this with the other deportees. The problem was vast and confused beyond comprehension. Some of the deported communists said that Stalin had carried out a counterrevolution in which every achievement of Lenin’s revolution had been destroyed.

Some of the deported communists said that Stalin had carried out a counterrevolution in which every achievement of Lenin’s revolution had been destroyed.

Others held that the foundations of the revolution — public ownership and a collectivist economy — had remained intact, but that instead of a free socialist society, a terrifying combination of socialism and slavery was being erected on those foundations. The outlook was therefore more difficult than anything they could have imagined, but there was perhaps some hope, if not for this generation then for the next.

Stalinism, it was true, was casting grave discredit upon the ideal of socialism, but perhaps what was left of socialism might still be salvaged from the wreckage. Adriano could not quite make up his mind, but he was inclined to adopt this latter view.

Events now took a turn so fantastic that even the most fertile imagination could not have conceived it. One day, toward the end of 1941 (Hitler’s armies had just been repulsed from the gates of the Russian capital), Adriano was freed from the concentration camp and taken with great honors straight to Moscow.

The Kremlin urgently needed East and Central European communists capable of broadcasting to the Nazi-occupied lands and of establishing liaison with the underground movements behind the enemy lines. Because of their country’s strategic importance, Polrugarians were especially wanted.

But not a single one of the chief leaders of the Polrugarian party was alive. The few less prominent ones who had been dispersed in various places of deportation were hurriedly brought back to Moscow, rehabilitated, and put to work. The rehabilitation took the form of an apology from the Security Police to the effect that the deportation of Comrade So-and-So had been a regrettable mistake.

Several times a week, Adriano, facing the microphone, shouted into the ether his confidence in the Land of Socialism, extolled Stalin and his achievements, and called on the Polrugarians to rise behind the enemy lines and prepare for liberation.

Faithless Tutelage

He sensed sharply the incongruity of his situation. He was now a propaganda agent for his jailers and torturers, for those who had denigrated and destroyed the leaders of Polrugarian communism, his friend and guide among them. At heart he could neither forget nor forgive the agony and the shame of the purges. And with a part of his mind he could never detach himself from the people he had left behind in the north.

Adriano was eager to help defeat the Nazis, and for this, he felt, it was right to join hands ‘with the devil and his grandmother’ — and with Stalin.

But he could not refuse the assignment. Refusal would have amounted to sabotage of the war effort, and the penalty would have been death or deportation. Yet it was not merely for life’s sake that he was doing his job. He was eager to help defeat the Nazis, and for this, he felt, it was right to join hands “with the devil and his grandmother” — and with Stalin.

Nor was this merely a matter of defeating Nazism. Despite all he had gone through, he clung to his old ideas and hopes. He was still a communist. He looked forward to the revolutionary ferment that would spread over the capitalist world after the war.

The more severe his disillusionment with the Soviet Union, the more intense was his hope that the victory of communism in other countries would regenerate the movement and free it from the Kremlin’s faithless tutelage.

The same motives prompted him to agree to a proposal, which Stalin personally made to him a few months later, that he should organize a Polrugarian Committee of Liberation and become its secretary. It was certain that the Red Army would cross into Polrugaria sooner or later. The Committee of Liberation was to follow in its wake and become the nucleus of a provisional government.

Adriano’s hands were full of work. He was now in charge of liaison with the Polrugarian Resistance. He issued instructions to the emissaries who penetrated the enemy lines or were parachuted behind them.

He received reports from the guerrillas in the occupied country and transmitted them higher up. He arranged that leaders of the noncommunist and even anti-communist parties be smuggled out of the country and brought to Moscow. And he induced some of them to join the Committee of Liberation.

The Two Adrianos

The sequel is known. The Committee of Liberation became the provisional government, and then the actual government of Polrugaria. The noncommunist parties were squeezed out one by one and suppressed. Polrugaria became a People’s Democracy.

Moscow, for its own reasons, was telling the Polrugarians that they should not look too much to Russia as their model.

Adriano is one of the pillars of the new government, and so far nothing seems to foreshadow his eclipse. He has not found the way out of the trap; neither has he been crushed in it.

There are two Vincent Adrianos now. One seems never to have known a moment of doubt or hesitation. His Stalinist orthodoxy has never been questioned, his devotion to the party has never flagged, and his virtues as leader and statesman are held to be unsurpassed.

The other Adriano is almost constantly tormented by his communist conscience, a prey to scruple and fear, to illusion and disillusionment. The former is expansive and eloquent, the latter broods in silence and hides even from his oldest friends. The former acts, the latter never ceases to ponder.

From 1945 to 1947, the two Adrianos were almost reconciled with each other. In those years the Polrugarian party carried out some of the root-and-branch reforms that for decades had been inscribed in its program. It attacked the problem of Polrugarian landlordism. It divided the large semifeudal estates among the land-hungry peasants. It established public ownership of large-scale industry.

It initiated impressive plans for the further industrial development of a sadly underdeveloped country. It sponsored a great deal of progressive social legislation and an ambitious educational reform. These achievements filled Adriano with real joy and pride. It was, after all, for these things that he had languished in Polrugarian prisons.

In those years, too, Moscow, for its own reasons, was telling the Polrugarians that they should not look too much to Russia as their model, that they ought to find and follow their own “Polrugarian road to socialism.” To Adriano, this meant that Polrugaria would be spared the experience of purges and concentration camps, of abject subservience and fear.

Communism, intense industrial and educational development, and a measure of real freedom to argue with one’s fellow and to criticize the powers that be — this seemed to be the achievement of an ideal.

Roads to Socialism

What disturbed him even then was that the people of Polrugaria were showing little enthusiasm for the revolution. To be sure, they saw the advantages and on the whole approved them. But they resented the revolution that was being carried out over their heads by people whom they had not chosen and who did not often bother to consult them and who looked like stooges of a foreign power.

Adriano knew to what extent the presence of the Red Army in Polrugaria had facilitated the revolution. Without it, the forces of the counterrevolution, with the assistance of the Western bourgeois democracies, might have reasserted themselves in bloody civil war, as they had done after the First World War.

He who has been an outcast in Stalin’s Russia has watched with a shudder as his ‘Polrugarian road to socialism’ has become more and more the Stalinist road.

But he reflected that a revolution without genuine popular enthusiasm behind it is half defeated. It is inclined to distrust the people whom it should serve. And distrust may breed dark fear and terror as it had done in Russia.

Yet, although he saw these dangers, he hoped that through honest and devoted work for the masses, the new Polrugarian government could eventually win their confidence and arouse their enthusiasm. Then the new social order would stand on its own feet. Sooner or later the Russian armies would go back to Russia. Surely, he thought, there must be another road to socialism, perhaps not exactly a Polrugarian one, but not a Russian and a Stalinist road either.

In the meantime, Vincent Adriano did a few things that were understood only by the initiated. He sponsored in Polrugaria a cult to glorify the memory of his old friend and guide who had perished in Russia, although Moscow had not officially rehabilitated the latter’s memory. The biography of the dead leader can even now be seen displayed in Polrugarian bookshops, side by side with the official life of Stalin. Since the circumstances of the martyr’s death are not mentioned in the biography, only the older communists are aware of the hidden implications of this homage.

Adriano has also set up a special institute which looks after the families of all the Polrugarian communists who perished in Moscow as “spies and traitors.” The institute is called the Foundation of the Veterans and Martyrs of the Revolution. Such gestures give Adriano a measure of moral satisfaction, but he knows that politically they are irrelevant.

As the two camps, East and West, began to marshal their forces and as the leaders on both sides, each in their own ways, confronted everybody with a categorical “who-is-not-with-me-is-against-me,” Adriano’s prospects darkened. If he could have had his way, Adriano’s answer would have been a hearty “plague o’ both your houses.”

He who has been an outcast in Stalin’s Russia, a beast of burden in one of his concentration camps, he to whom every copy of Pravda, with its demented hymns to Stalin, gives an acute sensation of nausea, has watched with a shudder as his “Polrugarian road to socialism” has become more and more the Stalinist road. Yet he does not see how he can depart from it.

History’s Irrational Forces

He takes it for granted that all the West can offer to East and Central Europe is counterrevolution. The West may extol freedom and the dignity of man (and who has explored the meaning of these ideals as tragically and thoroughly as Adriano?), but his gaze is fixed on the gulf he sees between Western promise and fulfilment. He is convinced that in his part of the world every new upheaval will bring more rather than less oppression, more rather than less degradation of man.

At times, Adriano would be happy to give up his high office and withdraw into obscurity. But the world has become too small.

He is willing to concede that those who speak for the West may be quite sincere in their promises, but he adds that he has retained his old Marxist habit of disregarding the wishes and promises of statesmen and of keeping his eyes on social and political realities. Who among the Polrugarians, he asks, are ready to rally to the banners of the West? There may be a few well-meaning people among them, but these will be the dupes.

The most active and energetic allies of the West in Polrugaria are those who have had a stake in the old social order, the privileged men of the prewar dictatorship, the old soldateska, the expropriated landlords and their like. These, should the West win, will form the new government, and, in the name of freedom and of the dignity of man, let loose a White terror the like of which has never been seen.

Adriano had known their terror once, also. But that was at a time when the old ruling class believed that their rule would last forever, and when their self-confidence prevented their terror from becoming altogether insane. Now, if they came back, they would be mad with fear and revenge. The real choice, as he sees it, is not between tyranny and freedom, but between Stalinist tyranny, which is in part redeemed by economic and social progress, and a reactionary tyranny which would not be redeemed by anything.

At times, Adriano would be happy to give up his high office and withdraw into obscurity. But the world has become too small. He cannot seek asylum in the West. This, in his eyes, would be not much better than treason — not to Russia, but to his ideal of communism. Nor can he withdraw into obscurity. Resignation and withdrawal on his part would be a gesture of opposition and defiance, and this the regime he has helped to build would not allow.

How much is there in common between the young man who once set out with Promethean ardor to conquer history’s insanity as it manifested itself in capitalism and the middle-aged cabinet minister who vaguely feels that history’s irrational forces have overpowered the camp of the revolution, too, and, incidentally, driven him into a trap?

He does his best to bolster his own self-respect and to persuade himself that as statesman, dignitary, and leader he is still the same man he was when he championed the cause of the oppressed and suffered for it in the prisons of his native land. But sometimes, while he solemnly receives delegations of peasants or salutes a colorful parade, a familiar sharp pain pierces his heart; and suddenly he feels that he is merely a pathetic wreck, a subpolar beast of burden.

Sergei Prokofiev Was One of the Soviet Union’s Great Composers

Sergei Prokofiev died 70 years ago today, overshadowed by the death of Joseph Stalin, who had banned much of his work. But Prokofiev’s brilliant musical compositions have outlived him and still sound fresh and exciting to modern listeners.

Sergei Prokofiev, 1918. (Library of Congress via Wikimedia Commons)

Two of the twentieth century’s most brilliant composers, Sergei Prokofiev and Dmitri Shostakovich, produced some of their best work in the shadow of Joseph Stalin’s dictatorship. Like so many Soviet writers and filmmakers, they attracted the ire of Stalin’s cultural commissars, precisely because of their creativity.

While Shostakovich lived to see the end of the worst excesses of Stalin’s rule, and thus greater space in which artists could express themselves, Prokofiev had the horrible luck to die on the very same day as Stalin in 1953. As a result, the Soviet press barely reported on the death of one of the country’s greatest artists.

Even his coffin had to be taken by hand through back streets from his Moscow apartment, as a hearse was prohibited from picking it up to make space for the crowds thronging the roads for Stalin’s funeral. But Prokofiev’s work has escaped from Stalin’s shadow to enjoy lasting and deserved renown.

Breakdown of Tradition

Sergei Prokofiev was a vital transitional figure in musical history. Born in 1891, he began to compose as a child prodigy in the shadow of the great romantic Russian tradition of Pyotr Tchaikovsky, Alexander Glazunov, and Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov — the latter two were also teachers of the young Prokofiev at the Saint Petersburg Conservatoire in the first decade of the twentieth century.

Sergei Prokofiev’s work has escaped from Stalin’s shadow to enjoy lasting and deserved renown.

At the same time, his maturation as a man and composer took place against the backdrop of the breakdown of that tradition in favor of the mystical expressionism of Alexander Scriabin and the angular modernism of Igor Stravinsky. In spite of the turbulent and extreme contrasts in stylistic influences, Prokofiev managed to develop a strong musical personality and highly distinctive style of his own.

On the one hand, his music often has lush melodies and harmonies, while on the other, dissonances abound. There is a romanticism in much of his music, and yet it always sounds very much of the twentieth century. Whereas many composers go through periods in their style, Prokofiev tended to move back and forth between the romantic and the modern, or to overlay them in the same piece.

His relationship to his times also has its peculiarities. Like Stravinsky and Shostakovich, he found his life disrupted and dominated by the Russian Revolution of 1917 and its consequences. Stravinsky defined himself ever after in opposition to communism. Shostakovich took inspiration from the revolution and remained engaged — albeit often highly critically — with socialist ideals for most of his life.

Prokofiev, however, seems to have been largely disengaged from politics. In the summer of 1917, while the revolution reached a particularly tense and violent point, he retreated to the countryside to write the lighthearted Classical Symphony (1917), inspired by music of the eighteenth century. He left Russia in 1918, not fleeing the new Soviet power, but so that he could take up lucrative offers to perform in the United States and Western Europe.

Return to Moscow

He led a largely itinerant life, performing his works as a pianist and conductor around the world, before returning to the USSR in 1936. The decision to return, precisely at the moment when Stalin’s dictatorship was going full throttle in its purges, may seem very odd. Yet this is only the case when we look at it in terms of the political context.

Prokofiev’s move back to the USSR was mostly down to his homesickness and to the fact that he would be more financially secure there.

For Prokofiev, the move back to the USSR was mostly down to his homesickness and to the fact that he would be more financially secure there, allowing him to focus on his composing, rather than having to rely on endless touring and performing in the West. In short, the radical upheavals of the interwar period appeared to be mere background for him, important only insofar as they affected his ability to make his musical career.

A fascinating insight into Prokofiev’s worldview can be found in his published diary from his first return to the USSR for a concert tour in early 1927. At this time, the revolution was at a key inflection point. Leon Trotsky and his followers were effectively in opposition to the regime, but they were still free to speak out, and Stalin had yet to fully assert his dominance.

Culturally, life was still very open, with a great deal of artistic experimentation. The glimpses of the famous conductorless orchestra Persimfans in rehearsal and performance in Prokofiev’s diaries is particularly tantalizing. His keen eye and cool detachment from the politics makes for an often interesting (although superficial) picture.

For example, at one point he expressed an interest in attending a public lecture by Trotsky in Moscow because Trotsky was known to be such a great speaker, but Prokofiev’s handlers encouraged him to avoid it and go to a concert instead. Coming out of the concert he noticed a large crowd outside the venue where Trotsky was speaking:

One could sense that the atmosphere of Trotsky’s lecture had been electric and we were glad we had not gone: we might have got into political trouble and for no good reason at all.

Insofar as he expressed political opinions, they tended to be rather cynical.

Satire and Grotesquery

That said, he was an artist of his time. Coupled with his immense skills in creating orchestral color, melody, and rhythmic vitality, this characteristic not only made his music highly engaging in its own terms, but also enabled it to capture much of the energy of the revolutionary period and of a rapidly industrializing society.

Prokofiev’s music captured much of the energy of the revolutionary period and of a rapidly industrializing society.

When he was still in his twenties, he had already developed a distinctive modernist voice in works such as Chout (1915/1920), the Scythian Suite (1914–15), the third and fourth piano sonatas (both 1917), and most especially in the opera and orchestral suite The Love for Three Oranges (1919/1924). All of these pieces illustrate his distinctive angular style, and his ability to develop great spans of resolutely tonal music that are nonetheless full of spiky dissonances fully integrated into the whole.

Another aspect of his music, particularly in the 1920s, was grotesquery. The Love for Three Oranges, for which Prokofiev wrote the libretto as well as the music, is loosely based on an eighteenth-century commedia dell’arte play. It is part Brechtian satire, part farce.

Even by the standards of comic opera, the story is often outrageous. It begins with a debate between different theatrical forms. A key moment involves a witch falling over and exposing her underwear, and one character is a fairy who emerges from an orange only to be turned into a giant rat.

The Piano Concerto No. 2 (1912/1923) contains a fiendishly difficult scherzo, in which the pianist has to maintain an uninterrupted and fast-paced series of runs, chased by “whoops” from the orchestra. This sense of musical fun and adventure is one of the most attractive elements in his music.

Satirical and grotesque elements were a feature of much art that followed the Russian Revolution, expressing perhaps the confidence that followed the comprehensive overthrow of a backward and autocratic regime. One can hear this in the music of Shostakovich, and it was also a distinctive feature in the writings of Mikhail Bulgakov, the duo Ilya Ilf and Yevgeny Petrov, and the radical theater of Vsevolod Meyerhold.

Meyerhold was particularly close to the modernist composers of the period, including Prokofiev. However, a crude Stalinist narrative later emerged of untrammeled Soviet progress, favoring a style known as Socialist Realism, which promoted grandiosity and populism over artistic subtlety. This had effectively stamped out the satirical edge in Soviet art by the late 1930s.

Apex and End Point

Prokofiev’s decision to return to live in the USSR at a time when modernism in art was being effectively prohibited did lead to a turn toward a more conservative musical style in certain works, for example in the operas Semyon Kotko (1939) and War and Peace (1941–43), and the ballet Cinderella (1940–44). There were also, for the first time in his career, clear attempts to be more populist with scores for movies such as Lieutenant Kije (1933–34) and Sergei Eisenstein’s Alexander Nevsky (1938–39), along with the evergreen piece for children, Peter and the Wolf (1936).

All artists were forced to adapt their style to Socialist Realism if they were to survive at all, much less continue their careers in the USSR.

These observations are not meant as a criticism. For one thing, all artists were forced to adapt their style to Socialist Realism if they were to survive at all, much less continue their careers in the USSR. Prokofiev’s later operas are not to my taste, but they do have a secure place in the repertoire of opera houses around the world.

On the other hand, the Lieutenant Kije Suite is one of the most enjoyable pieces I know, and yet it has great pathos, too. The opening moments, with a haunting solo trumpet followed swiftly by a light march, set the whole tone of the piece. It ends with that same solo trumpet melody, rather than the expected big bang.

Alexander Nevsky is often thrilling, especially in the music for the battle on the ice between the title character’s army and the Teutonic invaders. And Peter and the Wolf is still, over eighty years later, one of the best introductions to the orchestra and to classical music in general.

During this period, Prokofiev also produced one of the true masterpieces of the twentieth century, the ballet score Romeo and Juliet (1935–36), which has much of his signature angularity, allied to memorable melodies. Indeed, his ballet music represents both an apex and an end point of the great tradition of classical ballet music. His music of the 1930s is the core of his secure place in the repertoire and his continuing popularity today.

New Adventures

Like Shostakovich and others, Prokofiev continued to be much more challenging and musically adventurous in smaller-scale works, such as his Violin Sonata No. 1 (1938). This is especially the case in the sixth, seventh, and eighth piano sonatas (1939–44), which are collectively known as the War Sonatas. These are pieces that are tremendously challenging for even the greatest pianists — not just technically, but also musically in capturing subtle shifts in feeling.

The hope that accompanied the victory over fascism led both Prokofiev and Shostakovich to attempt a revival of the earlier revolutionary style.

The hope and no doubt sense of relief that accompanied the victory over fascism in 1945 led both Prokofiev and Shostakovich to attempt a revival of the earlier revolutionary style of satire and freer uses of dissonance. In that year, both composers presented a new symphony. Shostakovich’s Symphony No. 9 radically undermined the expected victory symphony with a relatively short, small-scored, and lightweight piece.

Prokofiev’s Symphony No. 5 is much more equivocal in terms of tone. It is a tightly structured piece and can be enjoyed in a fairly straightforward way, and it immediately became one of his most popular works in the USSR and abroad. There are some marvelously big tunes and exciting climaxes, and mostly this has the character of a grand victory piece.

The patina of victory was enhanced when the premiere in Moscow, conducted by the composer, had to be delayed a few minutes while military guns outside fired to celebrate the Soviet army crossing into Germany. Prokofiev described the piece as “a hymn to free and happy Man, to his mighty powers, his pure and noble spirit.”

Yet one does have to carefully scrutinize public pronouncements made under the harsh repression of Stalin’s dictatorship. The second movement is very playful, with some of the angularity of Prokofiev’s works from the 1910s and ’20s, while the third is dark, often punctuated with his trademark dissonances. The grinding chords of the final movement evoke big, mechanized processes — a sort of aural equivalent of the factory scenes in Charlie Chaplin’s Modern Times.

It is at the climax of the symphony that things unexpectedly take an ambiguous turn. We appear to be headed toward a heroic conclusion when the music starts to break out into a wild frenzy. The orchestration thins out, leaving a string quartet apparently playing out of key. A trumpet interjects with a sustained note awkwardly guiding the final chord back to the home key of B-flat.

This ending has an interesting parallel with Shostakovich’s own Symphony No. 5 (1937), which also ends with a subtle undermining of heroism. Indeed, Shostakovich made a similarly deceptive public statement about his fifth, saying that it represented the “triumph of socialist man.” Both composers were highly adept at exploiting the ambiguities possible in nonvocal music.

The Zhdanov Decree

Whatever misgivings the regime had about the style employed by Prokofiev and others at the end of the war, the criticisms were relatively muted. Perhaps as a result, Prokofiev returned to a much more challenging style in his Symphony No. 6 (1945–47). But Stalin’s cultural commissar Andrei Zhdanov put a stop to any perceived weakening of the doctrine of Socialist Realism in February 1948. Prokofiev was denounced by name in the “Zhdanov Decree,” along with Shostakovich, Aram Khachaturian, and others.

Stalin’s cultural commissar Andrei Zhdanov put a stop to any perceived weakening of the doctrine of Socialist Realism in February 1948.

Immediately, many works of these composers were banned outright, and their music was dropped from performances in general. Prokofiev slid quickly into dire financial circumstances as a result. This, combined with poor health, led to a sad decline in the last few years of his life. If that were not enough, his ex-wife, the mother of his children, was sent to the gulag in 1947, from which she would not emerge until the late 1950s, long after his death.

During those last years, he produced only a handful of works, mostly small, minor pieces. The major works from this period include the final Symphony No. 7 (1951–52). Inspired by the great cellist Mstislav Rostropovich, he also wrote a Cello Sonata (1949) and the Symphony-Concerto for Cello and Orchestra (1950–52).

All of the pieces, especially the works for cello, have a level of introspection and depth of emotion hitherto rare in Prokofiev’s music, with the exception of his War Sonatas. They are hauntingly beautiful, with an added poignancy for listeners aware of the difficulties that marred the end of his life.

Prokofiev’s work stands, together with that of Shostakovich, as the pinnacle of music in the USSR. His detachment in terms of emotion and politics means that his music does not express all the hopes and despair of the Soviet experiment in the way that Shostakovich’s does, nor does it as often reach the same emotional depths. But, technically, he was perhaps the better composer.

His ability to hold onto the great romantic Russian tradition while also being fearlessly inventive and modernist meant he was the guide and inspiration for a whole line of Soviet composers, from Shostakovich to Khachaturian and Alfred Schnittke. He was one of the composers that defined modernism in the first half of the twentieth century, and much of his music still sounds fresh and exciting, even seventy years after his death.