Deadly Mass Shooting at Jehovah’s Witness Church in Germany

Last Thursday evening in Germany, a gunman broke into Jehovah’s Witnesses’ north Hamburg parish hall during a religious service with fifty attendees and proceeded to open fire.

The shooter fired over one hundred bullets from a handgun, killing six and injuring eight.

Four men and two women, aged 33-60 and all German citizens, were among the dead, and an unborn child. Four of the wounded are in critical condition.

The suspected shooter was later found dead among the others, having committed suicide after his rampage. Hamburg police responded to the first emergency call at 9:04 pm, sending a large contingent of officers, including special forces, to the scene.

The shooter has been identified as Philipp Fusz, a 35-year-old German resident formerly a member of the same congregation.

Authorities had previously received a tip that he should not be in possession of firearms due to mental instability but paid him an unannounced visit and found no cause for concern.

In response to the attack, Chancellor Olaf Scholz has called it a “brutal act of violence,” and Hamburg Mayor Peter Tschentscher expressed his deepest sympathy to the victims’ families. The church issued a statement, expressing their grief and offering prayers to everyone involved.

David Semonian, a U.S.-based spokesman for Jehovah’s Witnesses, conveyed his sorrow to the members of the faith around the world.

Archbishop Carlo Maria Viganò: The COVID Pandemic Farce Served as a Trial Balloon for the New World Order

All Global Research articles can be read in 51 languages by activating the Translate Website button below the author’s name.

To receive Global Research’s Daily Newsletter (selected articles), click here.

Follow us on Instagram and Twitter and subscribe to …

The post Archbishop Carlo Maria Viganò: The COVID Pandemic Farce Served as a Trial Balloon for the New World Order appeared first on Global Research.

Some of Us Don’t Think the Russian Invasion Was “Aggression.” Here’s Why.

All Global Research articles can be read in 51 languages by activating the Translate Website button below the author’s name.

To receive Global Research’s Daily Newsletter (selected articles), click here.

Follow us on Instagram and Twitter and subscribe to …

The post Some of Us Don’t Think the Russian Invasion Was “Aggression.” Here’s Why. appeared first on Global Research.

The Covid “Killer Vaccine”. People Are Dying All Over the World. It’s A Criminal Undertaking

First published on November 26, 2022

***

We are being accused of  “spreading disinformation” regarding the Covid-19 vaccine. 

The Reuters and AP media “trackers” and “fact checkers” will be out to smear the testimonies of parents who have lost their …

The post The Covid “Killer Vaccine”. People Are Dying All Over the World. It’s A Criminal Undertaking appeared first on Global Research.

We Are Being Smashed Politically, Economically, Medically and Technologically by the Elite’s ‘Great Reset’: Why? How Do We Fight Back Effectively?

All Global Research articles can be read in 51 languages by activating the Translate Website button below the author’s name (desktop version)

To receive Global Research’s Daily Newsletter (selected articles), click here.

Follow us on Instagram and Twitter and …

The post We Are Being Smashed Politically, Economically, Medically and Technologically by the Elite’s ‘Great Reset’: Why? How Do We Fight Back Effectively? appeared first on Global Research.

Many People Fully Vaccinated for COVID Are Now Going Blind

All Global Research articles can be read in 51 languages by activating the “Translate Website” drop down menu on the top banner of our home page (Desktop version).

To receive Global Research’s Daily Newsletter (selected articles), click here.

Visit …

The post Many People Fully Vaccinated for COVID Are Now Going Blind appeared first on Global Research.

Fred Halliday’s Writings on Global Politics Are a Vital Resource for the Left

The Irish scholar Fred Halliday covered an extraordinary range of subjects in his work, from Middle East revolutions to the Cold War. Halliday brought a Marxist perspective to the study of global politics and left behind a rich intellectual legacy.

Fred Halliday as a young man. (Alex Halliday / openDemocracy)

Fred Halliday (1946–2010) made an enormous intellectual contribution to both the discipline of International Relations (IR) and what is usually referred to as “area studies” of the Middle East. When Halliday began his intellectual and political life, Marxism was a relatively marginal presence in both of these fields. Although Halliday later moved away from Marxist political positions, the expansion of space for the Left in these disciplines owes much to his work.

Halliday represented a type of public intellectual virtually unknown today, combining popular exposition with regional expertise and global analytical reach that was articulated, at least initially, from a position on the Marxist left. A glance at the covers of Halliday’s books, most of them published by nonacademic presses, reveals the wide currency of his ideas: for example, the Sunday Times described 1989’s Cold War, Third World, a still avowedly Marxist extended essay, as “a brilliant, tightly argued, timely study.”

Such a reception is unthinkable in the British press today, testifying to an intellectual culture long submerged beneath slews of middlebrow pap. We might criticize his later conclusions and theoretical underpinnings — so robust an intellectual pugilist as Halliday would expect nothing less — but there is still much for the Left to learn from his legacy.

Child of the Enlightenment

Halliday was born in Dublin in 1946 and raised initially in Dundalk, a town close to the Irish border. His sense of origin in a place where imperialism, armed nationalism, and both religious devotion and sectarian identification were everyday realities informed his study of the Middle East and his political positions.

Halliday represented a type of public intellectual virtually unknown today, combining popular exposition with regional expertise and global analytical reach.

There was also a more direct connection in the influence, at secondhand, of the British and Irish Communist Organization (BICO), a small Marxist-Leninist group that had an outsized intellectual influence in the 1970s and ’80s. BICO opposed Irish unification and republicanism, seeing the (predominantly Protestant) skilled working class of the north of Ireland as a historically progressive force.

Halliday was never a member of BICO, and his sympathy for Trotskyist figures such as Isaac Deutscher would not have sat well with the organization’s self-proclaimed Stalinism. He was, however, a student of Bill Warren, BICO member and author of Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism (1980). Combatively opposing the widely held position that imperialism retarded the capitalist development of the Third World, Warren argued that imperialism produced such development in its colonies — and was therefore, to some extent, welcome.

At one level, Halliday’s lifelong worldview derived from a superposition of Warren’s muscular “stage-ism,” in which capitalist (and imperialist) development progressively provided the foundation for a planned economy, upon Deutscher’s Trotskyism, which was based on ideas of uneven and combined development and permanent revolution. Deutscher was an outspoken anti-Stalinist, while Warren was quite the opposite. Yet both converged around a conception of socialist revolution as a program rather than a process of self-emancipation of the working class: one that could therefore conceivably be achieved by a form of “revolution from above.”

This view informed Halliday’s bedrock understanding of an unevenly unfolding global modernity — either of capitalist development or Enlightenment rationality — whose contradictory progress was the only hope for human emancipation. This was what Halliday meant when he described himself as a member of the Bani Tanwir or “child of the Enlightenment.”

The anticipated endpoint of this process for Halliday gradually shifted from socialist revolution to a kind of radical liberalism, as noted by his former students Alex Colas and George Lawson. This reflected the fortunes of the political projects with which he was engaged. In the 1970s, Halliday reported on and fostered solidarity for the late flowering spurt of revolutions in the Third World that followed the US withdrawal from Vietnam. The Iranian revolution of 1979 marked a caesura, bringing to power not the left-wing currents with which Halliday had worked but an Islamic Republican regime.

Halliday’s work then turned to explaining the Cold War as the “intra-systemic” conflict that was the context for these revolutions. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the 1991 Gulf War marked a third and final phase in Halliday’s intellectual and political life, in which he turned toward a rights-based cosmopolitanism — although he produced his most substantive work on revolutions at this time.

Across each of these phases, Halliday contributed to three distinct but interlinked fields: the study of revolutions; connected to this, an account of the Cold War and IR based on a historical materialist approach; and finally the specialism for which he is most well-known, the study of the politics of the Middle East, including Islamist movements. In each he brought to bear not only his intellectual acuity and immense erudition across several languages, but also the conception of historical progress that reflected his engagement with Warren and Deutscher.

Revolution, Rationality, and Modernity

Halliday’s engagement with revolutionary movements predated and gave rise to his intellectual work. His first published book, at the age of twenty-four, was a translation of Karl Korsch’s 1923 work Marxism and Philosophy with an accompanying introduction. His first major contribution was 1974’s Arabia Without Sultans.

Halliday’s engagement with revolutionary movements predated and gave rise to his intellectual work.

Halliday was a member of the Middle East Report and Information Project, which would go on to produce Middle East Report, and the editorial collective of the New Left Review. Halliday’s engagement with the region therefore sprang from a particular revolutionary perspective and the need to inform a Western left-wing audience about its revolutionary movements. Arabia Without Sultans emerged from a long personal engagement with the People’s Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG) in the Dhofar region of Oman.

Halliday’s purpose was to dispel the “mystified flummery” about the Arabian Peninsula as a land of “sheikhs, deserts, holy places and camels,” the better to inform a revolutionary strategy for the region. The work of a group like PFLOAG in Dhofar, an area that not only lacked an industrial working class but even large urban settlements of any kind, represented an extreme example of the general trend of radicalizing Third World revolution. Rather than taking hold in the industrialized core of the capitalist system, it was in the partially industrialized or agrarian — in the case of Dhofar, nomadic — regions that the most revolutionary movements were emerging.

This phenomenon Halliday ascribed to a version of Trotsky’s theory of uneven and combined development. The Middle East, like the Third World as a whole, had been incorporated into a global market and system of states, but in ways that “accentuated” rather than eradicated their differences with the industrial-capitalist core. The emergence in the Gulf of an oil-dependent rentier bourgeoisie that was nonetheless largely composed of monarchs and tribal aristocracies represented a case in point.

For Halliday, it was in such “weak links” that we could most expect revolutionary movements to emerge. It was unclear in this argument why such movements would be able to maintain their rule, lacking a working-class base with the material interest in and social capacity for the building of socialism. This was a problem that Halliday later confronted later in his books Cold War, Third World and (coauthored with his then-partner Maxine Molyneux) The Ethiopian Revolution.

Demonstrating his debt to Warren, Halliday stressed that capitalism and even imperialism produced potential for revolutionary change as much as they retarded it. The most striking example of this potential in the 1970s, for Halliday, was Iran. His next book, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, appeared in 1979, shortly before a revolution ousted the US-backed monarchy that had played an important role in the eventual defeat of the PFLOAG. Halliday showed how Shah Reza Pahlavi, by building a “bourgeois dictatorship” in monarchical form based on oil rents, had produced a new revolutionary social force, the urbanized working class, albeit a highly stratified and diversified one.

This analysis of Iran was in some respects vindicated and in others overturned by the revolution of 1979, an event of seismic importance for the region. Although the Iranian working class played an important role in the revolutionary movement, leadership fell to the fraction of the Shia religious establishment associated with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, supported by the traditional petty bourgeoisie of the bazaar. Just a few months later, the USSR occupied Afghanistan to shore up the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), riven by factional conflict and isolated in a predominantly rural and socially conservative country.

These developments forced Halliday to engage in a rethinking of the relationship between revolution, modernity, and international relations. This was to culminate in his 1999 book Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power. This work also drew upon reflections begun in 1981’s The Ethiopian Revolution, and his PhD on revolution and foreign policy in South Yemen, later converted into a published work.

Revolutions From Above

The dilemma with which Halliday struggled in the late 1980s and 1990s was no mere intellectual exercise. The idea of revolution, as Halliday was to write in The Sixth Great Power, covers both the phenomenon of popular uprising and the metahistorical concept of “the Revolution” as systemic change. The late Third World revolutions of the 1970s seemed to unite both — or at least permit the systemic change to be achieved by revolution from above.

In The Ethiopian Revolution, Halliday and Molyneux considered the seizure of power in 1974 by a committee of military officers, the Derg, as a “coup in the context of social revolution.” Drawing on Ellen Kay Trimberger’s work on revolutions from above, they argued that we should in some instances consider such phenomena to be “not so much an alternative to revolution from below” but rather an extension of a mass movement. Halliday and Molyneux were highly critical of the Derg’s violently coercive polities. Yet they believed that it could nonetheless be seen in these terms, although the nature of the postrevolutionary society in Ethiopia was still to be decided.

Halliday’s view of social transformation as a program that could be implemented from above was not uncommon on the Left at the time.

Writing for the New Left Review, Halliday applied a similar framework to events in Afghanistan during the same period. There had not been a revolution “in the sense of a seizure of power by an oppressed class.” Nonetheless, he argued that a “revolutionary process” was under way in the country by means of the PDPA’s program of “socialist transformation” and “expropriation of the existing ruling class.”

This view of social transformation as a program that could be implemented from above was not uncommon on the Left at the time. It also reflected a really existing conundrum in revolutionary experiences: Did revolution consist of the moment of rupture and heroic mass mobilization, or of the subsequent process of profound social transformation? If the latter could be achieved without the former, was it still “revolutionary”?

Halliday’s answer to this question in the late 1970s was a qualified “yes.” Over the next two decades, however, experience brought this model of revolutionary transformation into question. As Halliday recognized, the late Third World revolutionary regimes in Afghanistan, South Yemen, and Ethiopia stood fractured and besieged. Lacking a wide social base from which to pursue their programs of radical transformation, these regimes were mired in civil war and increasingly dependent on internal repression as well as external support from a sclerotic Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, an eminently modern revolution in Iran, bearing all the hallmarks of universalism, mass mobilization, and urban uprising, had brought an avowedly theocratic regime to power. The capstone to this series of disorienting trends was, of course, the fall of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European dependencies in 1989–91.

The Sixth Great Power was Halliday’s response to these transformations. The title derived from Marx’s remark that in addition to the five great powers of nineteenth-century Europe, we should expect a “sixth great power” of revolution to eventually prevail. Halliday no longer shared Marx’s belief in such an outcome. However, he did seek to rescue the idea of revolution, to which he gave the dual meaning noted above, from the malign neglect it suffered in the study of IR.

Revolutions, Halliday wrote, demonstrated an evident similarity in their various manifestations from France in 1789 to Iran in 1979. Their ideological invocations, their self-consciously heroic narratives, and their aspirations to universal revolutionary order all appeared alike. Yet here again, Iran constituted a fulcrum. While the Iranian revolution partook of all the familiar forms of modern revolution, its eventual content stood against that heritage of 1789 with which Halliday strongly identified.

As the book amply demonstrated, not only were revolutions generally international in their origins, courses, and consequences, but much of the history of international relations (the phenomenon) and International Relations (the discipline) was a response to revolutionary threat. To a degree unusual in the field, the book also discussed counterrevolution — particularly the formation of counterrevolutionary international coalitions against a revolutionary state or movement.

Halliday still identified the uneven and combined development of capitalism as the “inescapable context” of the metahistorical “Revolution.” However, he argued that the unfolding of that development process had demonstrated that Revolution — at least the upper-case variety — was a phenomenon of capitalism’s earlier phases, not an endpoint.

Explaining the Cold War

We can trace Halliday’s interest in the interaction between revolution and the international system back to the burst of post-Vietnam Third World revolutions: he counted fourteen between 1974 and 1980, from Guinea-Bissau to Nicaragua, Grenada to Iran, yet none thereafter. These social revolutions interacted with — but were not determined solely by — the confrontation between the nuclear-armed superpowers.

That confrontation, Halliday argued, pitted two different economic and social systems (not classes) against each other: capitalism and socialism, whatever the deformations of the latter. If revolution and counterrevolution at a domestic level meant a programmatic contest between different economic and social systems, the Cold War (waged since 1917, in Halliday’s view) constituted the international analog for such a contest.

For Halliday, we could explain the Cold War neither as a historical accident nor in terms of domestic politics alone (nor indeed by reference to the reified geopolitics studied in IR departments). He developed this argument in his 1983 book The Making of the Second Cold War, which looked in detail at the intensified rivalry between Washington and Moscow that led many to fear a nuclear conflict might be imminent.

1989 forced Halliday to engage in greater depth with theories of International Relations as he sought to construct a Marxist response to them.

Halliday identified several key weaknesses of the Soviet-led bloc in its competition with the United States: slackening growth rates, the reversal of political liberalization under Leonid Brezhnev’s long rule, and the sheer drabness of everyday life for citizens of the “people’s democracies.” When Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to deal with these problems through glasnost and perestroika in the late 1980s, he inadvertently precipitated the demise of the Soviet experiment.

Halliday incorporated the collapse of the USSR into his argument after 1991. If the Cold War was fundamentally a “systemic” rivalry, that meant that the entire edifice collapsed when the ruling elite of the USSR lost faith in the socialist system. He never resolved this tension between materialist outcome and idealist explanation in his account of the Cold War.

All the same, 1989 forced Halliday to engage in greater depth with theories of IR as he sought to construct a Marxist response to them. The product of this endeavor was 1994’s Rethinking International Relations, in which Halliday attempted to bring about what he called a “necessary encounter” between historical materialism and IR.

Marxism and IR

Marxist scholarship in the field of IR is now common, but it was lesser known in the early 1990s. Leading figures in IR, such as Kenneth Waltz or Stephen Walt, certainly engaged with Marxism in general and the thought of Vladimir Lenin in particular, while John Mearsheimer enthusiastically welcomed Halliday for a guest lecture at the University of Chicago. Realist IR scholars have tended, if anything, toward the Left in their own politics rather than being hidebound conservatives.

Marxist scholarship in the field of International Relations is now common, but it was lesser known in the early 1990s.

Nonetheless, the core premise of the discipline was then (and to some degree remains) ideological: to abstract the state from the social relations in which it is embedded on the grounds that the latter are “domestic” rather than “international” phenomena. The various schools or “paradigms” of IR — Realism, Liberalism, the English School, and so forth — followed this approach in one shape or another.

Marxism had received a place in IR textbooks in the form of one such groupings: “structuralism.” Those textbooks informed students that Realists explained conflict in terms of power and security while Liberals explained cooperation in terms of shared interests. For their part, “structuralists” were said to explain global inequality (particularly North-South inequality) by reference to imperialism and exploitation.

Halliday’s enormously influential London School of Economics (LSE) colleague Susan Strange was also developing international political economy as a subfield. Strange attempted to reintegrate the study of “power” into accounts of “markets” — albeit operating with a rather reified conception of both.

Halliday argued that this version of “structuralism” was an entirely unsatisfactory engagement with, and by, Marxism. As a theory of social totality, Marxism aspired — or ought to aspire — to explain the relations between powerful states just as much as anything else. Moreover, the fundamental Marxist debates on imperialism before and after World War I fundamentally concerned the origins of conflict between states of the capitalist core, not the rule of the core over the periphery.

The international level of social reality nonetheless posed a challenge for historical materialism, because Marx formulated the latter as if there were only one society, rather than a plurality of state-society complexes. For Halliday, there were no purely national histories — therefore there could be no historical materialism without the international. It should be noted here that Halliday also saw the study of gender as a major blind spot in both IR and Marxism. Together with Margot Light, he introduced some of the first teaching on the subject in IR courses at the LSE.

To develop a form of historical materialism that was adequate to the task of understanding this international society, Halliday deemed it essential to discard the “vulgar polemic” that he believed to characterize much Marxist writing on the international, including many of the anti-imperialist positions he had previously criticized. In particular, Halliday argued that we had to sever Marxism as an analytical framework from Marxism as a political program. This meant dropping the idea that an alternative social and economic system was immanent to capitalism or even a possible outcome.

Halliday argued that we had to sever Marxism as an analytical framework from Marxism as a political program.

Halliday saw the contribution of historical materialism to IR as sitting not in one particular geographical or thematic area but rather in terms of a threefold approach. First of all, Marxism placed international relations in the context of specific modes of production and the social formations they generate — or to be more precise, the one specific mode of production that has generated a global system of sovereign states: capitalism.

A second point following on from this was that Marxism historicized concepts and practices, eschewing the idea of transhistorical or natural categories. This may seem like a banal point, yet it was a call to arms in in a discipline characterized on the one hand by purely empirical diplomatic history and on the other by purposefully ahistorical modeling.

The third aspect in which Marxism challenged existing IR approaches was through its focus on classes and class struggle. This fed into the fourth main aspect of Marxism in IR, the importance of revolution, as discussed above.

The Middle East, Orientalism, and Islamism

The best-known aspect of Halliday’s work concerns the study of the Middle East. From his early iconoclasm in Arabia Without Sultans onward, he sought to promote an “analytic universalism” that was at odds with both poles in the debate on “Orientalism” in Middle East studies.

Broadly speaking, this debate polarized the field into two camps. The first comprised the adherents of an older, European tradition of study of the region’s languages, religions, and cultures, that saw those cultural characteristics as explanations for contemporary political phenomena. Their opponents were galvanized by the publication of Edward Said’s 1979 book Orientalism, which castigated this tradition as a handmaiden of imperial power, inventing the object of its own knowledge the better to dominate it.

For Halliday, both sides of this polemical divide were trafficking in linguistic meta-analyses rather than concrete historical or political problems. Although the “Orientalist” side indubitably served the colonial enterprise, he argued, Said’s disciples ignored the fact that accurate knowledge can still be produced for objectionable aims. In Halliday’s blunt analogy, if you want to rob a bank, you need to know where the safe is and when the employees go home after finishing work.

Halliday sought to promote an ‘analytic universalism’ that was at odds with both poles in the debate on ‘Orientalism’ in Middle East studies.

This perspective informed Halliday’s response to the emerging strategic landscape of the 1990s. In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, Islam and Islamism were already beginning to feature as the new antagonists of US hegemony. Samuel Huntington’s 1996 work The Clash of Civilizations — a now justly ignored mishmash of Pentagon realpolitik and “third-rate Orientalism,” in Halliday’s words — offered ideological justification for this perspective. Islam and the Myth of Confrontation (1995) was Halliday’s riposte.

The Myth of Confrontation was not a book about Islamic doctrines. As Halliday was keen to point out, the assumption that such doctrines determined the social world was in itself a category error. “Islam” as an object of study had to be disaggregated. There was no timeless essence of Islam that could “clash” with an (equally mythical) European or Christian civilization. As Halliday pointed out, both — or indeed any — cultural traditions were historically riven with conflicts of power, interest, and emancipation.

He also stressed that we should not ascribe any particular status to the Middle East, although it was more frequently conflict-prone than other regions. Its social formations were naturally the product of their specific histories, and that included the role of religious and nationalist discourses within them. However, in order to grasp such specificities, we needed categories “of general and comparative application” — what Halliday called “matching an analytic universalism with historical particularism.” He aimed this argument not merely at adherents of Huntington’s thesis but also at the Islamists whom Halliday regarded as their equivalents.

In the early 1980s, Halliday had opposed those Western socialists who he accused of supporting the struggle of the Afghan Mujahedeen — which he saw as a “counter-revolutionary rural movement” — against the Soviet occupation. In making these arguments, he was sometimes prone to a kind of rhetorical looseness that is unfortunately common on the Left (and to which the present author is probably not immune!). As Gilbert Achcar recounted in his book Eastern Cauldron, he had opposed the Soviet invasion in a document coauthored with Halliday’s New Left Review colleague Tariq Ali. This was not because they supported the Mujahedeen, but rather because they believed — correctly as events were to progress — that the Soviet occupation would have disastrous results for any progressive causes in Afghanistan.

Rhetorical shortcuts aside, Halliday’s underlying faith in the expansion of the universal principles bequeathed by the Enlightenment and its successors informed his perspective. As Halliday saw it, siding with the Mujahedeen, Iranian Islamists, or Iraqi Ba’athists was worse than siding with imperialism, because it promoted the reactionary opponents of those Enlightenment principles. His support for the 1991 Gulf War against Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait was a notable example of this stance and marked Halliday’s break with most of the Left.

Such questions dominated global politics in Halliday’s final decade. Published after the 9/11 attacks, Two Hours that Shook the World reprised Halliday’s previous arguments about Islamism. While he opposed the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Halliday nonetheless had little time for the antiwar movement — or anti-capitalists more generally — whom he accused of dallying with reactionary jihadism. By the mid-2000s, Halliday no longer called himself a socialist: in his own words, while he did still identify with the “radical critique of capitalism,” he no longer believed it was “possible to have an equal world” or to “abolish the state.”

One of his last notable political acts was to decry the acceptance of Muammar Gaddafi’s son Seif al-Islam into a PhD program at the London School of Economics, where Halliday taught for many years. Erstwhile apostles of the “Third Way” like Tony Blair’s ideological guru Anthony Giddens ignored his warnings and eagerly made obeisance to the “Brother Leader.”

Halliday’s Legacy

Where does Halliday’s legacy stand more than a decade after his death? Although he witnessed a renewed upsurge of protest in Iran toward the very end of his life, Halliday did not live to see the tumult of the Arab revolutions of 2011. These uprisings constituted as fundamentally international a revolutionary wave as any studied by Halliday.

Capitalist development has produced in the urban working class the most consistently democratic social force.

However, they produced no new state form challenging the system as a whole — with the partial exception of two radically divergent experiments in northern Syria, under the rule of ISIS and the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) respectively. Universalist demands for “bread, freedom, and social justice” animated the uprisings, but Islamists were important participants in as well as beneficiaries of them.

Most of all, 2011 reopened the question of the historicity of revolution which Halliday left unanswered in 2000. To the extent that these uprisings did not result in fundamental social transformation, they confirmed Halliday’s idea that the era of revolutions (or Revolutions) has passed.

Yet these upheavals did not take place in countries that were going through an earlier phase of capitalist development — at least not if that phrase refers to some absolute criteria of urbanization or industrialization. They are, indeed, better considered revolutions of late capitalist development, emerging from a context of increasing inequality, crumbling public spheres, and the cliquish, authoritarian neoliberalism that rules over these states.

This point suggests a further way in which Halliday — and even to some extent Bill Warren — has been proven right. Imperialist hierarchy has not blocked or prevented capitalist development in the global South. Only the most blinkered paleo-Maoist can look at the People’s Republic of China today and see anything but the throbbing core of a global capitalist economy. Even societies such as Egypt, although marred by extreme poverty, inequality, and international subjugation, are now more industrialized than service-based economies in the North.

Mass workers’ movements were key features of the Arab revolutions of 2011 in Tunisia, Egypt, and even Yemen, where Halliday once began his career studying Third World revolutions. This reflects a broader trend in which capitalist development has produced in the urban working class the most consistently democratic social force, adding support to another of Halliday’s arguments.

A Tragic Sensibility

What does the reality and the fate of these revolutions mean for the form of radical and emancipatory critique with which Halliday identified as bani tanwir? On some issues, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in which he advocated a two-state solution on practical grounds, it is difficult to reconcile Halliday’s position with contemporary political realities such as Israel’s increasingly ultranationalist governments.

Halliday’s later writings reveal a tragic sensibility, entirely understandable within the parameters of his political formation. He identified the contradictory possibility of universal progress with the expansion of economic development, pace Warren. He also identified that possibility, at least in some sense, with the systemic alternative offered by the socialist bloc.

Of course, Halliday held no illusions in the sclerotic Brezhnevite system he visited in the early 1980s. He nonetheless saw it precisely as a different system. The failure of that system then left us with little alternative, he believed, but to mount such defenses of the gains of modernity as were possible. From this perspective came his wariness of left-wing approaches to Islamists.

Yet two connected questions arise. First, if the will of the leaders of the USSR and the People’s Republic of China was enough to change their systems into capitalist ones, were they really that different to start with? Secondly, if such systems (and their erstwhile imitators in the Arab world) were not systemic alternatives, then where is the political subject of progress to be found?

If, as the revolts of 2011 suggest, it is in the multifarious and frequently impoverished urban masses of the region, then that subject is likely — at some points and in some places — to include not just believing Muslims but also Islamists. Such revolutionary subjects are even now being recomposed, without regard to how enlightened or not they are perceived to be.

As I write, revolutionary mobilizations are doggedly continuing in Sudan, now into their fourth year and second transitional agreement with a military regime that was veiled for two decades in Islamic garb. In Iran, the extraordinary mobilization of women, young people, workers, and Kurds appear to have forced the “hijab police” from the streets.

It is cheering to think that Fred Halliday, whose first experience of Iran was smuggling a copy of Che Guevara’s Guerrilla Warfare to an unknown contact in a cafe, would look on and approve — and perhaps think that more things are possible than we might believe.

Workers’ Pensions Are Backing Child Labor Through Private Equity Investments

Public officials have been using the retirement savings of unionized public employees to capitalize, through private equity investments, an outsourcing business that has used low-paid immigrants and even children for hazardous work in slaughterhouses.

Activists gather near the Hearthside Foods packaging facility on March 6, 2023 in Bolingbrook, Illinois, protesting the employment of child workers at the facility. (Scott Olson / Getty Images)

Last month, the Biden administration announced it fined a company for employing more than a hundred children to clean meatpacking plants — one of the most dangerous jobs possible, for one of the most dangerous employers in America.

That company, a sanitation contractor called Packers Sanitation Services Inc., has been repeatedly bought and sold by private equity funds that manage retirement money for state and local public employees, according to our review.

In other words, public officials have been using the retirement savings of unionized teachers, firefighters, and police officers to capitalize — and help Wall Street executives profit from — an outsourcing business that has used low-paid immigrants and even children for hazardous work in slaughterhouses.

At various points, private equity firms have loaded Packers up with debt in order to pay themselves big dividends. The company’s current owner is the world’s largest private equity firm, the Blackstone Group, whose Republican mega-donor CEO collected $1.3 billion in pay and dividends last year.

What’s more, the New York Times recently reported on a factory filled with young migrant workers at a giant food contract manufacturer that outsources production for major snack and cereal brands. That company, Hearthside Food Solutions, has also been owned by private equity funds managing public employees’ retirement savings.

Such stories are especially dark examples of what can happen when pension officials put public employees’ retirement savings into opaque private equity investments. Workers’ own money often gets used to finance the war on workers, funding schemes to drive up housing costs, inflate health care bills, and keep wages low.

In this case, the money has helped private equity executives enrich themselves through vulnerable workers risking life and limb, undermining a century’s worth of efforts in the United States to prevent children from working dangerous factory jobs.

These revelations are part of a broader trend. Child labor violations are rising sharply in the United States, including in hazardous industries, according to the Department of Labor. Republican lawmakers in several states are moving to relax child labor laws in order to help employers find more workers in a time of historically low unemployment.

“Private equity firms need to be more proactive and be more serious about labor conditions in the companies they own,” said Justin Flores, a senior campaign and research coordinator at the Private Equity Stakeholder Project, a financial industry watchdog group. “And for the pension funds that are investing in these private equity funds, we think they also need to be more involved and more active in understanding and knowing what they’re investing in and what management is doing at those companies.”

“A Corporate-Wide Failure”

Packers Sanitation Services Inc. says it was founded in 1970 based on a “vision of providing contract sanitation services using a non-unionized workforce.” The Wisconsin-based company has about 16,500 employees.

Many Packers employees work the graveyard shift cleaning meatpacking plants for major food conglomerates. It’s a harrowing job, one that’s often performed by undocumented immigrants. A 2017 Businessweek story found that Packers topped the list of the most dangerous employers in America, based on its rate of dismemberment and other severe workplace injuries.

Last month, the Labor Department announced that Packers paid $1.5 million in fines — a paltry sum for a company that reportedly made $460 million in 2021 — after an investigation found the company had employed at least 102 children on overnight sanitation crews at thirteen meat processing facilities, including those owned by industry giants JBS, Cargill, and Tyson Foods.

According to news reports, children as young as thirteen were using dangerous chemicals to clean back saws, head splitters, fat skinners, and blood-soaked floors. NBC News reported that the kids were “largely undocumented migrants.”

“The child labor violations in this case were systemic and reached across eight states, and clearly indicate a corporate-wide failure by Packers Sanitation Services at all levels,” said Labor Department official Jessica Looman.

The Labor Department has called on Congress to increase fines for child labor violations, noting that the current maximum penalty of just over $15,000 per child is “not high enough to be a deterrent for major profitable companies.”

A Blackstone spokesperson told us in a statement that Packers “has an absolute zero-tolerance policy against employing anyone under the age of 18 and is fully committed to ensuring it is enforced all local plants,” adding that the company “has continued to enhance its already extensive procedures to prevent identity theft — including recent steps to conduct multiple additional audits and trainings, and hire further third-party compliance experts.”

A Packers spokesperson said that none of the underage workers identified by the Labor Department currently work for the company and that many of them left Packers “multiple years ago.”

She continued, “As parents and citizens, we don’t want a single person under 18 working for [Packers], period — and take extensive steps to prevent individuals at the local level from circumventing our wide-ranging procedures.”

Capitalizing on “Pressure on Businesses to Outsource”

Packers has gone through four private equity acquisitions since 2007. Those transactions all appear to have involved funds backed by public pension dollars, according to our review of financial documents.

While investors in private equity funds can’t know exactly how private equity funds will deploy their money, officials at the Pennsylvania Public School Employees’ Retirement System (PSERS) knew when they invested with Blue Point Capital Partners that the Ohio-based private equity firm could target outsourcing companies.

A March 2007 report from PSERS staff recommending its board invest in Blue Point Capital Partners II said that the firm’s criteria for portfolio companies included “outsourcing and consolidation trends.”

“Blue Point will continue to seek investments in companies that are in a market position to capitalize on the general pressure on businesses to outsource non-core operations or consolidate suppliers,” officials wrote, noting the firm had invested in the “industrial outsourcing” and “specialty chemicals” sectors.

The PSERS board soon committed to invest up to $100 million “in a side fund to Blue Point Capital Partners II.”

One month later, Blue Point Capital Partners II acquired Packers for a reported $90 million. Other investors in the Blue Point fund included retirement systems in Ohio and Boston.

In 2011, Blue Point sold Packers to Harvest Partners, a private equity firm based in New York, for a reported $540 million.

The purchase was made by Harvest Partners V — a fund whose investors included state retirement systems in North Carolina and Kentucky.

In 2014, Packers was sold for $1 billion in part to Leonard Green & Partners. The Leonard Green fund involved, Green Equity Investors VI, received investments from more than two dozen state and local public pension funds, according to the financial data service Preqin.

The fund’s investors included state retirement systems in Alaska, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, and Washington.

Blackstone, based in New York, purchased Packers in 2018 at an undisclosed price. According to the Wall Street Journal, Blackstone acquired Packers using Blackstone Core Equity Partners. That Blackstone fund has received investments from state retirement systems in California, New York, and North Carolina.

A spokesperson for the California State Teachers Retirement System, which invested $500 million with the Blackstone fund, told us, “We continually monitor our holdings, engage companies, and collaborate with general partners to monitor and address the risks in the portfolio and develop and implement action plans to mitigate them.”

According to research from the Private Equity Stakeholder Project, Leonard Green and later Blackstone both loaded the Packers’ balance sheet with debt in order to pay themselves hundreds of millions of dollars in dividends.

“Our Hearts Break”

The Packers story shares many similarities with the story of Hearthside Food Solutions — the company at the heart of a recent New York Times exposé on young migrant workers laboring in dangerous factories.

That story followed several children who entered the United States as unaccompanied minors and were placed with sponsors, only to end up working full-time at a Hearthside factory in Michigan. The Labor Department is now investigating the company for potential child labor violations.

Hearthside said in a statement that it was “appalled” by the “Times article alleging that the industry is employing underage individuals in unsafe conditions, and further suggesting that some of these issues may be taking place at one of our locations. Our hearts break for the young people whose stories are documented in the article.”

Like Packers, Hearthside is built around the premise of helping companies outsource labor. The company is the largest food contract manufacturer in the United States. Workers in its factories bake and package cereal and snacks for industry giants like General Mills, Quaker Oats, and Frito-Lay.

Hearthside has a history of union busting. In job listings for plant managers and directors, the company actively seeks out candidates with “experience in a non-union manufacturing environment and union avoidance.”

Since 2009, Hearthside has gone through a series of private equity transactions — at least some of which involved funds supported by public employees’ retirement savings.

Its first private equity buyer was Wind Point Partners, based in Chicago, with the investment reportedly coming from Wind Point Partners VII. That fund’s investors have included state pension systems in Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, and Texas.

In 2018, Hearthside was acquired by Charlesbank Capital Partners, based in Boston, and the Swiss firm Partners Group for $2.4 billion.

According to Preqin, one of the funds involved was Charlesbank Equity Fund IX. State retirement systems in Florida, Michigan, Missouri, and Tennessee have invested in that Charlesbank fund.

Partners Group Direct Equity 2016 was also involved with the Hearthside acquisition. The San Bernardino County Employees’ Retirement Association in California has invested with that fund.

Experts say that public pension officials who oversee government workers’ retirement savings have an opportunity — and responsibility — to better police the behaviors of the private equity firms they are financing.

“Pension funds have a lot of leverage — they have a lot of ability to shape how private equity works,” said Flores, of the Private Equity Stakeholder Project. “If they take the high road approach, and say, ‘We don’t want to be invested in the exploitation of workers, or pricing people out of their homes, or abusing tenants’ and things like that, we think we’ll see a change in behavior of private equity.”

You can subscribe to David Sirota’s investigative journalism project, the Lever, here.

NATO’s Trojan Horse Behind Europe’s COVID-19 Response

All Global Research articles can be read in 51 languages by activating the Translate Website button below the author’s name (desktop version)

To receive Global Research’s Daily Newsletter (selected articles), click here.

Follow us on Instagram and Twitter and …

The post NATO’s Trojan Horse Behind Europe’s COVID-19 Response appeared first on Global Research.

The Political Virtue of Moral Clarity: Reagan’s “Evil Empire” Address at 40

Looking back 40 years, it is remarkable the extent to which Ronald Reagan’s voice still thunders through
his 1983 speech before the National Association of Evangelicals. Upon revisiting this address, more
commonly known as his “evil empire” speech, I was struck by the moral clarity of Reagan’s words and
the lesson that those words have for Christian leaders, pastors, and officials today.

To start, Reagan offered a clear articulation of the principle of subsidiarity. As the president put it, “If
America ever ceases to be good, America will cease to be great… I want you to know that this
administration is motivated by a political philosophy that sees the greatness of America in you, her
people, and in your families, churches, neighborhoods, communities—the institutions that foster and
nourish values like concern for others and respect for the rule of law under God.” Not only did Reagan
declare that he cherished the little platoons that sustain American civic life, but he also acknowledged
that these institutions—church, family, neighborhood—are necessary to the social order of the nation.

Indeed, Reagan even went so far as to contrast this stance with the “prevailing attitude of many who
have turned to a modern-day secularism, discarding the tried and time-tested values upon which our
very civilization is based.” As if to hammer the point home, he closed his speech by denouncing Marxist-Leninist materialism as “the second oldest faith, first proclaimed in the Garden of Eden with the words of temptation, ‘Ye shall be as gods.’” For Reagan, there existed a direct line between a purely materialist
view of the universe and the abuses of the communist regimes in Moscow, Beijing, and elsewhere.

It therefore may be tempting for many of us to read Reagan’s words with wistful eyes, nostalgic for an
era when the president might speak so forthrightly to an audience of evangelical pastors. Yet we should
not minimize the challenges of Reagan’s day. His party lost the 1982 midterms. Unemployment had
eclipsed 10%. The Soviet Union intensified its occupation of Afghanistan. And Iran had begun turning the
tide in its war against Iraq, looming over the Middle East as an anti-American would-be “hegemon.”
Reagan—as well as the Christian leaders he was addressing—faced many difficulties in his time, no less
than we do in our own. As Paul Fessler notes, Reagan’s attempt to situate the Cold War as an explicitly
spiritual problem elicited sharp criticism the moment after he gave the speech. Even so, by the end of
Reagan’s presidency the “evil empire” was well on its way to collapse, and his vice-presidential successor
won a third GOP term over his overmatched opponent, both signs of evident political success.

Reagan’s address thus holds two lessons for us today. First, there is power that flows from moral clarity.
To put it bluntly, Reagan stayed the course. He had spoken of the Soviet Union as a source of evil in the
world for decades by the time he had entered office; he had a long track record of combating Marxism,
hearkening back to his cooperation with the FBI to expose communist infiltration of the film industry in
the 1940s. Reagan’s anti-communism was public, not merely a private disposition. As early as 1952, he
exhorted the graduating class at William Woods College to embrace individual liberty and so to oppose
communism: “Within the heart of each one of us is something so God-like and precious that no
individual or group has a right to impose his or its will upon the people.”

Although the world is richly complex and there are quite a few shades of gray—as those who work in
Washington know all too well—Reagan’s speech reminds us that nuance is not in itself a virtue. The sort
of political diagnosis that sees anti-Muslim concentration camps meant to exterminate Uyghur culture in
Xinjiang and reacts with whataboutism of American racism, for example, represents a kind of moral
colorblindness that ends in impotence. Reagan understood that some actions—and indeed, some
regimes—truly are evil and deserve opposition. While such a diagnosis does not absolve us of reflecting
on the past and repentance for wrongdoing, it does mean that the imperfections of the American
experiment should not cloud our ability to arrive at a clear moral judgment when such judgment is
deserved. Reagan had many faults, but his consistent clarity about communism was not one of them.

Second, Reagan’s address also reminds us that moral clarity is not enough. Reagan proved particularly
adept at translating precepts into policies, such as when he authorized the U.S. military buildup to
engage the Soviet Union from a position of strength. But he also knew how—and when—to separate
moral judgments from political actions. For example, Reagan entered into arms negotiation talks with
Soviet leaders, met with Gorbachev at Reykjavik, and even visited Moscow in June 1988, all actions that
would seem incommensurate with the puritanical anticommunism of his 1983 address in Orlando. As he
told James Baker, “I’d rather get 80 percent of what I want than go over the cliff with my flags flying.”

Hence, strong as his condemnation of the “evil empire” was, Reagan possessed the wisdom to avoid
equating moral diagnosis with strategic choices. His ability to avoid this pitfall while still prosecuting a
foreign policy deeply informed by his understanding of the Judeo-Christian tradition provides a helpful
example for those of us today grappling with the onset of fresh partisan divisions at home and a new
Great Game with China abroad. It is vital that we do not abandon good-faith debate and respectful
dialogue toward those with whom we disagree, even as we recognize the paramount importance of our
challenges today. Evil, to paraphrase Solzhenitsyn, exists in each person’s heart no less than in the
concentration camps of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, or modern-day Communist China. We should
never allow moral outrage at the sinfulness of such regimes to overwhelm our capacity for prudential
judgment or productive dialogue. As H.W. Brands observes, Reagan knew the purpose of politics “is to
govern, not preserve ideological purity.”

Christian leaders, thinkers, and policymakers should take these lessons to heart. What we can offer is
vital to the healthy operation of our political system: a recognition that the best policies must respond
to humankind’s yearning to achieve justice while being chastened by an acknowledgment of the reality
of evil in our world. Reagan’s speech gives us a chance to reconsider this prospect for such a time as
now.

The post The Political Virtue of Moral Clarity: Reagan’s “Evil Empire” Address at 40 appeared first on Providence.