Chile’s Attempt at Democratic Socialism Combined State Action and Bottom-Up Initiative

Chile’s socialist experiment was made possible by a confrontational working-class political party and a militant labor movement. The experience shows the promise, and the dangers, of a movement based in both government initiatives and grassroots militancy.

Various groups of miners taking part in the festivities marking the first anniversary of Salvador Allende’s accession to the presidency, at the National Stadium in Santiago, Chile, November 4, 1971. (Bettmann Archive / Getty Images)

In the early 1970s, Chilean workers attempted something never done before: a democratic socialist revolution. Throughout the twentieth century, Chile was a deeply unequal society; it was also unique among the developing world because of its long-standing parliamentary tradition and a highly organized industrial working class and associated political parties.

After decades of struggle, the workers’ movement took power in a democratic election and, alongside grassroots efforts, initiated a transition toward socialism. Chile’s democratic socialist project was ultimately defeated by a capitalist-backed coup in 1973, but it has remained a powerful inspiration for democratic socialists around the world.

The past few years have seen a resurgence in democratic socialist politics in the United States. Socialists have won public office at all levels of government; young radicals are turning toward rebuilding the labor movement as rank-and-file organizers; many American workers are reviving and reforming their unions; and promising new organizing has sprouted at corporations like Amazon and Starbucks. Still, we’re a long way from socialism.

Without successful models of socialist revolution, those of us in capitalist countries with democratic institutions who want to see fundamental transformation must come up with a new road map. Chile’s attempt under Salvador Allende and the Popular Unity (UP) coalition remains one of the few models of a democratic socialist transition we have; both the UP’s victory, and its ultimate defeat, have important things to teach us.

Independent Political Action and Electoral Victory

Unlike other revolutionary socialist projects that took power throughout the twentieth century, Chile’s socialists made elections central to their plan for socialist transformation of society. And unlike the more electoral-oriented socialist parties of Europe, Chile’s socialists understood their task as breaking with capitalism. In his inaugural speech to parliament, Allende proclaimed that unlike the Bolsheviks’ “dictatorship of the proletariat” in Russia, “Chile is the first nation on earth to put into practice the second model of transition to a socialist society,” a democratic, “pluralistic” socialism.

Allende’s election was made possible by socialist political parties, firmly rooted in the industrial working class, that refused alliances with capitalists and remained committed to full democratization of the economy. The UP government’s 1970 election was the culmination of fifty years of working-class struggle. Chile’s first Marxist party, the Socialist Workers Party (POS), was founded in 1912, uniting the most radical wing of electoral politics with nascent labor struggles among nitrate miners. The POS renamed itself the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh) and joined the Comintern in 1922.

Ten years later, following the short-lived Socialist Republic of Chile led by Air Force commander Marmaduke Grove and his subsequent populist-infused socialist presidential campaign (garnering 17 percent of the vote), the Socialist Party (PS) was founded. The PS also identified as Marxist but was more heterogeneous than the Communists, distinguishing itself mainly by its refusal to toe the Soviet line on international politics or domestic strategy.

The Socialists and Communists eventually came together to present a united political opposition to the capitalists, setting the stage for Allende’s eventual rise. In the early ’50s, they unified a politically fractious labor movement under one central labor federation, the Central Única de Trabajadores de Chile (CUT), and then in 1956, alongside four smaller parties, formed an electoral coalition called the Popular Action Front (FRAP). FRAP fielded the Socialist Party’s Salvador Allende in 1958, nearly winning the presidency in a crowded race, and ran Allende again in 1964.

The Socialists and the Communists had different understandings of FRAP’s strategy. In the past, both the Socialists and Communists had participated in center-left coalition governments led by the middle-class Radical Party, but this strategy largely led to defeat. While the Communists retained the desire to broaden the FRAP coalition to include reform-oriented upper and middle classes and those they considered progressive capitalists less tied to US investment, by the mid-1950s, the Socialists had broken with their previous strategy of cross-class alliances.

Their experiences had taught the Socialists that to break with foreign ownership of Chile’s natural resources and the country’s semifeudal agricultural system, the working class would have to lead the fight.

Their experiences with such alliances had taught the Socialists that to break with foreign ownership of Chile’s natural resources and the country’s semifeudal agricultural system, the working class would have to lead the fight. The Radical-led governments the Socialists had participated in were incapable of carrying out these two tasks due, on the one hand, to their capitalist and middle-class leadership’s political and economic ties to foreign capital and Chile’s landed elite, and, on the other hand, the vacillation of the Communist Party between supporting the Nazi-Soviet pact and making alliances with national capitalists in the name of a “popular front” against fascism. Because of these moderating factors, the Radical-led governments could not carry out land reform, reneged on promises to support legalizing peasant unionization, regularly gave out ministries to the right-wing Liberal Party, and failed to promote state-led economic development, which would have required nationalizing certain sectors held by North American capitalists.

Around the same time, the Socialists began trying to use fights for reforms as a way of radicalizing workers, rather than as ends in themselves. A minimum program to address workers’ immediate needs and demands would be determined through direct conversation with different sections of the working class. By winning these minimum demands through independent organization going head to head with capitalists and the state rather than through backroom deals with the boss or parliamentary maneuvers, workers could build their fighting capacity and consciousness. If the party lost the fight, it would demonstrate how Chile’s capitalists and their politicians were fundamentally opposed to workers’ demands, and if the Left won the fight, it would build the confidence of workers in their own power.

As opposed to the earlier strategy of cross-class center-left coalitions, by uniting the working class behind its own independent banner in FRAP, the Left could more seriously present an alternative program for society in direct conflict with capitalist parties. But the Socialist insistence on building a movement to fight for the interests of the working class first and foremost, and the Communist tendency to subordinate workers’ interests for the sake of building alliances with other classes, created a tension within the left coalition.

For the 1970 presidential election, FRAP refashioned itself into Popular Unity, in some ways a concession to the Communist position. Unlike FRAP, UP included some small middle-class parties, but its mass working-class parties led the coalition, and it didn’t budge on its commitment to socialism through establishing a workers’ government.

Still, the UP adopted a “moderate” strategy for socialist transition — its first six years would be a carefully controlled government-led process, laying the groundwork and building a popular majority so that the next administration could complete the transition. In these first six years, UP planned to nationalize portions of the commanding heights of the economy, expand democratic institutions, oversee redistributive programs, and carry out land reform.

Capitalist Retaliation and Working-Class Advance

UP ultimately won the 1970 election in a three-way race with just under 37 percent of the vote in a grassroots campaign, led by local committees of workers and supporters from the various parties and movements backing Allende. The activists on the ground leading the UP campaign were involved in active struggles in their workplaces and communities, like campaigns for independent unions. While both the Socialists and Communists were electoral parties, they saw building and leading a powerful labor movement as one of their major tasks, and they were the parties most popular with Chile’s working class. Their combined votes within the CUT amounted to nearly 60 percent of CUT membership in 1972, with other UP and radical left parties making up another 10 percent. The UP’s base in shop-floor organization was crucial to its early success and its ability to beat back, for a time, right-wing attacks on the socialist experiment.

While both the Socialists and Communists were electoral parties, they saw building and leading a powerful labor movement as one of their major tasks.

The Communists were the leading force in CUT, beating out the Socialists in membership among private sector workers in core industries. The Socialists advocated a more confrontational strategy, lamenting in the late ’50s that CUT overemphasized national unity and striking deals with capitalist politicians, which the Socialists thought dampened the unions’ ability to unite the working class around a strategy of class struggle. Despite moderation at times from the Communist leadership, these groups of organized workers would play a leading role in Chile’s attempted transition to socialism.

Socialists winning an election doesn’t mean that capitalists will peacefully and voluntarily give up their wealth and power, and they didn’t in Chile. Throughout Allende’s three years in power, Chile experienced capital flight, capital strikes, lockouts, shopkeeper hoarding, and middle- and professional-class strikes and slowdowns — all while facing a right-wing terrorist campaign, along with pressure from international capital and imperialist intervention. Many of these maneuvers were a rational response of capitalists and privileged sections of the middle class to UP’s socialist program. Rising wages alongside price controls, redistributive programs, and the threat of nationalization provoked capital flight, strikes, and hoarding, as capitalists could no longer guarantee future substantial profits nor, importantly, their control over the economy.

The UP government responded to capitalist sabotage by expanding the “social property area,” the government’s term for enterprises under state control. By bringing industries under public ownership and management, the government could operate firms at a lower rate of profit than capitalists would usually accept to maintain adequate levels of investment and production.

Socialists winning an election doesn’t mean that capitalists will peacefully and voluntarily give up their wealth and power, and they didn’t in Chile.

The State and the Shop Floor

In the face of capitalist resistance, a government choosing to socialize more of the economy is not a foregone conclusion; most socialist or social democratic leaders in other countries have feared heading toward an existential conflict with private property. It was mass action from below, rooted in the workplace — along with the initiative of radical state officials — that led Chile’s government to take this more revolutionary path. (The government of François Mitterrand in France, for instance, pursued the more common route of abandoning its socialist program in the face of capitalist resistance.)

Allende’s electoral campaign and victory inspired a new wave of grassroots action in the workplace and countryside, and that organizing in turn altered the course of government policy. In one dramatic example, workers at the Yarur textile mill kicked out their decades-old company union in favor of a militant independent union shortly after Allende took power. The shop-floor campaign was led by Socialist and Communist rank-and-file leaders, produced a newsletter with its demands for an independent union on one side and Popular Unity’s program on the other, and received support from local party organizations. The newly independent union struggled for control over the shop floor, forcing the removal of tyrannical managers and establishing shop-floor committees to oversee production to prevent capitalist sabotage.

Months later, Popular Unity won an astounding 50 percent in the April municipal elections, reflecting the success of Allende’s redistributive program in cultivating popular support. This victory inspired the Yarur workers to strike, demanding and winning the nationalization of their factory against Allende’s initial wishes. This kind of bottom-up activity spread throughout Chile, resulting in many factories and enterprises being taken into the social property area that weren’t on the UP’s original list of firms to be nationalized. Similar processes occurred in the countryside as radicals organized peasant unions and mass land seizures, taking advantage of preexisting land reform laws but also going beyond them.

Allende’s electoral campaign and victory inspired a new wave of grassroots action in the workplace and countryside, and that organizing in turn altered the course of government policy.

The Ministry of the Economy collaborated with workers in organizing the social property area. Members of the ministry were in constant contact with workers on the shop floor, supporting them in developing the case and subsequent plan for nationalization. Their closer contact with the shop-floor movement, along with the economic need for socialization, made members of the ministry more inclined to support these bottom-up initiatives and to transform government policy in lockstep with developments on the ground.

As elite resistance intensified in October 1972 with a trucker owner-operator strike, lockouts, and shopkeeper hoarding, Chilean workers built new grassroots institutions they termed “Popular Power” to defend the revolution and maintain a functioning economy. Workers reopened factories they were locked out of, and coordinated producing and distributing goods as well as defending against right-wing violence and sabotage. In cities, they formed volunteer committees to requisition and distribute hoarded goods. And within the growing social property sector, workers pioneered new democratic structures of participation and management alongside the government.

But tensions were growing within the Left. The Communist Party approached Popular Power with skepticism and was at times antagonistic toward more radical developments in the countryside. In the party’s eyes, the bottom-up activity was jumping the gun on socialist revolution, would prematurely provoke capitalist counterreaction, and threatened the union structures that the party dominated. The strength of this perspective within UP was reinforced by the fact that the legislature and the judiciary remained under the control of capitalist forces who used their legal powers to obstruct Allende’s agenda and force a constitutional crisis. Meanwhile the left-wing of the Socialist Party and other smaller parties within and outside of UP embraced Popular Power and advocated that Allende more forcefully embrace the structures as central organs for carrying out the workers’ revolution and fighting capitalist reaction.

The Right remained committed to ending Allende’s government at all costs, eventually staging a coup in September 1973 that killed the three-year experiment at a democratic transition to socialism.

Despite left-wing pleas, Allende adopted a strategy similar to that advocated by the Communists, attempting reconciliation with capitalists to end the employer offensive of 1972. He agreed to integrate the military into his cabinet, and effectively demobilized government support for Popular Power, notwithstanding its continued growth after the October strikes. Despite further conciliatory efforts by UP, the Right remained committed to ending Allende’s government at all costs, eventually staging a coup in September 1973 that killed the three-year experiment at a democratic transition to socialism.

The Road to Power

A democratic socialist transition is far from the agenda in the United States. And, of course, the two countries’ political and social contexts are vastly different — not to mention that more than half a century has passed since Allende first took office. Nonetheless, Chile’s experience carries important lessons and raises vital questions for American leftists.

A democratic socialist transformation of society will likely have to pass through the conquest of power by the working class through its party or parties in a democratic election. But a workers’ party of the sort cannot solely be a vehicle for winning elections or passing legislation.

Chile’s Socialist and Communist parties were real, mass working-class movements, embedded in the workplace and shop-floor struggles and oriented toward the conquest of political power by the working class and the reorganization of the economy along the lines of social and democratic ownership and control. They operated independently of and in direct conflict with capitalists, and to the extent that they incorporated middle-class parties into their coalition, it was on the basis of the middle-class groups accepting a working-class program for socialism. This is in contrast to left-wing parties that moderate their demands to attract the middle class, as many social democratic parties have done in the past fifty years.

Abandoning their previous strategies of class collaboration and instead orienting toward building an independent working-class electoral formation in FRAP allowed the Left to consolidate a unified working-class movement behind a socialist program. In doing so, the Left successfully polarized society around the politics of class. As conservative and reform governments were unable to address Chile’s rampant inequality, inflation, unsustainable economic development, and imperialist domination, this independent force was able to put itself — and its program — forward as a compelling alternative.

Actions inside and outside the state reinforced one another, with victories in the electoral sphere both building upon and further inspiring grassroots action. Grassroots activity in turn set into motion revolutionary processes that state managers couldn’t control, although some encouraged and collaborated with them. The electoral and grassroots wings also came into conflict as a real contradiction emerged: the base’s growing expectations propelled the movement into a struggle that the leadership feared it couldn’t win.

Orienting toward building an independent working-class electoral formation in FRAP allowed the Left to consolidate a unified working-class movement behind a socialist program.

Attempting to moderate the base rather than encouraging bottom-up initiative may have stunted the movement from developing the capacity necessary to defeat or stave off a coup. Allende was right to want to avoid civil war, but it remains an open question of how to avoid civil war while retaining a commitment to deepening and expanding the revolution being carried out by the grassroots movement. Marxist theorist Ralph Miliband, in his classic essay “The Coup in Chile,” argued that only through wholeheartedly preparing for such a war, giving real institutional teeth and strategic leadership to organs of popular power, can socialists prevent one.

These questions may rear their head again if we’re ever so lucky to get as far as socialists in Chile did. But we’re still missing the central ingredients necessary to get there. In the United States today, there is no party or serious pre-party group representing an independent working-class political program and bottom-up struggle. Nor do we have a large, militant labor movement in which to root such a party. If we’re looking for an on-ramp onto the long democratic road to socialism, building those movements and institutions is a good place to start.

Emily Is Not the Biopic Emily Brontë Deserves

Emily Brontë is one of the most uniquely brilliant women writers who ever lived, the perfect subject for a feminist biopic. She deserves better than the shallow pop feminism of the new movie Emily.

Still from Emily. (Obscured Pictures)

If you’re aware of the film Emily, the new biopic of writer Emily Brontë, author of Wuthering Heights, it’s probably because it’s doing surprisingly solid business for a modestly budgeted period piece and is being widely lauded by critics and delighted audience members. Manohla Dargis of the New York Times praises the film by saying approvingly that it “takes a frisky approach to its source material.”

Let’s just pause here to consider this statement. The film represents a “frisky approach” to the life of Emily Brontë. “Frisky.” FRISKY. If there’s one word that should never be applied to the searing, tragic, yet magnificent life of Emily Brontë — or, hell, any Brontë — it’s “frisky.”

But Dargis isn’t wrong in this descriptive term, because if you don’t know much of anything about Emily Brontë and you see this new film, you’ll get the impression she was an irreligious, sexy minx with fetchingly tousled hair who screwed her father’s cute curate (Oliver Jackson-Cohen) in the barn after he’d counseled her to learn to love nature in order to endure her drab life in her father’s parsonage on the moors. You’ll also get the impression that Emily (Emma Mackey of Sex Education) was enabled to write the thunderous Gothic novel Wuthering Heights because of her hot, forbidden love life. That, plus her experiences running around the moors high on opiates with her wild brother Brandon (Fionn Whitehead of Dunkirk).

And you’ll discover that Emily’s father, the Reverend Patrick Brontë (Adrian Dunbar), was a mean, cold bastard, making all the sisters go to church and overstrain themselves acquiring scholarly accomplishments so they could get themselves hired out as teachers and governesses. For no reason at all!

You’ll also find out that Emily’s sensational book, which was followed immediately by her death at age thirty, inspired her prissy sister Charlotte (Alexandra Dowling) to get down off her high horse and write Jane Eyre. As for Anne Brontë (Amelia Gething), she never did anything interesting.

That’s pretty much the level actor Frances O’Connor is working on in making her film debut as writer-director of this version of Emily Brontë’s life story, which amounts to cinematic libel. Critics write breathlessly about O’Connor’s important experiences as an actor in period literary adaptations giving her the chops to tackle this subject so fearlessly. Specifically, O’Connor starred in a loose and extremely frisky adaptation of Mansfield Park in 1999, playing the lead role of Fanny Price as a healthy, outspoken extrovert — the opposite qualities of the character of Fanny Price as written by Jane Austen.

If you’ve seen the film, you’ll remember that the final scene involves Fanny getting a tattoo of her love Edmund’s name on her ass. So you can see where O’Connor got her ideas about adapting nineteenth-century women-centered literature.

One of the few disapproving reviews of Emily, by Mick LaSalle of the San Francisco Chronicle, states:

O’Connor, an actress . . . making her directorial debut, calls upon [Emma] Mackey to evoke and embody Emily Brontë while furnishing her with a life and personality entirely different from that of the famous author. This is an impossible task. Forget about writing “Wuthering Heights”; I don’t believe this Emily could read it.

It’s not that there are no good aspects to the film. The cinematography by Nanu Segal is beautiful and memorable at points. For example, the scene in which curate William Weightman is striding across the moors to keep a tryst with Emily waiting in the barn, and the image of him is framed by a barn window. The shots cut back and forth between the palpitating Emily and the approaching curate, with each shot of him bringing William farther forward than the time-frame would seem to allow, creating a surging shock effect that reflects her own emotions.

And the most memorable scene, shot in moody shadows, involves a guessing game featuring an eerie white mask and the challenge of the wearer evoking a chosen personality the others have to guess at. Emily puts it on and seems to summon the spirit of the Brontë children’s long-dead mother in a way that terrifies and overwhelms them.

But such effects can’t make up for a basically silly approach to the material. There’s a framing question in Emily, posed by the pinched prig sister Charlotte while Emily Brontë lies on her deathbed: “How did you write Wuthering Heights?”

The long answer is in flashback. The other disapproving review of the film points out,

One bad idea presides over Emily, sapping its better moments of their originality. That idea is one that often comes up in films about writers: the notion that no one could possibly write well about something they hadn’t experienced directly. The 2007 movie Becoming Jane assured its viewers that Jane Austen was only able to produce so many great novels about young women finding true love because she had attained and (unlike her heroines) lost it herself. . . . [But] romantic love is arguably the predominate theme of Western literature and culture, especially the parts of it with which the Brontës were familiar. It’s not as if they (or anyone else) needed first-hand experience to know anything about extravagant passion, given how much, and how widely, they read.

Nevertheless, this is the stupid question that has long preoccupied literary critics and readers ever since the book was first published under the male pseudonym Ellis Bell. The qualities of the book that shocked people — its ferocity, rawness of emotion, perceived coarseness and violence, and heretical views — were the very ones that made many people sure it was “a man’s book,” impossible for a fragile, gentle, unworldly woman to have written. You’ll still occasionally run across some moron claiming that Wuthering Heights must’ve been written by Branwell Brontë because it’s simply too powerful a book to have been written by a woman. This view was satirized in the 1932 novel Cold Comfort Farm, by Stella Gibbons, in which the heroine is pestered by a tiresome Bohemian pedant who’s writing a book called Pard-Spirit: A Study of Branwell Brontë, claiming that “it’s obvious that it’s his book and not Emily’s. No woman could’ve written that. It’s male stuff.”

Emily achieves its own kind of idiocy that’s all the more distressing for the way it is getting credit for presenting Emily Brontë afresh.

It’s to the Bohemian’s claim that “his sisters hated him because of his genius” and conspired to take the credit from Branwell. While he slaved away fifteen hours a day writing all their novels, they slandered him as a drunken wreck in order to hide their own dipsomania from the public.

The film Emily isn’t quite that extravagant in its reimagining of what was going on in the lives of the Brontë family when it comes to explaining their authorship. Yet it achieves its own kind of idiocy that’s all the more distressing for the way the film is getting credit for presenting Emily Brontë afresh, as a feminist figure, as if she hadn’t been considered a feminist figure for generations. But this is the new, improved pop feminism, now with extra spunk! And we know what that means. Some generically victimized woman character will “find her voice,” experience a sexual awakening, lean in, persist, and show her male oppressors they were wrong to underestimate her.

The worst of it is, Emily Brontë is one of the most uniquely brilliant women who ever lived, the perfect subject for a feminist biopic.

The Brontë sisters finding a way to express themselves so fully and brilliantly and shockingly, despite the cruel gender and class constrictions of their lives, makes them merit serious biographies by great feminist filmmakers. They created relatively few literary works — their obsessive, intricately plotted, world-building juvenilia, written from childhood on (with their brother Branwell); a jointly published book of poetry written under their male pseudonyms of Ellis, Currer, and Acton Bell; and a small armload of novels, written in a white heat of productivity in their short lives. Emily’s Wuthering Heights and Anne’s Agnes Gray were accepted for publication earlier, while Charlotte’s initial effort, The Professor, was turned down. But her second novel, Jane Eyre, was accepted and published so rapidly, it was made public before any of the others — and created a sensation.

Once her identity was discovered, the book made Charlotte Brontë so renowned that her fame cast a fainter but still lurid glow on her sisters’ works as well. And if many found Jane Eyre rather shocking, Wuthering Heights was a scandal.

Ultimately, all of the sisters wrote great novels — Charlotte’s Jane Eyre and her brilliantly modernist Villette, and Anne’s unjustly neglected The Tenant of Wildfell Hall, can stand alongside Emily’s fiercely written Wuthering Heights on any shelf. But when it comes to amazing lives, though all were interesting women, Emily towers above the others. She was so strong that, far from being victimized by the restrictions placed on women’s lives in early nineteenth-century England, she forged a solitary path for herself through a secret door of her own making to find freedom within apparently narrow domestic entrapment. Her own siblings found her mysterious and a little scary.

Still from Emily. (Obscured Pictures)

The key story of Emily’s life is the one about her having been attacked by a possibly rabid dog. Her response was to come home, heat a knife blade to a searing temperature, and stoically cauterize her own wound.

No one had to counsel Emily to love nature — it was her leading characteristic. People who knew her reported that she would come home from long walks on the moors with her face almost transfigured by ecstasy, as of one who’d been in direct contact with the sublime. Her primary relationships beyond her immediate family — she was especially close to her sister Anne — were with animals. Her dog Keeper was described as practically her twin soul, and she frequently returned home with injured animals, or lost baby animals, that she’d raise and rehabilitate herself.

Given this, the complete lack of animals in the heroine’s life in Emily is an astounding omission. In fact, judging from the film, almost all animal life has been eradicated from 1840s Yorkshire.

Emily Brontë would never have said anything so ridiculous as Emily’s line in the film about being trapped in her narrow, dreary life on the moors. The greatest thing that ever happened to her was being relieved of the burden of having to go out into the world to earn a living, as the other Brontë children had to do. And far from having to be rebuked by her sister Charlotte for her idle ways, as happens in the film (“Don’t be a burden, Emily”), she took her responsibilities so seriously, she wouldn’t give up fulfilling her household duties while she was desperately ill from tuberculosis, even when her family begged her to lie down. She only laid down to die.

It was an urgent matter for Patrick, shared by the Brontë children, that they all, including the girls, be trained for working lives, because his house and income would be lost upon his death. This became an even more pressing matter when Branwell failed to establish himself in any of the careers he attempted, including artist, writer, tutor, and stationmaster — he soon fell into dissolute habits, depression, illness, and early death. The sisters had no other financial resources and, faced with the prospect of having no father or brother to support them, the great fear was that they’d all be left destitute. It was one of the tragic ironies of the Brontë family that Patrick outlived all his children by many years.

Charlotte and Anne endured for a while the grinding misery of lives as governesses and low-level teachers, positions that often earned one very little respect from affluent adults or their children. These harsh experiences informed their novels. Meanwhile, though Emily was tasked with running the household, she was also enabled to spend hours on most days of her life roaming her beloved moors and writing extraordinary literary works. She’s considered the only great poet in the Brontë family.

Emily couldn’t endure “society.” Though an excellent scholar, she failed in her few agonizing attempts to get the formal education required to train for a job as teacher or governess, because she found life among strangers insupportable. Its virtually disabling effects upon her are dramatized in the film. She couldn’t withstand the regimentation and restrictions and suffocating self-consciousness of public life. “Freedom was the breath of life to her,” Charlotte wrote of her, and she found that freedom on the moors and in her own writing.

Yet critics are buying wholesale the film’s idea that Emily was a woman whose whole life was pathetically crabbed and unfulfilled:

Despite writing one of the most rugged and enduring novels in all English literature before her 30th — and final — birthday, Emily Brontë spent the whole of her life in a suffocating environment that saw her brilliant imagination dampened at every turn.

If only my imagination could be one-tenth as undampened as Emily Brontë’s! Here’s a passage from Wuthering Heights conveying the intensity of vision and feeling she could summon. In it, her anti-heroine Cathy recounts her blasphemous dream of dying, going to heaven, and then rejecting the realm of God in favor of the moors:

Heaven did not seem to be my home, and I broke my heart with weeping to come back to earth, and the angels grew so angry that they flung me out onto the middle of the heath on the top of Wuthering Heights; where I woke to sob for joy.

Writing that is kind of a big deal for the daughter of an Irish-born Anglican priest, by the way.

Not that any of this will matter to the majority of people who want to go see this film, I have to acknowledge. It’s enraging, but as far as I can tell, the simple version of complex, compelling subject matter is ever more preferred. Nobody much cares that Emily Brontë was nothing like this doofus portrayed in Emily, or that a wiser, more visceral, less falsely pretty film based on the actual life of the woman would be a hundred times more thrilling. The swoony romance, the dopey explanation for literary achievement, the fake feminism — people like that stuff. In this case, I write for the tiny minority of possible viewers who have some sort of investment in the Brontë sisters and their writing and can still be warned off.

Annie Ernaux Met Workers Striking to Defend Their Pensions

For the last ten days, France has been shaken by strikes against Emmanuel Macron’s bid to raise the retirement age. Nobel Prize–winning author Annie Ernaux met strikers at a Paris rail station to discuss how working life has been devalued.

French writer Annie Ernaux, Nobel Prize in Literature laureate,in December 2022 (left); CGT union procession in Paris, March 7, 2023 (right). (Tim Aro / TT News Agency / AFP via Getty Images)(Samuel Boivin / NurPhoto via Getty Images)

In February, Le Monde diplomatique published a text by the writer Annie Ernaux entitled “Walking Tall Again.” In it, the 2022 Nobel Prize winner for literature recalls her memories of the 1995 social movement against then prime minister Alain Juppé’s plan to reform pensions. She also refers to the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who took up the cause of the strikers: “Bourdieu’s political commitment to the strike made me see it as my duty as a writer not to remain a passive onlooker in public life. To see this internationally recognized sociologist getting involved in social conflicts, and to hear him, was an immense joy, a liberation.”

When Damien Iozzia, a supervisor and secretary of the UFCM-CGT union (which represents railway staff in management and supervisory positions) at Paris’s Montparnasse station, read her text, he saw it as “an invitation to ask Annie Ernaux to come here.” He contacted publisher Gallimard to suggest that the author come and talk not only to workers who had mobilized at the SNCF national rail company but also to an employee from the energy sector.

On March 14, ahead of the eighth day of protests against Emmanuel Macron’s reform raising the legal retirement age from sixty-two to sixty-four, the writer showed up at a small union hall in the Vaugirard station, a stone’s throw from Montparnasse. The room rattles every now and then as trains pass by. She was accompanied by friends — the sociologists Jean-Marc Salmon and Didier Eribon, and publisher and writer Jean-Marie Laclavetine.

Ernaux had accepted the invite without hesitation: “The commitments I’ve had all my life, I’m pursuing them,” she told us a few minutes before the meeting, underlining the glaring absence of intellectuals and artists committed to the workers mobilized in this movement. Around the table, everyone has been on strike since March 7.

This article, from French daily Libération, recounts an exchange that lasted nearly two hours. It was a discussion not just of pensions but also of work (while also noting that the two subjects are inextricably linked), of the meaning it has lost and of the destruction of public services.

Annie Ernaux

I’m here because I think the Macron reform is the worst injustice that can be done to people, taking years off their lives. I’ll take a personal example. I retired from the national education system at sixty. At sixty-two they discovered I had breast cancer. So, I could have died at exactly sixty-two. To think that people will die even before they retire is real violence. We don’t all have the same working conditions, and to add on an extra two years is an attack on life. Are we here on Earth simply to feed — I’m going to use the dirty word — capital? I’m here to listen, because there is usually a great silence about the world and the reality of work.

Stéphane Cortez

I’ve been working shifts for over thirty years. It’s very nice to see you and to feel that there are people who are interested in the world of work. When Damien [Iozzia] told me about it, I thought of one thing: I don’t know at what point in the company I was designated as an “N minus 1” (direct inferior). I didn’t even realize it. I’m someone’s “N minus 1.” Is that what being employed means now?

Mathieu Lambourdière

I’ve been with the SNCF for nine years. I saw a shift in 2016. Since then, I’ve been through three reorganizations, each time with job cuts. Even management has changed. Before, we had managers who came from the bottom up, who had passed competitive exams. Today, they have abolished most of those opportunities. People with high responsibility often come from schools or, when they are picked internally, are chosen for their ability to apply the company’s policy exactly. Once the labor inspector agreed with the unions that a memo from management was illegal. The managers came to us and said, “You have to apply it.” At the SNCF, we are lucky to have worker activism that protects us a little, but we are still suffering this change.

Retired people who have the time to do what they want often start writing texts and poems. Today, we are lucky enough to have AI that writes poems for us, whereas we have to work longer.

Damien Iozzia

The real switch is ideological and goes back about fifteen years. There was a turning point in the way the SNCF, or rather the SNCFs, were managed. Because there are now five SNCF companies, five limited companies. Here, around the table, we are almost all railworkers, but we don’t all have the same bosses. There are four different bosses. Even though we all work in the same place, all with the same goal: to make the trains run. On Montparnasse, there are twelve different management teams. So, when you want to question management, you have to know which one to question!

Vincent Benaben

I think it was [French communist politician] Ambroise Croizat who said, “We’re defending the right to life.” When you reach retirement, it’s the first moment when you are completely liberated. Besides, people who have the time to do what they want often start writing texts and poems. Today, we are lucky enough to have AI that writes poetry, whereas we have to work longer. When things could be the other way around.

Mathieu Lambourdière

On technology: a comrade said something really interesting yesterday. His father-in-law, a railway worker, told him that when the first TGV (high-speed trains) arrived, this was presented to him as an advance, which would allow him to make his journeys between Paris and Rennes in half the time. He said: “So I’ll work twice as much and get paid the same!” His boss said, “Well, no.” But it would only be logical for our societies to evolve toward that. One of the government’s arguments on raising the pension age is that we are all living longer than before. But under what principle should we give these extra years to the boss?

Catherine Fléchard

As a trade unionist, life is not easy, especially over the last twenty years. Before, the struggle was on much healthier terms. The dismantling of public services and all these new ways of organizing work mean that at a certain point we all need to stand together. In the energy sector, we are asking ourselves the question of opening up to meetings with employees from the competition, for example. We have to open our minds to be ready to do that.

We can start winning again. There, we won quite a lot on wages. But we’ve been taking a beating for quite some time now. I’m still very optimistic, because we’re also seeing new generations who don’t have a political background and who are helping us.

When the first high-speed trains arrived, this was presented to a worker as an advance, which would allow him to make his journeys between Paris and Rennes in half the time. He said: ‘So I’ll work twice as much and get paid the same!’

Damien Iozzia

When I arrived in 2015, there were still seventy ticket counters. Everything’s disappeared, and been replaced by a place where you have two or three colleagues standing, with tablets, shuttling around people who are completely lost. It’s called “accompanied self-service.” These sales agents, who have a certain know-how and were presented as an essential part of the process, feel they’ve been downgraded. They feel completely useless. Moreover, they’ve not been all that mobilized during the strike. Because they tell us: “It’s pointless for us, if we go on strike, nobody sees it.” The company has taken away their possibility of contributing their expertise. It’s devastating. It destroys their work. I also have in mind all those colleagues who spend their day behind beeping portals and whose only added value is to make sure there are no problems. What’s the point of getting up in the morning another two years more, just to do that?

Annie Ernaux

It’s interesting because from my point of view as a user, I am completely unable to buy a ticket on the internet. The SNCF website is deadly. Before, there were employees who gave us information. You could buy your annual holidays ticket, too. . . . In Cergy, this facility has disappeared; it’s impossible to buy a ticket at the ticket office to go from Paris to Marseille. We haven’t thought about the disarray that this causes people. It’s important to see what has become of work.”

As a pensioner, I’m in no position to say this, but I think that only the struggle pays.

Catherine Fléchard

That’s it. The manipulation of the employee starts from their work becoming a nonsense. That’s how we lost the public services. What Damien said about the SNCF was also true of the energy sector. These people are totally resigned. They are constantly confronted with the discontent of the user. These are people who are no longer seen in battles.

Sophie Lecointre

I arrived in Montparnasse at the escale [a point where station agents inform and direct passengers]; I worked at the passenger office — the after-sales service. We dealt with passengers’ various hitches. The plan of the new management was to close this office. From then on, everything in the station fell apart. The ticket offices started to disappear. Now, to find an agent, you have to go through a shopping mall.

Today, I’m at the control, so at the end of the customer’s journey. We are subjected to everything, all their anger, their rage, and I hear them, I understand them because I have lived through it, all these closures, all these changes. We didn’t want it, but our management said: “Yes, but it doesn’t work, there’s too much waiting, it’s easier to go and buy on the internet.” But no, actually. Nobody asked for this: it was imposed on us. It’s like all public services: in order to break them, they first say they are unworkable. But a public service must remain public; we’re not here to make money. And besides, where is our money? Where did it go? And now we are being asked to do two more years? I don’t agree.

One of the government’s arguments on raising the pension age is that we are all living longer than before. But under what principle should we give these extra years to the boss?

Annie Ernaux

Listening to you, we understand that it is impossible to separate the problem of retirement at sixty-four from working conditions. The issue here is work, and we have to ask the question at the same time as we continue the strike. As a pensioner, I’m in no position to say this, but I think that only the struggle pays.

This dialogue we’ve had was important. I learned a lot about the SNCF, or what used to be called the SNCF, and what made up these big public firms like National Education, French Electricity (EDF), the Post Office. . . . In Cergy, the main post office has closed. Now, the post office is in the 3 Fontaines mall. And it follows the business hours. This is a typical example.

 

Damien Iozzia

Your presence is more than symbolic. For us, what is important is to be able to anchor ourselves in reality. And who else but you could have said that? We are lucky today that people whose voices are heard come to see us. The hardest thing in our daily lives is to let people know what we are living through.

The Paris Commune Was a Unique Experiment in Running a City for Its People

On this day in 1871, the Paris Commune began its brief history before a conservative government drowned it in blood. While it lasted, the Commune sketched out a new way to run a major city based on democracy and the public good, not private profiteering.

National guardsmen pose in front of an artillery barricade in the Place Vendome, during the civil war between the Third Republic and the Paris Commune, following the Franco-Prussian War. (Hulton Archive / Getty Images)

The Paris Commune ended in mass violence with the slaughter of thousands of Communards on the barricades and the burning of much of the city. This final struggle forged the Commune as an iconic event in the history of socialism and the collective memory of popular struggle.

Yet it is now only vaguely remembered that before the Commune’s demise, the people of Paris had set about reconstructing authority and governance in the city along unprecedentedly revolutionary lines, grounded in the popular euphoria surrounding the central government’s retreat from Paris on March 18, 1871.

Despite near-constant threats to the Commune’s existence from the rival government occupying Versailles, the audacious common folk of Paris imagined and began to constitute a new city and a new politics of their own design. Time, as it turned out, was short.

Birth of the Commune

The surrender of Napoleon III to the Prussian army on the outskirts of Paris in early September 1870 had set the stage. A provisional government faced little choice but to mobilize the population in defense of Paris and other major cities.

The Paris Commune ended in mass violence with the slaughter of thousands of Communards on the barricades and the burning of much of the city.

Into this political space a broadly republican popular movement leapt forward to provide organization for resistance and to claim the right to self-governance. This meant enhancing the National Guard, organized in neighborhood-based units and only minimally under a central leadership already badly discredited by the military debacle of the previous weeks.

Encircled by the Prussian army, Parisians endured months of privation unequally distributed along class lines. At the same time, cut off from outside political and military support, Parisians invested local government, reinforced by the National Guard, with greater authority, through the “localization of activity.”

That strategy included the formation of cooperatives, local political clubs, and secularized public schools. November municipal elections brought a significant augmentation of the Left’s influence, though well short of a dominating presence except in a handful of arrondissements.

The advent of the Commune came only in the aftermath of a succession of events that profoundly altered the political stakes for a besieged Paris. First came the signing of an armistice on January 28, 1871, between the provisional national government ensconced outside the city at Versailles and the Prussians.

The terms of the armistice proved humiliating and included the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, a substantial indemnity payment, and a brief symbolic march of Prussian troops through the heart of Paris. A newly emboldened, broadly republican movement in which the Left’s influence had grown dramatically seized the role of defending the “fatherland” by asserting Paris’s autonomy.

The months of resistance and hunger set the stage not only for national resistance but for a civil war. On the one hand stood the Communards, and on the other, a discredited national government barricaded with its middle-class supporters at Versailles and in the rural areas adjacent to Paris.

The government’s failure to recapture cannons that were under the control of the Central Committee of the Parisian National Guard crystalized an already polarized politics. The central government added fuel to the fire by rescinding the Commune’s moratoriums on the sale of goods in government pawnshops and reinstituting the payment of rents and other bills that had accrued during the siege.

The First Order of Business

For an all-too-brief period, before being overtaken by brutal and ultimately cataclysmic suppression at the hands of central government troops under the command of Adolphe Thiers, the Paris Commune provided a unique setting for new forms of local governance to crystalize and challenge the traditions of urban bourgeois hegemony.

The Paris Commune provided a unique setting for new forms of local governance to crystalize and challenge the traditions of urban bourgeois hegemony.

Following the final withdrawal of the central government in March, the Commune issued a succession of declarations outlining in broad principles what was already being carried out to varying degrees in the streets and arrondissements. The first order of business was to establish viable democratic polities and governing procedures in the spirit of the Proudhonist vision of local associationism, which had deep roots among Parisian working people.

Municipal elections on March 26 produced a new governing council for the self-declared Commune of Paris. While attacking bureaucratic control by setting maximum salaries of officials and breaking lines of authority from the central government, the Commune also limited the claims of landlords and creditors, affirmed “municipal liberties,” and circumscribed religious authority.

The communal vision came somewhat more sharply into focus with the famous April 19 Declaration, even as the prospects for all-out civil war deepened. A month of political contention and two municipal elections had set the stage for a programmatic statement of far-reaching scope. The former mayors and deputies had shown their class colors and largely retreated to the protective embrace of Adolphe Thiers’s Versailles government-in-waiting.

The Declaration of April 19 was vague at key points, and its aspirations were ultimately overwhelmed by the imperative to defend militarily the fragile social and political space within which the Commune defined itself. Nonetheless, it delineated the outlines of an alternative social order. This was to be a city within a federation of similarly constituted cities.

Such a locally constituted republic would forge an alternative unity of French citizens. Through the free exercise of liberties within self-governing municipalities, cities would claim democratic control of their own budgets and administration. They would expand municipal services, create a whole new set of institutions ranging from public schools to cooperative workshops, and while not directly attacking property, would “universalize power and property,” as circumstances might dictate.

Their vision was prescriptive, open-ended, and optimistic about the promise of municipal self-government. Future generations of municipal socialists would draw inspiration from that promise and the project of “social regeneration.” More importantly, the experience of governing in those early days suggested more powerfully than prescriptive declarations the tangible meaning of the municipal social republic envisioned.

Haussmann’s Legacy

Though piecemeal and incomplete, the Commune took some concrete steps to implement this vision both before and after the declaration. Some initiatives had been rooted in communal resistance to monarchist authority over the years immediately preceding the Commune.

Ironically, the bourgeois transformation of Paris created conditions that promoted a diverse new citywide working class.

The massive reconstruction of Paris at the hands of Baron Georges-Eugène Haussmann during the prior two decades took on legendary status, thanks in part to his own self-promotion. The construction of wide boulevards less susceptible to barricading and the destruction of many old, central working-class neighborhoods created a new urban landscape into which the rapidly expanding population of Paris flowed with unpredictable consequences.

That expanded population included large numbers of construction workers and stonemasons, some of whom had long been part of regular seasonal migrations to Paris from other parts of the country, like the Creuse. Their slow displacement from the central boarding houses and hiring fairs of the Place de Grève accompanied more permanent settlement in the new working-class neighborhoods on the periphery.

Whether by reputation for chronic contention with authorities or because of the new solidarities in their adopted neighborhoods, the stonemasons and other building workers were overrepresented among the arrested and deported Communards following the final street battles in late May.

Systematic studies by Jacques Rougerie, Manuel Castells, and others confirm that this “urban revolution” was not driven by a new proletariat but rather, as Rougerie termed it, “an intermediate working class” which included building workers, traditional artisans, and a significant component of shopkeepers, clerks, and professionals. As Castells put it:

They were the people of a great city in the process of mutation, and the citizens of a Republic in quest of its institutions.

David Harvey has shown that the “Haussmannization” of Paris in the years after 1848 produced urban space more starkly organized on class lines that set the stage for the upheaval of 1871.

Ironically, the bourgeois transformation of Paris created conditions that promoted a diverse new citywide working class infused with the scent of a broader internationalism that potentially challenged the bourgeoisie’s “superior command of space.” And that challenge, as Roger Gould has argued, grew precisely out of the neighborhood solidarities of these new “urban villages” that encompassed a new class.

Harvey and others have enumerated workers’ urban initiatives in the Commune that reflected their own claims over the control of Parisian space. The organization of municipal workshops for women; the encouragement given to producer and consumer cooperatives; the suspension of the night work in the bakeries; and the moratorium on rent payments, debt collections, and the sale of items from the municipal pawnshop at Mont-de-Piété reflected the sore points that had bothered working-class Paris for years.

In some cases, during the days immediately following March 18, as Prosper-Olivier Lissagaray recounted, “former subordinate employés” assumed new responsibilities, as happened for instance in the postal service. They had to improvise with limited resources in the face of sabotage by departing higher officials.

The Commune’s brutal denouement has, in some respects, obscured the innovative, localist social and political reforms that it briefly instituted and that it passed on to social democratic reformers who, in the 1890s and beyond, sought to craft a municipal socialism shorn of the revolutionary aspirations and the risks that were all-too-brutally embodied in the crushing of the Commune.

Interpreting the Commune

Memory of the Commune lingered for decades, not only in the nightmares of the bourgeoisie and their reformist allies but among social democrats who, like their Communard forbearers, saw in the city the opportunity to address the immediate grievances workers continued to face and to dream of an alternative social and political order they might constitute in cities.

Contestation over the memory and meaning of the Commune unfolded most vigorously among socialists themselves.

The paradox of brutal defeat in defense of what increasingly came to seem the utopian promise of municipal revolution was not lost on subsequent commentators. Contestation over the memory and meaning of the Commune unfolded most vigorously among socialists themselves.

Karl Marx’s The Civil War in France in its earliest editions provided almost instant history of the events in Paris as they unfolded. Drawing on what limited sources he could find — newspaper accounts, smuggled letters, and occasional firsthand reports — Marx cobbled together a report to the General Council of the First International delivered in late May 1871 just days after the final massacre of Communards. Marx’s agenda was multilayered, and each layer subsequently fed into the memory and constructed meaning of the Commune.

First, he sought to assert the proletarian character of the revolt, though he would subsequently revise that assessment. Second, and perhaps most basically, he defended the nobility of the Communards’ revolt and sacrifice, seeing it as a watershed event in the promulgation of socialism, though its immediate consequences were clearly more ambiguous.

Third, he stressed the state-dismantling and state-building features of the Commune in ways that implicitly challenged the anarchists’ celebration of what they asserted was its nation-state–destroying character. Subsequently, he would belittle the moderation and “feel-good” measures undertaken by the Commune in the days and weeks following its initial creation.

A further subtext in the responses of Marx, Engels, Karl Kautsky, Vladimir Lenin, and other Marxists was the continuing ideological war with Proudhonist associational influences, which, in their view, had been all-too-manifest in the Commune. Its emphases on localism, decentralized democracy, and producerist cooperative economy were seen as harbingers of a different socialist order, one that subsequently would continue to animate the practical reform programs of municipal socialists.

Communal Spirits

The horrific scenes of the Commune’s suppression between May 21 and 28 provided ample material for the elevation of those events to legend. Estimates of those slaughtered in battle or by execution ranged from seventeen thousand to forty thousand. Nearly fifty thousand were arrested, many sent into exile as far away as the French colony of New Caledonia in the South Seas.

The horrific scenes of the Commune’s suppression between May 21 and 28 provided ample material for the elevation of those events to legend.

Subsequent observers would continue over the next decade and more to attempt to make sense of the stirring events in Paris or, in the case of anti-Communard bourgeois commentators, to contest or efface its memory. In France, socialist politics became a tangled web in which the Commune served as a touchstone for both “possibilist” and “impossibilist” factions.

Paul Brousse, who served a “political apprenticeship” as an anarchist, came to believe in the revolutionary promise cities held, despite the failure of the Paris Commune. He advocated “le Socialisme Pratique” wherein “meaningful socialist measures could be achieved on the local level prior to revolution at the centre.”

The key was a shift in tactical thinking away from violence toward politics. Others drew parallel conclusions, albeit in different contexts. Mary Putnam, an American living in Paris as the events of May 1871 unfolded, enjoyed close ties to a family sympathetic to the Commune and believed the events she witnessed signified a legitimate defense of “municipal rights.”

The Commune continued to be honored as a moment of socialist martyrdom, and anniversaries and other symbolic occasions provided opportunities to affirm the sacrifices of the Communards on behalf of socialism. International commemoration of the Commune and particularly the date of March 18 became, in the words of Georges Haupt, “an idea, a profession of faith, and a confirmation of a historical future, of the inevitable victory of the proletarian revolution.”

But even as commemoration of the Commune became a fixture of socialist rhetoric and iconography, so did the debates over its meaning intensify. The relevance of the Commune to the ongoing project of socialist transformation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reflected the deep polarization within the movement itself.

American socialist Phillips Russell, visiting Paris in May 1914, on what turned out to be the eve of the Great War, joined a procession of “thirty, perhaps forty thousand . . . working men and women, and children too,” in commemoration of the Commune. The huge crowd grew suddenly silent as it approached a wall in the Père Lachaise cemetery.

This was the spot where, as Russell recalled, “the workingmen and women, who took charge of Paris forty-three years ago and ran it peacefully and well,” had been mowed down by the army of Thiers, “their bodies piling in heaps against the wall.” Deeply impressed by the commemoration, in the face of a massive police presence, Russell “learned that the spirit of the Commune still lives in the hearts of its working people.”

This is an abridged extract from Shelton Stromquist’s new book Claiming the City: A Global History of Workers’ Fight for Municipal Socialism, available now from Verso Books.

14-Year-Old Opens Fire at Birthday Party Killing 8 People and Injuring 7 Others

A 14-year-old boy, that is nicknamed “El Chapito” after the notorious Mexican drug lord Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, is accused of taking part in a mass shooting in Mexico that has left eight people dead and seven more injured.

According to the Daily Mail, the teen is believed to have rode up on a motorcycle and then opened fire on a family that was celebrating a birthday in the Mexico City suburb of Chimalhuacan. The motives for the brutal attack are still unknown; however, it is assumed to be related to gangs or drugs due to the suspects.

Another man, named “El Nono,” was apprehended in connection to the shooting. As stated by Mexico’s federal public safety department, seven other gang members have been charged with drug-related offenses. Although the boy’s real name has not been disclosed, “El Chapito” translates to “the little boy,” and “El Nono” means “the ninth.”

The 14-year-old was transferred to a judge in Mexico’s Comprehensive Criminal Justice System for Adolescents, implemented through a constitutional amendment in 2005. This system provides special tribunals and alternative justice options for juveniles, allowing minors to be institutionalized only in extreme cases or if they are older than 14 and have committed a criminal offense.

Land of the Rising Dead, Part Two: Death and Taxes

In December 2022, Japanese PM Fumio Kishida of the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) announced a doubling of his defense budget over the next five years, intended to make it worth 43 trillion yen ($314bn) by 2027, making Japan the world’s third-largest military spender after the US and China. But how to pay for this, given Tokyo’s long-term economic stagnation in the decades following its famously rapid 1980s stock-market boom and equally fast 1990s bust? 

The LDP is split, with one faction, led by Kishida, favoring tax rises on citizens or businesses. This goes against the current doctrine of ‘Abenomics’, a free-market regime of low tax and low regulation, as espoused by the recently assassinated former LDP PM Shinzo Abe. Abe’s loyal remaining Cabinet acolytes think more taxes would stifle economic growth, so call for special government bonds to be sold to the public to raise defense cash instead.

The best way to settle this debate might be to contact the ghost of Abe himself and ask him what he would do. Step forward the Happiness Realization Party (HRP) a politico-religious cult movement led by one ‘Master’ Ryuho Okawa. As we saw in Part One, Okawa is a prolific self-styled channeler of the souls of the eminent dead, most notably his economic heroine Margaret Thatcher, whose sage post-mortem advice he dutifully recorded in his thousands of automatically-written best-selling books.

The Master’s Master-Plan

Exploiting regional traditions of Shinto-style shamanism, on their voluminous website-cum-newspaper The Liberty Web, the ‘Happies’ have run detailed interviews with the ghost of Mrs. Thatcher, whose military and business ideology chimes perfectly with Master Okawa’s own: The Master had previously been a financier in New York during the 1980s Reaganomics boom-years, while today being highly concerned about the immense geo-strategic threat posed by Japan’s nuclear-armed totalitarian neighbors China and North Korea. According to the late British PM: “A small government is preferable … [the Japanese government should] assist the privatization of industries. There are too many laws, which prohibit the growth of private companies, so set them free and educate them to fight for themselves, to obtain prosperity.” 

But the ruling LDP was less steely than the Iron Lady. “The Japanese people have a group psychology… that overtaking is a fearful thing,” Okawa has lamented. Whenever GDP began to grow, the nation’s soft-hearted voters demanded the rich be taxed further to combat inequality. Yet this would only counterproductively overburden businesses and make everyone worse off, as Robin Hood-style redistributive economics always does, The Master argued. Thus, one may easily conclude, Fumio Kishida increasing taxes to fund the military would only crash the economy further, leaving generals with even less to spend than they had in the first place.  

Financial Suicide

Under the supposedly free-market LDP and their ‘Abenomics,’ Japan risked becoming a unilaterally “pacifist economy,” the Happies prophesized, directly conflating economics with military might. Shinzo Abe may have posed as a Thatcherite, said Master Okawa, but this was all a lie. In 1989, Abe’s LDP predecessors had introduced a consumption tax on goods and services, a Japanese version of Britain’s VAT (Value Added Tax) or the United States’ Sales Tax, causing the economy to begin its decades-long slump as increased prices inevitably dampened consumer spending. 

Furthermore, in Master Okawa’s opinion, VAT makes people commit suicide. VAT is a “devilish taxation system,” which causes more deaths than earthquakes, a truly “abnormal circumstance” in geologically unstable Japan. The HRP has drawn graphs supposedly proving a direct correlation between suicides and all successive hikes in VAT from April 1997 onwards, when the surcharge rose from 3% to 5%. In 1997, 24,391 potential Japanese customers killed themselves. By 1998, due to the further 2% increase in the price of goods and services, this number had shot up to 32,863; that’s 8,472 extra victims murdered by tax. 

As the HRP argued: “tax increase > depression (financial unrest) > suicide increase.” This was doubly bad, as dead people don’t pay taxes, thus decreasing treasury income, not increasing it as VAT was meant to; as the iconic pro-free-market Laffer Curve graph purports to paradoxically demonstrate, the lower your tax rate, the greater your tax-intake. Yet when tax receipts plummeted, LDP policy-makers responded by increasing VAT even further, leading to ever more deaths. If this vicious cycle of economic evil did not cease, then eventually “Japan will surely become an unprecedented suicide country,” the HRP warned. 

The Rice Age

Why could Japan’s elite not see the error of their ways? Because the LDP’s leaders were suffering from “tax-karma,” a severe condition triggered by previous mismanagement of macroeconomic matters during their past lives. In 2011, the HRP psychically interviewed the (living) astral body of the country’s then-PM, Yoshihiko Noda, about his plans to increase taxes even further. 

Why was Noda doing this? “No … well … to be honest, I don’t really know much about taxes,” his spirit admitted. “That’s certainly what it looks like, yes,” said Liberty Web chief interrogator, Jiro Ayaori. Noda explained how the country’s unaccountable civil servants set MPs’ fiscal agendas for them, like unelected puppeteers. “Politicians are amateurs,” explained Noda, who only exist “to make bureaucrats happy.” A politician’s only job was to promise voters the impossible – in Noda’s case, that an increase of VAT to 10% would boost prosperity, not suicide – then hope they had already left office before it became evident their plan had failed. 

In a previous life, Noda had supposedly worked as guardian of a rice warehouse, during Japan’s feudal Edo Period. In those far-off days, rice could be used by farmers to pay their taxes, in lieu of money. When famine hit, the tons of valuable rice locked inside Noda’s bank-cum-warehouse meant the peasants starved when food was actually easily available. Noda tried to avoid moral liability by claiming, as a mere security guard, to have had no understanding of the matter, as “the market was something the merchants did.” 

The wrathful Shinto and Buddhist gods disagreed, and so when later reborn in his current body, Noda’s suffering soul had sought out the position of PM, where it would be possible for him to “make the right decision on taxes” and thereby “graduate from his [bad] tax-karma” by making “his spirit-level … rise.” But, being used to tax being paid in food, Noda succeeded only in making “a foolish judgment on the tax problem” by increasing VAT yet again, meaning he will “again have tax issues in his next life.” The Happies deplored how such financially illiterate souls could be reborn into top cabinet positions. “It’s a dubious system, isn’t it?” complained Master Okawa. 

Initially, this all sounds like literal economic insanity, but upon closer inspection is merely a heightened, cartoonish extrapolation of actual mainstream political currents in Japanese society: the LDP’s desire to grow the economy and thereby help double Japan’s defense budget in light of the growing regional threat from Beijing and Pyongyang is actually entirely rational, wise and laudable. Reading The Liberty Web can thus give you a surprising level of insight into the forces driving current Japanese foreign, military and economic policy. After all, you can’t write a check with rice in 2023.   

The post Land of the Rising Dead, Part Two: Death and Taxes appeared first on Providence.

Colin Powell and the “The Sloppy Dossier”: Plagiarism and “Fake Intelligence” Used to Justify the 2003 War on Iraq: Copied and Pasted from the Internet into an “Official” British Intel Report

Fake intelligence as well as plagiarized quotations had been slipped into an official intelligence report on Iraq’s WMD presented to the UN Security Council by Secretary of State Colin Powell in February 2003.

The post Colin Powell and the “The Sloppy Dossier”: Plagiarism and “Fake Intelligence” Used to Justify the 2003 War on Iraq: Copied and Pasted from the Internet into an “Official” British Intel Report appeared first on Global Research.

Saint Patrick’s Day 2023 Remembrance: England’s “Irish Slaves”

Global Research Editor’s Note

In 2008 (reposted in 2015), Global Research posted a short Oped article entitled The Irish Slave Trade: The Forgotten “White Slaves”. This article which skimmed the surface of a complex historical process has been the object …

The post Saint Patrick’s Day 2023 Remembrance: England’s “Irish Slaves” appeared first on Global Research.

Saint Patrick’s Day: The Real Irish American Story Not Taught in Schools

“Wear green on St. Patrick’s Day or get pinched.” That pretty much sums up the Irish-American “curriculum” that I learned when I was in school. Yes, I recall a nod to the so-called Potato Famine, but it was mentioned only …

The post Saint Patrick’s Day: The Real Irish American Story Not Taught in Schools appeared first on Global Research.