Fresh shooting attack in Huwara: 2 Israelis wounded, 1 seriously

The assailant fled the scene. A suspect was arrested shortly afterwards.

By World Israel News Staff

Two people were injured in a shooting incident Sunday afternoon in Hawara, Samaria.

A terrorist opened fire at a passing Israeli vehicle and fled the scene. One of the victims, a man, suffered a serious head injury and was treated by Magen David Adom EMTs before being transferred to Beilinson Hospital

The lightly injured victims, reportedly in shock, managed to call for help.

Israeli security forces scanning the area of ​​the incident found a Carlo submachine gun – the kind manufactured in Palestinian-administered areas – that was left at the scene.

This is a developing story.

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GROWING TIES: Muslim-majority country’s new envoy ‘proud’ to serve in Israel

Mukhtar Mammadov, Ambassador Designate of Republic of Azerbaijan to Israel, talks about the upcoming opening of the Azeri embassy in Tel Aviv.

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Twenty Years Ago, the Iraq War Changed Everything — and Taught Elites Nothing

The ripple effects of the disastrous Iraq invasion still course through the Middle East and domestic US politics decades later. Yet there’s little evidence those in power have learned anything from it.

President George W. Bush with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Vice President Dick Cheney, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice after a meeting about the Iraq War in the White House in Washington, DC, January 5, 2006. (Brooks Kraft LLC / Corbis via Getty Images)

The first thing to remember about the Iraq War is that it was only meant to be the beginning.

You don’t have to take the word of former general Wesley Clark, a man who once nearly started World War III, and his claim that there existed a secret memo outlining plans for war on “seven countries in five years,” starting with Iraq and ending with Iran. The Bush administration’s own behavior, rhetoric, and later admissions made it abundantly clear that this was the idea.

Of course, George W. Bush’s invasion fell to shambles so quickly that he never had the chance to put this plan into action. Rather than being the starting gun for a series of US wars in the Middle East, the attack on Iraq instead became merely the signature disaster of the Bush presidency and — at least until recently — the entire twenty-first century, a Vietnam-like black hole insatiably pulling human lives, neighboring countries, and trillions of dollars into its death vortex.

For Iraqis, the war was a cruel and lasting generational cataclysm that killed hundreds of thousands and displaced millions, with parts of the country toxic to their inhabitants years after the war was nominally over thanks to US use of depleted uranium. The considerable US costs — including more than four thousand dead soldiers and nearly $3 trillion set aflame — pale in comparison. Yet even so, this week has been replete with US retrospectives on the war and what it means. Why, twenty years on, does the Iraq War still hold the place it does in our consciousness?

After all, the US invasion of Afghanistan — the other Vietnam-esque quagmire Bush dragged the country into, in this era of supersize wars — lasted far longer. And Iraq was by no means the last US-led regime-change war, with Obama condemning Libya to still-ongoing bedlam with his 2011 ouster of Muammar Gaddafi. What Bush and his underlings did in Iraq is hardly unique in the scope of US history, let alone just this century.

And yet there is something distinct about Iraq.

Lemons to Lemonade

Maybe it’s the extraordinary cynicism of the administration’s push for war, which involved not just “co-opting” global sympathy for the United States, as UK prime minister Tony Blair urged Bush to do the day after September 11, but manipulating ordinary Americans’ pain and anger over the attacks to create the consensus for an entirely unrelated war neocons had long slavered over.

Bush’s former counterterrorism advisor Richard Clarke and others memorably alleged that the then president almost immediately demanded aides find some connection to Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in the attacks. Plenty of documents — like a top secret directive Bush signed six days later ordering the Pentagon to start war planning for Iraq — made it just as clear that he was determined from the start to take out Hussein no matter what.

Plenty of documents made it clear that Bush was determined from the start to take out Hussein no matter what.

Likewise, it took only hours after the 9/11 attacks for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to ask the vice chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others if there was information “good enough [to] hit” Hussein at the same time as Osama bin Laden, and to order the Pentagon’s top lawyer to get “additional support” for the “connection w/ UBL [Osama bin Laden].” Two whole months before September 11, Rumsfeld had produced a memo suggesting a “more robust policy” against Hussein on the basis of “the danger of an increasingly bold and nuclear-armed Saddam in the near-future,” and claiming that his ouster would create “a much-improved position in the region” for the United States and “enhance US credibility and influence.”

Thanks to the slew of paperwork unlocked by the UK’s Iraq Inquiry, we can today read almost in real time as US and British officials schemed over a “clever strategy” for how to most effectively sell and justify an attack on Iraq to a largely reluctant world. Sending weapons inspectors into Iraq, they made clear, was merely a tool in this campaign. As Secretary of State Colin Powell explained to UK prime minister Tony Blair, the “over-riding objective is the removal of Saddam,” and if the dictator avoided the trap by allowing inspectors in, they would simply “find a new demand to justify military action.”

Misinformation From the Mainstream

All of this was bad enough. But as Powell’s words suggest, the administration’s determination to drag the country into war also involved a breathtaking and ferocious campaign of fearmongering, omissions, half-truths, and outright lies, all propagated at the highest levels.

Bush officials were ubiquitous on TV making the case for war, sometimes citing the very same dubious information they’d anonymously fed to the press as independent confirmation of the claims they were making. Internal dissent was ruthlessly ignored and suppressed, as when undercover CIA officer Valerie Plame was publicly outed to get back at her husband for disputing officials’ lies. Powell himself drew on the considerable esteem in which US liberals and foreign publics held him to make a pivotal pro-war case at the United Nations that he privately derided as “bullshit.”

We’ve arguably never seen this level of misinformation campaign in US politics, before or since. So relentless was the administration’s campaign of deceit that on the eve of the war, nearly two-thirds of the US public thought Hussein had played a role in the September 11 attacks, and upward of 90 percent believed that he had weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) or was developing them. The Trump administration’s comparatively lackluster and unsuccessful attempts to create a groundswell of support for regime change in countries like Cuba and Venezuela are a testament to how sophisticated this operation was.

We’ve arguably never seen this level of misinformation campaign in US politics, before or since.

None of it could have succeeded without the mainstream press. Long before the words “social” and “media” became a single noun, this avalanche of powerfully effective fake news emanated from the most establishment of establishment news outlets and no small number of liberal columnists, to the point that you can literally count the number of journalists who questioned the administration’s case on one hand. It took only two days after the 9/11 attacks for a reporter to bring up the nonexistent links between Hussein and bin Laden to Powell, and for the Wall Street Journal to cite “experts” that Iraq was “most likely to have helped” bin Laden. An exhaustive analysis of two weeks of coverage in the lead-up to the war by Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting found that 222 of the 297 current and retired officials that networks overwhelmingly relied on as guests were associated with governments backing the war, and that a mere four were critical of the invasion.

This all came with a stifling and aggressively censorious pro-war climate that makes the last few years’ worth of complaints about cancel culture look quaint. What little dissent from the official line existed was swiftly stamped out, with reporters and media personalities losing their jobs or outright ordered not to be critical of the war effort, while those with even an inkling of questioning the administration were scurrilously labeled as anti-American or pro-Hussein. Antiwar protesters were derided or cast as suspect. Even voices on the Left weren’t immune to this jingoistic fervor.

The media’s conduct didn’t get much better once the war began. The Iraq War continued, if not perfected, the art of “embedded journalism,” sidestepping the grave error officials had made in Vietnam, when they’d allowed reporters the leeway to honestly and independently tell the public what was happening on the battlefield.

Cable networks covered the campaign less like the brutal assault it was and more like the Super Bowl. In one infamous incident shortly after the invasion, CNN and other networks broadcast footage every four to seven minutes of a throng of Iraqis cheering as they toppled a statue of Hussein. The reality was that the square was nearly empty, that the small crowd was largely reporters and US marines, and that the Iraqi who sledgehammered the statue later regretted it, having become a refugee in the post-invasion chaos and now fantasizing about killing Bush and Blair with his bare hands.

Cable networks covered the campaign less like the brutal assault it was and more like the Super Bowl.

No matter. Media coverage of the war soon dropped off, and the US public was led to believe the war was won and done, a belief soon tested by the outbreak of civil war in Iraq, the steady stream of body bags coming home from Iraq, and the failure of any WMDs to materialize.

It’s no coincidence that Americans’ trust in the media dipped in 2004, as the mission in Iraq started to look more and more distinctly unaccomplished. That trust has only deteriorated ever since. The press has never really recovered, a state of affairs helped along by a widespread refusal to self-reflect on this failure, much less accept responsibility for it. The years since have instead set off a desperate search for scapegoats, be it Donald Trump or social media.

A Spreading Cancer

But as the war’s fallout stretched far into this century, collapsing faith in the press would prove to be only one facet of its political cost. A slow-twisting dagger in the side of the Bush presidency for the rest of his two terms, the war would go on to both make and break politicians, helping account for the rise of Barack Obama (and, stunningly, Donald Trump), and contributing to the shocking defeats of Jeb Bush and Hillary Clinton. Meanwhile, it’s hard to find a young leftist today in the United States (and beyond) for whom the invasion wasn’t one of their formative, radicalizing experiences.

The unambiguous catastrophe that the war became set off a genuine shift in US public opinion more generally, as Washington politicians succeeded in somehow getting more Americans killed than had died in the terrorist attack that was supposed to have justified the war. Public sentiment soon lurched away from the hawkish view that had prevailed since the Reagan era, and toward less military adventurism, more restraint, and an emphasis on securing prosperity at home. Even if US elites today remain slow to catch up to the rest of the country, this public shift has inflicted real political costs on those running against it, enough that the war’s architects are still whining today that the resulting “Iraq syndrome” has stopped them from getting all the wars they’ve wanted in the intervening years.

Beyond domestic politics, the reputational damage the war inflicted on the United States globally was immense.

Beyond domestic politics, the reputational damage the war inflicted on the United States globally was immense. Washington had been enjoying the “unipolar moment” for barely more than a decade when Bush invaded Iraq, triggering unprecedented global opposition, while running roughshod over international law, multilateralism, and the “norms” in which US officials now unconvincingly drape themselves.

If the United States was the undisputed global power, it had suddenly revealed itself as a profoundly erratic, irresponsible, and dangerous one. Iraq to this day remains a sticking point for a Global South unwilling to align with the United States over the invasion of Ukraine, and is no minor cause of the United States’ potential displacement in the region by what US officials see as their leading rival, China.

Geopolitical blowback for US elites continued in the form of strengthening Washington’s other major adversary in the region, Iran — which used the ensuing power vacuum to boost its influence in Iraq, whose Shia majority was no longer held down by the dictatorial, Sunni hand of Hussein. When Trump very nearly started a war with Iran by assassinating Qassem Soleimani in 2020, it was as the powerful Iranian general was heading to Baghdad, a common practice for the man who used the Bush-created void in Iraq to extend his government’s military and political sway inside of Iran’s former foe. Even on the foreign policy establishment’s own narrow, power-seeking terms, in other words, the invasion was one big case of Washington elites shooting themselves in the foot.

The chaos that defined Iraq only metastasized in the years that followed, in large part due to the administration’s arrogance and laziness. Not caring to properly understand the country it was occupying, the Bush administration blundered forward against official advice with its policy of “de-Ba’athification” and disbanding of the Iraqi military. This contributed to the creation of an army of bitter Iraqis who wound up helping to form ISIS — which cut a swath of terror and death across not just Iraq but also Syria, and which necessitated yet more US troop deployments, foreign occupations, and endless wars in the region that persist today.

Sold as an action to fight terrorism, the invasion of Iraq was instead terrorism’s greatest gift.

Sold as an action to fight terrorism, the invasion of Iraq was instead terrorism’s greatest gift. Meanwhile, twenty years later, US soldiers are still in Iraq, more than a decade after the official withdrawal.

Miles to Go

It’s still an open question how much elites have really learned from Iraq, and how much has really changed.

No subsequent administration has had the appetite for more ground invasions that cost US lives and money, including Trump’s administration, which preferred to try regime change in countries like Venezuela using economic warfare and local proxies. But as Trump’s four years showed, whether in Venezuela or Cuba, regime change and military adventurism are still at the top of the menu for US foreign policy.

Leaders continue to try their hand at Bush’s folly, even as Iraq should’ve beaten into the heads of everyone alive that the ability to militarily subdue a country isn’t the same as winning a war, and how quickly and easily things spiral out of one’s control when a leader is violently toppled. Obama blasted Bush while repeating his policy in Libya with similarly horrendous results and intensifying similar efforts in Syria. Commentators and officials today talk with breathtaking glibness about regime change as a solution to Russian aggression. And of course, it’s not just US leaders: Russian president Vladimir Putin’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine has followed Bush’s playbook almost to a T, from faulty intelligence and expectations of being greeted as a liberator to poor war planning and empowering local extremists.

Leaders continue to try their hand at Bush’s folly, even as Iraq should’ve beaten into the heads of everyone alive that the ability to militarily subdue a country isn’t the same as winning a war.

The architects and major backers of the war, meanwhile, have suffered no consequences, moving on to plum positions in US intellectual circles and policy making. Bush is now a beloved elder statesman who has dipped his toe back into politics. John Bolton is now running for the GOP nomination after a stint as national security advisor to another Republican president. Propagandists for the war — whether David Frum, Nicole Wallace, or Ari Fleischer — populate the nation’s media platforms. Some, like Bill Kristol, who led the call to Bush to invade “even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the [September 11] attack,” are now influential in liberal circles. Dick Cheney’s advisor as he engineered the war is now a top state department official shaping US involvement in the Ukraine war. The leading Democratic architect of the invasion is the president.

Maybe Iraq’s lasting legacy is the psychic break it triggered for Americans at the height of post–Cold War supremacy — a violent, ongoing reminder that those who rise to the top of US media and political institutions may not in fact be all that bright, or all that good, fueling the signature cynicism and rage of the era we’re living through. As for the lessons it holds about the limits of US military power and the perils of seeking hegemony at all costs, it looks like those are yet to be learned. But it’s not too late.

Netanyahu touts elimination of ‘dozens’ of Arab terrorists, vows crackdown on anti-judicial reform ‘anarchy’

Following apparent assassination of senior terrorist in Syria,  Netanyahu vows continued crackdown on terror – and on anti-judicial reform protests that spread ‘anarchy.’

By World Israel News Staff

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed his government will take a tough stance on terrorists, and that the police will crackdown on critics of the judicial reform plan whose protests promote “anarchy.”

Speaking at the start of the government’s weekly Cabinet meeting Sunday, Netanyahu laid out the agenda for the government, highlighting efforts to build an international coalition to bar Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, the recent spate of Arab terror attacks, and lawlessness at some anti-judicial reform protests.

“Today, I will discuss our three struggles: Against the Iranian nuclear program, against terrorism and against anarchy. First, the diplomatic struggle. The Government of Israel is continuing the struggle against the Iranian nuclear program.”

“Last week I met with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. I stood together with the Chancellor on the platform in Berlin from which Jews were sent to the death camps.”

“As opposed to the past, today when we face the extremist regime in Tehran, which seeks to obliterate us from the face of the earth, we do everything necessary to defend ourselves. Like I say to world leaders and as I told Chancellor Scholz, the Jewish state will not allow another Holocaust.”

The prime minister alluded to last week’s bombing attack at the Megiddo Junction in northern Israel which left one man seriously wounded.

Netanyahu touted the “dozens of terrorists” eliminated by Israeli security forces in recent weeks, and vowed authorities would bring terrorists “everywhere” to justice

“Our forces are active around the clock in order to settle accounts with the terrorists and thwart terrorist infrastructure. Dozens of terrorists have been eliminated in the past month; many others have been arrested.”

“Whoever tries to harm Israeli citizens will pay the price. We will find the terrorists and the architects of terrorism everywhere.”

Netanyahu’s comments came just hours after the Islamic Jihad terrorist group claimed that a senior member of its military wing had been shot and killed by Israeli agents in Syria.

Amid ongoing protests, including rallies Saturday night that descended into violence, Netanyahu warned that the movement against the judicial overhaul plan is spreading “anarchy.”

“We will not accept anarchy. There are those who are calling for the blocking of highways, for refusal, for blood in the streets, and to attack public figures. We will not accept this. We will not accept violence – by any side.”

I expect the Inspector General and the police to enforce the law, to prevent violence and the blocking of roads, and to allow the daily life of the citizens of the country.”

“I expect the Shin Bet and the State Attorney’s Office to take determined action against those who incite to murder ministers and MKs, and the Prime Minister and his family, without turning a blind eye, without cutting slack and without cutting corners. I expect the IDF Chief-of-Staff and the heads of the security services to vigorously fight against refusal to serve. There is no place for refusal to serve in the public discourse. A state that values life cannot tolerate such phenomena and we will not tolerate them.”

“Instead of incitement and calls to anarchy, instead of the awareness engineering by the propaganda channels, there needs to be a genuine, substantive and fair discussion of the judicial reform. The foundation of democracy is the balance between the three authorities: The legislative, the executive and the judicial. This balance has been overturned in Israel in recent decades in a way that has not happened in any democracy in the world.”

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Protester arrested for vandalizing Modi’in home of Israeli justice minister

The suspect, a resident of the city in his 60s, allegedly spray-painted “Enemy of the People” on a wall outside Justice Minister Yariv Levin’s residence.

By JNS

A man was arrested on Saturday for vandalizing a wall outside Israeli Justice Minister Yariv Levin’s home in Modi’in on Thursday.

The man, a resident of the city in his 60s, had spray-painted “the enemy of the people” on the wall, in the context of the judicial reform plan being spearheaded by Levin.

Separately on Saturday, a man was arrested for threatening Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a video posted to social media.

On Saturday evening, Israelis took to the streets to protest the judicial reforms for the 11th straight week.

“Next week, Israel’s government intends to pass the dictatorship and religious coercion law. Every citizen must come out and take a stand in these fateful moments of the State of Israel. Together, hundreds of thousands will save Israeli democracy,” protest organizers said in a statement.

They vowed to escalate demonstrations if the coalition does not halt the legislative process associated with the reforms, declaring this coming Thursday a “National Day of Paralysis.”

Anti-reform protesters last week blocked roads, the Haifa port and Ben-Gurion Airport, and destroyed property on a day of ‘escalating resistance.’

Netanyahu has repeatedly called on the opposition to engage in negotiations without preconditions, overtures that have been summarily rejected.

The Israeli premier reiterated last Sunday that he had been elected to pursue change and accused the opposition of trying to overthrow his government.

“Only four months ago, we held elections. The government I head received a clear mandate from the citizens of Israel. The fact that for two whole months, our repeated calls for dialogue received no response from the opposition proves that what interests the opposition is not the judicial reforms, but the creation of anarchy and the overthrow of the elected government,” he said.

“It is impossible to be in favor of the success of the Israeli economy and to encourage the flight of funds from Israel. It is impossible to be in favor of the rule of law and to encourage violations of the law. It is impossible to be in favor of the security of the state and to encourage insubordination that would collapse the security of the state,” said the premier.

“There is no conditional Zionism,” he added.

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Let’s Talk About the COVID-19 Lab Leak Theory

Whether COVID emerged from nature or from a laboratory leak is a legitimate debate. We still don’t have all the answers, but how that discussion was stifled bodes poorly for scientific inquiry.

Security personnel stand guard outside the Wuhan Institute of Virology as members of the World Health Organization team investigating the origins of COVID-19 visit. February 3, 2021. (Hector Retamal / AFP via Getty Images)

The following is a preview from the spring edition of Jacobin, “Conspiracy.” You can subscribe today for a year of our print edition (digital access included) for just $10.

Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, social media platforms began to flag, downgrade, or remove a range of posts that these companies said were spreading misinformation about the virus. Facebook’s list of COVID-related content that is subject to removal for violating its community standards is very long, from claims that the illness can be cured by herbal remedies to posts that say the vaccines contain microchips or are ineffective. In February 2021, the firm expanded its list to include any posts making claims that the virus was man-made or does not have a natural origin. Google likewise altered its auto-complete capability so that anyone typing in “coronavirus lab leak” or similar phrasing would not see their search query autofilled, whether via the search engine directly or its subsidiary YouTube, so as to not lead “people down pathways that we would find to be not authoritative information.”

This policing of what is acceptable and unacceptable to say was not limited to social media. Following accusations from the likes of Republican senator Tom Cotton in February 2020, as well as President Donald Trump’s predilection for calling COVID-19 “kung flu” and the “China virus,” an open letter from twenty-seven high-profile public health scientists was published in the Lancet, the prestigious British medical publication, denouncing the “rumours and misinformation” about the origin of the virus. “We stand together to strongly condemn conspiracy theories suggesting that COVID-19 does not have a natural origin,” they wrote. Researchers from multiple countries who had performed genomic analysis of SARS-CoV-2, they said, “overwhelmingly conclude that this coronavirus originated in wildlife.”

The signatories further attempted to demonstrate this overwhelming scientific consensus by stating that the presidents of the US National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine and “the scientific communities they represent” had written a letter to the White House confirming the virus’s bat-derived origin, and that the director-general of the World Health Organization had issued a call to “promote scientific evidence and unity over misinformation and conjecture.” The authors of the letter said that suggesting anything other than a natural origin of the disease did nothing “but create fear, rumours, and prejudice” and that, contrary to this, they were standing in solidarity with the science and health professionals of China.

Those who accepted the natural origin story were on the side of the scientific consensus, like those who accepted natural selection against creationism, and anyone who suggested otherwise was not just a conspiracist, like those who believe NASA faked the moon landing, but was a racist conspiracist to boot.

The Two Theories

In a hyperpolarized media environment, because it was the likes of Tom Cotton and Donald Trump who had hinted at a lab leak, any discussion that this might be a hypothesis worth testing became verboten for much of the press. Even the New York Times dismissed the claim as a “fringe theory,” and the Washington Post categorized it as a “conspiracy theory.” And so when the liberal media refused, for the most part, to consider the question, the always inflammatory right-wing media was more than happy to oblige, with all its predilection for exaggeration and hate. Thus, out of fear that even objective investigation of the lab leak question would result in prejudice, prejudice was what resulted.

Assessment of the validity of a scientific statement had retreated from its dependence on empirical evidence. Validity was now assessed instead based on who was making the statement. Argument from evidence had been replaced with argument from authority. It does not matter what your telescope says, Galileo, for it is the Church that decrees Jupiter can have no moons.

But then, in late February 2023, the Wall Street Journal reported that the US Department of Energy had concluded the most likely origin of the COVID-19 pandemic was indeed a laboratory leak. Such resolutions, albeit made with “low confidence,” parallel those reached by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the latter’s with “moderate confidence.” Four other intelligence agencies and the National Intelligence Council still believe the virus spilled over from an infected animal — a zoonotic transmission — also with low confidence. The Central Intelligence Agency is undecided. That is, all the agencies concerned have low or moderate confidence, or are sitting on the fence, and no one has high confidence in either hypothesis.

Because the Department of Energy and the FBI are both operating under the direction of a Democratic president this time, it has become permissible to consider the lab leak hypothesis without being accused of racism or conspiracism. It is not that any new evidence has been presented, but who is presenting the evidence has changed. And so, despite the thawing of the discourse, this is not yet an improvement with respect to science.

To be clear, no agency believes the pandemic was the result of a bioweapons program. Instead, any leak could have been the result of an accident at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, which is located near where the outbreak first occurred and which studies coronaviruses. Such an accident could have occurred in any number of ways. Perhaps it was from “gain-of-function” research — genetically altering a pathogen to better understand it and try to predict its “next move” evolutionarily, thus developing a vaccine or other response before that move happens. Figures such as Republican Rand Paul have criticized gain-of-function research as “fooling with Mother Nature,” and liberals like economist Jeffrey Sachs and political comedian Jon Stewart have been no less anxious about “mad scientists” who know not what they have wrought. But perhaps gain-of-function research had nothing to do with the leak. Perhaps biosecurity measures were not sufficient or failed, and such an altered virus escaped. The original SARS virus, which first emerged in 2002, has escaped from extremely secure labs a total of six times. Or perhaps it could have been as simple as a researcher becoming infected while collecting virus samples from a bat cave.

Regardless of how a leak happened, if it did happen, the rationale for such a hypothesis rests on three observations: on the fact that researchers have tested tens of thousands of wildlife samples without finding the virus in any animal other than humans; on the proximity of the Wuhan Institute of Virology to the outbreak; and on intelligence that three researchers from that institute became so ill they were admitted to the hospital in November 2019, around the time of the outbreak.

But there is no smoking gun. No one is very confident at all that a lab leak was the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic. They just think it is slightly more likely.

The rationale for the alternative, natural origin hypothesis is that zoonotic origin is how all other novel infectious diseases have emerged; that the outbreak region does have a thriving wildlife trade that pushes its merchants and suppliers into close contact with animals known to be reservoirs of coronaviruses; and that China appears to have been as taken by surprise by the outbreak as anyone else.

Again, the partisans of natural origin also have low confidence in this hypothesis. They just think theirs is the one that is slightly more likely.

To be fair, something of a thaw had begun in 2021, when the FBI first made noises about a lab leak and when, around the same time, another group of high-profile scientists, including key figures in the world of virology, published their own open letter, this time in the journal Science, arguing that both the lab leak and the zoonotic spillover hypotheses were viable. But it was the Department of Energy reveal in late February that has opened the floodgates.

Defending the Scientific Revolution

Science is not a battle of partisan authorities. It is a battle of evidence. What distinguishes the Scientific Revolution from all other ways of knowing that came before, all other facts about the world that had previously been discovered, was the deceptively simple but radical epistemological break that is the scientific method. An observation about the world prompts a hypothesis — a possible explanation of why something is the way it is — which is followed by a test of that hypothesis, which in turn prompts more observations, and then more hypotheses and more tests of those hypotheses. All that matters is evidence. It matters not who is making the hypothesis, performing the test, or doing the observing.

Prior to the Scientific Revolution, evidence was secondary to the authority of who was making a truth claim. But because the predictive power of the scientific method is vastly superior to superstition or tradition, there is a tendency sometimes for scientists to be wielded as a new authority, or for scientists to treat themselves that way.

The Scientific Revolution, and the Enlightenment of which it was a part, came about at the time they did because of the great, centuries-long antiauthoritarian tumult that stretched from the Reformation through to the American and French revolutions. The scientific method necessarily depends upon an egalitarian foundation for a rejection of the belief that any bishop or lord, pope or king is better than anyone else — that anyone at all knows better than anyone else by dint of who they are.

Today the mask debate, like the lab leak debate, as well as debates over school closures, lockdowns, and vaccines, is settled in the minds of too many people on the basis of whether they view the given partisans of a position as good people, and not on the evidence provided.

Pandemic policy is too important to return to a pre-Galilean assessment of truth based on an appeal to authority. So let journalists, social media firms, public officials, and scientists expunge from our vocabularies the unscientific phrases “scientists say” and “science denial.” Let us instead re-embrace the motto of the oldest scientific body in the world, Britain’s Royal Society, “Nullius in verba,” which can be roughly translated from Latin as “Take nobody’s word for it.”

Antisemitism on campus: Students rewarded for attending hateful anti-Israel events at NY college

Brooklyn community college offers extra credit for students who participate in one-sided, biased anti-Israel events; Advocacy group says Jewish students no longer feel safe on campus.

By World Israel News Staff

Students at a community college in New York city are offered extra credit for participating in anti-Israel, antisemitic events on campus that present a one-sided version of the Israeli-Arab conflict, says a watchdog group.

S.A.F.E. CUNY, an NGO that “advocates for Zionist Jews systematically discriminated against and excluded” at CUNY, expressed concern last week about an exhibit approved by senior administrators at Borough of Manhattan Community College (BMCC-CUNY).

The exhibit, which was displayed in a “highly-trafficked, public area,” expressed sympathy with “Intifada (a call to murder Israeli Jews),” S.A.F.E. CUNY wrote on its Twitter account.

BREAKING: Yesterday, we were tipped off to a truly horrifying, deeply antisemitic CUNY-sponsored display posted by @bmcc_cuny administrators in a highly-trafficked, public area. We share images here.

In addition to sympathizing with Intifada (a call to murder Israeli Jews),… https://t.co/cwJMBfVnuj pic.twitter.com/1FWMfyEmNa

— SAFE CUNY (@SAFECUNY) March 16, 2023

“Among the falsehoods and tropes leveled at Jews and Israel: 1) That Israel “targeted” journalist Shireen Abu Akleh for murder; 2) that Israel is guilty of ‘ethnic cleansing’; 3) that Israel is a settler-colonial state; and more,” the group continued.

Dr. Jenna Hirsch, Associate Professor of Mathematics at CUNY- BMCC, told United with Israel that she was stunned the clearly biased exhibit had been approved by administrators.

VIDEO of the antisemitic display that now adorns @bmcc_cuny‘s hallways, sponsored by BMCC. Thank you to the courageous person who provided this to us. You can really get a sense of how prominent it is. pic.twitter.com/D16OzOVvH2

— SAFE CUNY (@SAFECUNY) March 16, 2023

“I went inside and a girl behind the desk told me that they indeed sanctioned the exhibit under the auspices of the director of the program. I didn’t believe her, so I asked her again – ‘Are you sure the director knows about this exhibit and allowed the students to put it up?’ She assured me they did.”

Notably, the exhibit is part of an ongoing series of events disseminating anti-Israel and antisemitic propaganda, which was organized by CUNY-BMCC’s Social Justice and Equity Center director, Nadia Saleh.

“The students are actually offered official credit, which will appear on their BMCC transcript for participating in these anti-Israel events!” Dr. Avraham Goldstein, Assistant Professor of Mathematics at CUNY- BMCC, told United With Israel.

“S.A.F.E. CUNY should bring to the public attention that as a result of these systematic anti-Israel activities, visibly Jewish students and faculty, and especially Orthodox Jews and Israelis and Zionist Jews, no longer feel safe on campus,” Goldstein continued.

“We believe that the rise of the antisemitic assaults and attacks on the CUNY campuses in the recent year or two (as admitted even by the top CUNY officials themselves) is caused by this anti-Israel hysteria promoted by BMCC Social Justice & Equity Centers and their systemic campaigns of hate and libeling.”

Goldstein encouraged donors to reconsider giving funds to the school until “the situation is straightened out,” and encouraged S.A.F.E. CUNY to examine any legal actions at their disposal.

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Nearly three in four Palestinians back Huwara terror attack—poll

For the first time since the establishment of the P.A., a majority (52%) of Palestinians now support its dissolution, according to the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research.

By JNS

Seventy-one percent of Palestinians support the terrorist murder of two Israeli Jews in Huwara, Samaria, on Feb. 26, according to a public opinion poll conducted earlier this month. Only 21% of those surveyed were against the attack and similar armed attacks.

Brothers Hallel Yaniv, 21, and Yagel Yaniv, 19, were shot by a Palestinian terrorist as they sat in traffic in the Arab village.

The poll, conducted by The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in partnership with the Ramallah office of the German think tank Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, shows a general hardening of attitudes in the Palestinian Authority population, with growing support for terrorism in the conflict with Israel.

For the first time since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, a majority (52%) now support its dissolution, while just 42% say the continuation of the PA is in the interest of the Palestinian people.

For the study, 1,200 adults were interviewed in person at 120 randomly selected locations in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria between March 8-11, 2023, according to PCPSR. The margin of error is 3%.

“Public evaluation of internal conditions points to a greater deterioration in the standing of the P.A. and a significant loss of trust in it,” PCPSR said in a press release.

“Findings show a rise in the belief that the P.A. is now a burden on the Palestinian people and for the first time in our polls, a majority supports the dissolution of the PA and views its collapse as an interest for the Palestinian people. In fact, a majority thinks that the continued existence of the PA serves the interests of Israel and that its dissolution or collapse would strengthen Palestinian armed groups.”

Only 27% of Palestinians support the concept of the two-state solution while 71% oppose the concept.

Seventy-three percent opposed and only 21% supported Palestinian attendance at last month’s security summit in Aqaba, Jordan, in an effort to stop the escalation of the armed conflict in Judea and Samaria.

A second regional security summit discussing security coordination between Israel and the P.A. ahead of Ramadan was scheduled for Sunday in the Egyptian Red Sea resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh.

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The US Invasion Was a Catastrophe for the People of Iraq

The US promised to bring freedom to Iraqis, but its eight-year occupation resulted in death and destruction on a horrifying scale. It left behind a corrupt, sectarian political order that has responded to popular protests with brutal repression.

An Iraqi woman runs after her daughter as they arrive on the helipad at the Balad Hospital after their house was hit by mortars, injuring both of her daughters. Balad, Iraq, 2004. (Lynsey Addario / Getty Images Reportage)

In March 2003, the US military launched a full-scale invasion of Iraq. The Bush administration promised to bring freedom to millions of Iraqis. In reality, the occupation inflamed sectarian divisions and reopened Saddam Hussein’s torture chambers at Abu Ghraib, while US officials tried to privatize Iraq’s vast oil resources.

Eight years later, US forces officially withdrew from Iraq after hundreds of thousands of people had been killed. They left behind a corrupt and authoritarian political system that was soon unable to cope with the rise of ISIS. A protest movement has developed in the past few years to challenge the ruling class in Baghdad. But the legacy of the occupation will be haunting Iraq for decades.

Dina Rizk Khoury is professor emerita of history at George Washington University and the author of Iraq During Wartime: Soldiering, Martyrdom, and Remembrance. This is an edited transcript from Jacobin’s Long Reads podcast. You can listen to the two-part interview here and here.

Impacts of an Invasion

Daniel Finn

What was the balance sheet in terms of death, injury, and material destruction from the period of direct US occupation in Iraq?

Dina Rizk Khoury

The invasion and occupation of Iraq after 2003 was devastating in many ways. But it’s important to keep in mind that the US war on Iraq goes back a long time before that. It really started in 1991. The impact of the 2003 invasion was made all the worse because the embargo that was imposed by the United Nations and supported by the United States after 1991 had already weakened the infrastructure of Iraq, particularly when it came to health and education.

Between 2003 and 2011, which was the official date for the withdrawal of American troops, the tally on the American side was 4,500 US soldiers killed. On the Iraqi side, there were 650,000 deaths, according to the reliable statistics that we have from the New England Journal of Medicine. The US fight against ISIS from 2013 also led to the death of 40,000 Iraqis. These are documented figures.

There are currently two million households in Iraq that are led by women as well as countless orphans.

In addition, there are five million Iraqi refugees. Some fled to Syria and Jordan in the wake of the sectarian civil war, but a large number were internally displaced, moving from areas that had seen a high level of violence to more peaceful districts. We also know that the occupation of large parts of Iraq by ISIS and the subsequent war on ISIS also created over a million internal refugees.

Another social cost of the war that is not spoken about very often is the stress on family structures. There are currently two million households in Iraq that are led by women as well as countless orphans. This has taken its toll on the ability of Iraqis to rebuild their social lives.

We also need to discuss the material and environmental destruction that came with the occupation. The early months of the occupation led to widespread looting, particularly of Iraq’s cultural heritage. You have to think of Iraq as a territory that is virtually one big archeological site. It is one of the world’s most ancient civilizations.

Before the invasion, the Pentagon and the State Department seem to have acknowledged the importance of taking care of that heritage. The bombing and fighting during the invasion did not take place in the vicinity of archeological and cultural sites, so the US forces knew this was something they had to bear in mind. However, the warning went unheeded in the first months of the occupation.

During that period, the Iraqi national museum and the national library were looted. About 170,000 artefacts were taken from the museum and about a million books and manuscripts were looted or burned. US forces also took the archives of the Ba’ath Party and various government ministries out of Iraq.

About 170,000 artefacts were taken from the Iraqi national museum and about a million books and manuscripts were looted or burned.

The archaeological sites suffered as well. For example, the occupation forces built military bases on the ancient ruins of Babylon and Ur, and a helicopter launchpad damaged the theater of the Assyrian king Nebuchadnezzar. When ISIS emerged, of course, there was more destruction of Iraq’s cultural heritage in the areas it controlled. The trade in smuggled antiquities filled the coffers of ISIS.

When it comes to the environment, we are beginning scientific studies about the impact of military ordinance on public health. Iraq has effectively been at war since the 1980s. During the 1980s, when Iraq invaded Iran, there was extensive use of chemical and biological weapons on both sides. The 1991 Gulf War left a lot of depleted uranium in the soil, and UN agencies recorded an increase in the number of cancer patients as a result. Iraq is a space where the United States has experimented with weapons systems since the 1990s, resulting in a great deal of environmental degradation.

Daniel Finn

What was the nature of the political system that was put in place under US domination after 2003?

Dina Rizk Khoury

The United States came into Iraq with two stated purposes. The first was to overthrow Saddam’s dictatorship and set up a democratic system. The second was to establish a free-market economy unregulated by the government, in which foreign companies as well as companies built by the Iraqi diaspora would have the lion’s share in the task of reconstruction and developing Iraq’s oil reserves. There was a deeply entrenched view after the Cold War that held that liberal democracies only flourish when you have free markets and the state sector of the economy is dismantled.

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the administrative body set up by the United States to govern Iraq in the first year of the occupation, proceeded to implement a series of measures that were meant to eradicate all the remnants of the institutions that had formerly governed the country. A number of observers have described this as a process of state-building in reverse.

The Coalition Provisional Authority devolved the security and military functions of the Iraqi state to US military forces, foreign contractors, and private militias.

The CPA disbanded the Iraqi army and devolved the security and military functions of the state to an amalgam of US military forces, foreign contractors, and private militias aligned to political parties that were empowered by the occupation. There was an attempt to “de-Ba’athify” all state institutions, which meant political and economic disenfranchisement and criminalization for tens of thousands of people who were primarily Sunni. This fueled the insurgency and a sectarian civil war, particularly in the Arab regions of Iraq.

Iraq was a one-party state until the Americans occupied it. It was necessary to be a member of the Ba’ath Party if you wanted to work in state institutions, go to university, or be part of the military, even if you weren’t an active member of the party or didn’t belong to its upper echelons. This “de-Ba’athification” process thus affected a large part of the population.

In place of the Ba’ath, the United States set up an interim government that was supposed to be a constitutional democracy. However, Washington envisaged a different kind of constitutional democracy than we would be familiar with in Western Europe or the United States itself, for example.

The United States and its Iraqi allies saw Iraq as being divided along ethnic, tribal, and sectarian lines. In such a divided country, where the divisions were supposedly entrenched in culture rather than along economic and social lines, the only democratic system that could work would be one that gave proportional representation to the communities in a parliamentary system.

US policy makers and their overseas Iraqi supporters saw the Ba’ath regime as being dominated by the Sunni minority. To reset the balance and make sure that all communities had representation, they believed, it was necessary to divide power along communal and ethnic lines. The constitution that was ratified in 2005 set up a confessional system of representation in which parliamentary seats, the executive branch, and the resources of the state were divided up between political parties organized around sectarian and ethnic agendas. This was known as the muhasasa system.

Under this system, the president of the republic would be Kurdish, the prime minister would be Shia, and the parliamentary speaker would be Sunni. It was very similar in its construction to the much older Lebanese system of democratic politics. However, this was totally new to Iraq — there was no history of it — whereas the Lebanese system had antecedents in the nineteenth century and was reinscribed under the French colonial mandate during the interwar period.

In its crudest iteration, this system furnished the scaffolding of a political and economic bargain among Iraq’s post-invasion political class to divide up the state’s ministries and institutions and privatize its resources according to ethno-sectarian quotas. The main beneficiaries have been the Shia blocs, which remain in power up to the present, with Sunni parties as their junior partners. The Kurdish parties have control in the areas ruled by the Kurdish Regional Government.

While these elites may have a fractious relationship with one another in their continuous bargaining for a greater share of the pie, they constitute a new political class with economic interests and a common style of governance. They build power by offering patronage to supporters who become their clients. They appoint people to positions in the various ministries under their control. This is their main way of winning support.

By 2011, when the US forces left, most state institutions had become arenas of competition between highly militarized political parties.

The funding for this patronage comes from state resources. Instead of being invested in the economy, these resources are used to buy clients. By 2011, when the US forces left, most state institutions had become arenas of competition between these highly militarized political parties. Corruption is built into the system at the expense of rebuilding the country and developing its economy for the benefit of Iraqi citizens.

Daniel Finn

How was Iraq’s political economy — its oil sector in particular — transformed during the occupation?

Dina Rizk Khoury

The United States went into Iraq with the aim of imposing a friendly client regime. A large part of its interest in doing so was to develop Iraq’s oil resources. The country has the world’s fifth-largest oil reserves. The United States and its allies were interested in opening up the development of Iraqi oil to American and European companies.

During the 1990s, Iraq had functioned under a crippling sanctions regime in which it could only produce enough oil to feed its own population. It couldn’t sell its own oil either — it had to go through an international body set up by the UN that monitored the sanctions regime. Its infrastructure had become debilitated, so there was a lot of work to be done. The Americans and the Iraqi elite who came in with the occupation thought this was a perfect opportunity to begin privatizing the production and marketing of oil.

The Iraqi oil industry, which accounted for 85 percent of state revenues, had been nationalized in 1972. There were several attempts after 2003 to pass a new oil and gas law that would privatize it. A law to that effect was introduced in parliament in 2006 and 2008. It faced great opposition from Iraqi parliamentarians who said that oil was the patrimony of the Iraqi state. It was also opposed by labor unions in the oil industry and by political parties like the Sadrists.

There were several attempts after 2003 to pass a new oil and gas law that would privatize the Iraqi oil industry.

In response, the government devised a way of getting around this opposition. It said that Iraqi oil would remain a national resource under the purview of the oil ministry, but that foreign companies would be granted what were known as technical service contracts to develop the oil fields. In return, they would receive either a share of the profits or a set fee per barrel of oil produced. As a result, the Iraqi state lost control of the production of oil.

By 2009, all new oil and gas development was allocated to international oil companies in production-sharing agreements. These companies had the right to manage the oil fields with very little oversight by the Iraqi government. The workers in the oil sector had previously been employees of the Iraqi state, but they now found themselves employed by these foreign oil companies and their subcontractors. The oil workers’ unions objected to this and tried to stop it.

The privatization of Iraq’s energy resources proved very lucrative for the international oil companies, particularly the subcontractors in construction, security, and the transport of oil. These subcontractors also included Iraqi businessmen and political figures who were in partnership with the oil companies, especially in shipping and marketing. By 2013, oil production in Iraq still hadn’t matched its levels before 2003, in part because of the overcharging and corruption that came with the new production and drilling contracts.

When we think about the political economy of oil, it’s important to look at who benefits from the new arrangements, apart from the companies involved in the oil-production agreements, of course. The main parties and militias draw their funds from control of the marketing, transport, and smuggling of oil. There is an entrenched political system that has the primary resource of oil at its disposal. It can enrich itself at the expense of the state coffers or investment in more sustainable economic activities like industry and agriculture.

Political, security, and business entrepreneurs have amassed vast wealth and influence from the new political economy of oil. It’s difficult to exaggerate the negative consequences of this misuse of public resources for working Iraqis who are not part of this elite. The system of power that was set up after the US invasion is dependent on the distribution of wealth through clientelism and the sale of public offices.

The privatization of Iraq’s energy resources proved very lucrative for the international oil companies, particularly the subcontractors in construction, security, and the transport of oil.

The official unemployment rate in Iraq today is 16 percent. Among the youth, it’s much higher — 36 percent. Most Iraqis work in the informal sector. They have no protection, job security, or social benefits because the state is bankrupt. This precarious class includes people from various social backgrounds: university students, health professionals, teachers, and so on. It supplies the fuel for massive protests against the Iraqi political system that continue to erupt in the country.

Violence and Political Fallout

Daniel Finn

You’ve touched on this already when talking about the nature of the Iraqi political system, but could you tell us a little more about the main political forces that were competing for power in Baghdad after the US withdrawal?

Dina Rizk Khoury

The first and most important Shia bloc is the Dawa Party of Nouri al-Maliki, who was prime minister between 2006 and 2014. The second is the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, which has more followers in the southern parts of the country. These two parties were based in exile in Iran during the period of Ba’athist rule before they came to power after 2003.

Both parties had pro-Iranian agendas. They saw Iran as their protector and saw themselves as the protectors of Iranian interests, although the Supreme Council’s offshoot, the Hikmah movement of Ammar al-Hakim, is now trying to distance itself from Iran.

The other strong political force is the Sadrist movement, which is led by a charismatic figure, Muqtada al-Sadr, the descendant of a venerable family of Shia clerics, many of whom suffered at the hands of the Ba’ath. Muqtada al-Sadr sees and projects himself as a nationalist. He regularly mentions the fact that the Sadrs never left Iraq and are not allied to Iran — although he is very cautious in his relations with Iran at the same time.

Muqtada al-Sadr has managed to remain part of every government coalition while also presenting himself as an honest alternative to the corrupt Shia parties.

He is a populist who appeals to the disenfranchised population. There are Sadrist strongholds in Baghdad’s popular quarters and in the south. The Sadrist militia, the Mahdi Army, fought against the US occupation and played a central role in the sectarian war, particularly in Baghdad.

Al-Sadr has navigated the politics of Iraq masterfully. He has managed to remain part of every government coalition while also presenting himself as an honest alternative to the corrupt Shia parties. At various times, he has expressed his agreement with the protesters challenging the corruption of the system. He has extricated himself quite cleverly from his militia background and continues to present himself as a populist, a nationalist, and a protector of the poor.

There are other secular parties such as the Communists and others connected with the Iraqi diaspora figures who returned after 2003. However, they have always played a minor role and are in effect junior partners of the main Shia parties. You also have the Sunni parties, who had become marginalized in the political system by 2011.

A number of Sunni political groups decided to run for parliament and take part in the system as junior partners. But they were discredited in the eyes of most Sunnis because they could not persuade the Shia parties to deliver resources to Sunni-dominated areas. This was what fueled the al-Qaeda insurgency in those areas in 2007–08.

That led in turn to the so-called Sunni Awakening, an alliance of tribal leaders supported by the United States to fight against al-Qaeda. By 2011, al-Qaeda had been defeated and its remnants were scattered elsewhere. Yet Anbar and Fallujah remained quite neglected.

The Kurdish parties dominated the regional government, particularly the Kurdistan Democratic Party, led by the Barzani family, which was based in Erbil, and Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, based in Sulaymaniyah. These parties controlled the government in the Kurdish areas and had their own militia. The federal army has no presence there.

Daniel Finn

What factors lay behind the sudden collapse of the Iraqi state and army in the areas where ISIS took control?

Dina Rizk Khoury

The rise of ISIS may have seemed quite sudden to outside observers, but there was a history behind it. The areas where ISIS took control were marginal and neglected by the Iraqi state. The inability of the central government to deal with Sunni demands in Fallujah and Anbar province in 2012–13 led a number of young people to travel to Syria and join ISIS because they did not think there was any hope of getting assistance from Baghdad. There had been well-organized protests in those areas that were violently suppressed by the Maliki government.

The rise of ISIS may have seemed quite sudden to outside observers, but there was a history behind it.

In addition, ISIS arose in a particular national and regional context. There was a pro-Iranian government in Iraq that was openly sectarian and corrupt and a murderous government in Syria that was also supported by Iran. This led to a radicalization of the Sunnis in both Iraq and Syria that was supported by Turkey and some Gulf States.

The Maliki government had also used its control of the interior and defense ministries to fill the ranks of the army and the security services with supporters who had very little training and operated with an openly sectarian agenda. Those forces in Mosul were unequipped to deal with the rise of ISIS — they just turned and fled when ISIS came.

Daniel Finn

How did Iraqi state managers and their allies respond to the challenge from ISIS in both political and military terms? How would you characterize the long-term consequences of that response for Iraq?

Dina Rizk Khoury

The takeover of Mosul by ISIS came as a surprise to the Maliki government. The rapid disintegration of any government presence in the north generated panic among the Shia population as well as the government. They were saying to each other that there was going to be a massacre of the Shia by the Sunnis, harking back to the early history of Islam. Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the premier religious authority among the Shia, issued a call from the holy city of Najaf urging all Shias to take up arms and fight against ISIS.

The rapid disintegration of any government presence in Iraq’s north generated panic among the Shia population.

This call led to the formation of the Popular Mobilization Forces by the Iraqi government. This was a state-sponsored umbrella organization composed of several armed factions. While the majority of those factions were Shia, they also included Sunni Muslims from Anbar province and Christians, as well as Yazidi groups.

The Popular Mobilization Forces were mobilized to fight against ISIS in the north, along with a counterinsurgency unit trained by the United States, certain sectors of the Iraqi army, and the Peshmerga forces of the Kurdish Regional Government. Between 2014 and 2016, this coalition of forces waged war against ISIS and ultimately defeated the movement. There was a massive deployment of air power, with about eleven thousand air strikes launched against ISIS, particularly in the Mosul area.

The US and Iraqi governments saw ISIS primarily as a military problem. The political conditions that allowed ISIS to take power were not discussed at all. They simply declared that ISIS was an evil force and people who supported it were evil. The only solution required to get rid of ISIS from this perspective was a military one. There was very little attempt to deal with the factors behind the support for ISIS.

Because of that, the post-ISIS landscape in Iraq has not been very promising. It resulted in further militarization of Iraqi society and politics. The Popular Mobilization Forces are still powerful players in Iraqi politics. They have become a political bloc that can protect its own interests and that plays an important role in managing the areas that were retaken from ISIS.

The Iraqi state has never had a monopoly of violence, as most states do. It is an amalgam of political groups that wield power through their militias. The Popular Mobilization Forces have now become part of the political scene. The Iraqi government continues to see a military response as the only way to deal with potential threats to its legitimacy.

Another result was the strengthening of the Kurdish territorial reach in areas beyond the Regional Government’s undisputed territories. These were areas that the Kurdish Peshmerga helped win back from ISIS and that the Kurds were not willing to give up easily afterward. They have claimed that the Yazidis and other minorities who inhabit these areas are actually Kurdish and therefore should be part of the Regional Government’s jurisdiction. This has compounded the fragmentation of Iraq’s territorial space into cantons controlled by parties.

There has been no serious effort at reconstructing the areas devastated by the war against ISIS.

There has been no serious effort at reconstructing the areas devastated by the war against ISIS. There was a conference in Kuwait where pledges were made to provide hundreds of millions of dollars in aid for reconstruction, but this has not materialized. Those areas are now worse off than they were before ISIS came to power.

About a million people have been internally displaced. This includes people whose families were accused of collaborating with ISIS and who fear retribution if they go back. The Iraqi government is not doing anything to reassure them.

Protest and the Future of Iraq

Daniel Finn

What was the nature of the protest movement that emerged in 2019? What features did it have in common with the protests that were unfolding more or less simultaneously in countries like Algeria, Sudan, or Lebanon?

Dina Rizk Khoury

Let me begin by answering the second part of your question about the common features of these protest movements. They were all dominated by young people from a generation who feel abandoned by their governments. Their basic rights to education, health care, and employment have been completely eroded, in part because of the push for privatization and liberalization of the region’s economies and the dismantling of state services.

These young people were largely nonideological in the sense that they didn’t belong to political parties with clear ideological agendas. Their agenda was primarily for basic human rights. They understood those rights to include social rights as well as political rights in the liberal sense of the term.

They also shared a common repertoire of protest, as social scientists call it. That involved the occupation of public squares — retaking the spaces of the city for organizing protests. They picked up certain slogans and images from elsewhere. For example, the 2019 Iraqi protests borrowed the face of the Joker from protesters in Chile. This was a very savvy group of young people organizing through social media to get around the repressive apparatus of the state.

What distinguished the Iraqi case is the particular context in which those protests emerged. There was a generation of Iraqis who were raised under the late Ba’ath regime and then the US occupation and the system it established. They rejected the claim of political parties organized around sectarian agendas to represent them and demanded a new order that would embrace all Iraqis.

The protests in Iraq arose from a complete failure of the state. The Iraqi government was experiencing a clear crisis of legitimacy.

In that sense, they differed from the other protesters because they were trying to create a sense of civic engagement and Iraqi nationhood. This was a challenge that protest movements elsewhere didn’t have to grapple with — apart from in Lebanon, where there was also a challenge to political parties based on sectarianism.

The protests in Iraq also arose from a complete failure of the state. The Iraqi government was experiencing a clear crisis of legitimacy. We already saw the beginning of organized protests in 2015, while the fight against ISIS was in progress. Even though ISIS posed an existential threat to Iraqi Shias because of its sectarian agenda, the protesters were still ready to challenge the corruption of the political order at that time.

By 2019, the protests were drawing in wider sections of the population. The 2015 demonstrations had been concentrated in southern areas like Basra, but they now spread to cities all over southern and central Iraq from October 2019. The protesters were mainly Shia, although Christian and Sunni Iraqis also expressed their support.

Civil society groups such as the women’s movement and labor unions had been growing in Iraq during the 2010s. The Iraqi Communist Party assisted in the organization of unions, and they also received support from international labor organizations in trying to revive what had once been a fairly strong union movement before the Ba’ath took power. There were unions of students and professional groups such as teachers as well.

These civil society organizations joined the protests and helped sustain them. For example, doctors would go to the tents that were set up in Tahrir Square to help. Unions would establish their own tents to support the protestors. The protests expanded beyond the youth to incorporate a wider cross section of the Iraqi population.

Daniel Finn

How did the Iraqi government respond to the protests and the crisis of legitimacy that you alluded to?

Dina Rizk Khoury

The scale of the protests alerted the government to the serious problem it was facing. Its response was violent: in the first six months, six hundred Iraqis were killed by the state forces, and about twenty thousand were injured. But the government then had to curtail the violence.

This was partly because the protesters had the protection of the Sadrist movement, at least until January 2020. Muqtada al-Sadr played his usual mediating role, telling the government that the protesters had legitimate demands and that his movement was going to protect them. He sent his followers onto the streets to protect the demonstrators against the violence of the state. In doing so, he also expanded the size of the protests, since he has a large following.

Muqtada al-Sadr played his usual mediating role, telling the government that the protesters had legitimate demands and that his movement was going to protect them.

Al-Sadr changed his position after the US military killed the head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, Qassem Suleimani, and the leader of the Popular Mobilization Forces, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, at the beginning of January 2020. The Sadrists then withdrew their support, saying that they did not want to weaken the government and accusing the protesters of being funded by the United States.

Eventually there was a less violent response that involved trying to co-opt the protests by promising more public sector jobs. When the protesters articulated a clear political agenda, demanding the government’s resignation and calling for fresh elections under a new electoral law, the government promised to respond.

Daniel Finn

What was the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the political situation in Iraq? Was it possible to maintain any form of effective social mobilization?

Dina Rizk Khoury

The pandemic played a critical role in limiting the ability of Iraqis to mobilize. It wasn’t the main reason why the protests petered out, but it certainly discouraged people from taking to the streets for what might be super-spreader events. The failure of the government to respond in the way that it should have to the pandemic then left Iraqis in a position where they had to fend for themselves throughout the crisis.

Daniel Finn

What potential would you say exists today for the kind of political action that could establish a more democratic and egalitarian system in Iraq?

Dina Rizk Khoury

It is very difficult to radically transform the current political system in Iraq. The most that we can hope for is reform within the system itself. That means elections that are more inclusive of the different political forces, as well as the independent secular parties that have been organized in the wake of the protests.

One section of the protest movement decided that the only way to bring about change was to participate in the system.

In October 2021, there were elections held on the basis of a reformed electoral law. It was now possible to vote for individual candidates, whereas under the previous system, your vote would only count if you voted for a party that belonged to one of the blocs. For the first time, we saw people running for election as independents outside of the parties.

In that election, one section of the protest movement decided that the only way to bring about change was to participate in the system, while others insisted that change could only come through revolution and the overthrow of the system. There was a relatively small group of independents elected who were aligned with the protest movement, and the Sadrist party won the largest number of seats. As I discussed previously, the Sadrists have been able to navigate in the space between government and popular politics in a way that has allowed them to survive and flourish.

There are a number of potential pitfalls within the field of electoral politics. The newcomers who were elected as independents have no experience and have to learn how to operate as a united front, while the Sadrists are unstable allies for those seeking to bring about change.

After their election victory, the Sadrists tried to form a majority coalition with Sunni and Kurdish forces that could take up some of the demands of the protesters for reform. But these efforts at coalition-building fell apart. In June 2022, they withdrew completely from the government, which left the door open for traditional Shia parties to come in for business as usual.

However, business as usual is not viable in the long run. The Iraqi state is more or less bankrupt, and the International Monetary Fund is demanding further privatizations. The established parties have built their political strength on their ability to dispense government appointments, but they can no longer carry on doing so.

In the current situation, change will have to be incremental. All of these parties are militarized, and violent confrontations between the different Shia parties would compound the fragmentation of Iraq. There is no revolutionary option for the protesters: they are going to have to work within the system as it currently exists, with regular protests around certain issues and perhaps also changes of government.

Israel eliminates Islamic Jihad commander in Syria, terror group claims

Islamic Jihad vows revenge after senior terrorist from its military wing shot and killed in Syria, allegedly by Israeli agents.

By The Associated Press

A commander in the Palestinian Arab terrorist group Islamic Jihad was killed in Syria on Sunday in what the organization described as an assassination by Israeli agents.

The Al-Quds Brigades, the military wing of the Islamic Jihad group, said in a statement that Ali Ramzi al-Aswad, 31, was killed Sunday morning in the Damascus countryside in a “cowardly assassination with bullets bearing the fingerprints of the Zionist enemy,” referring to Israel.

There was no immediate statement from Israel on Sunday’s alleged assassination.

The Islamic Jihad said in a statement Aswad’s family had left the Israeli city of Haifa in 1948 and settled in the refugee camps in Syria, where he joined the organization as a young man.

In 2019, Israeli warplanes fired missiles at the home of Akram al-Ajouri, a member of Islamic Jihad’s leadership living in exile. Ajouri was not harmed, but his son was reportedly killed in the attack.

Last month, airstrikes on residential areas in Damascus that Syrian officials said killed at least five people were attributed to Israel. An Islamic Jihad official warned Israel in a statement that there would be “a decisive response without delay to any assassination attempt (on) the leaders of the resistance.”

Israel has carried out hundreds of strikes on targets inside government-controlled parts of Syria in recent years, including attacks on the Damascus and Aleppo airports, but it rarely acknowledges or discusses the operations.

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