Defense Minister Gallant calls to halt judicial reform legislation

“The branches need a new balance, which will strengthen public faith. But such sweeping changes cannot occur without dialogue.”

By World Israel News Staff

Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on Saturday night made a dramatic televised appeal calling on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to halt the judicial reform, warning that the rift in the country has caused “immediate and tangible danger” to Israel’s security.

Gallant acknowledged that changes to the judiciary were needed, but that they should happen through dialogue.

“The branches need a new balance, which will strengthen public faith. But such sweeping changes cannot occur without dialogue.”

“I have never encountered the intensity of anger and pain as I have seen now. The rift within the nation has penetrated deep into the IDF and the defense establishment – this is a immediate and tangible danger to the security of Israel,” he said.

He also called on the opposition to put an immediate end to the IDF reservist protests.

Likud MKs Yuli Edelstein and David Bitan backed Gallant’s call to halt the legislation.

Edelstein, who chairs the Knesset’s powerful Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, thanked Gallant for “joining the path I’ve been leading for weeks.”

“The majority of the people want and understand the need for changes in the judiciary, but this must be done with patience, dialogue and widespread negotiations in order to reach a wide consensus,” he said in a statement.

Bitan tweeted: “I back the words of my friend the defense minister.”

Opposition leader Yair Lapid hailed Gallant’s “brave and critical step.”

“The coup seriously harms national security and it is his role and responsibility to stop the dangerous escalation,” Lapid said.

“Stop everything, do not pass the change in the committee for the appointment of judges and the Deri law this week, and come and hold talks at the president’s residence,” he added.

National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir called on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to fire Gallant.

“I call on the prime minister to fire Gallant, who came in with the votes of the right, but surrendered to the pressure of those who refused orders [to serve in the military], and tries to put a stop to the important reform,” Ben Gvir said.

Communications Minister Shlomo Karhi expressed remorse that “our defense minister gave in to pressure from the left.”

He added that “we won’t cancel the people’s vote to satisfy the elite and the media.”

The post Defense Minister Gallant calls to halt judicial reform legislation appeared first on World Israel News.

WATCH: Ultra-Orthodox teens record record-breaking 96% pass rate in Israel’s tough CPA exams

“Our goal was single-minded: to pass the exam and start working.”

By World Israel News Staff

Israeli lawmaker Moshe Gafni (UTJ), who chairs the Finance Committee, this week hailed a record-breaking 96% pass rates for Israel’s CPA exams by ultra-Orthodox Beis Yaakov seminar students, beating out leading universities by a large margin.

Of the 95 young charedi women who took the test, which is known for being extremely difficult, 91 passed.

“Our goal was single-minded: to pass the exam and start working,” Maayan Hanun, a charedi woman who recently passed the exam, said. “When you have such a goal in mind, you run with it all the way. It was our lives for the past two years and nothing got in our way.”

“הוכחה שהחברה החרדית היא הזדמנות – לא נטל”: 96% מתלמידות הסמינר החרדיות שניגשו לבחינת ההסמכה בראיית חשבון עברו אותה בהצלחה – בלי תעודת בגרות@AkivaWeisz pic.twitter.com/v6dXYqx85V

— כאן חדשות (@kann_news) March 20, 2023

“I told everyone I met as well as everyone who knows me to pray for me to pass. Me and the girls I study [the course] with went to the kotel the day before the exam. My aunt recited psalms until the exam was over,” Chaya Saruk, another passing candidate, said.

Bar Ilan University came second, but by a much lower pass rate. Of the 97 students who sat the exam, only 67% passed. Tel Aviv University recorded a pass rate of 54% for 39 students, while only 34% of the 47 students from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem passed.

The post WATCH: Ultra-Orthodox teens record record-breaking 96% pass rate in Israel’s tough CPA exams appeared first on World Israel News.

John Brophy Is the Most Important Labor Leader Nobody Knows

John Brophy earned the moniker “Mr. CIO” in the 1930s for his excellent organizing for the Congress of Industrial Organizations. He was steadfast and never flashy, which is perhaps why he’s been forgotten. It’s also what makes him a model for our times.

Labor leader John Brophy (1883–1963). (Wikimedia Commons)

Like many readers of this publication, I have a special place in my heart for one Bernie Sanders. The period bracketed by his two presidential primary runs has been without question the most exciting political moment of my life. Despite his losses, I still think Bernie is the model for the Left of a principled and strategic politician. We do ourselves no favors in hastening a “post-Bernie” era or thinking we have nothing left to learn from the man.

Above all we can learn from Bernie’s consistency. It’s what allows him to stand aloof from the culture wars, a seeming moral anchor in a rancorous and cynical political climate. It’s what endowed him with the trustworthiness that made it possible for a democratic socialist to have a shot at winning the nomination of an avowedly capitalist party. If you’ve heard one Bernie speech, you’ve heard them all: unionized jobs, Medicare for All, a Green New Deal. He’s so steadfast and predictable that his critics can’t decide whether to condemn him for being an extremist or for being, well, boring.

Bernie belongs to a long and rich tradition of American radicalism. Of its many luminaries, one embodies this quality of consistency particularly well, and perhaps this is why his name, John Brophy, is not a household one. Brophy was a true working-class hero: as national director of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) during its ascendance, Brophy was a key player in many of the struggles that laid the groundwork for the New Deal order. And as the one person to internally challenge John L. Lewis — perhaps the most egotistical and spiteful maniac the American labor movement ever produced — before Lewis’s departure from the CIO, Brophy stood boldly for democracy and solidarity at a high personal price.

It should also be said that Brophy was indeed boring: friends called him “loquacious,” but even close colleagues would sometimes wince before going into meetings with him, knowing Brophy’s penchant for exercising ten words where one would do. Loquacity aside, Brophy had that same Sanders consistency. His basic program — nationalizing basic industries, shortening the working day, organizing the unorganized, giving working people a greater voice in American democracy — was formulated early on in his life and echoed unwaveringly throughout. Brophy always put principles before personal matters, and his steady manner helped channel volatile personalities into productive organizational action, action that just so happened to lay the groundwork for the most prosperous time for working people in American history. We should all aspire to be so boring.

Son of the Mines

Brophy was born in an English mining family. His father and his uncle, John’s namesake, were both miners. His grandfather died of a stroke while waiting to be lowered into the shaft, and even his great-grandmother was a miner before female labor in the mines was outlawed. The only traditions that ran as strong as mining in the Brophy family were Catholicism and unionism. When Brophy came with his family to the United States from England at age nine, he remained rooted in all three family traditions.

Despite enduring the pressures of desperate poverty and working as a full-time miner in Pennsylvania beginning at age twelve, Brophy found plenty of time for reading. He recalls in his autobiography that one of the greatest events of his childhood was when his mother collected some quantity of boys’ magazines from a lady for whom she did domestic work. In his adolescence, he was especially drawn to the writing of Richard Ely, Henry Demarest Lloyd, Henry George, Eugene Debs, and other critics of capitalism.

Brophy speaking at an outdoor labor rally at Six Mile Run, Pennsylvania, August 17, 1924. (Catholic University of America Digital Collections)

Brophy was a unionist above all else, but he was close to both socialists and socialist analysis. Economist Carter Goodrich said Brophy was a radical “of the sort whose favorite words are ‘program’ and ‘plan’ and ‘thought out beforehand.’” From very early on, and consistently throughout his career, he was sharply critical of the ultra-left, particularly the Communist Party. He believed that a clear, bold progressive program — the nationalization of the mines, organizing the unorganized, a six-hour day, and union democracy — laid out the best course between a blinkered business unionism and Communist “intellectualism.” Despite this position, he opposed red-baiting where it divided unionists.

In 1917, Brophy was elected president of District Two of the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), and in 1926, he challenged John L. Lewis himself for the presidency of the whole union in a campaign entitled “Save the Union.” Lewis, of course, was later to be the face of the CIO, but in the mid-1920s he had few organizing triumphs to his name and was making the UMWA more autocratic by the day.

When Lewis won the election, Brophy knew that there had been foul play at work. But he and allies like Powers Hapgood also believed that his insurgent campaign had been skillfully split by Lewis’s red-baiting, which made much of the fact that Communists had supported Brophy, despite their disagreements. Hapgood lamented, “Must they [Communists] always be told to go to hell and their cooperation refused in certain things in which every honest progressive believes merely because we differ from them in ultimate revolutionary ideology?”

Brophy’s defeat was complete. Not only did he lose his local presidency, but Lewis also expelled him from the UMWA for supposed “dual unionism.” From his expulsion in 1928 until his return to mining and unionism in 1933, Brophy, who had dedicated his life to the labor, was effectively exiled from the labor movement.

The only traditions that ran as strong as mining in the Brophy family were Catholicism and unionism.

Lewis had totally vanquished his rival, but having done so, he found himself commanding a quickly shrinking empire: from a high of half a million bituminous coal miners in 1921, membership had fallen to eighty thousand by mid-1928. Lewis had soundly defeated the “Save the Union” campaign, and as implicitly promised, the union collapsed with the Depression.

“For downright blundering, mad, unreasoning, stupid, destructive, and disloyal leadership,” District 12 president Frank Farrington seethed, “Lewis’s action has never been equalled by any leader in the organized labor movement of America.”

Back in Action

In June 1933, the same month that the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) passed, Brophy returned to mining and to his local. Word got back to Lewis, who invited him to meet. As if he had not ruined the man’s life, Lewis explained to Brophy that their past differences were simply over the question of “timing,” not substance. Brophy was understandably wary of Lewis’s overtures, but he nonetheless accepted a UMWA staff job when it was offered.

Brophy finally returns to good standing in the UMWA in 1934. (Catholic University of America Digital Collections)

Lewis, for his part, had indeed changed. He was still the same power-obsessed petty tyrant, but he understood the moment better than most: Section 7a of the NIRA, guaranteeing workers the right to “organize unions of their own choosing,” was a game changer. In September 1933, Lewis capitalized on rank-and-file rebelliousness to pressure operators and Roosevelt into a contract covering all of the major bituminous districts.

With a generational victory in the bag, Lewis looked around him and chastised other labor leaders for squandering an opportunity. The craft orientation of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) was its limitation, and Lewis was determined to overcome it. His determination was symbolized in the right jab that Lewis landed on carpenters’ union president William Hutcheson, one that he supposedly delivered after having leapt over several rows of chairs at the October 1935 AFL convention. A month later, the first CIO office in Washington, DC, was opened by Brophy, now the CIO’s national director.

Brophy conferring with John L. Lewis at the 1937 CIO convention. (Catholic University of America Digital Collections)

It’s difficult to know what gave Lewis such confidence in Brophy, given their history. Perhaps part of it was a “keep your friends close, but your enemies closer” philosophy. Maybe he also understood that his own dominant personality needed some balancing for the organization to be successful. By all accounts, Brophy’s impact as director was a universally positive one. In Walter Reuther and James Carey’s portrayal:

He was in the forefront of every organizing campaign that made national headlines during the last six years of the 1930s. It was John Brophy who helped rally striking rubber workers in Akron after they discovered that they could “shut the machines down.” It was John Brophy who climbed a barbed-wire fence in Flint to encourage sitdown strikers not to surrender. It was John Brophy who went to New Orleans and Jersey City despite publicized threats that if he addressed scheduled labor rallies, he would never leave either city alive. And, it was John Brophy who helped form the Steel Workers Organizing Committee.

If anything, Reuther and Carey underplay his role in the sit-down strike in Flint. Brophy had the foresight to see that UAW president Homer Martin was not up to the task of holding out on GM during the strike, and he stepped in to serve as a key liaison to Governor Frank Murphy, skillfully finding ways for him to avoid breaking the strike. After the strike, he was also the CIO’s representative on the negotiating committee, bringing much-needed contractual knowledge to the table.

It was Brophy who climbed a barbed-wire fence in Flint to encourage sit-down strikers not to surrender.

Brophy also played the key role in developing the CIO’s internal culture. He personally drafted the regional structures, central bodies, and certificates of affiliation that gave the CIO internal structure and established it as a true rival organization of the AFL. And despite his own aversion to Communism, he defended people like Harry Bridges of the longshoremen’s union against red-baiting. Anything that divided the labor movement was abhorrent to Brophy.

Brophy with Powers Hapgood (left) and Adolph Germer (right) organizing the rubber workers in Akron, Ohio, 1936. (John Brophy, A Miner’s Life [University of Wisconsin Press, 1964]).More generally, Brophy traveled ceaselessly during this time, serving as a mediating link between the rank and file and CIO leadership. For this he gained the moniker “Mr CIO” — a development that no doubt rankled Lewis. He also challenged Lewis on substantive questions: for instance, Lewis was initially opposed to the Tennessee Valley Authority, which he saw as a threat to coal production in the region. Brophy eventually convinced him that “an organization which stood for improving the conditions of the common people could not oppose the TVA.”

Servant of the Program

For all this, Brophy’s position was an appointed rather than elected one. When the time came in 1938 to elect leadership in an organization that Brophy gave structure to, Lewis publicly opposed his candidacy for secretaryship, putting forth his daughter Kathryn instead.

It’s possible that Brophy could have won the election despite Lewis’s opposition, given the respect he had earned as national director. But ever wary of causing internal division, Brophy would not allow his name to be put up for nomination. As his autobiography editor notes in frustration, “He never allowed himself to become a ‘big shot,’ nor was he diverted from what he liked to call the ‘larger program’ in pursuit of lesser objectives.” The next year he was replaced as organizational director by Allan Haywood, a Lewis acolyte.

He never allowed himself to become a ‘big shot,’ nor was he diverted from what he liked to call the ‘larger program’ in pursuit of lesser objectives.

Sister Camilla Mullay, Brophy’s biographer, speculates on a few possible reasons for Brophy’s demotion. The only other person to be demoted in 1939 was Bridges, leading many to think that the “menace of Communism” was at the forefront of Lewis’s thinking. But Brophy was well-known to be as opposed to Communism as any other CIO leader, and much more aligned philosophically with the socialists. (Brophy was never a member of the Socialist Party, as he believed the “rigid doctrines of Marxist materialism” were at odds with his own Christian humanism, but in most matters of political ideology and practice, he was a socialist.)

Mullay finds more convincing the idea that Lewis believed Brophy simply unsuitable to the moment. Workers had been pounding at the door demanding to join the CIO in the mid-’30s. Lewis saw the road ahead to be a more difficult one from an organizing perspective, and perhaps he felt that Haywood, an apolitical yes-man who liked being “one of the boys,” was more appropriate to the task of organizing the unorganized than Brophy, the mild-mannered intellectual and religious abstainer from drink.

The obvious reason for Brophy’s demotion, however, might be the truest one. Brophy was the anti-Lewis, a reputation he could not live down even while acting as Lewis’s spokesman. Mullay helpfully summarizes their differences:

Except for a brief period in the mid-nineteen thirties, John L. Lewis personified for Brophy the laissez-faire philosophy, the business unionism, and the dictatorial leadership that he detested as evil. Philosophic differences led Lewis to give in to the coal operators in 1922 when Brophy held out for continuing the strike. This philosophic divergence caused Lewis to write in 1925 that the coal industry could be cured by the free play of natural economic laws, and Brophy to urge the nationalization of mines. Typical again were their attitudes in the 1928 election: Lewis voted for Hoover, Brophy, for Thomas. Actually Lewis’ drive to organize the unorganized, which drew Brophy to his side as an enthusiastic collaborator, sprang not from the desire to push the entire larger program, but from the need to secure the UMWA flanks, the captive mines owned by the steel industry. Lewis demanded personal loyalty, Brophy, union democracy. Lewis was concerned with personal power, Brophy with principles, institutions, and movements. Lewis thought it fitting that he be chauffeured in a limousine to his big office; Brophy believed a labor leader should live like a rank-and-filer.

Given their opposition, it makes sense that Lewis and Brophy’s relationship would end bitterly — and that when Lewis turned the reins of the CIO over to Philip Murray and then promptly alienated himself from Murray, Sidney Hillman, and other labor leaders, Brophy once again found a home in the CIO. Murray appointed him to the War Labor Board, where he tirelessly championed economic planning led by labor. As he said in 1941:

It has become apparent during the last decade and more that industrial management, if left to its own devices, is utterly incapable of organizing our American economy on a basis of full production, high wages, and low prices. It is essential that other elements of our society step into that breach. . . . Labor alone at once knows how the job is done and has the will to do it, not in the interest of private profit, but with the welfare of the nation as a whole in mind.

Brophy was particularly drawn to the CIO’s Industry Council Plan (ICP), which proposed “the creation of joint industry and labor management councils” to be responsible for managing each of the industries jointly. This plan was hatched during the war to coordinate defense production, but Brophy saw the plan as an urgent peacetime initiative as well. He spoke on the ICP consistently at CIO conventions, well past the point when anyone else in organized labor was listening, through to his retirement in 1961 and passing in 1963.

Writing to Walter Reuther in 1958, Brophy described the aim of the ICP as “democratically arrived at policies dealing with the use of America’s natural resources, the elimination of depressed areas, and the availability and cost of electric power.” After the war, he served on the Missouri Valley Authority (MVA) Committee and pushed for the creation of an MVA on the model of the TVA. As with the ICP idea itself, the MVA was one of Brophy’s “vigorous instruments for attaining the long-range goal — full integration of workers into the social and economic planning process,” a goal that was both untimely and timeless.

Brophy laying a CIO wreath in Mexico with Walter Reuther and Dan Benedict on December 13, 1954. (Catholic University of America Digital Collections)

Being Boring From Within

The historian Robert Zieger has written that “until 1941, in most things except name the CIO was the UMW and John L. Lewis.” To the broader public, Lewis’s gigantic face and booming voice personified the new labor behemoth.

But comparatively out of sight, moving from town to town, mine to mine, plant to plant, Brophy gained the reputation of being “Mr CIO.” It fit him much better than it did Lewis, who could only ever be John L. Lewis. Brophy, by contrast, melded with the organization in its period of ascendance, and he bore a lifelong commitment to the basic principles for which the CIO is known — organizing the unorganized and incorporating workers’ voices into an industrial democracy.

Out of sight, moving from town to town, mine to mine, plant to plant, John Brophy gained the reputation of being ‘Mr CIO.’

Of the many lessons Brophy’s life and social philosophy have to offer, the fundamental simplicity of the socialist program might be the most important. Despite all its enemies’ bluster about scandalous extremism, at the end of the day socialism is just not that interesting. In the face of political demagoguery and absurd culture wars, it points back again and again to material interests and worker empowerment. Contemporary socialists may fill magazines and podcasts with infinitely interesting discussions of the “leftist perspective on x,” but socialism itself is fairly bereft of opinions. It doesn’t know the latest. It’s not holding court at a bar. It is impervious to “vibe shifts.”

If Brophy is any example, we could all do well to be a little less interesting, less opinionated, less acerbic, and much more focused on the long-term program. Bayard Rustin once wrote in a very different political context:

Genuine radicalism . . . is not measured by how loud and abusively one can shout or by the purity and beauty of one’s rhetoric. Rather, genuine radicalism seeks fundamental change through concerted, intelligent and long-range commitment. . . . Obviously there is much wrong with the trade union movement; obviously there is much wrong with black people in the United States; obviously there is much wrong with white liberals; obviously wherever we look we can find fault. But the only result of endless fault-finding is that you end up in a corner with the few people who are as good and pure as you are. It renders impossible the building of a political movement capable of directing its attention to the most basic task of all — the redistribution of wealth. . . . Those self-appointed spokesmen who raise divisive issues to prove the superiority of their politics are not really radical. By confusing and distracting from the real sources of social change, they retard the struggle for equality and justice.

When the next upsurge happens, it will be incumbent on the Left to cast off its own quixotic concerns and serve as the trusted and principled channel through which the demands of working people are directed to transformational gains. This means, among other things, being more principle than personality, more program than opinion, more Brophy than Lewis. “The most important labor leader nobody knows” has much to teach us in this regard.

Much of the biographical material here is taken from Sister M. Camilla Mullay’s 1966 dissertation, “John Brophy, Militant Labor Leader and Reformer: the CIO Years,” and John Brophy’s autobiography, A Miner’s Life. Also consulted were Melvyn Dubofsky and Warren Van Tine’s John L. Lewis: A Biography, and Robert Zieger’s The CIO: 1935–1955.

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Academic Workers at Rutgers University in New Jersey Are Poised to Strike

Unions representing grad workers, postdocs, and faculty at Rutgers University have been without a contract for almost nine months; earlier in March, they voted by 94% to authorize a strike. We talked to two workers about their contract fight.

A Rutgers AAUP-AFT demonstration. (Rutgers AAUP-AFT / Facebook)

At Rutgers University in New Jersey, graduate student workers, postdocs, and faculty have been working without a contract since June 30 of last year. Workers say that the university is refusing to budge on their unions’ core demands, which include living wages, greater job security for adjuncts, and better health care coverage for adjuncts and certain categories of grad workers. On March 10, Rutgers American Association of University Professors–American Federation of Teachers (AAUP-AFT), representing grad workers and full-time faculty, and the Part-Time Lecturer Faculty Chapter (PTLFC) AAUP-AFT, representing adjuncts, announced that their members had voted overwhelmingly to authorize a strike, with 80 percent of members turning out to vote, and 94 percent of them voting in favor. Jacobin’s Sara Wexler spoke to worker-organizers from each union about their contract demands and why they say workers are ready to go on strike.

Sara Wexler

Can you tell me what led to this strike vote?

Bryan Sacks

My unit is the adjuncts’ union at Rutgers, the PTLFC. What led to the vote was a fairly long campaign that we undertook going back at least a couple of years. To be fair, we didn’t know it would lead to a strike authorization vote — but it did because of, broadly speaking, management’s intransigence, its delay tactics, and its unwillingness to seriously consider the core demands that we’re making as we negotiate a contract.

Our contract expired June 30, so we’ve been out of a contract around nine months. We’ve put forward a host of proposals, but the three central ones are demands for equal pay for equal work, for job security provisions that we currently lack, and for subsidized health care consistent with other employees at Rutgers.

Liana Katz

My unit is the full-time faculty and grad worker unit; we also represent postdocs as well as education opportunity fund counselors. Since our contract expired, we’ve been engaged in a massive push of grassroots organizing, in parallel with the bargaining that we’ve done at the table with the university administration.

This has involved a lot of different things. It has looked like actions on the ground and informational pickets at all of Rutgers’s campuses. It has looked like members going out and talking to other members, posting up in publicly accessible parts of campus just to be visible and build a community around the union. We’ve also had members leading trainings in phone banking, essentially doing a massive outreach push to folks who are already union members, as well as to those who had not yet joined the union to bring them into the fold.

We’ve been doing this work in parallel with Bryan’s union, with the adjuncts as well as with undergrad students and several community organizations in New Brunswick, which is where the largest Rutgers campus is located. We have a series of demands on the table right now that we refer to as our “bargaining for the common good” demands. These concern undergrad student issues, as well as community issues. So we’ve been organizing in tandem — not just with members in our own unit, but also community members and students.

Bryan Sacks

We’ve been organizing continuously for the last couple of years. We pride ourselves on being a democratic union. Our executive board, which is comprised of about fifteen people, prides ourselves on democratic unionism. We strive to stay in close communication with our members, because our theory of democratic unionism is that we’re only as strong as our members. We made very clear to our members all along here as we built up to this — this approach to “peak militancy” — that we can’t win anything ourselves. There’s fifteen of us. We can only do it with the eight hundred or 1,200 or 1,700 or hopefully as much as 2,600 or 2,700 PTLs [part-time lecturers] who teach in the course of a year at Rutgers. That’s where our power lies.

We pride ourselves on being a democratic union. Our theory is that we’re only as strong as our members.

We all take that very seriously, and that’s played itself out in regular town-hall communications, various social events, happy hours, and such. Our organizing committee has worked on each of Rutgers’s campuses to reach out to rank-and-file members more or less on a continuous basis. What accounts more than anything else, I would say, for that 94 percent yes vote is folks who are engaged, who’ve been informed, and who’ve told us they want action.

Sara Wexler

Could you say a little bit more about the undergraduate and community involvement?

Liana Katz

We’ve been primarily organizing with a group of students who are part of an organization called Rutgers One on the New Brunswick campus, and with community groups Cosecha and New Labor, which are rooted in New Brunswick, and they’ve put forward and developed a series of demands. The primary one, I would say, is calling for a rent freeze in all the properties that Rutgers owns because rents have been skyrocketing in New Brunswick. It’s not only unaffordable for students.

Another issue for students is that the condition of the dorms that they live in that Rutgers owns and maintains is incredibly poor — with issues from sewage leaks to mold in the showers — for the price that they’re paying now. The price is not reflected in the quality of the housing that they have access to.

But also, there’s this upward pressure on rents in New Brunswick because Rutgers is the largest landlord in that community. So when Rutgers raises its rents, it puts pressure on landlords to raise their rents as well, and it’s becoming increasingly unaffordable for community members to stay in place. So that’s a joint community and student demand.

Also, we’re looking at things like ending the punitive practices that the university has around fines and fees for undergrad students: they’re not able to access their transcripts or graduate if they have outstanding debt to the university. We’re trying to end that practice as well as create a fund for workers who were left out of the governmental COVID payments during earlier phases of the pandemic. New Brunswick has a large immigrant community, and some of its members, due to citizenship status issues, did not have access to those federal government payments.

Sara Wexler

What do you want to see in the new contract? What are your demands?

Bryan Sacks

There are dozens of individual demands, but the three core demands that the Rutgers adjunct union is making are for equal pay for equal work with our full-time nontenure-track teaching faculty colleagues, for longer-term appointments and work guarantees within those appointments — job security — and for subsidized health care, either in the form of participation in the state health benefits program, or through participation in the plan that’s offered to grad fellows at the university.

The first of those, equal pay for equal work, refers to the fact that, depending on how you determine what a fair, full-time equivalent is for the work that nontenure-track full-time faculty do, we’re paid by somewhere between 40 and 100 percent less. We’ve made demands to address that yawning gap, which opened up about ten years ago; before that our salaries were not identical but were more closely in alignment.

Our contention is that we do basically the same work as those nontenure-track teaching faculty. They strongly support our demands, by the way; they’re part of Liana’s unit as well. We are very happy, of course, that they achieved the salary gains that they did two cycles ago. But we want PTLs to be paid equally to what they’re paid, and we’ve proposed fractional appointments to address that — that PTLs would be paid a fraction of what NTTs [nontenure-track teaching faculty] are paid based on that full-time equivalent combined with their minimum yearly salaries. We put that across the table to the administration back in June. It took until December for us to get a counterproposal, and we’ve only had one exchange back and forth since.

That second demand, for job security provisions in the form of longer terms . . . Adjuncts at Rutgers work term to term, no matter how long they’ve been here. You can’t accrue any real security, no matter if you’ve taught for five years, ten years, or fifteen years in some cases. One person on our board has been here forty-two years, and she still works term to term. That means we have to reapply for our jobs every term. We need to get new appointment letters every term.

Adjuncts at Rutgers work term to term, no matter how long they’ve been here. You can’t accrue any real security.

It’s a source of great frustration, and it’s undignified, of course. This is one of the things we hear most from our rank-and-file members. We want timely appointment letters, and we want longer appointments.

In some ways, health care is the hardest demand, because of the state’s involvement in the health benefit program — for example, there’s a need for litigation to get PTLs full participation in the state plan. But without getting far into the details, we do have a strategy around moving the ball significantly on health care.

Sara Wexler

What are the grad student workers’ demands?

Liana Katz

The demands are certainly overlapping in the sense that adjuncts and grad workers are some of the most vulnerable and some of the most taken-advantage-of workers at Rutgers. We’re fighting for basic provisions that we need to sustain ourselves, that you would think wouldn’t be this hard for us to achieve. But here we are.

We have several core demands for grad workers, the first of which is a salary that moves us closer to earning a living wage in the area of New Jersey where Rutgers is. Currently grad workers who are working as a TA [teaching assistant] or a GA [graduate assistant], which is a research assistant — if you’re on a nine-month contract, you earn just a little bit over $30,000 a year. We also have a category of grad workers who are on fellowship, who earn even less, usually around $25,000 a year; for a nine-month appointment, that can go even lower, to $20,000. There may be some grad workers who are earning even less than that.

What we’re asking for in terms of salary is for grad workers to be started at around $37,000 at the beginning of the contract, and then that would go up to around $41,000 at the end. Again, this is just a basic need that we have because we’re not earning enough to support ourselves, to support our families, while we’re trying to complete our degrees — at the same time as we’re doing an immense amount of work for Rutgers University itself.

A second crucial demand is that grad workers on fellowship be brought into the bargaining unit with TAs, GAs, and full-time faculty. Right now, they’re not part of our bargaining unit. They’re not considered workers by the university, even though in some cases, especially in STEM fields, they’re performing the same work over the course of their time at Rutgers whether they’re a research assistant or on fellowship. When you’re on fellowship, again, the pay is even worse than when you’re a TA or a GA, and you don’t have access to the state health insurance that TAs, GAs, and faculty members have access to.

I’ve had two years on fellowship and two years as a TA, and I’m switching back and forth between not only earning different amounts of money, but also between different health insurance plans. I think this is an issue that affects a lot of grad workers who are on fellowship. If you have serious health concerns or are just trying to stay on top of your health needs, it’s extremely challenging to go back and forth between the one plan that’s pretty good and another plan that’s really not adequate. We want to bring fellows into our bargaining unit so that they can receive the same pay and the same health insurance as teaching assistants and research assistants.

Our other two demands are around access to funding. The first one is a demand for five years of guaranteed funding for grad workers who are pursuing a PhD. Funding packages are extremely uneven across the university. In my department, we have access to four years of guaranteed funding, but there are other departments where you might only have two or one. It depends on the financial situation of your department and what it can offer you when you’re admitted.

In most cases, even in the departments where you have a more generous funding package, it’s often not enough to successfully complete your degree and to do the work that you set out to do when you began your graduate education. So we’re asking for a guaranteed five years for those who need it. We’re also asking for a one-year funding extension for people whose research was delayed by the pandemic. Many of us were forced to completely stop our research during that time or had very limited access to our labs or our field sites. For many grad workers who are trying to finish up their degrees now, their timelines have been severely delayed. Departments have done what they can to support their grad students, but we need the university to step up in this moment and provide extra funding for those of us who need it.

Sara Wexler

Have there been any updates from the university since the strike authorization vote?

Bryan Sacks

On Friday, the presidents of our two unions were sent letters by the special counsel at Rutgers, who’s also the head of the Office of University Labor Relations. He leads bargaining for the university’s side, and the letter, which referred to a potential work stoppage, was meant to intimidate. I think that’s a fair assessment of it. It referred to communications that union leadership was making to its members and concern that some of those communications might not be fully informing our members as to the consequences of a work stoppage or strike, which, as they were told, is plainly illegal.

The administration needs to show our members that it has heard us. To date, it has not.

Now, in New Jersey, there’s no statute that prohibits public employees or public university employees from going on strike. There’s a case-law environment that is open to interpretation for sure. But this was expected. The university wants us to think that it’s going to take the strongest possible actions against any action that we take, in an effort to scare members or to intimidate us. I’m not going to be intimidated. I’m going to listen to what my members say, and I’m going to communicate with those members what the situation is and allow for the best decisions to be made on their behalf.

Sara Wexler

How do you feel about the prospect of going on strike?

Liana Katz

Something that has happened since we have taken that strike authorization vote is that we’ve started doing picket line trainings so that if we end up going out on strike, we can do so safely and effectively. Last I was told, we’ve already had 250 people sign up for those trainings. Those are people who are interested in leading and organizing their own picket line, which I think is a strong showing that we are ready and that our members are ready for this, should we decide that we need to take this step.

Bryan Sacks

Members of my unit took that training today, which they reported back was very well attended, and it’s still in early days for sign-ups. The sign-ups are happening every day. So we are encouraged by that.

At the same time, of course, we want a good, fair, negotiated settlement that meets our demands. That’s what we want. You take a strike authorization vote for a variety of reasons, and one of them is to signal to the university that you’re prepared to take the strongest actions if it continues to not be satisfactorily responsive to what you’ve been proposing. I take that responsibility very seriously. Nobody who’s in a position of elected leadership should expose their memberships to any undue risk — but the key word is undue. The administration needs to show our members that it has heard us. To date, it has not.

Sara Wexler

How has the contract fight affected the academic community at Rutgers?

Bryan Sacks

One thing that’s been very heartening for my unit, the adjuncts’ unit, is that we’ve been brought in and made part of a coalition of Rutgers unions that coalesced around the beginning of the pandemic. I’m talking now about nineteen unions at Rutgers that have more than twenty thousand members total in them. We formed a coalition to respond to the various impacts that the pandemic was bringing to bear. So we’ve been working with one another since that time on a variety of issues that have cropped up, related to the impact of the pandemic health and safety issues, remote work, telework — things like this that affect a lot of different units.

We’ve made great progress in getting the administration to deal with us collectively. Prior to the time I’m referring to, the administration had no interest in being at the same table or even being in the same room to negotiate impacts, say, for something like the pandemic. But we’ve won the ability to do that. We are currently bargaining over several provisions together — not all nineteen of us, of course, because not all nineteen unions are up for a contract. But that has been critical, that there is both an actual coalition and a coalition mindset among various unions.

You referenced the strike authorization vote that was taken by Liana’s unit and my unit; also the medical faculty recently completed their own vote. Being in such close alignment with the other faculty locals has been extremely heartening for my unit, adjuncts, who for a variety of reasons often feel like we’re out there by ourselves at the university, invisible, forgotten, and often as a result of that, the first to be disposed with when the administration can get away with it.

Liana Katz

There is a narrative out there, which the university administration is also pushing a little bit, that union organizing and a strike would be harmful to students: if their professors and their TAs are not holding class, they’re going to be missing out on their vital education that they’ve come to Rutgers for. Something that’s been exciting for me is seeing the close organizing between our unions and also our undergrads, because they’ve done a lot of work to do outreach to their peers — going to classrooms, for example, and doing class reps, educating folks about the bargaining situation, educating folks about what union and labor organizing means, what it looks like, what it has looked like on Rutgers campuses in the past, and what it looks like in the present.

It’s been great to work with the undergrad activists and see this close collaboration between students, faculty, and grad workers across the board, because we are the ones who make Rutgers what it is. We’re the ones who do the work, and we are the ones who create the community there. It’s deepened our relationships across all of these different communities that make up the university.

This coming Friday, there is going to be a punk show that is a fundraiser for our joint full-time and adjunct unit strike funds. There’s a storied punk community in New Brunswick that has these famous house shows — this was an idea that originated there, with students and community members who wanted to do something in solidarity and to mobilize the local bands, mobilize their communities in support of the potential strike and our union organizing.

Sara Wexler

How do you imagine the new contract changing things for students, faculty, and postdocs at Rutgers?

Liana Katz

For grad students, these demands have the potential to be extremely transformational. If we’re able to attain what we have put across the table now, or close to that, it’ll get grad students much closer to a living wage, which would allow folks to take care of themselves and their families much more effectively. It would also allow us stability as we pursue our degrees and perform work on campus. And I think these demands have the potential to make pursuing a PhD more accessible to a wider category of folks who might not be able to do so because of how much you get paid when you’re doing grad work.

What’s equally exciting is that all the organizing that we’ve done, the fact that we’ve put these bold demands on the table . . . I think it sets us up nicely to continue to do this work, to continue to grow our movement, and to have the power to ask for even more next time.

Bryan Sacks

From the perspective of PTLs: if we’re able to achieve these demands, it’ll put a real dent in the degree of contingency and the precarity that we live in at Rutgers and have been forced to live in our entire careers. It will allow PTLs to do things like plan their lives for more than a few months out. To know that we’ll actually have an appointment that might go on for a year or two years or three years will allow us to feel part of departments — to feel that we’re not just, in the very fitting word, an adjunct, who’s there to do a job as little as possible and more or less be invisible.

If we’re able to achieve these demands, it’ll put a real dent in the degree of contingency and the precarity that adjuncts live in at Rutgers and have been forced to live in our entire careers.

And it’s going to be a benefit for students, for us to win our demands. We can’t tell students that we’ll be around to mentor them next term. We can’t even tell them a lot of times what classes we’re teaching. When they ask us, “Professor, I’d like to take another course with you, what are you teaching?”, we can’t even tell them that. A lot of times, we can’t meet them in our offices, because we don’t have offices. Sometimes between semesters, the university shuts down our email accounts because we’re no longer employees and we haven’t been hired for the next term, and students are trying to communicate with us. We only learn afterward. Who knows how many times we never learned this, because they don’t ever see us or hear from us again?

This kind of thing is outrageous at a university that’s supposed to prioritize student experience. As bad as precarity is for adjuncts, it’s also terrible for students. So we anticipate, to the degree that we can win these demands, that we can change the relationship between adjuncts and the university, and therefore also change the relationship of a lot of students with their university.

“Global Hegemony”: America’s Grand Strategy in the Asia-Pacific

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Abu Ghraib Survivor: Taking the Hood Off 20 Years After Iraq War

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When Tito Turned to the West

During the Cold War, Yugoslav socialist Tito tried to chart a course apart from the Soviets. But his actions enraged Stalin — putting Tito on the unlikely path of seeking Western support and revealing the difficulties of nonalignment amid great power politics.

Josip Broz Tito with US House Speaker Carl Albert in the 1970s. (Carl Albert Research and Studies Center, Congressional Collection via Wikimedia Commons)

In his memoir Conversations With Stalin, apparatchik-turned-dissident Milovan Djilas reports an awkward interaction with a Soviet handler during a 1948 trip to Leningrad. “In no Party in Eastern Europe,” the handler intimated, “is there such a closely watched foursome as yours.” The party was the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), and the foursome was Djilas, Edvard Kardelj, Aleksandar Ranković, and Tito. These were the CPY’s four most powerful members in the late 1940s, but Tito — the nom de guerre of Josip Broz — stood above the rest as the unquestioned leader of Communist Yugoslavia.

Why did the Soviets keep such a close eye on their ostensible comrades in the Balkans? After all, the Yugoslavs were, as the Marxist writer Isaac Deutscher describes them in his biography of Stalin, “up till 1948, considered to be the most dogmatic and fanatical of all European Stalinists.” After they took power in 1945, Tito and his comrades quickly and diligently constructed a new state along impeccably Soviet lines. According to historian Ivo Banac,

The Yugoslavs were not only the first to abolish monarchy in Eastern Europe, they were also the first to adopt a Soviet-style constitution (January 1946), the first to institute legal procedures against church dignitaries of episcopal rank (the trial of Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac in October 1946) and the “opposition within the united front,” the first to use rigged trials against their own wayward members (the Dachau trials of April and August of 1948 and July 1949), the first to introduce Soviet-style planning (First Five-Year Plan of April 1947 with the highest rate of state investment of 27 percent of GNP in Eastern Europe) and the first to establish collective farms (1,318 by the end of 1948).

The Soviets supplied Yugoslavia with substantial economic and military aid, and the Yugoslavs were an important part of the “socialist camp” in its burgeoning confrontation with its former allies in the war against Hitler. Many of Tito’s leading military officers were trained in the Soviet Union, and he did not hesitate to hide his loyalty to the Kremlin. “If the Red Army needs us to lead its march toward the English Channel,” Tito declared in 1946, “we’ll be there tomorrow!”

Just two years later, however, Stalin expelled the CPY from the Cominform (the Communist Information Bureau, the successor to the Communist International, or Comintern); ruling parties in the Soviet satellite states waged a vicious purge campaign against alleged followers of “Tito-fascism” in their ranks; and well-founded fears of a Soviet invasion had Tito turning to the United States and the newly established NATO alliance for a lifeline.

What happened? According to Deutscher, the “years of armed revolutionary struggle” against the Nazis and their collaborators transformed Tito from a “puppet into a man and leader”; Stalin “sensed the change, and grew suspicious” of Tito’s stature and autonomy. The Yugoslavs charted their own course during the Partisan war, and they were not about to give that up despite their fundamental alignment with the Soviet system. Tito became accustomed to occupying a position of command, and enjoyed enormous prestige as the leader of a national liberation movement that won its victory largely on its own strength. Stalin could not suffer a potential rival with an independent spirit in the Communist bloc, and he acted accordingly.

The conflict ran deeper, however, than a personal rivalry between two extremely strong-willed leaders. The Spanish Marxist Fernando Claudín, in his two-volume history The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform, identified the fundamental question underlying the breach: Was “Yugoslavia to be an independent country or a ‘socialist’ colony? This conflict was the underground war in which the Soviet and Yugoslav secret services engaged in from 1945.”

Tito emerged from the Partisan war and revolution as a leader who wanted to chart his own course, not just at home but in world politics.

Tito was a fervent Communist who owed his position at the head of the CPY to the Soviets, who purged the previous party leadership amid the great terror of 1937. But he emerged from the Partisan war and revolution as a leader who wanted to chart his own course, not just at home but in world politics. This impulse clashed not just with Stalin’s ego, but with Stalin’s calculations of what would best ensure the security interests of the Soviet state in the postwar order. This put the erstwhile comrades on a collision course, which in turn compelled Tito to look to the capitalist West for help against the Kremlin — a turn that would have been unthinkable for the Yugoslav Communists just a short time before.

It is difficult to revisit this history and not see certain parallels with current tensions in Russia’s “near abroad,” including the war in Ukraine. In both instances, the regional power’s search for security against the West (first by the Soviet state, then its Russian successor) led it to seek an imperial relationship with its intended subordinate, only to see the strategy backfire.

In Yugoslavia’s case, Soviet attempts to restrict its sovereignty pushed Tito to establish closer economic and military relations with the West, thereby helping NATO consolidate its position in southeastern Europe. In Ukraine’s case, Russian attempts to keep the country in its orbit by indirect means failed. The full-scale invasion aimed at installing a pliant regime in Kyiv has been a strategic disaster for Russia by accelerating Ukraine’s westward turn. As Russia continues to decimate Ukraine, Ukrainian support for NATO membership and a generally pro-Western orientation has risen to an all-time high, and it may end up pushing away former Soviet republics in central Asia and the Caucasus too.

Realism came in for a beating in the wake of Russia’s invasion, not least because some leading realist scholars, namely John Mearsheimer, appeared to justify or excuse it. But in both the Yugoslav and Ukrainian cases, the players involved all behaved the way certain realist theories, including Mearsheimer’s, would have predicted. The Soviets, then the Russians, sought to restrict the sovereignty of smaller neighbors; those states resisted, and in doing so turned toward outside powers with their own interest in coming to those smaller states’ aid. In both cases, the fundamental problem for the Soviets and Russians was a lack of hegemonic capacity and an overreliance on coercion to achieve strategic goals.

In both the Yugoslav and Ukrainian cases, the players involved all behaved the way certain realist theories would have predicted.

Despite these similarities, however, it is important to avoid essentializing the USSR and its Russian successor; there is not an unbroken continuity through all of history. The Soviets adopted different approaches to their neighbors in East Central Europe in different times and places.

In Finland, the USSR exercised something akin to hegemony by limiting the scope of Finnish foreign policy but largely staying out of domestic policy (an arrangement commonly known as “Finlandization”). In the later stages of World War II and the immediate postwar period, it flexed its power in countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia through its Communist allies’ participation in broader coalition governments, and later shifted to a strategy of full-blown Stalinist imperialism as the Cold War intensified.

The Yugoslavs were unique in their successful resistance to both Finlandization and imperialism, which was made possible by their relative geographic distance from the USSR and the capacities they built through freeing themselves from the Nazis without decisive Red Army intervention.

Collision Course

In the late 1920s, the CPY descended into intense factional struggles that dismayed the leaders of the Comintern. A Bosnian Communist of Czech descent known as Milan Gorkić led the party beginning in the early 1930s. He was an ardent Communist, but as Banac writes in With Stalin Against Tito, he was “not always an obedient underling: his impatience with discipline and with Moscow’s supremacy was an issue in several party rows during the mid-1930s.”

Gorkić’s pursuit of a more ideologically flexible party organization chimed with the new Popular Front line (the Soviet policy of supporting a broad coalition of anti-fascist forces), which he backed and implemented with aplomb. That did not sit well with opponents of the policy, many of whom were jailed in the notorious Mitrovica prison. From behind the prison walls, they waged a fierce struggle against Gorkić’s leadership, and at times each other. The Comintern grew fed up with the constant strife in the Yugoslav party, and in 1937 Gorkić was summoned to Moscow, where he was arrested, imprisoned, and eventually executed. Tito was appointed to lead the purged party and tasked with ending the rampant factionalism, disciplining the party’s ranks, and making it capable of executing the directives handed down from Moscow.

Tito stands with his cabinet ministers and staff at his mountain headquarters in Yugoslavia on May 14, 1944. (Imperial War Museums / Wikimedia Commons)

In 1941, the Nazis invaded Yugoslavia, defeated the king’s forces, and drove his government into exile in London. The Communists quickly took on a leading role in the resistance to Nazi-fascist occupation, which put them on a collision course with the Chetniks, Serbian nationalist rebels backed by the government-in-exile.

According to Banac, however, conflict with nationalist forces in the anti-Nazi resistance

was precisely what Moscow wanted to avoid. Stalin’s concept of the “Grand Alliance” against fascism not only set aside the long-term communist revolutionary aims, but actually implicitly obliged communists to support the restoration of previous regimes as a matter of national salvation.

In Stalin’s view, the CPY should concentrate only on carrying out a partisan war in the enemy’s rear, not making a social revolution that would risk antagonizing the United States, Britain, and other Allied powers.

Tito and his comrades disagreed. They pursued a two-front war against both the Nazi occupation and the old regime led by the exiled king in London, and for a social revolution in Yugoslavia. Moscow wanted the CPY to collaborate with the Chetniks against the Nazis, even as the Chetniks collaborated with the occupiers.

Georgi Dimitrov, the Bulgarian head of the Comintern, advised Tito not to establish new, Communist-dominated political organs to compete with the royal government-in-exile. But Tito went ahead with it anyway. In 1942, the CPY founded the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), followed by the establishment of its own government in 1943. The Communist-led resistance forces won military victories and extended their territorial control. Meanwhile, the Chetniks tarnished themselves by collaborating with the Nazis and committing atrocities against the civilian population. As the Partisans’ fortunes rose, the British abandoned the royalist government in favor of Tito’s AVNOJ in 1944, effectively making it the legitimate government of Yugoslavia.

Tito and his comrades pursued a two-front war against both the Nazi occupation and the old regime led by the exiled king in London, and for a social revolution in Yugoslavia.

Despite the wartime disagreements over strategy, the Soviets and Yugoslavs were closely aligned at war’s end. As historian Jože Pirjevec recounts in Tito and His Comrades, the Soviets supplied the Yugoslavs “with arms, munitions, and other essentials via a long-term loan. In addition, the two countries reached an agreement on trade and substantial financial aid for Yugoslav industry,” including joint Soviet-Yugoslav economic enterprises.

But the postwar honeymoon quickly turned sour. While the Soviets portrayed their joint enterprises as a boon for both countries, the Yugoslavs came to suspect them as vehicles to keep their country an underdeveloped supplier of food and raw materials to the Soviet metropole. Moreover, the Kremlin’s guardians of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy thought the Yugoslavs to be insufficiently deferential to Stalin’s supreme genius. Pirjevec cites a Soviet central committee opinion of their erstwhile comrades along these lines:

Tito and the other leaders of the CPY do not mention Comrade Stalin in their declarations as the most important theorist of our times — a worthy successor to Marx, Engels and Lenin. In their speeches, there is no hint of the groundbreaking role played by the communist parties, especially of the All-Soviet Communist Party (Bolshevik). The glorious influence of the Soviet Union, the only country to have successfully built a communist society, and which nurtures all human progress, is ignored.”

The Tito-Stalin Split

The burgeoning Soviet-Yugoslav conflict had economic and ideological dimensions, but its roots were fundamentally geopolitical. A civil war broke out in Greece in 1946, pitting communist rebels against the Greek monarchy. The Soviets did not come to the rebels’ aid, because Stalin had agreed to cede Greece to the Western sphere of influence in the “percentages agreement” with Winston Churchill. He did want to risk a new war with the West so soon after the devastating war with Hitler.

Tito and the Yugoslavs didn’t share their hesitations and provided extensive military aid to the Greek communists. The United States and Britain wanted to contain communism in the region, so they threw their weight behind the Greek monarchy.

With the Western presence in the eastern Mediterranean growing, Tito decided to resume discussions with the new Communist government in Bulgaria, led by former Comintern chief Dimitrov, about the possibility of establishing a Balkan federation. The British protested; Stalin agreed, and ordered the Yugoslavs to call off the talks.

Tito was ‘convinced that he could create a powerful state in the Balkans capable of achieving independence from the Soviet Union.’

Yet Tito not only persisted — he went further. As Pirjevec describes him, Tito was “convinced that he could create a powerful state in the Balkans capable of achieving independence from the Soviet Union and destabilizing the way in which the three great powers had divided the European southeast.” He sold the steps toward a Balkan federation primarily as a hedge against possible German aggression. But he also added, “We are not only against German imperialism, but against all those who wish to question our sovereignty” — a clear shot at his ostensible friends in Moscow. According to Pirjevec, the “final straw” for Stalin was Tito’s intention to turn neighboring Albania into a Yugoslav protectorate — a policy that Stalin did not actually oppose on its merits but rejected because Tito approached Tirana directly without consulting Moscow.

Stalin retaliated with a series of vituperative letters that attacked the Yugoslavs for various sins and errors, a campaign that culminated in the CPY’s expulsion from the Cominform in 1948. Fearing the possibility of a Soviet-engineered coup, Tito reacted by cracking down mercilessly on real and alleged “Cominformists” in the party. Somewhere between a tenth and a fifth of the party’s membership was caught in the dragnet, and thousands were shipped to the notorious Goli Otok prison island in the Adriatic to recant their alleged crimes.

Cut off from the rest of the Communist world and besieged at home, Tito sought help from the only available source — the Western powers, above all the United States. Ironically, Tito moderated his foreign policy along the lines Stalin had demanded to win economic and military aid from the West against Stalin, as well as Western support for granting Yugoslavia a seat on the United Nations Security Council.

Gamal Abdel Naser, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Tito. (Stevan Kragujević / Tanja Kragujević / Wikimedia Commons)

Tito’s fears of Soviet aggression were not misplaced. At the same time they expelled the CPY from the Cominform, the Soviets were tightening their grip on the “people’s democracies” of Central and Eastern Europe and purging alleged followers of “Tito-fascism” from the Cominform parties. The outbreak of the Korean War further alarmed the Yugoslavs, especially since the Kremlin issued thinly veiled calls for regime change in Belgrade while giving the green light for North Korea’s attack on the South.

In the summer of 1950 Nikolai Bulganin, a member of the Soviet Politburo, gave a speech in Prague declaring: “The Yugoslav people deserve a better fate, and the day when they will overthrow the Fascist Tito-Ranković clique is probably not far away.” Stalin and the leaders of the Soviet satellite states made real plans to invade Yugoslavia and overthrow Tito’s government, which they considered to be a “chained dog” of the Western powers. Tito had a long memory, and he did not forget what happened in Moscow in 1937 to his immediate predecessors at the head of the CPY.

He understood very clearly who he was dealing with, and he prepared accordingly.

Tito, the United States, and NATO

In 1951, Tito moved to get arms from the United States, sending his top diplomat and chief of staff on a secret mission to Washington for direct talks with the Truman administration. Military and economic aid started flowed from the West, and Tito publicly offered praise for the support. The Truman administration, according to Pirjevec, even “seriously considered the inclusion of Yugoslavia in NATO.”

The Yugoslavs’ path to NATO membership was ultimately blocked because of Italian opposition, as well as Tito’s fear that joining the Western military alliance would have been a bridge too far. Instead, Tito engaged in a series of clever diplomatic maneuvers. He agreed to resolve lingering conflicts with Italy over Trieste on the Adriatic coast, clearing the way for further Western aid. And in a truly remarkable U-turn, he ended his support for the Greek communists, and, in 1953, joined a military pact with soon-to-be NATO members Greece and Turkey. This effectively gave Yugoslavia access to the Western alliance without actually joining it.

The cooperation between Tito and the West was certainly not rooted in ideological or political agreement, but in mutual geopolitical interest.

The cooperation between Tito and the West was certainly not rooted in ideological or political agreement, but in mutual geopolitical interest. The Yugoslavs had an interest in defending themselves from a potential Soviet invasion and securing economic aid — particularly massive shipments of wheat, without which the country would have struggled to feed itself. The United States and its NATO allies had an interest in driving a wedge into the “socialist camp,” and in strengthening its military position in the alliance’s southeastern flank.

As it turned to the West for military and economic aid, the CPY also sought new political allies like the social democratic and labor parties of Western Europe; after being expelled from the Cominform, it considered joining the Socialist International.

This momentum, however, was interrupted by one of the biggest international events of 1953: the death of Stalin. According to Pirjevec, the “inclusion of Yugoslavia in the Western world would probably have continued if, on 5 March 1953, Stalin had not suffered a fatal stroke. He had persevered in his propaganda against Tito until the end and it continued by force of inertia even after his death.”

Relations between the Soviets and the CPY began to thaw when Nikita Khrushchev took leadership of the Soviet party, a development that also set back the progress of Yugoslav democratization promoted by figures like Djilas. Djilas, for years one of Tito’s closest comrades, was ousted from his leading role in the renamed League of Yugoslav Communists (LCY) in 1954 and spent many years in jail for his outspoken criticism of the Communist government.

Despite this thaw in relations, tensions between the Soviets and Yugoslavs did not die with Stalin. Tito was a leading founder of the Non-Aligned Movement to counter the influence of the two Cold War camps in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. He continued to hedge against the Soviets in Europe by maintaining generally friendly relations with the West, particularly the United States and Britain. He was dismayed by Soviet military intervention against popular revolts in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968, though he did not always publicly voice his criticisms.

Tito with Nikita Khrushchev in Skopje, August 22, 1963. (The State Archives of the Republic of Macedonia / Wikimedia Commons)

Over two decades after Stalin’s death, well into his eighties, Tito was still vigilant against Soviet machinations. During a 1976 meeting with Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev in Belgrade, Tito reacted to Brezhnev’s insistence that he would not speak in front of a certain LCY central committee member in characteristic fashion. According to those present, Pirjevec recounts, Tito “ripped the cigarette from Brezhnev’s mouth, crushed it on the carpet and yelled ‘You ox! We are not in Czechoslovakia here, and I am not called Dubček!’” He rejected Brezhnev’s requests for military bases on the Adriatic coast, refused to cease criticizing the Soviets among the nonaligned countries, and resisted the Soviet push for a closer relationship between the two countries.

After meeting with Tito near the end of 1976 the French foreign minister related the Yugoslav leader’s resolve to his American, British, and West German counterparts: “They made it clear several times that they’re determined to resist the Russians. I have never heard Tito say this before. This time, we heard him for one or two hours. It was clear that they would defend very strongly their independence, their integrity.” In addition to the already-rising tide of ethnic chauvinism in the Yugoslav republics, Tito and his comrades considered resistance to Soviet power one of their main tasks in the era of the interventionist Brezhnev Doctrine.

Against Poles, Camps, and Blocs

Fernando Claudín’s verdict on the Yugoslav-Soviet split is unequivocal:

In the face of encirclement by Russian imperialism, camouflaged under the label “socialist,” and by the Communist movement, still totally alienated by Soviet “myths”, the only defensive move abroad still open to the Yugoslav revolution was to take advantage of the “cold war” between capitalist imperialism and the new imperialism which was beginning to appear.

The Soviets certainly did not see themselves as imperialists. Indeed, they considered their state the world’s anti-imperialist headquarters. Different conceptions of imperialism abound, particularly in the Marxist tradition, and a singular definition has never really been settled upon.

Leninist conceptions have been the most influential, and these revolve around competitive struggles between national blocs of finance capital. If one defines imperialism as an expression of capitalist development, then noncapitalist states by definition cannot be imperialist. This isn’t particularly satisfying, and it often amounts to special pleading. If imperialism is understood as the coercive restriction of sovereignty of one political unit by another, then Soviet relations with Yugoslavia and the “people’s democracies” were clearly imperialistic.

The devastation of the “Great Fatherland War” spurred Stalin to pursue a policy of defensive expansion in its wake. As Valerie Kivelson and Ronald Suny argue in Russia’s Empires, the postwar map of Central and Eastern Europe was “an unambiguously imperial one, with formerly independent polities subordinated through military conquest and control maintained through differentiated, more or less indirect rule, terror, and force. In the late Stalin years Moscow determined the political and foreign policy choices of its East Central European satellites” in an attempt to counter the Western alliance. It tried to subject Yugoslavia to similar treatment but failed. Stalin resorted to coercion and threats to compel Yugoslavia’s compliance, but only succeeded in pushing Tito to look for external help.

The Soviets did not formally absorb their satellite states, nor did the United States in its own sphere of influence. As Kivelson and Suny note, “Latin American states learned the lesson that they had to consider the interests of their powerful northern neighbor in their allegiances, programs, and choice of allies,” and the United States was not shy about intervening with force if the lesson wasn’t learned.

At the same time, however, Kivelson and Suny argue that the US empire in the Cold War era didn’t operate the same way as the Soviet version. In their view, the United States exercised “a looser but powerful influence that eschewed much interference in the domestic arena but demanded loyalty to the hegemonic state in foreign policy.” As Franklin Roosevelt colorfully described Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza: “he may be a bastard, but he’s our bastard.”

As the world careens toward a new era of great power rivalries, it is worth revisiting the history of Yugoslavia’s attempt to chart its own course.

The Soviets did not impose their will on their smaller neighbors immediately after the war’s end, and at first permitted a degree of local autonomy. But as the Cold War took hold in the late 1940s, Kivelson and Suny observe, “Stalin pitilessly installed Communist Party dictatorships in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.” The Soviets generally lacked the kind of “soft power” resources the United States could marshal, which meant they often had to rely on naked coercion to achieve their goals. This is a major reason why Tito’s diplomatic initiatives in the emergent postcolonial world — where newly independent countries were wary of falling quickly under the sway of either the United States or the Soviets — were so successful.

As the world careens toward a new era of great power rivalries, it is worth revisiting the history of Yugoslavia’s attempt to chart its own course. One need not approve of Tito’s pharaonic tendencies, nor the anti-Stalinist Stalinism that defined the Yugoslav party and state, to appreciate the value of a project that seeks to overcome the logic of poles, camps, and blocs in the name of a wider solidarity.

The Weakness of Labor, Not Automation, Is the Greatest Challenge Facing Workers

Anxiety that automation is coming for workers’ jobs has reached a fever pitch. But talk of robots replacing humans often conceals a less complicated reality: management uses technology to undemocratically reorganize and intensify labor.

Machining of aluminum pistons at the Ford Motor Company’s Cleveland engine plant through automated equipment, 1955. (Bettmann / Getty Images)

Just last month, IBM’s chief executive warned that AI will automate white collar work, despite the fact that the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that there is little evidence to support the claim that technology is accelerating job loss. Labor productivity, which should be skyrocketing if machines really were rapidly replacing workers, has been exemplary for below-average growth. This mismatch between automation’s hype and its reality has a history.

In reality, automation has always been more ideology than technology. Coined in the 1940s, the idea of automation was first articulated by managers. Its purpose was to provide rhetorical cover for union busting by depicting human labor as technologically obsolete, even as workers continued to toil under degraded conditions. In the not-too-distant past, some on the Left have called for an automated and workless society, while others have warned of impending doom for working people at risk of replacement by machines.

What unites techno-optimists and dystopians about automation is that both look at the workplace from the perspective of management. From the corner office they equate increases to productivity — made possible by technologies that speed up and intensify the pace and quality of work — with laborsaving technology. But if the history of automation discourse is any indication, the Left has not benefitted from uncritically embracing the notion of automation to understand the investment and managerial decisions of capitalists. A clear-eyed look at the history of the term reveals that behind its rhetorical justifications, automation is simply another way of explaining away the control that capitalists have over the conditions and compensation of workers.

Automation: An Anti-Union Philosophy

In 1950, over a thousand workers struck the Ford Motor Company’s Buffalo stamping plant to protest a factory-wide speedup that forced workers to complete more tasks per hour than in any other factory in the Ford empire. In many ways, the strike was unremarkable; speedup was the rule in the postwar automobile industry, and workers everywhere hated it. What set the action apart was the fact that, in theory, no one was supposed to be working in the Buffalo plant at all. According to Ford, the factory possessed a revolutionary new technology: automation.

The word automation stood in for a story: that all technological development inevitably bent toward the elimination of human labor.

In 1950, the word automation was brand new, and like the Buffalo plant, it was a Ford product. The word’s first public use dated from 1947, when Ford opened its Automation Department. There, managers used automation to describe the introduction of the transfer machine, a mechanism that bored holes in engine blocks.

However, the transfer machine was not a new technology; it dated from the 1880s. What was actually new at Ford in 1947 was the industrial labor movement, in the form of the United Auto Workers (UAW). Famously hostile to organized labor, Ford had only recognized the union in 1941, and was the last major American automobile manufacturer to do so. Forced to bargain with the UAW, Ford executives sought to limit the union’s power, and they used the widespread technological enthusiasm following World War II to do so.

After the war, American industry appeared not only to have overcome the economic disaster of the Great Depression (“The capitalist dog has returned to his old vomit,” the historian Lewis Mumford rued in 1944), but also to have issued victory ready-made from its factories and laboratories. Breakthroughs like the development of the electronic digital computer and the splitting of the atom seemed to promise a new world where technology could solve even the most difficult problems of human existence. Ford vice president of production D. S. Harder called automation “a new concept — a new philosophy — of manufacturing.” According to management, technological progress itself, and not the profit motive, required that shop-floor power shift away from the worker (along with the unions employers were now legally compelled to recognize) and into the hands of the engineer and the manager.

The word automation stood in for a story: that all technological development inevitably bent toward the elimination of human labor, and that production would demand more technical skill than physical effort from the workforce of the future.

Automation and the Degradation of Work

So compelling was this new narrative of automation that even union officials took it for granted that the organization of the workforce had become as much a technical, as a political, issue. Deferring to the discourse in 1955, Walter Reuther, president of the UAW, remarked that “we stand on the threshold of a development of science and technology that will enable us to solve the problems that have plagued the human family for these many thousands of years. . . . We welcome any development that will lighten the burden of human labor.”

The rest of the automobile industry would follow Ford, using the pretext of automation not to abolish human labor, but to degrade and cheapen it.

But what management and union leaders called automation, workers described as a speedup.

When Soviet engineers visited Ford’s “automated” engine plant in Cleveland (which employed seven thousand people), they reported that the machinery was standard, but that the speed with which workers labored was unparalleled. Watching workers, they said, was “like looking at a speeding motion picture.” The work was degraded in other ways, too. The Cleveland engine plant paid workers, on average, eleven cents less an hour than their coworkers at the famous River Rouge facility in Dearborn, Michigan. “[A]utomation and down-grading as a result of job-dilution had gone hand-in-hand at the Cleveland plant,” the UAW found. According to labor organizer Nat Ganley, despite the fanfare around “the most modern push button machines, the most wonderful technical improvements,” workers were “compelled to turn out more production on the same machines, and the same job, than they were a dozen years ago.”

The rest of the automobile industry would follow Ford, using the pretext of automation not to abolish human labor, but to degrade and cheapen it. In the words of Simon Owens, a longtime worker at Chrysler, “automation has not reduced the drudgery of labor. Whatever Automation means to management, labor bureaucrat, or engineer, to the production worker it means a return to sweatshop conditions, increased speedup and gearing the man to the machine.”

Managers sped up and degraded black workers with particular intensity. Leaders of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers found that for “the black worker the pressure of production never ceases . . . . [they] are now producing at least twice as much as auto workers twenty years ago.” In particular, because of the “super exploitation of black labor, profits in auto have soared. . . . Often new black workers are forced to do the work of two white men.” (The postwar automation discourse in fact universalized an older, racist argument, applying it to the entire industrial working class: white supremacists a century earlier had depicted black labor as necessarily menial, and therefore prone to mechanization. Slavery and steam, said a former US Commissioner of Patents in 1859, were practical equivalents.)

None of what was going on at Ford was unprecedented in the history of industrial capitalism. When contemporary economists write about automation, it is usually as shorthand for labor productivity, or the amount produced per hour worked. The more productive labor, the argument goes, the more work vested capital — technology — must be contributing to production. There were certainly increases in productivity during the postwar period. Machines can increase productivity by speeding up labor, intensifying it, and even, at times, yes, replacing it. For that matter, managers compelling workers through nonmechanical means — like coercion, fear of unemployment, or wage theft — also wrest more “productivity” out of their employees. The postwar automation discourse, however, was distinct from the specific dynamics of capitalist competition that drive the relentless transformation of productive forces.

Since the dawn of industrialization, technological changes have, paradoxically, both increased productivity and generated work under newly degraded conditions. Increases in productivity have not resulted in less human effort, because the “work” of capitalism is limitless, and no breakthrough in productivity will persuade capitalists to let a resource to sit idle. It will both overuse human labor in one place and let it go to seed somewhere else; it will countenance huge reserves of untapped human potential for a time while working it to the bone moments later.

Rather than a general decline in human labor and the rise of a leisure society — a through line to some endgame where human labor will be pointless — we see a circular trend, where capital rushes from place to place, exploiting labor for a time, using it up, and then moving on to use it somewhere else. (“The bones of the cotton-weavers are bleaching the plains of India,” the British statesman William Bentinck averred in the 1830s, as English factory owners mechanized textile production and accelerated the expansion of English wage laborers, that proletariat of proletariats.) This fact is perhaps the most important difference between the enlargement of humanity’s powers to manipulate the natural world, and the realities of working under conditions of capitalism: no amount of power is ever enough.

By the 1950s, employers across the United States deployed the automation discourse to degrade working conditions. At the same time, union leaders, unable or unwilling to resist claims that human labor was becoming obsolete, attempted to bargain under the terms of automation, often with poor results. When the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) embraced the containerization of shipping in the infamous 1960 Mechanization and Modernization Agreement, it signed off on the creation of a bifurcated workforce of A-men who enjoyed full union benefits and B-men who did not, foreshadowing what by the turn of the twenty-first century would become typical in unionized industrial workplaces.

Rather than a decline in labor and the rise of a leisure society, we see a circular trend, where capital rushes from place to place, exploiting labor for a time, using it up, and then moving on to use it somewhere else.

Similarly, John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers (UMW) supported the introduction of the continuous miner in the 1950s under the assumption that technological change would lead to better-paid, secure jobs. It did not. And the United Packinghouse Workers of America (UPWA) understood the introduction of power tools to the disassembly line as “automation” (and therefore inevitable), only to discover in the early 1960s that the Automation Committee set up between the Amalgamated Meat Cutters (AMCBW), the UPWA, and Armour and Company had been, in the words of the UPWA’s president, a “façade of humaneness and decency that would conceal a ruthless program of mass termination of employees of long service and cynical manipulation of the natural fears of its employees to accomplish drastic cuts in wages and working conditions.”

Today, far from laborless, the meatpacking industry depends on an army of workers, whose jobs are in fact among some of the most fast-paced and dangerous in the United States.

The Left Adopts the Automation Discourse

While it may have begun as a story told by management, the automation discourse appealed to many on the American left. While classic liberal political thought had held that a free person might work, so long as they worked their own property, the mass dispossession of ordinary people through industrial capitalism now meant that the vast majority worked for wages on property they did not, and would never, own. The automation discourse solved this problem by erasing half of the equation: workers did not need to overcome the alienation caused by industrial modernity by finding freedom in their work, because control over the organization and distribution of labor was decided by the constant progress of science and technology.

But when left tendencies folded the idea of “automation” into their politics, the result was often that the labor process itself, as well as the workplace, lost a great deal of political importance in their analyses and activism. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) set up cells in northern cities to organize what they believed would be masses of white youth unemployed by automation. When they failed to appear, SDS adopted the “New Working Class” theory, calling for its members on college campuses to organize what it believed would be the workers of the future — skilled white collar professionals who would service the machines that replaced industrial workers. (The idea has had staying power as a liberal nostrum, with centrists calling for job-training and “learn-to-code” panaceas under the mistaken assumption that technological change inevitably creates demand for skilled labor.)

James and Grace Lee Boggs, closer to the labor movement than SDS, argued that “automation” would put the lever of revolution into the hands of black Americans by upskilling the white working class and marginalizing black workers to low-paying “scavenger” jobs. People who sought to bring about the revolution by organizing the workplace, the Boggses argued, had misplaced their energies. “These militants who are so advanced,” James Boggs wrote, “are really behind the average worker who has reconciled himself to eventual oblivion.”

Among some radical feminists, the allure of “cybernation” (a late-1960s synonym for automation) premised women’s liberation on an escape from biological reproduction. According to Shulamith Firestone, biology was the cause of sexism, and to liberate women from oppression, society needed first to “free humanity from the tyranny of its biology.” The demands of the body itself, rather than social relations, needed to be mechanized away. A political revolution, according to this view, required a technological one, shifting the site of struggle from the present to the future.

When left tendencies folded the idea of ‘automation’ into their politics, the result was often that the labor process itself, as well as the workplace, lost a great deal of political importance in their analyses and activism.

While Firestone called for escaping reproduction, the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) took a different tack. It called on the federal government to compensate mothers for their labor raising the next generation of Americans. Rather than dismiss reproductive labor as inherently degraded, activist Johnnie Tillmon called on President Richard Nixon to issue “a proclamation that women’s work is real work.” If motherhood was properly acknowledged and remunerated, it could be made coherent with a liberated subject. The NWRO, at least, could imagine a social revolution that did not require a technological breakthrough ushered into existence by capital.

A misplaced faith in technological process left both unions and revolutionaries intellectually disarmed. It absolved them of the admittedly difficult task of imagining how to reconcile work and freedom. This remains the task of the Left today, which like the rest of the culture has (understandably) become increasingly dystopian. Technological dystopianism, like technological utopianism, is a kind of fetish and a distraction. It treats capital like a capitalist would — as the decisive force in history.

We do not require technological wonders and an escape from labor to make our world more just. A left politics of work must call not for new powers, but for a more equitable sharing of those powers it currently possesses. That isn’t a question of what the machines will do tomorrow, but what people should do today.