The Digital Iron Curtain: How the RESTRICT Act Threatens to Devastate Privacy and Crush Free Speech Online

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Where Did the Claim that “97% of Scientists” Believe Climate Change Is a Man-Made, Urgent Problem Come From? Is It True?

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Radical Protests in France, A Province of the Global Orwellian Empire. Can Fascism be Overcome?

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“Facing Clear Evidence of Peril” in a Country of Lies. “Money is the Dirty Secret of all News”

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Conservatives Are Banning Books in America, Not Liberals

For all we hear from conservatives about liberals’ censoriousness, data newly released by the American Library Association is a reminder that the overwhelming majority of book-banning campaigns come from the Right.

Students studying in a school library, United States, circa 1960. (FPG / Archive Photos / Getty Images)

In the depths of the McCarthy era, the American Library Association (ALA) released an eloquent statement in defense of intellectual freedom and free expression called “The Freedom to Read.” Subsequently updated and endorsed by a host of other organizations, the current version begins:

The freedom to read is essential to our democracy. It is continuously under attack. Private groups and public authorities in various parts of the country are working to remove or limit access to reading materials, to censor content in schools, to label “controversial” views, to distribute lists of “objectionable” books or authors, and to purge libraries. These actions apparently rise from a view that our national tradition of free expression is no longer valid; that censorship and suppression are needed to counter threats to safety or national security, as well as to avoid the subversion of politics and the corruption of morals. We, as individuals devoted to reading and as librarians and publishers responsible for disseminating ideas, wish to assert the public interest in the preservation of the freedom to read.

Then and now, the ALA’s statement gets at a deep and important truth. Coordinated efforts to target particular books or limit their reach have long been a canary in the coal mine for creeping censorship and authoritarianism — a reality as concerning in 2023 as it was during the McCarthy era. Amid the torrential discourse of today’s culture war, however, it’s easy to get a mistaken impression about where such efforts are really coming from.

For over two decades, the ALA has been compiling data about attempted bans in public and school libraries. Its newly released findings for 2022 suggest a growing appetite for censorship across the United States. The organization tracked a record 1,269 demands to censor library books and resources last year — an increase of 38 percent from 2021.

The vast majority of efforts aimed at removing books from America’s library systems are the result of campaigns by organized conservative groups.

A demand, as the director of ALA’s Office for Intellectual Freedom Deborah Caldwell-Stone puts it, is an attempt “to remove a book from a library’s collection so that no one else can read it.” Of the reported challenges, about 60 percent were aimed at materials in school libraries, with the remainder targeting those in public libraries.

Alarming as it is, the ALA’s top-line number actually understates the problem. Most of the registered 1,269 demands involved multiple titles, with four in ten taking aim at over a hundred books. (Before 2021, by contrast, the organization notes that “the vast majority of challenges to library resources only sought to remove or restrict access to a single book.”) Such efforts appear to be the result of well-organized campaigns rather than some spontaneous surge in citizen or parental concern.

In recent years, some liberals have attempted to remove particular books from libraries or school curricula, a few of them successfully — most often because they contain racist language or imagery. But organizations like the ALA and PEN who monitor book challenges and censorship are absolutely categorical that such examples are dwarfed by those originating from the Right. Conservatives are banning books in America, not liberals.

While the ALA has yet to release its annual list of the top ten banned books for 2022, we need only glance at its findings from the previous year for a clue about the kinds of titles that will almost certainly be included. Overwhelmingly, the ALA’s 2021 list featured books containing LGBTQ-themed content or material some consider sexually explicit. As Caldwell-Stone told MSNBC earlier this month, these developments are overwhelmingly the product of conservative intolerance rather than liberal censoriousness:

It’s just reflective of what we’re seeing in the numbers this year. It’s no longer a conversation between an educator and a librarian and a parent about a book the parent has concerns about. We’re seeing organized political attacks on our libraries and on our school libraries, intending to limit books to what is politically approved, morally approved, that fits the narrow agenda of the groups that are bringing these challenges. Make no mistake about it: they’ve got lists of bad books. You can go to social media, you can go to their websites, and what you find are lists of disapproved books. . . . Someone will show up at the board meeting with a list of books they haven’t read, haven’t seen, haven’t put in context, and demand their removal because they don’t fit someone’s agenda about being gay [or] being black.

It’s fair to be concerned about the way some liberals have come to think about teaching books that contain dated or offensive language, or to take issue with the way some publishers are now opting to sanitize old titles. When it comes to schools, there can also be reasonable disagreement about what is age appropriate or best suited for inclusion in a particular curriculum. But even if you do have such concerns, it’s a fact that the vast majority of efforts aimed at removing books from America’s library systems are the result of campaigns by organized conservative groups rather than progressive activists or oversensitive college students.

In this respect, they are ripples in a much larger wave of right–wing intolerance that is currently rolling across the country, usually under the same fraudulent aegis of protecting the young from a narrow ideological agenda. Trying to get books removed from library shelves clearly does the opposite — and should be met with full-throated opposition from anyone who believes in democracy, intellectual openness, and freedom of expression.

Did left-wing trans group justify mass murder?

Nashville shooter who murdered six people, including three children, felt “no other effective way to be seen,” a radical trans group says.

By World Israel News Staff

Audrey Hale, 28, who had begun to identify by the male name “Aiden,” went on a shooting rampage at a Christian school in Nashville, Tenn., on Monday, managing to murder three adults and three children before being shot to death by a police officer, Rex Engelbert.

“I’m planning to die today,” she said in a text message before leaving on her mission to The Covenant School, a small, church-run private elementary school. “You’ll probably hear about me on the news after I die. This is my last goodbye.”

Hale, who had attended the same school as a child, reportedly said she felt rejected by her religious family because she was gay and in the process of gender transition.

Following the murder, The Trans Resistance Network (TRN), a far-left transgender group, said in a statement that the shooter felt “no other effective way to be seen.”

TRN, while extending its “deepest sympathies and heartfelt prayers to those families dealing with the loss of loved ones,” also mourned Hale’s death, calling the violent incident a “double-tragedy”.

“The second and more complex tragedy is that Aiden or Audrey Hale, who felt [she] had no other effective way to be seen than to lash out by taking the life of others, and by consequence, [herself],” TRN said.

Acknowledging that they did not know Hale personally, the group slammed the Right for allegedly making life difficult for transgender people, insinuating that the murderer was a victim herself.

“Life for transgender people is very difficult, and made more difficult in the preceding months by a virtual avalanche of anti-trans legislation, and public callouts by Right Wing personalities and political figures for nothing less than the genocidal eradication of trans people from society.

“Many transgender people deal with anxiety, depression, thoughts of suicide, and PTSD from the near-constant drum beat of anti-trans hate, lack of acceptance from family members and certain religious institutions, denial of our existence, and calls for de-transition and forced conversion.

“All of these factors contribute to a population that is medically under-served and who often face anti-trans bias while accessing care leading to significant physical and mental health disparities,” the statement read.

The group then took a defiant tone.

“Despite the overwhelming odds of homelessness, job discrimination, and constant anti-trans bigotry and violence, so many of us continue to persevere, survive and even thrive. We will not be eradicated or erased.”

The statement then urged media to “respect the self-identified pronouns of transgender individuals.”

“Hale self identified with ‘He, Him’ pronouns on forward facing sites. We also urge you to avoid pandering to those individuals on the Right who will use this double-tragedy to torment fear and terror of trangender people in order to advance a political agenda of transgender elimination.”

Former FBI special agent Jonathan Gilliam told ‘Fox & Friends First’ that a majority of mass shooters suffer from “sexual identity dysfunction.”

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Romanian TAROM Flight RO-7673 Diverted. 30-Year Old Pilot Had Chest Pain and Collapsed In-flight. Seventh Pilot Incident this Month

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What is REALLY going on in Israel? – analysis

There definitely is a serious problem in Israel, but it’s not what you think.

By Shmuel Sackett

I must have received 100 emails, phone calls, WhatsApp’s and even handwritten notes (yes, I have some very old friends…) from people asking me to summarize what is happening in Israel. Left wing protests, right wing protests, defense minister fired, highways blocked, airport closed, hospitals on strike… well, at least the falafel guy was still open. Ok, here goes:

First the good news. Passover is next week, and despite the nonsense and all the noise, 98% of Am Yisrael [the nation of Israel] in the Land of Israel will sit and enjoy the seder. Where’s the last 2% – you ask? That’s the tragic “5th Son” that never made it.

Let’s get back to answering the question. There definitely is a serious problem in Israel, but it’s not what you think. I have spoken to many of the protestors and the overwhelming majority of them have no idea what “judicial reform” is all about.

The original ones whot started screaming a few months back had genuine objections about proposed changes to Israel’s judicial system but that expanded into something far bigger than the original protest. Today’s protests are organized by sore losers who cannot accept defeat and realize that they will never win at the ballot boxes… so they took their supporters to the streets instead.

The opposition parties in Israel’s Knesset received more than 1,000,000 votes in the last election. That sounds like a big number – but it was far less than expected. The nation turned towards the “right” and rejected the likes of Yair Lapid [Yesh Atid party leader], Benny Gantz [National Unity] and Merav Michaeli [head of the Labor party, which failed to meet the electoral threshold to enter the Knesset].

So what did the three of  do? They joined forces with another political sore loser, Ehud Barak, and put together a team of PR experts and media people – with a budget that could have ended hunger in the world. Their goal was simple: to delegitimize Prime Minister Netanyahu and his right wing and ultra-Orthodox coalition partners. They couldn’t do this from the Knesset, since Bibi has a strong majority of 64, so they proceeded to destroy the country they supposedly love.

Their opening punch was a fight against judicial reform. “Bibi wants to take control of the Supreme Court,” they screamed. “This will be the destruction of the third temple” (yes, they said that!!). The problem was that the response by the government was weak and often non-existent. All Bibi had to do – to end this immediately – was explain the facts honestly and accurately but the attorney-general prevented him from speaking. This was a master stroke in the plan.

Poor, disorganized response

Most people simply have no clue as to how much power Israel’s Supreme Court has. There is literally no example of this anywhere in the world. In a recent interview with Piers Morgan, Netanyahu said the following: “Israel’s Supreme Court can nullify any decision of the Knesset, can nullify any appointment of the government, can intervene in military matters, can intervene in the fight against terror and can even try to stop the government from taking gas out of the sea… a project that will bring billions of dollars into the economy.”

He stressed over and over that there is no democracy in the world that gives the judiciary this kind of absolute power.

Had this been explained in a clear and simple way, the protest movement would have ended before it began. However, the government dismissed these protests as meaningless. Furthermore, the attorney-general forbade Netanyahu from speaking on this issue, calling it a conflict of interest. This was a gamechanger.

In addition, the right didn’t realize how well organized and, especially, how well-funded they were. People were being paid to attend these rallies – I know this for a fact; 250 shekel to attend the rally plus an additional 100 shekel for transportation expenses. The political losers (Lapid, Gantz, Michaeli and Barak) then went to stage 2. They claimed the current government was against women, peace and democracy. Stage 3 was an attack against Haredim – the usual favorite pin-cushion of the left.

During all these months, the response by Bibi and his team was poor and disorganized, and the left jumped on it. They continued with their full court press and nonstop attacks. They used a brilliant marketing technique, which I call “Claiming Ownership.” This is simple, yet highly effective.

It works like this: 10 companies are in an industry, all competing for business, when all-of-a-sudden one of them – just one of them – claims that they have a money-back guarantee. They then say that they have five engineers on staff for quality control, a 24-hour customer service center, a website in Spanish etc… In reality, all 10 of these companies have the same thing… but since they didn’t say anything – the one that announced it – Claimed Ownership!

This is what happened in Israel. The leftists claimed they are pro-democracy, that they want equal rights, that they care about the future of Israel and the biggest one of all; that they don’t want a civil war (Lapid and Barak repeatedly said that there will be blood in the streets). They never said the right wants a civil war, that would have been terrible. Instead, they said that they don’t want one and, as stated previously, since there was no response from the right, the people started to believe that its Opposition leader Lapid and his gang of election losers who want unity, democracy and brotherly love while Bibi, [Religious Zionism party leader] Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir [Otzma Yehudit] want war, bloodshed and dictatorship.

Let us learn from this fiasco

One more important point must be made. Israel is very similar to America in one critical way. The majority of the people are good and strong and live according to religious values but the leadership in all areas are in the hands of the weak, apologetic, politically correct liberals. Just think for a moment about Hollywood, the military, the academia, the media, the economy and the whole digital world. Outside of a very few exceptions, these are all in the hands of the political left. Israel is exactly the same way.

This is why, when they saw Bibi silent, they jumped on the opportunity to join the fight. The pilots (most of whom haven’t flown in 30 years), the labor union, the healthcare system… they all joined in the “Get Bibi” fight when they saw he was going down. Remember what I wrote above: The leftists suffered a major defeat on November 1, 2022 (election day), so they decided that if they can’t run the country… there won’t be a country to run.

The lesson for us in this big mess is simple. For years the right-wing built settlements, planted trees to keep land in Jewish hands and established Torah-based communities all over the country. They started amazing charity organizations, Jewish educational programs, pre-IDF training centers and much more. They did everything except the most important thing of all: leadership. They left that in the hands of the left and now we see what that means.

Years ago, I started an organization called “Manhigut Yehudit” – The Jewish Leadership Movement – together with my dear friend, Moshe Feiglin. We screamed and yelled about this concept, but our message fell on deaf ears. We said then – as we say now – that while everything listed in the previous paragraph is important, if the leadership remains in the hands of the leftists, it won’t matter what happens on election day.

I am sorry to say that our “prophecy” came true… but its not too late! Let’s learn from this fiasco and make sure that we enter the world of leadership in all areas of the country.

Shmuel Sackett is the founder and director of the Am Yisrael Chai Foundation, an organization that educates, builds and defends the people and land of Israel.

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Romance Under Capitalism Kills Our Libidos

Sexual activity among Americans is in decline, prompting moralizing about the end of romance and traditional gender roles. But the real problem is that people lack the economic and personal freedom to pursue their desires.

The widespread anxiety that desire is not in a good state, particularly among the young, has led to an intense production of talk about sex. (Randi Linford / EyeEm / Getty Images)

At some stage in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic, when the panic of the lockdown had settled into a steady rhythm and social life began to resume, I got talking to a young man in a bar. I was lonely, bored, and tepidly thrilled by the idea of a conversation that would be initiated in a space that was not my own. The man, I quickly learned, was a regular on dating apps. Having always professed a strong reserve for this form of meeting people, and a suspicion of the supposed chosen ones found on it, I listened in with faint sociological curiosity. On his dating profile there were six, perfectly crafted, seemingly natural photos, in which his cheekbones were luminously pronounced.

Although he conceded that he was mainly looking for something casual, having recently given up his underpaid job as a political pollster and moved back in with his parents, his profile included a strong interest in history and visiting museums. One of the photos showed him flanked by a castle. The app on which I had met him was one of the more wholesome hookup platforms. On it, he told me, a cultured look was likely to improve his dating credit (a credit system, which my friend, who works in data, tells me is a fantasy). He explained that he and his friends had created an array of fake male and female profiles on various apps that enabled them as a group to gain a maximum understanding of what women want; he had a 90 percent success rate.

Bemused, I wondered why I found my date — a man roughly my age — and his approach to desire and seduction so profoundly unseductive. Had a marketized view of desire infiltrated his mind? Or were some fundamental differences between the approaches of men and women to romance and sex at the heart of our mismatch?

These are some of the questions that have come to occupy the chorus of writers who make up the growing sex panic industry. Together, they wonder what has gone wrong among young people that has led them to have so little sex. Why, come concerns from all sides of the political spectrum, are the vibes so bad?

Death of Desire by Algorithm

At the start of lockdown, there was speculation that the pandemic would produce a great upsurge of sexual activity, as had occurred during the Blitz and other periods of imposed confinement. These hopes were soon undermined by a study published by the journal Sexual Medicine, which found a decline over the first months of COVID-19 in sexual frequency and relationship satisfaction across all age groups and demographics in the United States. Not only were people making love less frequently — the study also noted that the quality of romantic encounters when they did occur was disappointing. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a respiratory virus, which made risk at once pervasive and undiscernible, proved to be less sexy than air raids. Depression symptoms, relationship status, and the perceived necessity of social distancing contributed to the drop in sexual pleasure, particularly among women.

A recent study tracking sexual behavior in the United States shows that young adults abstaining from sex had more than doubled from 8 percent to 21 percent from 2008 to 2021.

The constraints of the pandemic pushed sex ever-further indoors, into the confines of family life, and onto digital spaces, isolating it from the public sphere. The Netherlands was one of the few countries to advocate seeking out a “sex buddy”; in other countries, it was expected that those not in a relationship would abstain from casual sex as a civic duty. Occasionally, there were playful acknowledgements that this might not be the most conducive way to wait out a crisis.

There are a number of studies that measure governments’ various degrees of success in discouraging sex outside of domestic settings. One study reveals that 40 percent of gay and bisexual men in the UK continued to have casual sex despite lockdown restrictions — though the rate of hookups was down in Australia, where more punitive measures came in earlier.

On dating apps, however, it became more common during the pandemic — as Tinder claims in a press release on the future of dating — to see Gen Zers expressing desire for friendship as well as, or rather than, sex. Sixty percent of users admitted that they came to the app because they felt lonely. During the pandemic, one twenty-two-year-old from Philadelphia reported going on Grindr and Scruff “partially just to talk to someone, partially to exchange nudes and maybe find someone to hook up with later — at the very least just get on their radars.”

Dating apps provided an immediate solution to the vital need to connect during a period of heightened loneliness in a way that links to earlier models of lonely hearts, where the drive for sexual and romantic connection implicitly acknowledged the difficulty of finding that connection and the limitations of the contemporary landscape for desire.

There is nothing new about this trend, which the Atlantic announced as a “sex recession” in 2018. Last year the Institute of Family Studies published a study tracking sexual behavior in the United States. The study shows that young adults abstaining from sex had more than doubled from 8 percent to 21 percent from 2008 to 2021.

Rates of sexual activity have also been in sharp decline in the UK, Sweden, and Finland, across all demographic groups. But the drop is sharpest, in the United States, for those under the age of twenty-five. Things are looking no better in China, where nearly half of “empty nest” youths have sex only once every six months or less; or in Japan, where young men view sex as “tiresome.” Since the Atlantic published its piece, numerous articles have reflected on the causal factors that have led a generation to decline from sex despite having the digital tools to access a wider dating pool than ever before. More recently, the New York Times has suggested that reversing this sexual recession could be the key to solving the loneliness epidemic.

Love’s Virtual Turn

When Gary Kremen, a computer scientist graduate of Stanford Business School, founded Match.com in 1993, only 5 percent of Americans had access to the internet. But Kremen firmly believed that the internet would drive the future of love. In making dating more cost-efficient and seemingly democratic (a supposed democracy that did not work in the “pickup” community’s favor), the internet promised to transform love and sex, making everyone a potential match. “Match.com,” a thirty-one-year-old Kremen told a TV reported in 1995, “will bring more love to the planet than anything since Jesus Christ.”

Over the next decade Match.com became an international phenomenon, with its membership rising to more than forty-two million members — providing a model for the now $9.6 billion global online dating market, with the Match group (which owns Grindr, Tinder, Match.com, OkCupid, and Hinge) accounting for roughly $3 billion of that market. In making “the marketplace of love . . . more efficient,” as Rufus Griscom wrote in Wired in 2002, it promised to do away forever with the “collective investment in the idea that love is a chance event,” as it proved that “serendipity is the hallmark of inefficient markets.” On Kremen’s website for his campaign for the Santa Clara Valley Water District board in 2014, a race for which he spent $400,000, his bio claimed that his role in online dating meant that he has been “indirectly responsible for over 1,000,000 babies.”

A world of privatized relations; the evisceration of desire by the algorithm; and the intensity and hours of work are among the material and structural forces that produce lonely cultures and bad sex.

It was not until Grindr launched in 2009, transforming gay culture, sex, and dating, that a new hookup ecosphere emerged. Sex and dating became at once more local and accessible, prompting an apparently new and freer sexual landscape. In using GPS technology (now the standard way of meeting people online) at a moment when smartphones were beginning to gain traction, Grindr presented a way to hook up that was easier — and some might argue safer — than cruising, without entirely losing that history, thus extending the culture of sex within the gay community through a virtual terrain. The success of Tinder, the heterosexually inclined app modeled on Grindr that launched three years later, hinged on its directness about romantic and sexual intentions.

Misdiagnosing the Problem

That the increased availability of sex did not make encounters more likely befuddled sexual theorists and romantic gurus. When Helen Fisher, a love anthropologist, came to rewrite her 1992 bestseller Anatomy of Love in 2016, she had to account for the changes that had occurred in the intervening two decades. To do so, she added a section to her book on the rise of “slow love.” In her reflections on today’s romantic culture she suggests that we might understand millennials’ hesitancy about love as an indication of a mature attitude toward desire. She praises the generation — who earn on average 20 percent less than their parents did at the same age — as model citizens for taking the time to find partners and settle down.

“Slow love” provides a pleasant-sounding screen for the transformation of love and sex that refuses to interrogate its broader social and economic causes. Such a view overlooks how the economics of dating looms large in Gen Z’s and millennials’ decisions about sex and relationships. There is, for instance, a correlation between an insecure, impersonal work market and a dating culture that — because of the amount of time that is required to invest in the apps to make them yield successful connections — leads, like today’s work culture, invariably to “dating burnout.” Daters feel increasingly “stressed” and “let down” by consistently going on dates that do not result in attachments.

The widespread anxiety that desire is not in a good state, particularly among the young, has led to an intense production of talk about sex. In Washington Post columnist Christine Emba’s recent book, Rethinking Sex: A Provocation, she proposes to make sex good again by making it the subject of moral improvement and by intensifying biological essentialism. For Emba, good sex is romantic, monogamous, and “less free.” She concedes that while she acknowledges that “a rising share of the population identifies as gay, queer or nonbinary,” her vision of love excludes them.

In the introduction to Louise Perry’s The Case Against the Sexual Revolution, Kathleen Stock — a philosopher and prominent anti-trans voice in the UK — views the current malaise in sexual culture as stemming from digital saturation, hookup culture anxiety, the effects of pornography, and, in her estimation, the wrongful positioning of sex work as work.

We need to articulate an alternative to both the right-wing culture of state-sponsored ignorance about sex on the one hand, and the liberal fetishization of romance and intimacy on the other, which looks to the market for solutions.

In Perry’s and Stock’s line of thinking, sex is conceived as a problem to be solved for the young by the old — a conundrum that can only be made good through tighter restrictions, historical regression, and conceiving of sex and gender experimentation as a danger to women.

These narratives ignore that the problem is not technology per se, but a technology that is attached to a highly privatized vision of intimacy.

Making Time for Sex

Recognizing that sexual culture is “an essential part of our social fabric,” the New York Times columnist Magdalene Taylor exhorts readers to have more sex, as if, like slow love, one could simply speed desire up again, and generate new social connections that will hold off the rise in loneliness. But, as the psychoanalyst Jamieson Webster writes in her recent book Disorganisation & Sex, we might need to think a little harder about creating the social context that “could tolerate the sheer multiplicity of sexuality” and “the singularity of individual styles of pleasure and unpleasure” that are part of a good sexual culture.

This social context would recognize the material and structural forces that produce lonely cultures and bad sex: a world of privatized relations; the evisceration of desire by the algorithm; and the intensity and hours of work that for most people make dating feel like a sunk cost that cannot easily be recouped. As the journalist Malcolm Harris observes, “a decline in unsupervised free time probably contributes a lot” to young people’s lack of desire. “At a basic level, sex at its best is unstructured play with friends, a category of experience that . . . time diaries . . . tell us has been decreasing for American adolescents. It takes idle hands to get past first base, and today’s kids have a lot to do.”

Sex requires openness to dull, embarrassing, or even bad experiences as well as good ones (bad experiences that, handled well, with good communication, are eventually made better). But, in a context in which sex has such high stakes, the kind of free experimentation which makes it fun becomes rarer.

Talking about sex freely — as opposed to moralizing sex — tends to generate better sexual connections. A study that compares youth sexuality in the Netherlands and the United States shows that the Dutch’s progressive culture and sex education create the conditions for more positive sexual experiences: most Dutch teenagers report that their first sexual encounters are well-timed, wanted, and fun, whereas most American teenagers say that they wish they had waited longer, a waiting game for a desirable future that has only extended with the repeal of Roe v. Wade.

We need to articulate an alternative to both the right-wing culture of state-sponsored ignorance about sex on the one hand, and the liberal fetishization of romance and intimacy on the other, which looks to the market for solutions to a sexual culture that are social and political. This will require accommodating ourselves to a view of intimacy that is rooted in experimentation, and that recognizes that — precisely because sex betokens the most complex and difficult relations of all — time and space are needed to figure out what forms our desire might take.

What US Social Movements Can Learn From France’s Pension Protests

France’s ongoing movement against pension reforms has an impressive level of popular mobilization. But it hasn’t relied on the “professional organizers” typical of US social movements — showing there’s a different way to build well-rooted mobilizations.

A protester shouts in a megaphone during a demonstration in Marseille, France, on March 28, 2023.
(Nicolas Tucat / AFP via Getty Images)

For the last two months, France has been going through one of its biggest social movements in decades. It has developed in opposition to President Emmanuel Macron’s pension reform, which aims at hiking the current legal retirement age from sixty-two to sixty-four. The plan is widely unpopular: two-thirds of the population oppose the bill, a figure that rises to 93 percent when we look at the active population alone. All eight labor federations have created and maintained a united front, the “intersyndicale,” the likes of which hadn’t been seen in decades. On Monday, March 20, the vote of no-confidence against Prime Minister Élisabeth Borne’s government fell only just short of a majority in the Assemblée nationale.

From a strictly institutional perspective, it seems that there are almost no obstacles left to the reform being implemented. But the social picture is radically different. As famous novelist Nicolas Mathieu recently put it, “Right now political rule is legitimate like [Richard] Nixon was after Watergate — less and less. Its legitimacy is mechanical, it is produced by texts and solid institutions, but it has lost what gives life to truly democratic political legitimacy: a certain degree of popular consent.”

The current moment feels like a standstill. On the one hand, a further national day of mobilization this past Thursday — even after the failed no-confidence vote — saw wildcat demonstrations and direct action tactics spread throughout the country like wildfire, and they are showing no sign of abating. On the other, the police has increased its violent, indiscriminate crackdown on all sorts of protest, with hundreds of pictures and videos going viral on social media fueling people’s anger and deeply ingrained sense of injustice.

One of the key conundrums that movement participants have faced for the past few months is the following: how to translate people’s shared, widespread discontent into active participation. What forms of collective action are actually able to strong-arm an unyielding government into dropping its bill? I’d like to make a modest contribution to that debate by comparing social movements’ approach in France with their US counterparts. In other words, it can be helpful to think about the current movement in France through the lens of US organizing culture and practices, and conversely to look at US organizing culture and practices from an outsider’s perspective.

Organizers, Activists, Militants

One way of looking at this is through Alicia Garza’s memoir, where she recounts her involvement in creating the #BlackLivesMatter hashtag in 2013 and expounds her views on what movements are and should be. She hammers home the point that, even though social media and digital tools may make it seem like it’s easy to bring huge numbers into the streets to protest, movements are not built by hashtags and tweets: they’re built by people. Not only that, but the building doesn’t happen spontaneously and intuitively.

Movement building implies a lot of daily work, which is time-consuming, and it requires certain preexisting elements, like a base, “a group of people united around an issue or a goal,” and ongoing commitment. To make her case, Garza recalls the killing of Oscar Grant by a San Francisco transit police officer in 2009 and the protests that developed in response to the killing. An ad hoc coalition of people came together and managed to get the officer fired from the transit police and eventually convicted of involuntary manslaughter. Garza disagrees, however, that this particular instance had a long-lasting effect.

I was a supporter, but no organizer followed up with me and asked me why I had become involved. No organizers asked me how I wanted to be involved moving forward, and no organizers laid out a plan for me to get involved and stay involved. I was a part of a constituency of people who lived in Oakland and care about what was happening in the place I lived, and I was mobilized and inspired, but I was not organized into a base that was ready to take action to achieve systemic change.

The distinctions that Garza draws here, between “mobilizing” and “organizing,” a “supporter” and an “organizer,” a “constituency” and a “base,” will be familiar to many readers — indeed, they’re a core part of organizing lingo. These oppositions will sound so familiar because they belong to the realm of the obvious and the taken-for-granted. Garza is far from the only one using them to make sense of movement activity and political work. They’ve been recently theorized by social scientists and movement actors like Hahrie Han or Jane McAlevey.

The other thing that is particularly striking in Garza’s argument is how much the organizer’s role is presented as a given, how much its existence is presupposed. Garza’s choice of syntax for the verb “organize,” which here refers in a vague way to engaging in politically oriented collective action, is interesting: “organizing” is not something that she hypothetically does by herself (she doesn’t write “I organize” in the sense that you would say “I run” or “I sing”), it is something that is done to her, she is “organized” by someone else — a professional organizer, one who probably works full-time for not-so-decent wages but who still defines their work activity in terms of expertise and professional pride.

Since the professionalization of the organizer role translates into the attempt to exert exclusive control over certain tasks, it becomes more complicated to foster and navigate cooperation between ‘professional’ and ‘amateur’ figures in movements.

For anyone who arrives to US protest politics from a different national context, there’s nothing obvious about these distinctions and the social roles that they imply. As a Frenchman studying community organizing work in Chicago for my PhD, for instance, I had a really hard time, at first, understanding that “activist” and “organizer” actually had very distinct meanings for the community organizers that I interviewed. To me, these were just synonyms, in part because when I tried to think of a French equivalent for each, I ended up with the same word: militant.

These seemingly minor linguistic differences point to real social differences in the broader division of political labor in the United States and France. When it comes to thinking about organizing work, comparing the two countries points to the consolidation of “the organizer” as a distinct role in the United States, whereas it doesn’t exist as such in France.

As I argue in my upcoming book, Occupation: Organizer, in the United States, the organizer’s role has been shaped for decades by complex professionalization dynamics. In the book I focus on community organizers, but similar dynamics have shaped organizer positions in labor unions and single- or multi-issue organizations. These dynamics entail organizer positions becoming salaried jobs, but issues of professionalization go far beyond the question of whether staffers get paid for their work. They also involve the development and institutionalization of certain skills that are brought together into training manuals and training programs, as well as the drawing out of boundaries that distinguish amateurs and professionals, ineffective behaviors and effective ones (think here of the “no organizers laid out a plan for me to get involved and stay involved” part in the quote from Garza).

Professionalization has also shaped political work in France, and it has done so for decades, whether you look at labor unions, political parties, or associations (an equivalent of sorts to US nonprofits). But what seems specific to the current US terrain is the nature of the organizing relationship, where (paid) organizers actively work to step back behind the (volunteer) community leaders or workers that they identify as individuals who can both get involved in the community organization or labor union and be that organization’s legitimate voice. As I show in Occupation: Organizer, this relationship is also bolstered by intense practical and symbolic competition with other social movement actors, who are often looked down upon as ineffective idealists who don’t have the necessary skills to create and sustain genuine popular participation.

This doesn’t mean that cooperation beyond organizational and professional boundaries can’t happen; since professionalization translates into the attempt to exert exclusive control over certain tasks, it becomes more complicated to foster and navigate cooperation between “professional” and “amateur” figures in movements. (I won’t get into the details here, but a critical analysis of professionalization dynamics must also highlight the fact that the development of paid organizer positions in community-based groups has translated into a democratization and diversification of organizers’ backgrounds and demographics. Today, in Chicago for instance, the typical community organizer is an upwardly mobile college graduate woman of color in her twenties or thirties.)

Given Their Due

To highlight how much Garza’s perspective is undergirded by social and cultural parameters quite unique to the US political terrain, I’d like to contrast it with some personal experiences that I had through my participation in the ongoing movement in France. I’m a dues-paying union member, but not a very active one. Most of my activist/organizing work these past few years has been done through other channels. Part of the reason why I’m not very active in my union is that the union local, the one from my university, is not very active beyond board members.

There’s a huge disconnect between the local board and rank-and-file members like myself. Since the protests against the pension reform bill started in mid-January, the union hasn’t organized a single meeting for its members to discuss the ongoing movement. When I called out the board on it, they quickly set up a meeting. There, I voiced my concerns about the lack of internal democratic life and activity. When I suggested that all union members should be reached out to see how they were willing to get involved in the fight — something which would seem like an obvious thing to do for a US organizer — people looked at me with genuine bewilderment.

When I suggested that all the French union’s members should be reached out to see how they were willing to get involved in the fight — something which would seem like an obvious thing to do for a US organizer — people looked at me with genuine bewilderment.

This doesn’t mean that no organizing is done in France, of course. It just points to the fact that the various tasks associated with organizing work break down differently in France and in the United States. Garza’s lament that she should have been organized by a (professional) organizer would just not resonate with people here. In political parties or labor unions where there are paid staffers, there are no positions where the job is to “organize,” in the sense of recruiting new members and increasing members’ levels of participation and commitment to an organization. Paid staffers do administrative work or act as spokespeople, but not in the paid organizer capacity whose existence and necessity Garza (and others) presuppose.

And in more transient movement circles, where having paid staff is clearly not on the agenda, the intentionality in relationship-building that is so central to organizing work — which is also what can make it so rewarding on a personal level — does not really make up part of militant know-how. And trying to be intentional and systematic in reaching out to other workers can result in polite but firm pushback on the part of your colleagues and comrades.

Why such pushback? At the individual level, it might be that colleagues and other workers are skeptical toward practices that feel top-down, potentially cynical, and manipulative. As I argue in the book, professional organizing does have deep historical roots in corporate management, so that’s not entirely surprising.

At the organizational level, carving out organizer positions would also alter existing divisions of labor, daily routines, organizational resources, and broader perspectives on how and why people get involved. A commonly held assumption is that people join a movement on their own terms, once things are in motion. The role of an organization is therefore primarily to write pamphlets and flyers and press releases that people will be won over by, not to engage in one-on-one molecular conversations with potential future members.

I’d like to use another personal experience from the ongoing movement in France to drive the point home. A few days ago, I participated in a general assembly at my university. We had all gathered in a big, antiquated amphitheater in the Sorbonne — this is before Macron resorted to the infamous Article 49.3; turnout wasn’t huge but it was decent, sixty to eighty people showed up. One of the participants is a grad student I had seen in previous movements before, who’s very active in one of the unions at my university.

During this general assembly, he mostly kept a log of who wanted to speak, called people up when it was their turn to speak up, and asked them to cut to the chase when they speechified for too long. He also wrote on the blackboard some of the demands that were voiced and items that should be voted on at the end of the meeting. In the United States, what this guy did would definitely fall under the broader category of what organizers can do during such public events — setting up all the parameters for public speech and democratic participation to happen, rather than doing the actual speaking. But at the same time, he also spoke up a couple of times at this general assembly, and at others I attended, which doesn’t correspond exactly with an organizer’s role in its US definition.

What does it matter that, quite unsurprisingly, there are practices and roles and norms within social movements that are not entirely similar in France and in the United States? What I have in mind here is not the hackneyed culturalist clichés that attribute collective behaviors and norms to “cultures” understood as everlasting, homogeneous blocs, such as the ludicrous clichés about the “unruly French” or the “entrepreneurial Americans.” The reason why transnational comparison is useful, rather, is that it highlights certain features whose salience might otherwise go unnoticed.

The US organizing relationship has no equivalent in France. Thinking about ways to adapt it into a French context could be one contribution to the conundrum that we are all in. But at the same time, the absence of such a role in the French case calls into question whether the need for the professional organizer’s role is really so obvious.