A Liberalism Worth Saving: What’s Missing From the Debate Over Liberalism

On October 19th, 2022 four leading intellectuals gathered with Harpers Magazine editor Christopher Beha for a discussion on classical liberalism. While all agreed with the premise that liberalism is increasingly under attack, up for debate was whether the liberal paradigm was worth saving at all.

The speakers included Patrick Deneen, known for declaring liberalism’s failure, Francis Fukuyama, known for declaring in the early 90s that liberalism had won for good, Christian socialist Cornel West, and libertarian economic historian Deirdre McCloskey. The line-up lacked one particular perspective, however: that of the conservative liberal; one who is classically liberal in a political and economic sense but culturally conservative.

Each of the four participants defined liberalism differently. Fukuyama’s liberalism is about a “fundamental recognition of individual rights,” based on a “presumption of basic equality of dignity” in connection with modern science. To Deneen, liberalism rejects the idea “that human beings have a telos, or an end, that we have a nature, and that the first is given to us by the second.” In Deneen’s account, liberalism is a break with the classical tradition, as represented by Aquinas and Aristotle.

The battle lines are drawn, apparently: Fukuyama is for liberalism, Deneen against it. West, in contrast, is more nuanced; he praises liberalism for recognizing “indispensable rights and liberties”, but faults it for turning a blind eye to economic and military oppression. Finally, McCloskey provides the most straightforward defense of liberalism, defining it as “equality of permissions.”

At this point the reader may expect the three liberals to gang up on the one anti-liberal. Not so. The liberals concede several crucial points to Deneen’s anti-liberalism. McCloskey “would agree with Patrick (Deneen) that liberalism is a rebellion against—well, against the church.” This is a striking claim from McCloskey, who is better known for insisting on the basic compatibility of what she calls “bourgeois virtues” with traditional morality.

While it is certainly true that all liberal thinkers would oppose the domination of the state by a single church, it is not the case that all liberals rebelled against religion. Alexis de Tocqueville, for example, believed that religion was essential, and that keeping it separate from government would encourage its sustainment. So did Adam Smith.

Deneen then exploits the differences of opinion among his interlocutors, claiming that “Untrammeled liberty in economic and social spheres results in deep social and political cleavages.” Populist anti-liberalism is “blowback” to the excesses of liberalism.

It’s hard to find much evidence to support Deneen’s story. As Oren Cass wrote in 2019, “market fetishism does not provide the basis for U.S. economics or public policy… it is not as if a bunch of market fundamentalists have actually cut back government provisions.” Instead, government regulation has continued to increase year after year, even under administrations verbally committed to deregulation. American liberty persists, but is hardly “untrammeled.”

And still, Fukuyama affirms Deneen’s account. In so doing, Fukuyama errs empirically and philosophically. Empirically, he blames financial deregulation for the 2008 economic crisis. This overlooks numerous complicating factors: the government’s role in generating the housing bubble the preceded the Great Recession of 2008, and the long series of financial bailouts preceding the 2008 crisis that encouraged risky lending.

In rejecting economic liberalism, Fukuyama hopes to preserve political liberalism. He thinks that a system of equal individual rights can survive under increasing government control of the economy. But as McCloskey notes, “liberty is liberty is liberty.” In the real world, it’s not possible to cleanly separate economic liberty from other forms of liberty. All human behavior involves economic decision-making and financial accounting, even charity and religion. To increase government control over individual economic decisions is to increase government control over all decisions.

McCloskey, the remaining economic liberal, fails to challenge Fukuyama and Deneen’s economic narrative. Instead, she focuses on a more tangential, but still important point about Milton Friedman’s conception of the social responsibility of business.

Deneen’s argument suffers from numerous other flaws, which the other speakers fail to rebut. He laments the lack of appreciation for order and hierarchy in liberalism, but then sides with mob rule against legal restraint. Deneen’s political thought is not workable in theory or practice.

He cagily says that “there’s always going to be some exercise of authority.” This is surely true, but it does not discount the fact that there are degrees of authority. Deneen tries and fails at eliminating the difference between liberty under the law and oppression under an authoritarian regime. Deneen presented so many openings for the liberals to exploit, and yet they failed to decisively act.

This was not a good showing for liberalism. What went wrong? The most significant problem was the absence of the conservative strain of liberalism.

Conservative liberalism is a core tradition in Western thought, critical to the development and sustainment of the American experiment in liberty. And while McCloskey did cite Adam Smith, she might have noted his warning that society will “crumble” absent “reverence for those important rules of conduct” which is naturally “enhanced” by the belief that “the Deity … will finally reward the obedient and punish the transgressors of their duty.” If Smith is correct about morality and religion, then a liberalism that explicitly rejects the traditional foundations of moral law is destined to collapse. Fortunately, hyper-rationalistic liberalism is not the only brand of liberalism available.

Conservative liberals have included Ronald Reagan, Friedrich Hayek, Frank Meyer, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Edmund Burke. In the present day, Samuel Gregg is a rare example of this tradition. Harper’s therefore cannot be faulted for omitting conservative liberals from the discussion. They merely mirrored the broader discourse.

To be sure, the idea of classical liberalism is still frequently cited. Classical liberalism, however, does not precisely denote conservative liberalism, since it is a broader tradition of thought. Increasingly “classical liberalism” used by disaffected men and women of the left who still value free speech and economic growth. This is a welcome development, but it cannot substitute for conservative liberalism.

John Stuart Mill was a classical liberal, if anyone was. Yet as Friedrich Hayek noted, Mill’s work suffers from the “cult of the distinct and different individuality.” And as usual Mill’s false conception of individualism eventually led him towards economic collectivism. Unlike Mill, a conservative liberal will recognize that social restraint is a necessary condition for liberty, as are faith, family, tradition, and ethical formation. 

Conservative liberalism is a nuanced, practical approach to politics. It holds competing ideas in tension. This brand of liberalism is not, and likely never will be, an object of mass appeal. Nevertheless, without a cadre of conservative liberals to influence public opinion and policy in a more prudent and gradual direction, consistent with human nature, all attempts to save liberalism will fail, and deservingly so.

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De-Dollarization: Brazil, India, China Move Away from Currency

Increasingly, following the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian war more than a year ago—and the subsequent, unprecedented sanctions that were leveled against Russia via the U.S.-dominated global banking system—key, ascendent geopolitical actors are taking steps to reduce their dependence on the U.S. dollar

The Man Who Met Gandhi and Hitler

What did a man, who encountered both Gandhi and Hitler, say about the prospects of non-violence?  The comparison is startling, but at least one journalist covered both persons: William Shirer.  Hitler is regarded by many as the most concrete incarnation of devilry ever seen.  Dr. E. Stanley Jones said that “one of the most Christlike men in history was not called a Christian at all.”1  He was Gandhi, a Hindu.  For Christians, this is an eye-popping and controversial statement, yet there emerges from this juxtaposition a serious question: what is the role of non-violence, and more specifically pacifism, in the world today?  Reinhold Niebuhr, while admiring Gandhi, was also very critically aware of the strengths and limits of non-violence.  Pacifism was even heretical, according to Niebuhr’s standards.  So, what did Shirer have to say about these two men who, in moral terms, could not be farther apart?  And how does this inform our ideas about non-violence and war?

On February 23, 1904, William Shirer was born.  Though best known for his book The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, he also produced a biography of the father of modern India, Gandhi, A Memoir.  Shirer came away from meeting Gandhi deeply moved, writing that the experience taught him the comparative equality of world religions.  He also believed, however, that there might be a limitation to Gandhi’s non-violence.

There is a commonsense approach to this debate.  Just as we evaluate the weather each day, putting on a warmer coat or bringing an umbrella in response to the meteorological circumstances, we must also be able to evaluate the political climate to gauge if non-violence is practicable.  Reading weather conditions is certainly easier, but two of the most famous advocates of non-violence, Gandhi and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., were also aware of this question.

First, what did Gandhi say about the conditions necessary for non-violence?  Gandhi called his non-violent method satyagraha, or “truth force.”  It struck a non-violent blow to the opponent’s conscience, attempting to reform them.  Gandhi spelled out the criteria for the success of satyagraha:  

The Satyagrahi should not have any hatred in his heart against the opponent.  

The issue must be true and substantial. 

The Satyagrahi must be prepared to suffer till the end of his cause.2

Gandhi did not adamantly proceed with non-violence under all circumstances.  He called off satyagraha campaigns when violence erupted as an unintended consequence.  Gandhi even fasted for the victims of such violence.  The Mahatma could also be very pragmatic about the time and place for non-violence, famously saying, “Where there is a choice between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence.”3  Gandhi’s understanding of the capacity for non-violence could be quite nuanced.

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was inspired by Niebuhr’s Moral Man and Immoral Society.  There Niebuhr wrote of non-violence that, “if persisted in with the same patience and discipline attained by Mr. Gandhi and his followers,” it would allow African American boycotts to achieve some success and greater racial justice.4

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was inspired by both Gandhi and Niebuhr, and did, of course, lead a very successful, though arduous, civil rights campaign.  Yet he also reflected upon some of the strengths and limitations of non-violent campaigns.  He wrote that “long years of experience” taught him four criteria that contributed to the success of non-violence:

Non-violent demonstrators go into the streets to exercise their constitutional rights.  

Racists resist by unleashing violence against them. 

Americans of conscience in the name of decency demand federal intervention and legislation. 

The administration, under mass pressure, initiates measures of immediate intervention and remedial legislation.5  

Examining these two lists, a few interesting points emerge.  Firstly, both men humbly omit the status of their own charismatic leadership.  Non-violent campaigns involve intense risk and need great motivation.  An inspirational leader and motive should be a constant companion to their effort.  Secondly, King’s criteria are more conscious that the public, as well as the government, must be capable of responding with a just, moral reaction.  In short, there had to be a sufficient moral barometer, a climate that was responsive to the non-violent plea.  Non-violence had to be able to impact the top political ranks.

Did Gandhi’s non-violence stand a chance against Hitler?  Far removed from what was going on in Germany, Gandhi at one point thought that it did.  The Jews and British might, he once suggested, use non-violence as a tool against Hitler.6  These are some of the most difficult and least realistic words to read coming from Gandhi.  Shirer, who had covered Hitler and had a firmer measure of him, was more discerning that Gandhi’s methods could not appeal to the heart of a heartless man.7   Rajmohan Gandhi, the grandson of the Mahatma, also recorded that Hitler had said he would just shoot Gandhi, had he faced him.8  This is a point of departure for realism.  Human nature can be good, but it also resists good norms and is sometimes shockingly morally numb.  Non-violence is an ideal as valuable to Christians as it is to Hindus or other world citizens, but it has its time and place.

The lesson to be learned here is neither to belittle non-violence nor to exalt exclusively the just war tradition, but to keep in mind that both have their time and place.  Indeed, though peace is the ideal, as Gandhi expressed well, the real world will rarely leave such accord unmolested.  What we fight for is the political and moral climate that allows for nonviolence more regularly, as King and Gandhi both exemplified, and to keep the tanks and soldiers in waiting for the worst of political weather.  Any moral belief system, whether Christian or Hindu, must have an ideal that inspires its adherents.  Yet it must also have a real measure that high ideals are always hard to implement and often only approximated in the real world.  Political climates, like the weather, are never fixed, and our tools of justice must be aptly chosen to meet them just as the choice of umbrella or snow jacket.  This is what William Shirer would say, the man who came close to the 20th century’s greatest devil and saint.

Bibliography:

1. Louis Fischer, Gandhi, His Life and Message for the World, (Mentor Books/ New American Library, New York, 1982), 130.

2. Mohandas K. Gandhi, edited by Shriman Narayan, The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. (India, Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House1968), volume 6, 186

3.  Louis Fischer, Gandhi: His Life and Message for the World, 89.

4.  Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man & Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics, (Louisville, Westminster John-Knox Press, 2001), 254.

5.  Martin Luther, King Jr, edited by James M. Washington, The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King Jr., (New York: Harper Collins, 1986), 127.

6.  Yogesh Chadha, Gandhi:  A Life, (New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1997), 363, 369-370.

7.  William Shirer, Gandhi:  A Memoir, 211.

8.  Rajmohan Gandhi, Gandhi: The Man, His People, and the Empire, (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2008), 400.

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